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This thesis presents the argument that in John Milton’s theology, political philosophy 
and poetry there is an underexplored relationship between utopianism and 
millenarianism. The study defines this relationship as the utopian millennium, through 
which the utopian values of control and regulation secure a chiliastic future. In a series 
of comparative chapters, the thesis traces how Milton’s utopian millenarianism can be 
situated within and how it develops through the intellectual, political and radical 
landscape of mid-seventeenth-century England. The study analyses Milton’s theology 
and political philosophy alongside contemporary intellectuals and radical figures, such 
as, amongst others, Samuel Hartlib, James Harrington, Thomas Hobbes, Marchamont 
Nedham, and Gerrard Winstanley. It also considers how the utopian and millenarian 
ideas of Milton’s prose works are reflected in his epic poetry. In doing so, the study 
observes how Milton’s gradual loss of faith in the English people encourages utopian 
formulations in the hope of ensuring the realisation of his eschatology. Milton’s 
growing disillusionment with the people coincides with his growing elitism: from the 
early 1640s to the end of his life, he placed his faith of those who he believed were 
capable of realising the millennium in fewer and fewer people. In contrast to the 
studious community of London in Areopagitica in 1644, by 1671, Milton idealises 
perfect, elect individuals, to whom he can aspire, if not with whom he self-identifies. 
Milton’s utopian millennium, tolerant and yet elitist, unorthodox and yet conservative, 
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Note on Texts & Abbreviations 
 
In all quotations, punctuation, spelling, and italicization are unaltered from the originals, 
apart from the modernisation of the long s, i/j, and u/v. Where a text is discussed at 
length, page references and, where relevant, line numbers will be provided 
parenthetically in the running text. The place of publication is London unless otherwise 
stated. All references to Milton’s shorter poems are to Barbara Kiefer Lewalski and 
Estelle Haan, eds., Complete Works of John Milton. Volume III: The Shorter Poems 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; corrected impression, 2014) (CWJM iii.). All 
references to Paradise Lost are to Alastair Fowler, ed., Paradise Lost (Harlow: 
Longman, 1998) and are incorporated parenthetically by book and line numbers. The 
following abbreviations have been used throughout: 
 
CPW The Complete Prose Works of John Milton, D. M. Wolfe, et al., eds., 8 
vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-82) 
CWJM The Complete Works of John Milton, Thomas N. Corns, Gordon 
Campbell, et al., eds., 11 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008-
19) 
CWGW The Complete Works of Gerrard Winstanley, Thomas N. Corns, et al., 
eds., 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
CETH Leviathan, Noel Malcolm, ed., 3 vols., in Noel Malcolm, et al., eds., The 
Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes, 25 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2012) 
HP Hartlib Papers, Sheffield University. References are taken from the 
online resource, accessible at https://www.dhi.ac.uk/hartlib/ 
OED Oxford English Dictionary 
ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
OFB The Oxford Francis Bacon, Graham Rees., ed., et al., 16 vols. (Oxford: 






Utopianism was diverse, divergent, and pervasive in mid-seventeenth-century England. 
It encompassed not only Baconian intellectualism – the belief that the propagation of 
empirical knowledge could bring about a return to man’s prelapsarian dominion of 
nature – but also the stringent, regulated totality of More’s Utopia (1516).1 It was not 
‘nowhere’, an unrealistic and unrealised social vision, but rather a pragmatic and 
achievable visionary mode of thinking. As a prospect of earthly perfection, the 
millennium, which was broadly anticipated by much of English society in the 1640s and 
1650s, served as an essential referent and source of inspiration for utopianism in the 
period. The turbulent events of the mid-seventeenth-century – the English civil wars, 
the republic, and the Restoration – produced myriad religious and political ideologies 
that accommodated utopian values of regulation and control in order to better secure 
and emulate the perfection expected at the millennium. While liberty of conscience, for 
instance, was central to the radical millenarian theology of Gerrard Winstanley (1609-
76), in response to the failure of his Digger colonies on St George’s Hill and in 
Cobham, Winstanley produced the utopian work, The Law of Freedom (1652), in order 
to more successfully appeal to Oliver Cromwell and the government for reform.2 As the 
case of Winstanley suggests, religious freedom was compatible with utopianism and 
millenarianism. While this study will acknowledge how utopianism became aligned 
with political ideologies, such as English republicanism, it will focus on the complex 
and often idiosyncratic relationship between utopia and millennium, particularly in the 
political and poetic works of John Milton (1608-74). In doing so, the thesis will also 
reflect more broadly on how these ideas developed, evolved, and adapted to the 
unprecedented political and social changes of mid-century England. 
Milton’s utopianism developed in tandem with his radically changing socio-
political context and shows how ideas of utopia and the millennium could evolve in 
response to the events of the mid-seventeenth-century. Milton was directly engaged 
with major intellectual, political and religious events and groups of his time, from the 
 
1 On Bacon, see Charles Webster, The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine and Reform, 1626-1660 
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975), pp. 15-31; on More’s Utopia specifically, see J. C. Davis, Utopia 
and the Ideal Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 41-62.  
2 On Winstanley, see John Gurney, Brave Community: The Digger Movement in the English Revolution 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); also CWGW i. 1-94; on The Law of Freedom 
specifically, see Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, pp. 169-204; also Glen Bowman, ‘Justice in a World 
Turned Upside Down: Utopian Visions in the English Civil War and Revolution’, in Contemporary 
Justice Review, 8/4 (2005), 397-408. 
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enterprise of the Hartlib Circle, to the political upheaval of the English republic, under 
which he served as Secretary for Foreign Tongues, and even in his exposure to early 
English Quakerism in later life through his student and friend Thomas Ellwood (1639-
1714). Milton was often aware of how society could usher in the millennium, and 
associated himself with groups and events to realise that end: in 1644, in his 
engagement with the Hartlib circle, Baconian intellectualism was prominent in Milton’s 
mind; the English republic and the Cromwellian Protectorate during the 1650s retained 
eschatological potential, while the English people, favouring monarchy, lost it; in the 
Restoration, this potential narrowed further to the select few capable of realising the 
millennium themselves. This study will show how Milton’s elitism, which became 
increasingly entrenched throughout the 1640s and beyond, influenced the development 
of his utopian millenarianism. Whereas in Areopagitica (1644), Milton envisions an 
ideal society contributing to an eschatological good, by 1671, in Paradise Regain’d, 
Milton’s utopian millennium was internalised in the figure of the Son. Milton’s growing 
disaffection with the English people necessitated utopian formulations. The popular 
desire for a return of the monarchy encouraged his most distinctly utopian text, The 
Readie and Easie Way (1659), which sought a return to republicanism on stringent 
terms. While Milton’s unorthodox theology and advocacy of religious toleration 
identifies him alongside contemporary radicalism, his elitism nonetheless marks him 
apart from such radicals as Winstanley. Milton’s utopian millennium represents a 
conjunction between toleration and elitism in the seventeenth-century. This thesis will, 
therefore, show both how Milton’s utopianism developed alongside his millenarianism, 






Many discussions of utopianism equate utopia with ideal society without the 
qualifications necessary for the seventeenth-century.3 While ‘utopia’, as the OED 
suggests, could mean simply a ‘hypothetical place, system, or state of existence in 
which everything is perfect’, in the seventeenth-century, Milton himself denigrates 
 
3 See, for example, Rosanna Cox, ‘“Atlantick and Eutopian Polities”: Utopianism, Republicanism and 
Constitutional Design in the Interregnum’, in Chloë Houston, ed., New Worlds Reflected: Travel and 
Utopia in the Early Modern Period (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 179-202. 
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‘Atlantick and Eutopian polities, which never can be drawn into use’ (CPW ii. 526) in 
Areopagitica (1644). Similarly, Thomas Hall (1610-65), in his A Confutation of the 
Millenarian Opinion (1657), identifies utopianism alongside millenarianism as equally 
idealistic, unlike the true, apocalyptic manifestation of Christ’s kingdom: ‘the Lord at 
last would bring us, not to a Millenarian, Utopian, Imaginary, Terrestrial Kingdom; but 
to a Real, Caelestial and Everlasting Kingdom’.4 Hall not only establishes a connection 
between millenarianism and utopianism, but he also identifies a dichotomy between this 
kind of earthly end time and the latter, apocalyptic eschatology. Hall’s use of ‘Real’ is 
ambiguous: while not ‘substantial’, the apocalyptic kingdom is ‘not imaginary’ (OED); 
Hall seems to be placing the emphasis on the idealism of utopianism and 
millenarianism, in contrast to the certainty – and future reality – of the apocalypse. In 
Paradise Lost, by comparison, Adam views Eden in contrast to his dream: ‘whereat I 
waked, and found / Before mine eyes all real, as the dream / Had lively shadowed’ (viii. 
309-11).5 Whereas Hall conflates utopia with millennium as jointly idealistic, this study 
will address how some millenarians perceived utopianism as a model of political and 
educational reform that could help to usher in the millennium. As the following chapter 
will explain in more detail, the utopianism that this study will discuss draws on the 
precedent of Thomas More’s (1478-1535) Utopia and Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) 
New Atlantis (1626). The strict, regulated community of Utopia and the advancement of 
knowledge central to New Atlantis are ideas that feature prominently in the utopian and 
millenarian texts considered in this study. Milton’s engagement with utopian and 
millenarian ideas is often directly tied to contemporary groups or events, such as the 
Hartlib circle and the Restoration; it is far removed from the idealism he criticises in 
Areopagitica. The cross-fertilisation of ideas in the mid-seventeenth-century meant that 
utopianism in the period was multifaceted and multivalent, manifesting in various forms 
and various interpretations of More and Bacon’s precedent.6  
J. C. Davis’s analysis of utopianism in Utopia and the Ideal Society, which 
ranges from Thomas More to the mid-seventeenth century, remains a seminal work on 
utopian literature, and will serve as an important critical source for this dissertation. 
Davis argues that contemporary criticism on utopianism establishes a disparity between 
 
4 Thomas Hall, A Confutation of the Millenarian Opinion, Plainly demonstrating that Christ will not 
Reign Visibly and Personally on earth with the Saints for a thousand yeers either before the day of 
Judgement, in the day of Judgement, or after it (1657), sig. A7. 
5 The empiricism of Eden and its relation to utopianism and millenarianism in Baconian terms is 
discussed in Chapter 7, pp. 263-70. 
6 On the cross-fertilisation of ideas, see David Como, ‘Print, Censorship, and Ideological Escalation in the 
English Civil War’, in Journal of British Studies, 51 (2012), p. 829. 
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the ‘classical utopia’ first depicted by More and the ‘modern utopia’ of mid-
seventeenth-century writers, such as Samuel Hartlib (1600-62) and James Harrington 
(1611-77). This is seen, generally, as a disparity between the abstract classical utopia, 
which the writer has no intention of being realised, and the pragmatic modern utopia, 
which ‘seeks primarily to change social arrangements, only thereby changing man’, and 
incorporates ‘a capacity for change within the model society.’ In pursuit of a more 
comprehensive definition, Davis returns to the fundamental roots of utopianism, as 
constituting part of the generic form of ideal society. Davis identifies the taut balance 
between ‘the existing and changing supply of satisfactions’ and ‘the wants of a 
heterogenial group’.7 The problem exists in the challenge of meeting supply with 
demand: this can be either quantitative (people want more), qualitative (people want 
different satisfactions), or the unequal social distribution of such satisfactions. Having 
explained the collective problem of a society, Davis outlines the varying forms of ideal 
society – of which utopia is part – that theoretically strive to tackle this problem. 
Davis defines four major forms of ideal society separate from utopia: 
Cockaygne, Arcadia, the Perfect Moral Commonwealth, and millenarianism. In the 
Land of Cockaygne, a medieval European tradition, ‘there were satisfactions enough to 
satiate the grossest appetite.’ Through complete individual sensual fulfilment, the 
potential for conflict is eliminated; there is no desire for anything alternative to that 
which is provided in Cockayne. In Arcadia, while nature is not as overwhelmingly 
generous as that of Cockaygne, men’s desires are more reserved. Where Cockaygne 
increases supply to meet demand, Arcadia envisions reduced demand to meet supply. 
With similarities to Arcadia, the Perfect Moral Commonwealth was structured on the 
‘moral reformation of every individual in society’. Like Arcadia, such moral 
improvement was commensurate with a reduction of appetite, which, in turn, increased 
satisfaction. The most popular and prevalent form of ideal society in the mid-
seventeenth-century was millenarianism. According to Davis, millenarians considered 
history as ‘a meaningless flow of contingencies’, in which meaning was only ascribed 
to major Christian events (creation, fall, incarnation, resurrection). It was, therefore, 
defined by the fervent anticipation of the second coming of Christ; this solution, 
significantly, was valued above the means of achieving it. ‘In this case’, Davis argues, 
‘the ideal society is left as a vague, tenuously perceived goal and neither in its 
 
7 J. C. Davis, Utopia & The Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing, 1516-1700 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 15, 19. 
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conception nor its realisation can it be described or analysed.’8 The potential to achieve 
the millennium of Christ is taken out of the hands of men. However, while for some 
millenarians this did result in a more passive attitude to imminent social reform, in that 
society simply had to wait for the second coming to herald a new millennium, it also 
encouraged more active sectarianism from those who believed that societal reform 
preceded and was a catalyst of the second coming.9 Millenarianism can, to some extent, 
explain this paradox: the prospect of Christ descending to earth – as opposed to the 
apocalyptic end of time, where earth is subsumed into the Kingdom of Heaven – 
encouraged social reform to prepare society in the hope of expediting the second 
coming. The Fifth Monarchists, believing that they were saints aiding in the realisation 
of the millennium, were some of the most aggressive and, in their governmental 
presence, influential of mid-seventeenth-century active millenarians. The Hartlibians 
and the Diggers acted with a similar degree of millenarian agency in their respective 
educational and agrarian efforts. Within this sectarian and intellectual context, Milton 
himself, exhibiting millenarian ideas as early as ‘Lycidas’ (1637), but more prominently 
in the anti-prelatical tracts, can be identified as such an active millenarian.10 This study 
will focus on seventeenth-century millenarians who believed that societal reform was a 
central part of the process of bringing about the second coming. 
Davis explains that, in notable contrast to the alternate forms of ideal 
society, the utopian embraces the reality of ‘limited satisfactions exposed to unlimited 
wants.’ Rather than unrealistically hoping for moral reformation or awaiting divine 
intervention, the utopian imposes restrictions through laws with the intention of 
controlling social problems, such as crime, poverty, insurrection, and war. By 
reorganising society through education, legal restrictions, and sanctions, the utopian 
attempts to solve the collective problem. In Davis’s own, definitive words: ‘The totality 
of the utopian vision is part of the perfection, the order of the utopia. It stems from the 
urge, not merely to improve, but to perfect. These three – totality, order, perfection – are 
cardinal characteristics of the utopian form.’ This utopian totality and the desire to 
 
8 Ibid., pp. 21, 29-30, 36. 
9 For studies of seventeenth-century sectarianism, see, among others, N. H. Keeble, The Literary Culture 
of Nonconformity in Later Seventeenth-Century England (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1987); 
Sharon Achinstein, Literature and Dissent in Milton’s England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
10 See John Milton, ‘Lycidas’ (1637), in John Carey, ed., John Milton: Complete Shorter Poems 
(Longman, 1987), line 130: ‘But that two-handed engine at the door’; see also John Leonard, ‘The Two-
Handed Engine and the Millennium at the Door’, in Edward Jones, ed., Young Milton: The Emerging 
Author, 1620-1642 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 252-77. 
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perfect remain central tenets of utopian writings in the mid-seventeenth-century.11 The 
decision to impose control in the form of social totality is shared by many mid-
seventeenth-century writers, even those who are conventionally not considered to be 
utopian. While Davis identifies James Harrington as utopian, for instance, Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679), whose utopianism is, in many respects, more immediately evident 
than Harrington’s, is not included in Davis’s study.12 By encompassing both millennium 
and utopia as forms of ideal society, Davis accommodates their intellectual proximity 
during the seventeenth-century. However, by separating utopia and millennium into 
distinct categories of ideal society, Davis does not reflect the interrelationship between 
the two forms of ideal society. This study will show how the millenarians who believed 
in the reform of society as a necessary precursor of the millennium sometimes perceived 
that reform as utopian, whether as the Baconian advancement of knowledge or as a 
homogenous, regulated society in the style of More’s Utopia.  
Amy Boesky’s Founding Fictions offers an analysis of utopianism that 
brings attention to the institutionalism that often attends it. Boesky explains that she 
views ‘the utopia as both a fiction and a sociology of statehood, centrally concerned 
with organization, with new institutions, and with institutionalism.’ She identifies the 
fictional nature of utopias – specifically the artifice of the travel narrative – and how 
they are often ‘found’ by individuals, which reflects the imperial context of the New 
World colonies. Boesky includes, most importantly, Bacon’s utopian institution in New 
Atlantis, Salomon’s House, and its mid-century realisation, the Hartlibian Office of 
Address, both of which drew on the idea of Michel de Montaigne, who, in turn, inspired 
Théophraste Renaudot’s Bureau d’adresse.13 Boesky’s analysis of utopias in the 1640s 
is expansive, covering both the Hartlib circle – including Gabriel Plattes’s A 
Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria (1641) – and Winstanley’s Law of 
Freedom (1652). She even accommodates Milton’s The Readie and Easie Way (1659) 
into her discussion of utopia, aligning the tract with ‘the utopias of industry which it 
succeeds.’ As Boesky argues, ‘the utopia taught the preeminence of the state, the need 
for supervision, surveillance, and control. Perhaps most important, utopias demonstrated 
that institutions, not individuals, had the capacity to manufacture and transform 
 
11 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, pp. 37-9. 
12 Richard Tuck, ‘The Utopianism of Leviathan’, in Tom Sorell, Luc Foisneau, eds., Leviathan After 350 
Years (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 125-38. 
13 On the Office of Address, see Webster, Great Instauration, pp. 67-77; Nicholas McDowell, Poetry and 
Allegiance in the English Civil Wars: Marvell and the Cause of Wit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 54-67. 
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values.’14 Boesky is also quick to draw away from the utopian totality that Davis 
outlines: ‘Utopias often strike modern readers as restrictive or totalitarian’; ‘Macaria 
may sound grimly over regulated to modern readers’.15 Boesky instead spends much of 
her book identifying the fictional elements of utopianism, such as the travel narrative. 
Such a literary approach to utopianism is valuable as a contrast to Davis’s historical 
interpretation. This study, however, intends to accommodate both perspectives to better 
reflect the diverse intellectual and textual environment of the mid-seventeenth-century. 
James Harrington’s (1611-77) The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), for instance, 
while in part a utopian fiction, nevertheless lacks a travel dialogue; Thomas Hobbes 
similarly depicts the Leviathan state on the frontispiece of Leviathan, incorporating an 
artifice that diverges from the traditional utopian travel narrative.16 The relationship 
between utopianism, the millennium, and institutions, such as the English republic that 
Milton defended and worked for, will help to show how ideas of the utopian millennium 
reflected major political events of the mid-seventeenth-century. 
Chloë Houston’s book, The Renaissance Utopia, begins to address the 
relationship between the fiction of utopia and its realisation in society, while also 
providing a valuable insight into the dynamic between utopianism and millenarianism. 
Rather than comparing utopianism to other forms of ideal society, as we see in Davis, 
Houston casts her net more widely, asserting that ‘in the Renaissance period a utopia is 
a text which portrays an ideal or seemingly ideal society in order to address the question 
of how to live well.’ This encompasses such a wide generic field that both Francis 
Bacon’s New Atlantis (1626) and John Dury’s The Reformed School (1650) are 
included. Davis categorises Bacon as a millenarian rather than a utopian, but Bacon was 
a significant precedent for establishing common ground between utopianism and 
millenarianism in the seventeenth-century. Houston’s less rigid approach better reflects 
the cross-fertilisation of ideas in the period. ‘A text’, Houston explains, ‘may be classed 
as utopian when it contains a description of an ideal society, even if the text as a whole 
is concerned with other matters’.17 According to Houston’s definition, while Milton 
produced no specific, self-contained utopian vision, many of his works – such as, most 
 
14 Amy Boesky, Founding Fictions: Utopias in Early Modern England (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1996), pp. 15, 2, 111-15, 180. 
15 Ibid., pp. 8, 94. 
16 On Harrington’s utopianism, see Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, pp. 205-40; on Harrington 
generally, see Rachel Hammersley, James Harrington: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2019). 
17 Chloë Houston, The Renaissance Utopia: Dialogue, Travel and the Ideal Society (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2014), p. 3. 
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notably, Areopagitica, Of Education, and The Readie and Easie Way – exhibit aspects 
of an ideal society that correlate with utopianism.  
Houston also offers a valuable analysis of the relationship between 
utopianism and millenarianism, but she limits her analysis to the 1640s when the more 
practical ‘utopian moment’ was during the 1650s. ‘As political conditions and 
millennial enthusiasm converged to make the perfect earthly community appear to be 
within reach,’ Houston asserts, ‘the utopia formed a central means of both imagining 
and promoting its achievement.’ Millenarians, such as Milton and the Hartlib circle, 
considered political and educational reform as necessary to realise the millennium. 
Utopian ideas of a homogenous, systemised state and of the propagation of knowledge 
both constituted part of the reform envisioned by some of these millenarians. In A 
Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria (1641) by Gabriel Plattes, for 
instance, the traveller insists to the scholar that utopian reform on the model of Macaria 
– specifically in the centralisation and control of medical knowledge – will precede the 
millennium.18 Houston goes on to discuss the Latin romance, Nova Solyma (1648), by 
Samuel Gott (1614-71), a utopia which she identifies as millenarian in its depiction of 
what Jerusalem would be like following the conversion of the Jews, which was a 
prominent event in the seventeenth-century millenarian imagination. However, Houston 
concludes that after the 1640s, ‘utopia no longer seemed within reach for England. The 
utopian moment, encapsulated in the optimistic idealism of the mid-seventeenth-
century, had passed, and in its passing, the unqualified belief in the truth and imminent 
reality of the ideal society was also left behind.’19 This study will revise the limits 
imposed by Houston by showing how Milton’s utopianism developed in tandem with 
and in response to the radical political transformation of the 1650s. Houston’s inclusive 
definition of utopianism is valuable, but restricting utopianism to the 1640s fails to 
reflect the pervasive nature of utopian ideas in mid-seventeenth-century society.  
Jonathan Scott, in his perceptive analysis of English classical republicanism 
in the seventeenth-century, Commonwealth Principles, identifies More as an important 
precedent for Greek classical republicanism in the period. Scott argues that More’s 
Utopia ‘not only combines the metaphysics and community of property of Plato’s 
 
18 Gabriel Plattes, A Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria. Shewing its Excellent Government 
(1641), in Charles Webster, ed., Samuel Hartlib and the Advancement of Learning (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 89; for a further discussion of Plattes’s Macaria, see pp. 37-8 
below. 
19 Houston, Renaissance Utopia, pp. 119-26, 146-50, 163; James Holston also discusses a relationship 
between utopianism and millenarianism in A Rational Millennium: Puritan Utopias of Seventeen-Century 
England and America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 3-14. 
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Republic, but does so within a humanist context which is self-consciously anti-Roman.’ 
As such, More contributes to the increased attention placed on Greek classical 
republicanism in the seventeenth-century that differed from – if not contradicted – the 
political philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527).20 This study will show how 
utopianism – particularly the regulated utopianism characterised by More’s Utopia and 
articulated by Davis above – became more prominent in the 1650s. Where Harrington, 
for instance, wrote Oceana partly in response to the failure of the successive republican 
parliaments in the early 1650s, Marchamont Nedham (1620-78) responded to 
Harrington in his ‘letters from Utopia’ in 1657, identifying utopianism as a threat to the 
security of the Protectorate; Milton, moreover, wrote partly in response to Harrington in 
his most distinctly utopian work, The Readie and Easie Way (1659). Milton’s 
opposition to the fiction of traditional utopias is clear in Areopagitica and in the lack of 
such a text in his corpus. The utopianism that he would nevertheless come to espouse – 
both the Baconian utopianism of 1644 and the Morean utopianism in 1659 – was that of 
ideas rather than ideals, of utopian concepts rather than detailed blueprints of ideal 
societies. Milton’s was a theoretical rather than monumentalised utopianism. Milton’s 
utopianism would be depicted in his later epic poetry, Paradise Lost and Paradise 
Regain’d. 
The utopianism considered in this study infiltrated into and was a 
manifestation of its socio-political context. In their Utopian Thought in the Western 
World, Frank and Fritzie Manuel argue that utopianism should be considered as a 
timeless genre, and not be analysed in the confines of its historical context:  
 
Limiting an interpretation to the immediate environment of the utopian, tying him down too 
closely and mechanically to the precise circumstances and incidents that could have triggered his 
writing, fails to recognize that he may have something ahistorical to say about love, aggression, 
the nature of work, the fulfilment of personality.21  
 
This study maintains a contrary view of utopianism: mid-seventeenth-century 
utopianism was a product of the radical political landscape of the period. Fervent 
millenarian anticipation attended such unprecedented events as the civil wars and the 
regicide of Charles I in January 1649. Utopian ideas of the advancement of knowledge 
 
20 Jonathan Scott, Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 32-4, 38-9. 
21 Frank E. Manuel, Fritzie P. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 
p. 24. 
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and of a homogenous totality similarly grew in volume, as they were perceived as 
means of realising the millennium. Milton engaged with both the Baconian idea of the 
propagation of knowledge in the early 1640s through the Hartlib circle and with a 
Morean, regulated totality in 1660, on the eve of the Restoration; it is in his later epic 
poetry that he shifts from utopian reform in society to that of the individual, specifically 
in the inner utopia of the Son of Paradise Regain’d. Utopianism was a model of reform, 
particularly that of politics and education, which was perceived by seventeenth-century 





The compatibility of utopianism and millenarianism depends on their mutual 
perfectionism. The perfect ideal of the millennium correlates with the absolutist, utopian 
means of achieving it. Millenarianism itself is distinguished from other forms of 
eschatology, such as apocalypticism, for its anticipation of Christ’s second coming on 
earth. Millenarians who expected a terrestrial millennium believed that it was necessary 
to enact social, political, and educational reform in anticipation of this singular event. 
Lutz Greisiger explicates the differences between the various forms of eschatology: 
 
Millennialism may be used in the universalized sense current within millennial studies, as referring 
to beliefs in a breakthrough to a time profoundly better than the present. In contrast, 
millenarianism and millenarian may be reserved for discourses involving a millennium in the 
narrower sense, a penultimate period of near perfection preceding the actual end of history, as it is 
so particularly widespread and specified in Abrahamic traditions. 
 
Apocalypticism, as a third eschatological form, ‘does not necessarily involve a 
millennium or similar interim period.’ For many of the millenarians considered in this 
study, the millennium was imminent and would be brought about by divine 
intervention, but still necessitated societal transformation in preparation for that deus ex 
machina. The importance of the distinction between apocalypse and millennium for 
Milton was that individuals – particularly the elite individuals to whose example Milton 
aspired – could assist in the realisation of eschatological change. ‘History,’ Greisiger 
explains, ‘as envisioned by the apocalypticist, is marked by determinism and 
periodization: since eternity each and every event has been predestined in God’s master 
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plan and the unfolding of this plan discloses its pattern, bit by bit.’22 At least from 1644, 
Milton did not advocate Calvinist predestination; instead, he placed greater emphasis on 
the role of individuals, particularly superior, elect individuals.23 In Milton’s 
seventeenth-century millenarian mindset, such individuals could contribute to the 
realisation of his eschatology. The millennium provided a referent of perfection to 
which utopian writers could aspire, and played a significant role in Milton’s theology. 
Nigel Smith’s Perfection Proclaimed identifies the millenarian 
perfectionism of 1640s and 1650s, which served as the end goal of some forms of 
utopianism, such as Milton’s. Acknowledging the significance of the ‘more spectral 
presence of radicals’ dating back to the 1550s, Smith explains that the mid-seventeenth-
century was a unique time for religious sectarianism in England. He writes that ‘1640 
was the first time the phenomenon had broken out on such a scale’, and fed into the 
‘civil turmoil in the following years’: ‘It is no surprise that the abolition of episcopal 
government, the collapse of the censorship, and the absence of a national policy of 
church government throughout the Interregnum contributed to the expansion and 
fragmentation.’ The mid-seventeenth-century environment was a breeding-ground for 
nonconformity. Myriad radical sects emerged in the late 1640s in response to turbulent 
contemporary events. Apart from Smith’s impressive analysis of myriad sectarian 
radicals, most important to this study is his discussion of millenarian perfectionism: 
 
The quality which most centrally characterizes the subject of this book is the attempt to bear 
witness in expression and behaviour to the immediacy and charisma of the Holy Spirit, however it 
was defined. It was the search for perfection, or the claim that it had arrived, which led to the most 
interesting discursive experiments of the Interregnum years. 
 
Millenarians anticipated the second coming of Christ with fervour; the political changes 
of the 1640s indicated to such believers that the wait was almost over. Significantly, this 
‘search for perfection’ appears to associate, if not align, with Milton’s millenarian 
pursuit of truth. The perfection of this absolute form of truth, just like the perfection 
identified by Smith, is mirrored in the utopian totality, as it is defined by Davis. Like 
other utopians, Milton channels the perfection he perceives in Christ and his thousand-
year reign into the utopianism he invests into his works. Smith concludes that ‘Versions 
 
22 Lutz Greisiger, ‘Apocalypticism, Millenarianism, and Messianism’, in Adam J. Silverstein, and Guy G. 
Stroumsa, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Abrahamic Religions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
pp. 277-9. 
23 Cf., Stephen Fallon, who recognises an element of Calvinism in Milton’s belief in the elect, in Milton’s 
Peculiar Grace: Self-Representation and Authority (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 183-95. 
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of self were created which moved increasingly towards the merging of the individual 
with the Godhead, the ultimate claim for perfection.’24 This thesis argues that Milton 
looks to societal reform as a means of advancing the nation collectively towards his 
millenarian ends. Towards the end of his life, as he depicts his utopian millennium in 
his epic poetry, figures such as the Son of Paradise Regain’d may even be viewed as a 
‘version of self’ for Milton. Milton came to employ utopian ideas, especially the idea of 
a perfect totality, as the most effective means through which society could usher in the 
millennium. 
Barbara Lewalski offers a perceptive analysis of Milton’s peculiar 
millenarianism in her essay, ‘Milton and the Millennium’. Lewalski acknowledges that 
‘the millennium is important for both the argument and imaginative vision of Milton’s 
poetry and prose.’ She explains that Milton’s millenarianism was dependent on 
contemporary events: ‘When the reformation seemed to be going well, he imagined that 
the millennium might be close at hand, and when it was in difficulties he deduced […] 
that Christ “will be slow to come” (CPW vi. 618).’ The connection that Lewalski 
observes between Milton’s theology and his political philosophy informs an 
understanding of how Milton’s utopianism infiltrated into his prose as well as his poetic 
writings: 
 
The projected downfall of all tyrants at the millennium offered support to his other arguments from 
scripture and natural law for eradicating bishops, idolatry and kingship, disestablishing the church, 
and promoting religious and intellectual liberty. And from 1648 on the projected millenarian reign 
of Christ as the only rightful earthly king regularly served Milton as an argument for republican 
government.  
 
Political transformation, particularly that which secured religious toleration, was an 
essential tool for ushering in the millennium for Milton. In Areopagitica, Milton 
associated the millennium with liberty of conscience; in the 1650s, Milton continued to 
support the English republic and Cromwellian Protectorate in part due to their tolerant 
religious policies. By 1660, it became necessary for Milton to articulate a more 
distinctly utopian blueprint in The Readie and Easie Way, especially with his awareness 
of the ideas of James Harrington. As Lewalski asserts, Milton believed that ‘the 
 
24 Nigel Smith, Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion 1640-1660 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 3, 10, 18. 
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millennium will come when the English (and presumably others) have become virtuous 
and free, rejecting all the forces that promote servility’.25  
Toleration was increasingly important to Milton’s theology from the 1640s 
onwards and represents a central means through which he believed society could usher 
in the millennium. In Milton and Toleration, Nigel Smith offers a valuable essay on 
Milton’s tolerationist views. Smith explains that while the ‘chiliast notion that it was 
time in the last days to gather the faithful and that no truth should be excluded in a 
debate that would finally establish the true church’ was a view that ‘Milton famously 
propounds in Areopagitica’, the same tract is also recognised for its defence of heretical 
Protestant views: 
 
Behind all of this lies the tradition of intellectual freedom of belief that belonged to elite groups in 
Europe, and that we most readily associate with the Italian city states of the later Middle Ages and 
the sixteenth century. Milton himself is a very pure descendant from this tradition, where 
speculation belonging to an educated elite might be left alone by ecclesiastical authorities. 
 
Smith explains how Milton’s early formulation of toleration developed into his ‘mature 
knowledge of religious toleration and persecution, of free will theology and of anti-
trinitarian theology’ in works such as Of Civil Power (1659) and Of True Religion 
(1673). ‘His writing,’ Smith continues, ‘fusing classical republicanism and advanced 
Protestantism, is dedicated toward inculcating freedom and belief as vigorously anti-
idolatrous and hence anti-enslaved activities’.26 Religious freedom is central to Milton’s 
millenarianism. In Areopagitica, the citizens of Milton’s idealised London are at liberty 
to collectively contribute to millenarian truth; by 1673, in Of True Religion, the 
boundaries of Milton’s toleration (not including his entrenched anti-Catholicism) had 
only expanded.  
The religious liberty that Milton defends in his works is a liberty to serve 
God, as Davis explains in his ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English 
Revolution’. Davis acknowledges that there were different perceptions of freedom in the 
 
25 Barbara Lewalski, ‘Milton and the Millennium’, in Juliet Cummins, ed., Milton and the Ends of Time 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 15-17; other important essays in this book include 
Sarah Hutton, ‘Mede, Milton, and More: Christ’s College Millenarians’, 29-41; Stella P. Revard, ‘Milton 
and Millenarianism: from the Nativity Ode to Paradise Regained’, 42-81; Ken Simpson, ‘The Apocalypse 
in Paradise Regained’, 202-21. 
26 Smith, ‘Milton and the European Contexts of Toleration’, in Sharon Achinstein, Elizabeth Sauer, eds., 
Milton and Toleration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 30-1, 42-4; for a more focused, 
textual analysis of Milton’s toleration and its limits in this volume, see Thomas N. Corns, ‘John Milton, 
Roger Williams, and Limits of Toleration’, 72-85. 
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seventeenth-century, and how commentators often suggest that the Calvinist 
‘disciplinary assurance of double predestination was displaced by an “Arminian” 
emphasis on free will and human agency’. Milton does not fit into a single discrete 
category: his advocacy of free will invites comparisons with Arminianism, though he 
distances himself from Arminians in both 1644 and 1673 (CPW ii. 519-20; viii. 425-6); 
he is frequently against Calvinism, especially in his opposition to Presbyterians, but he 
retains a belief in the elect, or at least a meritocratic elite, as does the God of Paradise 
Lost (iii. 183-4). Davis cautions that ‘we should not automatically identify liberty with 
personal autonomy or individual self-expression, self-realization.’ Distinguished from 
civil liberty, religious liberty was more commonly associated with obedience: ‘Properly 
understood, liberty of conscience meant submission to God, therefore, and not to self. 
The notion of personal autonomy was a gross misunderstanding of such liberty and its 
consequences were horrifying.’ As Dzelzainis explains in relation to Samson Agonistes 
(1671), ‘what matters in turn about [Samson] freeing himself from inward slavery is 
that it means he becomes a slave to God instead – once more alieni iuris and subject to 
heteronomous impulses and commands, this time of divine origin.’27 The irony, as 
Davis observes, was that tolerance of religious diversity necessitated obedience: 
‘Liberty of conscience was one side of a coin, the other face of which was submission 
and discipline.’28 Crucial to Milton’s mature theology, as it is represented in his later 
poetry, such as Paradise Lost, is that the individual is free to choose to obey. The 
hierarchical structure that frames that choice, whereby in Paradise Lost obedience 
promises heavenly ascension and disobedience eternal damnation, encourages utopian 
homogeneity. For Milton, toleration was necessary to achieve the millennium, but the 
conditions of that toleration and the system in which it existed were dependent on the 
state of England and its people at the time. 
Milton’s millennium was intricately connected to his utopianism. As he 
asserted in De Doctrina Christiana, ‘from the beginning, I say, of his judgement until 
its end, and for some time after its end, it appears that that so often promised glorious 
kingdom of Christ with his saints will come into being on earth’, after which he lists a 
number of scriptural references to support this claim: ‘But that that kingdom will be on 
 
27 Martin Dzelzainis, ‘“In the Power of Others, Never in My Own”: The Meaning of Slavery in Samson 
Agonistes’, in Milton and the Long Restoration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 300-1; on 
Milton’s theory of freedom, see Jason A. Kerr, ‘De Doctrina Christiana and Milton’s Theology of 
Liberation’, in Studies in Philology, 111/2 (2014), pp. 356-60.  
28 Davis, ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution’, in The Historical Journal, 
35/3 (1992), pp. 510, 513, 516-17. 
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earth, how very many passages show!’ (CWJM viii. 883-7). Where William B. Hunter is 
sceptical about Milton’s authorship of De Doctrina, suggesting that it lacked the 
immediacy that defined Milton’s millenarianism in the 1640s, John T. Shawcross 
strongly refutes this argument with the suggestion that the changing political 
circumstances in the late 1650s, following the failed republican parliaments and in 
anticipation of the imminent Restoration, meant that Milton’s expectation of an 
imminent millennium was similarly tempered.29 This study will contribute to evidence 
for the Miltonic provenance of De Doctrina by showing in detail how Milton continued 
to invest his prose writings with the form of millenarianism that he had espoused in 
Areopagitica, and which manifests in De Doctrina. Whereas Milton believed that the 
millennium could be brought about by political transformation – a belief that 
encouraged his support of the republic and Protectorate – the experience of the 
Restoration internalised Milton’s utopian and millenarian ideas. With the English 
republic having failed, Milton turned from society to individuals, specifically the elect 
individuals capable of exhibiting the internal, utopian self-control exhibited by the Son 





The utopian millennium, given its conservative and radical nature, questions arguments 
for an exclusively radical Milton. Christopher Hill’s landmark reassessment of Milton 
in Milton and the English Revolution asserts a seminal view of the ‘radical Milton’ that 
is still maintained in some recent criticism.30 Writing in the wake of major twentieth-
century Milton criticism, such as C. S. Lewis’s Preface to Paradise Lost and William 
Empson’s Milton’s God, Hill, radical in his own right by so strongly opposing the 
contemporary critical consensus, conveys a lasting image of Milton: ‘Milton was not 
just a fine writer. He is the greatest English revolutionary who is also a poet, the 
 
29 William B. Hunter, ‘The Millennial Moment: Milton vs. “Milton”’, in Milton and the Ends of Time, 96-
104; Shawcross, ‘Confusion: the Apocalypse, the Millennium’, in Milton and the Ends of Time, pp. 110-
17. 
30 See, amongst others, David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), for a favourable comparison between Milton and 
contemporary radicalism; David Williams, Milton’s Leveller God (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2017), who aligns Milton to the Leveller movement; Warren Chernaik, Milton and the Burden of 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), although more nuanced than some of his other 
essays, nonetheless argues that ‘Milton sought a clear space for human freedom’ (16), without precisely 
defining what that freedom is. 
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greatest English poet who is also a revolutionary.’31 Hill drew upon his extensive 
knowledge of the ‘radical underground’, which he believed fully emerged in the 1640s, 
to explain that Milton’s more unorthodox – if not heterodox – ideas most likely 
developed through discourse with this heretofore subterranean sectarianism.32 Although 
acknowledging his independence of such radicalism, Hill identifies Milton as having 
ideas comparable with those of contemporary sectarians, such as the Levellers, Diggers, 
and Ranters. Allied to this, Hill maps a consistent anti-establishment attitude in Milton’s 
1640s writings, from the anti-clericalism – the ‘acid test of radicalism’ – in the early 
1640s, to the divorce tracts, in which opposition to custom prefigures the anti-
monarchism of The Tenure, and in the defence of the freedom of the press in 
Areopagitica (1644). However, Hill does admit that Milton’s attitude towards the 
English people degenerates over time, which perhaps influenced his ‘advocacy of 
revolutionary dictatorship together with freedom among the ruling elite’. The problem 
was that ‘Milton’s age was facing for the first time in human history the problem of 
educating an electorate.’33 The taut balance between Milton’s potential for radicalism 
and the elite status from which he wrote and by which he was influenced will be 
reconsidered in this thesis from the view of Milton as an elitist rather than an 
exclusively radical writer. Contemporary utopian ideals will serve as the most valuable 
illustration of Milton’s discourse with and advocacy of authoritarianism and elitism.  
In contrast to Hill, Jonathan Scott argues for a collective intellectual 
revolution in the seventeenth-century, which was radical in its departure from the past. 
The revolution itself, Scott explains, was a ‘process of belief’, rather than a 
constitutional overhaul brought about by civil war, which means that the return of the 
monarchy did not mark its end. This is because the revolution was intellectual: ‘English 
radicalism, the profoundest intellectual consequence of the seventeenth-century 
instability, was the English revolution.’ By aligning the intellectual and radical events 
of the seventeenth-century, Scott coheres them into an identifiable whole. The English 
revolution was a collective, societal movement towards more divergent thinking that 
progressed independently of contemporary political changes. Milton was doubtless part 
of the intellectual developments as Scott sees them. Scott, for instance, uses Milton to 
 
31 C. S. Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); William Empson, 
Milton’s God (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Christopher Hill, Milton and the English Revolution 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1977), p. 4. 
32 See Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution 
(Isleworth: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972), for Hill’s analysis of the radical underground. 
33 Hill, Milton and the English Revolution, pp. 7-8, 99, 103-5, 108, 161, 168. 
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illustrate desire for religious change in the 1640s, as opposed to continuity. Scott’s 
argument for the collective process of this intellectual revolution spans to sectarian 
groups: ‘But the majority of the group labels we use – Levellers, Seekers, Diggers, Fifth 
Monarchy Men, Quakers – in fact describe not simultaneously existing organisations 
but chronological stages of a single process by which radical expectation mutated in 
response to a rapidly moving sequence of external events.’34 Scott consistently 
emphasises the collective experience of the English in the seventeenth-century. The 
desire for change was intellectual and outlasted the significant political oscillations of 
the mid-century. If radicalism was a process in this way, which means that it was more 
commonplace than is often maintained, then the focus should be placed on the varying 
degrees of radicalism in a subversive spectrum, rather than a binary distinction between 
radical and non-radical. There is no doubt that Milton was a radical: his ideas regularly 
challenged convention. However, he was not an activist, communist radical like Gerrard 
Winstanley, nor even a republican of the same cast as Marchamont Nedham. Milton’s 
desire for change served his ulterior millenarian ends. Whereas Milton viewed the 
republic and Protectorate as sufficient means for realising these ends, in 1659, at the eve 
of the Restoration, a state with a utopian regulatory structure was necessary. Scott’s 
argument for the widespread intellectual radicalism of the seventeenth-century requires 
the binary focus in Milton criticism, of radical and non-radical, to be reoriented in order 
to appreciate the diverse spectrum of radicalism extant in the seventeenth-century. By 
comparing Milton to contemporary millenarian radicals in Chapter 4 and contemporary 
intellectuals in Chapters 5 and 6, this study, particularly by addressing his utopianism, 
will identify Milton on the conservative end of the mid-century radical spectrum. By his 
later life, as Chapter 8 will discuss, his toleration for all Protestant sects encouraged his 
close proximity to early English Quakerism. 
Milton’s utopian attitude, by its absolutist nature, created a gulf between 
what he wanted the people of England to achieve and what they were actually capable 
of, which helped to foster his deep-seated elitism. Where James Holston suggests that 
the ‘virtuous citizen is the product of the virtuous utopian state, not its precondition’, for 
Milton, the elite were increasingly necessary in bringing about utopian and millenarian 
change in society.35 Paul Hammond offers an excellent analysis of Milton’s perception 
of the people in Milton and the People, particularly in that Hammond’s extensive 
 
34 Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European 
Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 6, 33, 234, 241.  
35 James Holston, A Rational Millennium, pp. 43-4. 
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classical knowledge allows him to interpret Milton’s works at an etymological level. 
Having acknowledged Milton’s idealisation of the people, observing that ‘Milton’s 
rhetoric soars as he envisages their role’, Hammond writes 
 
And yet Milton is uncomfortably aware that the people are rarely sufficiently pure, intelligent, or 
energetic to discharge those responsibilities which his political theory and his theology would 
place upon them. Indeed, while Milton defends ‘the people’ and the revolution which Parliament 
has brought about in their name, he also refers to ‘the vulgar’, as well as ‘the rude multitude’, and 
‘the rabble’, even characterising some people as ‘scum’. 
 
Hammond’s approach of investigating the etymology of Milton’s choice of words and 
how they recur in certain texts shows the disparity between Milton’s vision for the 
people and the reality of their insufficiency.36 Milton was repeatedly disappointed by 
the English people, showing his frustration for their mourning of the regicide in 
Eikonoklastes (1649), and finding in the Restoration an unforgiveable betrayal of his 
faith in them. This thesis will contribute to Hammond’s research in particular through 
the study of Of Education in Chapter 2. Hammond covers a broad array of Milton’s 
works, but does not consider one of Milton’s most explicitly elitist texts. Nevertheless, 
this study will agree with Hammond’s argument that, as Milton ages, ‘his ideals become 
entrusted to a smaller and smaller group, until after the Restoration his hopes seem 
directed towards lone individuals rather than communities.’37 Whereas Milton believed 
that a social elite, defined by education and socio-economic status, was necessary to 
lead society in the 1640s and 1650s, the elite individuals in whom Milton placed his 
faith after the Restoration, following the failure of the English republic and Protectorate, 
were specifically the elect. The ‘fit audience […] though few’ (vii. 31) that Milton’s 
epic narrator asks Urania to seek out in Paradise Lost is representative of Milton’s 
narrow conception of the elect in the 1660s. As Milton invested his faith in fewer and 
fewer individuals, so his utopian and millenarian ideas became interiorised, located 
specifically in elect individuals rather than English society. This study will observe how 
the socio-economic elite that Milton envisions in Of Education transitions to the elect 
individuals of his later poetry and how this reflects and coincides with his evolving 




36 Paul Hammond, Milton and the People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 1, 11-12. 




The remainder of this introduction will outline the structure of the thesis chapter-by-
chapter. The structure is broadly chronological in relation to Milton’s corpus, beginning 
with the anti-prelatical tracts of the early 1640s and ending with the 1671 poems, with 
reference to the 1673 Of True Religion. As such, it will acknowledge and identify the 
changes to and development of Milton’s political philosophy and theology in response 
to contemporary political and ecclesiastical events. The initial discussion of Milton’s 
utopian and millenarian ideas in his prose works of the 1640s and 1650s will inform 
interpretations of his later literary texts, considered in the final chapters of this study. 
Following the first chapter, which, separated into two parts, serves as a broad theoretical 
discussion of utopianism and millenarianism, each chapter of this dissertation will begin 
with a review of relevant critical material, and the main body of each chapter will be 
separated into sections. 
The thesis will begin with a chapter broken into two parts, each forming an 
overview of utopianism and millenarianism respectively. The former will analyse the 
origins of early modern utopianism in More’s Utopia and Bacon’s New Atlantis. In 
particular, it will identify just how significant Bacon is in providing a means of 
interpreting More’s original Utopia for seventeenth-century utopian writers. The second 
section will address the origins of Milton’s millenarianism in relation to Joseph Mede 
(1586-1639) and with an analysis of the anti-prelatical tracts of the early 1640s. 
Together, the two sections of this first chapter will establish the theoretical foundation 
from which this thesis will progress. 
The second and third chapters will discuss Milton’s proximity to the 
network of correspondents coordinated by Samuel Hartlib (1600-62) in relation to the 
1644 works, Of Education and Areopagitica. Chapter 2 will show how Of Education, a 
text solicited by Hartlib himself, compares with Plattes’s Macaria, the most explicit 
Hartlibian utopia. The Baconian ideas of Of Education will inform the discussion of 
Areopagitica in Chapter 3. While Areopagitica and Of Education are both recognised as 
having been printed on the same press as other tracts from the tolerationist circle of 
Henry Robinson (1604-64), Chapter 3 will also address how they both equally reflect 
their Hartlibian context. The calls for toleration in Areopagitica imbue the ideals of the 
Robinson coterie, but the emphasis in the text on public good also mirrors a similar 
Presbyterian standpoint advocated by the ecumenist John Dury (1596-1680) in An 
Epistolary Discourse (1644). These two chapters will emphasise how Milton’s early 
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utopianism was in keeping with his Hartlibian context and, as it was Baconian, also 
naturally accommodated Milton’s millenarianism. 
The fourth chapter will assess Milton’s radicalism in contrast to that of the 
Digger, Gerrard Winstanley (1609-76) and the early Fifth Monarchist, Mary Cary (ca. 
1621-53). While Milton’s millenarianism had, in Areopagitica, encouraged the active 
participation of private individuals in bringing about a public good, after he became 
employed by the English republic in 1649, he narrowed the parameters of this 
participation to exclusively include such statesmen as himself. Milton’s political 
involvement necessarily differs from Winstanley’s sectarian activism, which sought to 
bring about a prelapsarian-style common treasury. Cary offers a valuable contrast to 
Milton in that she advocated denominational unity, which did not ultimately become a 
part of Fifth Monarchist theology, while Milton maintained his strong criticism of the 
Presbyterians. This chapter, focusing predominantly on millenarianism rather than 
utopianism, will identify Milton at a distance from contemporary millenarian 
radicalism.  
In Chapter 5, Milton’s Latin works of the 1650s will be compared to the 
contemporary tracts of his friend and fellow statesman, Marchamont Nedham (1620-
78). Rather than ideologically aligned, this chapter will suggest that Milton and Nedham 
were consistently divergent in their political thinking, regardless of how close they were 
as colleagues and friends. The chapter will contend that Nedham’s interest theory, 
which he partly draws from Machiavelli, and popular republicanism is distinct from 
Milton’s increasingly entrenched disillusionment with the English people. Whereas 
Nedham advocates popular participation, taking inspiration from the Machiavellian 
model, Milton defends a superior part of the English people, which accommodates 
Cromwell himself during the Protectorate. The final section of this chapter will address 
how Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, published as editorials in Mercurius Politicus in 
1657, identify utopianism, particularly in the form of Harrington’s Oceana, as an 
undesirable alternative to the Protectorate.  
In the sixth chapter, Milton’s 1659-60 works will be directly compared to 
two influential seventeenth-century political philosophers and utopians: Thomas 
Hobbes and James Harrington. The chapter will argue that Hobbes’s Leviathan and 
Harrington’s Oceana exhibit both utopian and millenarian ideas that inform our 
understanding of Milton’s The Readie and Easie Way (1659). The differences between 
Milton and these two philosophers will further illustrate his peculiar form of utopian 
millenarianism. Whereas, specifically, Hobbes and Harrington advocate a national 
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church, Milton proposes greater division between church and state, particularly in a 
congregationalist organisation of religion in England. Whereas, moreover, Hobbes and 
Harrington espouse a particularly stringent form of negative liberty, Milton, as this 
introduction has explained, maintains his belief in religious liberty. As such, this chapter 
will show how Milton aligns with the utopianism and millenarianism of Hobbes and 
Harrington, while acknowledging that he nonetheless maintained ideological differences 
from the two writers. 
The final two chapters of this thesis will address Milton’s attempt to depict 
the utopian millennium in his epic poetry. In Paradise Lost, which will be the subject of 
Chapter 7, Milton’s universal hierarchy and Heaven are reminiscent of a utopian 
totality. Eden, by contrast, exhibits the empirical ideal that defined Bacon’s natural 
philosophy, and which Milton had advocated in Of Education. The millennium is 
anticipated by Michael in the final two books of the poem, in which Adam, having 
failed to act on Raphael’s advice and thereby having transgressed, returns to the utopian 
conformity of Heaven by accepting that obedience is best. The chapter will show, 
therefore, how Paradise Lost depicts many of the utopian and millenarian ideas that this 
study has traced in Milton’s political and polemical works. 
The final chapter argues that Milton successfully realises the utopian 
millennium in Paradise Regain’d through the figure of the Son. The chapter will 
contend that Milton’s proximity to Quakerism through his friend and student Thomas 
Ellwood, and through his move to Chalfont St. Giles, reflects the inner utopia 
represented by the Son’s unwavering self-control in the brief epic. As Milton and the 
Quakers were both persecuted in the Restoration, the internalisation of the ideals Milton 
had espoused more openly in the 1640s and 1650s reflects this experience. The chapter 
will argue that the Son is the embodiment of Milton’s utopian millennium. 
Milton’s utopian millennium offers a valuable insight into how the ideas of 
the poet and pamphleteer developed during the mid-century, and further illustrates the 
conjunction between his prose and poetic works. Milton’s ideal of the millennium 
necessitated utopian formulations and fuelled his disaffection with the English people, 
as they invariably failed to live up to his high standards. Utopianism was a means to 
achieve the millennium. Where Milton envisioned Baconian utopianism as such a 
means in 1644, by 1649, this had been replaced by the English republic; by 1659, he 
believed that a totality on the Morean model was necessary; by 1671, the means were 
internalised in elect individuals, such as the Son and Samson, who served as utopian 
models in their own right. Milton’s toleration of all Protestant sects meant that by the 
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early 1670s, he was more accommodating of sectarian values, such as Quakerism. This 
did not mark Milton as a late-blooming radical sectarian. Rather, as Quakerism had 
become less extremist and more individual Quakers were well-educated and from 
established echelons of society, Milton was more likely to be sympathetic towards their 
views. Milton’s utopian millennium, tolerant and yet elitist, unorthodox and yet 
conservative, encodes the dynamic changes of the political and intellectual landscape of 
the mid-seventeenth-century. As his disenfranchisement with the people grew and the 
republic failed, utopianism became an interior, qualitative means of achieving the 
millennium. The utopian millennium was an ideal that Milton believed increasingly few 



























a) Utopian Origins: More & Bacon 
 
The concept of ideal society has been a subject of political philosophy for centuries, 
finding its most evident origin in Plato’s Republic. Thomas More’s (1478-1535) Utopia 
introduces the idea that regulation and control could overcome the inherent flaws of 
human nature. The societal totality that this generates is the essence of More’s original 
utopianism, and, as will be shown later in this study, constitutes a part of the mid-
seventeenth-century utopian mindset, particularly in terms of the republicanism of the 
1650s.38 However, the form of utopianism that this study will analyse is not a carbon 
copy of More’s Utopia. Rather, it develops from a rejuvenated interest in the concepts 
of utopianism that Francis Bacon (1561-1626) instigates through his New Atlantis. 
Bacon’s self-conscious alignment to More in his text, and the frequent comparison 
made between the two authors by later seventeenth-century writers, is indicative of 
Bacon’s significant role in the utopian tradition as it was received at the time. Having 
identified the major utopian tenets that originate in More’s Utopia, this chapter will 
argue that Bacon’s interpretation of the utopian tradition – particularly his focus on 
scientific learning – facilitated the greater variety of utopia that pervades the mid-
seventeenth-century period. As Chapter 2 will acknowledge, Milton’s engagement with 
Baconian utopianism was facilitated by his proximity to the Hartlib circle in the early 
1640s. While J. C. Davis argues that Bacon’s New Atlantis is not utopian, but rather 
straddles the distinction between perfect moral commonwealth and utopia, this chapter 
will argue that this ambiguity is nevertheless an important contribution to the utopian 
tradition. This chapter, therefore, identifies the myriad form of mid-seventeenth-century 
utopianism to be the product of an intertextual development of ideas, which ensured that 
no utopia following New Atlantis conformed to a distinct conceptual blueprint.39  
Davis identifies the fundamental tenets of utopianism that originate in 
More’s Utopia. Regulation and control, Davis observes, exist at the foundation of the 
Utopian state. As explained in the Introduction to this thesis, in Utopia, the inherent 
problem of civil existence that the ideal society tries to combat – want and desire 
 
38 On More and republicanism, see Jonathan Scott, Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the 
English Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 32-8. 
39 On the variety of seventeenth-century utopian texts, see Christine Rees, ‘“Atlantick and Eutopian 
Polities” in Andrew Marvell’s Poetry’, in Forum for Modern Language Studies, 37/3 (2001), pp. 241-3. 
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exceeding that which the state or society can provide – is moderated through ‘a system 
of law and public administration […] that is all-embracing in its totality.’ As Davis 
explains,  
 
What we have called the collective problem is solved in Utopia neither by the idealisation of men 
(perfect moral commonwealth) nor by the idealisation of nature (arcadia), but by the twofold 
disciplining of men. First, although they are not fond of work, the Utopians are inured to it by their 
upbringing, social attitudes and structure and the supervision of the phlyarchs […] Secondly, this 
produce appears sufficient because the Utopian’s demands are minimal, his wants conditioned by 
the society in which he lives, its laws and customs. 
 
This suggests that More had ‘little faith in the average human being’s propensity to 
civilised social behaviour.’40 More allows no room for transgression in this idealised 
state; each Utopian must conform and contribute to the larger totality. The emphasis in 
Utopia is on discipline and how state apparatus can maintain stability in society by 
controlling the behaviour and actions of its population. In terms of other forms of ideal 
society, the perfect moral commonwealth relies on the assumed – and unrealistic – 
immutable morality of its citizens; a millenarian elevates all hope of an idealised 
societal change to the second coming of Christ. The utopian, by contrast, leaves no 
margin for error: the state removes the potential for demand to outstrip supply through 
systemic control. This study will show how the utopian vision described by Davis and 
originating in More contributes to the focus on control and regulation in mid-
seventeenth-century utopianism. However, mid-seventeenth-century utopian writers did 
not draw exclusively from More, but rather from a generic tradition upon which Bacon 
had doubtlessly left his mark. It is necessary to address the utopianism of the mid-
seventeenth-century period from the perspective of the development of the genre. 
More’s Utopia is structured in two books, the former of which conveys a 
conversation between Raphael Hythloday – a mariner who has travelled to the island of 
Utopia – a fictionalised figure of More himself, and Peter Giles, who introduces 
Hythloday to More. Commentators have identified this first book as a valuable 
indication of More’s engagement with contemporary humanism. Brendan Bradshaw, 
arguing against J. H. Hexter’s view that More perceived Utopia as an idealised Christian 
commonwealth, interprets the Platonic aspects of Utopia, particularly in the figure of 
 
40 Davis, Utopia and Ideal Society, pp. 52, 54, 56. 
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Hythloday.41 He contrasts this with the fictionalised More’s belief that an intellectual, 
like Hythloday, was morally obliged to offer counsel to the government of a 
commonwealth.42 The figure of More in Utopia repeatedly suggests that Hythloday 
should ‘enter some king’s service’: ‘I am fully persuaded that if you could overcome 
your aversion to court life, your advice to a prince would be of the greatest advantage to 
the public welfare.’ Hythloday’s response is that ‘doubtless Plato was right in 
foreseeing that unless kings became philosophical themselves the advice of 
philosophers would never influence them’.43 Quentin Skinner argues that Hythloday’s 
self-consciously Platonic outlook contrasts with the fictionalised More, who articulates 
a distinctly Ciceronian civic humanism:   
 
If we are to speak more precisely, we must recognise that what More is doing in Book I is reviving 
one particular set of humanist beliefs – those of a ‘civic’ or Ciceronian humanism – and sharply 
opposing them to a more fashionable and broadly Platonist outlook that was threatening to 
undermine the element of political commitment in the humanism of More’s own time.44 
 
This is a contrast between the active life, in which the intellectual contributes to the 
commonwealth through counsel, and the contemplative life, which Hythloday argues is 
preferable if philosophers are not kings, as they are in Plato’s Republic. The importance 
of participation in a commonwealth was central to mid-seventeenth-century utopian 
texts. In The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), James Harrington secures popular 
participation through a system of perpetual rotation, which was designed to avoid 
corruption of either the popular assembly or the senate. For Milton, the concept of 
participation in Areopagitica was dependent on his understanding of the relationship 
between the private and public, which, significantly, finds precedent in Utopia. 
More’s Utopia idealises a form of communism in which the private sphere 
is subsumed into the public. There is neither private property nor money in Utopia; their 
houses are never locked and even the privacy of the body is exposed before marriage to 
the future spouse. The Utopian is not a private individual, but rather a public servant. 
 
41 See J. H. Hexter and Edward Surtz, eds., The Complete Works of St Thomas More, IV (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1965), xv-cxxiv. 
42 Brendan Bradshaw, ‘More on Utopia’, in The Historical Journal, 24/1 (1981), pp. 18-23. 
43 Thomas More, On the Best State of a Commonwealth and on the New Island of Utopia, in George M. 
Logan, ed., Robert M. Adams, trans., More: Utopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; 
fourth repr. 2019), pp. 13, 29; further references to Utopia will be made to this edition and will appear 
parenthetically in the running text. 
44 Quentin Skinner, ‘Thomas More’s Utopia and the Virtue of True Nobility’, in Visions of Politics: 
Renaissance Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 223, see generally 218-23. 
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Work and leisure hours are equally regulated; idleness is limited just as recreation is 
monitored. As Hythloday asserts at the end of book 2 of the text, ‘Even the rich, I’m 
sure, understand this. They must know that it’s better to have enough of what we really 
need than an abundance of superfluities, much better to escape from our many present 
troubles than to be burdened with great masses of wealth (112).’ The private is removed 
to solve the problem of social inequality; public, collective wealth is, instead, favoured 
in Utopia. As this study will show, Milton’s own perception of the relationship between 
private and public spheres develops during the course of his polemical career. Where 
Areopagitica idealises the contribution of private individuals to a public, millenarian 
good, during the 1650s Milton became increasingly disaffected with the potential for 
private individuals to enact positive change in society. Milton’s attention narrowed to 
those individuals capable of serving the commonwealth, particularly to millenarian 
ends, who were largely defined by their education, religion, and political persuasion. 
One of Skinner’s major arguments for Utopia is that More advocates a view of nobility 
that is not defined by wealth, as it was perceived by humanists contemporary to More.45 
If the Utopians have achieved the ideal state, then they have not done so through wealth 
and status. While Milton’s elitism was meritocratic, he also increasingly believed that 
the common sort was incapable of fulfilling his own ideals. The relationship between 
private and public spheres that More establishes in Utopia is further explored in 
seventeenth-century utopian texts. Milton’s elitism is distinct from More’s communism, 
but he nonetheless engages with civic humanism in the mid-seventeenth-century as 
More does in Utopia. 
The central means through which More envisions the conflation of the 
private and public spheres is through the absolute uniformity of the Utopian society, in 
which a totalising communist system, moderated by the state, suppresses human want. 
The fifty-four cities that comprise Utopia are ‘entirely identical in language, customs, 
institutions and laws’ (44). In turn, Hythloday discusses the egalitarian nature of the 
Utopian state in that the Utopians take it in turns to act as farm labourers (45) as well as 
other roles in society. The system is total and dominating: all Utopians contribute 
equally to the betterment of the state. More collapses all societally-imposed boundaries. 
Despite this wider structural equality, there is a distinct system of regulation that 
percolates into the domestic confines of the Utopian household. The hierarchy of the 
 
45 Ibid., pp. 224-34; see also Skinner, ‘Sir Thomas More’s Utopia and the Language of Renaissance 
Humanism’, in Anthony Pagden, ed., The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 154. 
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household, whereby men remain in the same house ‘and are subject to the oldest 
member’ (56) correlates with the wider magisterial system, in which syphogrants are 
elected by every thirty families, which, in turn, are under an officer known as the 
tranibore (49-50). The role of the syphogrant is simple: eliminate idleness (52). As will 
become a major feature of future utopian works, every citizen must contribute equally 
and effectively to the betterment of the state.46 The macrocosm of the Utopian state, 
therefore, mirrors the microcosm of the domestic household; both are formed on a 
patriarchal system of control that regulates through hierarchical authority. These are the 
mechanisms through which the private becomes conflated with the public in Utopia. 
While More’s hierarchical state anticipates the patriarchal utopia of Winstanley’s The 
Law of Freedom (1652), state-regulated societies are also represented in Harrington’s 
The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) and Milton’s own The Readie and Easie Way 
(1659). Indeed, More’s careful attention to detail – he lists, for instance, the exact 
timings of every Utopian’s day, in which they work for nine hours and sleep for eight – 
mirrors Harrington’s own meticulous description of the minutiae of his balloting 
system. In keeping with the role of the syphogrant, the Utopians are not expected to 
waste their free time in ‘roistering or sloth’, but rather to utilise it in some form of 
recreational learning, which varies from lectures to music (52-3).  
Every facet of the life of the Utopian encourages the maintaining and 
enforcing of discipline. As Hythloday affirms, 
 
So you see that nowhere is there any chance to loaf or any pretext for evading work; there are no 
wine-bars, or ale-houses, or brothels; no chances for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for 
secret meetings. Because they live in the full view of all, they are bound to be either working at 
their usual trades or enjoying their leisure in a respectable way (62). 
 
There is nowhere to escape from the self-perpetuating and self-fulfilling totality of life 
in the Utopian state. The system depends on, and in turn enforces, discipline and 
conformity. More’s original utopianism is a totalising form of ideal society that 
infiltrates the intimate and domestic details of a Utopian’s life. The communist equality 
that Hythloday lauds in Utopia, which he suggests Plato advocated (39-40), is 
systemically structured to ensure participation of every citizen to the betterment of the 
Utopian state. There may be few laws, as Hythloday insists (39), but the system itself, 
 
46 See, for instance, Gerrard Winstanley, The Law of Freedom, discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, pp. 
174-8. 
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as it is in Oceana, is self-perpetuating. In Areopagitica, a text in which Milton criticises 
utopian idealism, he envisions a London in which the community contributes to an 
eschatological end point. Indeed, it is in the absence of laws – in this case, pre-
publication licensing – that necessitates the cultural system of participation in the 
betterment of the state. It was not, however, until 1659, with the imminent prospect of 
the Restoration, that Milton decided that, with the people incapable of contributing to 
the betterment of the state themselves, a stringent society comparable to the Morean 
model was necessary. Milton’s 1644 texts are more comparable to the utopianism of the 
Hartlib circle, the precedent for which was established by Bacon in his New Atlantis. 
 
 
BACON’S NEW ATLANTIS 
 
Of Education and Areopagitica owe more to Bacon’s utopianism than to More’s. 
Stephen Fallon has suggested that Milton’s developing theory of a relationship between 
spirit and matter may have drawn from a similar aspect of Bacon’s own philosophy.47 
Other critics have similarly made arguments for Milton’s Baconian sympathies.48 
William Poole, however, has argued for Milton’s distance from contemporary scientific 
discourse, particularly that of the Royal Society in his later life. While Milton was not a 
proponent of contemporary scientific ideas, which is likely a reason for his distance 
from the Hartlib circle during the later 1640s, this does not negate his Baconianism. 
Poole himself asserts that ‘there is no denying that it is possible to situate Milton in 
some kind of “dialogue” with contemporary science,’ but that ‘the dynamics of this 
dialogue are affected by other variables, notably the appropriation of radicalism, 
particularly theological radicalism.’49 It is, in fact, Milton’s theology that most clearly 
aligns him with Bacon’s natural philosophy. Bacon’s belief that the propagation of 
knowledge would bring about a return to prelapsarian dominion of nature, which will be 
discussed further in the following chapter, mirrors Milton’s own belief, particularly in 
the early 1640s, that intellectual reform would help usher in the millennium. In his New 
Atlantis, Bacon conflates his natural philosophy with the original utopianism that More 
 
47 Stephen M. Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century 
England (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 113-17. 
48 See Catherine Gimelli Martin, ‘“What if the Son Be the Centre of the World?’: Milton’s Epistemology, 
Cosmology, and Paradise of Fools Reconsidered’, in Modern Philology, 99/2 (2001), 231-65; Harinder 
Singh Marjara, Contemplation of Created Things: Science in Paradise Lost (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1992). 
49 William Poole, ‘Milton and Science: A Caveat’, in Milton Quarterly, 38/1 (2004), p. 28. 
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had established over a century earlier. It may not be a carbon copy of Utopia, which has 
led Davis to remove it from the utopian genre altogether, but it is written as a travel 
narrative, offering an insight into an ideal commonwealth in a style that self-consciously 
aligns with More. As Paul Salzman posits, ‘Bacon uses the New Atlantis to offer a 
vision of a society dedicated to scientific advancement, but he also uses it indirectly to 
convey a political vision of an ordered society’.50 As this study will show, mid-
seventeenth-century utopianism was myriad in style, form, and substance. One of 
Bacon’s most valuable contributions to the development of utopianism as a genre was to 
innovate on More’s utopian model: Bacon not only created his own utopia, one 
dedicated to the advancement of knowledge, but he also set a precedent as a utopian 
writer innovating on the utopian form that preceded him. 
Bensalem in New Atlantis is structured by a system of order, which is 
reminiscent of More’s original Utopia. Davis concludes that ‘the description of New 
Atlantis is too superficial for it to be labelled utopian in the sense already allocated’. 
While there is ‘a disciplinary and conflict-resolving function allocated to fathers 
preparing for the Feast of the Family […] given infant mortality rates and life 
expectancy, this can hardly have been expected to provide the basis for a general social 
order.’51 Davis’s argument assumes that Bacon’s New Atlantis must closely adhere to 
the blueprint of More’s Utopia for it to be called a utopia. While basic Morean tenets 
help define a text as utopian – and indeed some mid-seventeenth-century utopias are 
more evidently utopian in a Morean sense than New Atlantis – Bacon’s interpretation of 
the utopian tradition provides a more diverse precedent for the utopias that follow. The 
Feast of the Family, for instance, is, in fact, a significant representation of patriarchal 
order within Bacon’s ideal society, and one that resembles the familial system of 
More’s Utopia. Although the event occurs when a man lives ‘to see thirty persons 
descended of his body alive together, and all above three years’, which Davis suggests 
means that it is an infrequent event, the prominence of the Feast in the text should not 
be overlooked. Indeed, the manner in which it prompts the discussion with Joabim 
about marriage in Bensalem and its differences with Utopia suggests a wider parallel 
with More. During the Feast, at which all members of the family attend, the Tirsan deals 
with ‘any discord or suits between any of the family’; if any of the family are 
‘distressed or decayed, order is taken for their relief and competent means to live’; ‘if 
 
50 Paul Salzman, ‘Narrative Contexts for Bacon’s New Atlantis’, in Bronwen Price, ed., Francis Bacon’s 
‘New Atlantis’ (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 42. 
51 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, pp. 118-19. 
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any be subject to vice, or take ill courses, they are reproved and censured’. Equally, 
‘orders and advices’ are given regarding marriage.52 The patriarchal authority described 
by Joabim in this tradition draws from the power of the state: ‘The governor assisteth, to 
the end to put in execution by his public authority the decrees and orders of the Tirsan, 
if they should be disobeyed; though that seldom needeth; such reverence and obedience 
they give to the order of nature’ (169). This situation epitomises the relationship 
between utopianism and perfect moral commonwealth ideas in New Atlantis: while the 
framework of authority exists, the descendants of the Tirsan predominantly adhere to 
any orders. This is not, however, to say that the citizens of Bensalem are idealistically 
moral during the Feast, but rather that they are aware of the system in place. As the 
Feast plays a prominent role in interrelating New Atlantis and Utopia, and given the 
evident parallels between Bacon’s patriarchal system and that of More’s, the 
Bensalemite tradition illustrates the utopian order that lies behind the narrative of New 
Atlantis. 
Within this system of order is the institution that most clearly distances 
Bacon from More: Salomon’s House. Bacon’s theorisation and idealisation of such an 
institution had been at the forefront of his thinking for many years.53 As William 
Rawley, Bacon’s private chaplain, writes in the preface of the text: ‘This fable my Lord 
devised, to the end that he might exhibit therein a model or description of a college 
instituted for the interpreting of nature and the producing of great and marvellous works 
for the benefit of men, under the name of Salomon’s House, or the College of the Six 
Days’ Works’ (151). Rawley views Salomon’s House as the defining feature of New 
Atlantis. He does not describe Bacon’s desire to depict an ideal society in the style of 
More, but rather explicitly refers to the House. Accordingly, the House looms over the 
text; it takes until the end of New Atlantis for a Fellow to divulge its inner workings to 
the narrator. In this narrative structure, which reaffirms the educational purpose of New 
Atlantis – we learn about the House before we actually see it – its status as the integral 
kernel of Bensalem is clear. In the description of the advent of Christianity in Bensalem, 
it is described as ‘the very eye of this kingdom’ (159); the governor defines it as ‘the 
noblest foundation (as we think) that ever was upon earth; and the lanthorn of this 
kingdom’ (167). It is appropriate, therefore, that the arrival of the Father of Salomon’s 
 
52 Bacon, New Atlantis, in Susan Bruce, ed., Three Early Modern Utopias (Oxford: Oxford University 
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53 See Boesky, Founding Fictions, pp. 63-5. 
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House is uniquely detailed in New Atlantis. Bacon focuses closely on the ‘sun of gold’ 
that the Father wears, alongside a ‘small cherub of gold, with wings displayed’; the 
‘chariot was covered with cloth of gold tissued upon blue’; and ‘fifty attendants, young 
men all, in white satin loose coats to the mid-leg’ comprised the entourage. In the 
narrative, the Father is quasi-monarchical in his resplendent attire; he certainly appears 
with royal splendour and authority. Even the narrator treats him differently, as he 
‘stooped down, and kissed the hem of his tippet’, a sign of deference that other 
Bensalemites refused earlier in the text. Joabim, however, describing the Fathers, 
explains how ‘we have seen none of them this dozen years. His coming is in state; but 
the cause of his coming is secret’ (175). The Father may have made his appearance due 
to the return of Merchants of Light, who journey abroad for twelve years, but it may 
also be because of the surprise arrival of foreigners. What is important is that Joabim 
and the other Bensalemites have not seen the Fathers for so long. This suggests that the 
House is very much removed from Bacon’s wider ideal society. 
The aloof nature of the House is indicative of the inherent liberty – 
tantamount to self-governance – that the institution enjoys. Most evidently, the Fellows 
of the House manage the twelve-yearly expeditions abroad of two ships, manned by the 
Merchants of Light. As the ancient King Salomona decreed, their ‘errand was only to 
give us knowledge of the affairs and state of those countries to which they were 
designed, and especially of the sciences, arts, manufactures, and inventions of all the 
world; and withal to bring unto us books, instruments, and patterns in every kind’ (167-
8). The expeditions of the Merchants of Light are exclusively intellectual. As 
expeditions, and particularly for that length of time, they are entirely uncontrolled by 
the state. This means, of course, that the state of Bensalem assumes that these 
Merchants have the moral fortitude to fulfil their objective and return home. They are, 
however, as with Bacon and the Hartlibians after him, exploring uncharted intellectual 
terrain; in order to fulfil Bacon’s ideal of the Great Instauration, certain liberties were 
necessary. The necessary freedom of the Merchants of Light illustrates the conflict in 
New Atlantis between utopianism and perfect moral commonwealth ideas. These 
expeditions originate from a time where King Solamona was centralising power: the 
liberty of the Merchants of Light is borne out of his decree. It is clear, moreover, from 
the reception of the Father of the House, that Salomon’s House is treated with a 
reverence that distinguishes it from the state, whilst it always works to the betterment of 
Bensalem. Therefore, whereas Davis removes the definition of ‘utopia’ from Bensalem, 
given the greater diversity of mid-seventeenth-century utopias, it is better to consider 
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New Atlantis as an important contribution to the utopian genre, one that innovates on 
More’s original form. In Areopagitica, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, Milton 
advocates freedom from pre-publication licensing in order to achieve an ultimate ideal 
of the millennium; Bacon envisions the freedom of Salomon’s House with similarly 
eschatological ambitions. While Milton refrains from monumentalised Baconianism, 
such as in the distance he keeps from the Hartlib circle, whose Office of Address was 
partly modelled on Salomon’s House as well as Renaudot’s Bureau d’adresse, Bacon’s 
ideal of returning to prelapsarian dominion over nature is depicted in the dialogue 
between Adam and God in Paradise Lost (v. 250-451). 
Gabriel Plattes’s A Description of the Famous Kingdome of Macaria (1641) 
exhibits both the ideal of advancing knowledge – specifically medical knowledge – 
prominent in New Atlantis and is also structured as a travel narrative and dialogue 
reminiscent of More’s Utopia. Plattes’s utopia was written within the Hartlib circle and 
reflects the Baconian attitude of centralising knowledge in order to advance its 
communication, distribution and propagation. However, in his prefatory address to 
parliament, Plattes acknowledges that he is writing in the utopian tradition of More as 
well as Bacon.54 Accordingly, while Macaria is structured as a dialogic exchange 
between a traveller and a scholar, reflecting that of Hythloday and More in Utopia, it 
also envisions a ‘Colledge of experience’ (83), through which medicine and medical 
knowledge are distributed nationally. In Salomon’s House, there are ‘dispensatories, or 
shops of medicines’, which are described as being in far greater variety and volume than 
that found in contemporary Europe (180-1). Later in Macaria, moreover, the scholar 
explains that ‘one thing troubleth me, that many Divines are of opinion, that no such 
Reformation as we would have, shall come before the day of judgement’ (89). In 
response, the traveller insists that reformation will precede the millennium, specifically 
utopian reformation on the model of Macaria. Dissemination of knowledge by printing 
will encourage common people specifically to bring about Macarian reform. Macaria is 
not only a valuable seventeenth-century utopia in its synthesis of Morean form and 
Baconian ideas, but also, as the next chapter will show, in its proximity to Milton’s Of 
Education, the elitist ideas of which seem to have had an impact on Hartlibian ideology 
in the late 1640s. 
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The development of the utopian tradition between More and Bacon sets a significant 
precedent for the utopian texts that this thesis will consider. More’s Utopia defines the 
style of utopianism that Davis uses as a standard for the utopias that follow. Bacon’s 
New Atlantis innovates on More’s model. Bacon does not unequivocally conform to the 
generic tradition initiated by More, but rather places greater emphasis on learning, and 
particularly on a form of scientific research. This results in the institution of Salomon’s 
House enjoying a level of freedom incongruous with the wider Bensalem society. 
Notwithstanding the Merchants of Light, the House itself is structured by an empirical 
system of research that resembles a utopian totality. Bacon’s form of utopianism is 
more in keeping with that which follows him in the mid-seventeenth-century. None of 
these latter utopias are carbon copies of the Morean totality. They often focus on 
regulation and control, especially within the context of education. For Milton in 
particular, poor levels of education directly necessitated utopian formulations, in order 
to overcome the downfalls of an ignorant public. The fundamental difference between 
More’s Utopia and Bacon’s New Atlantis, which was more in keeping with mid-
seventeenth-century utopias, was that More’s utopia was an end in itself; Bacon’s, by 
contrast, through Salomon’s House, served the higher goal of wider scientific progress. 
The utopias that will be considered in this study follow Bacon’s model: the idealised 
endpoint of much mid-seventeenth-century utopianism – especially with Milton – is the 
millennium of Christ. Bacon, in many respects, catalysed the process of development of 













b) Millenarian Origins: Joseph Mede & Of Reformation 
 
Milton’s early poems, ‘Nativity Ode’ (1629) and ‘Lycidas’ (1638), exhibit an early 
form of the chiliasm that would become more prominent in the prose tracts Milton 
published during the eschatological excitement and fervour of the 1640s.55 Milton wrote 
‘Nativity Ode’ while he was at Christ’s, the Cambridge college where Joseph Mede 
(1586-1639), a significant millenarian writer, was a tutor. Mede’s works, specifically 
Clavis Apocalyptica (1627), illuminate the juncture between Milton’s early millenarian 
formulations and the more consolidated eschatology of his 1644 pamphlets, Of 
Education and Areopagitica. As this thesis will show, Milton’s belief in the imminence 
of the millennium, and his conviction that intellectual progress would realise this 
idealised end of history, necessitated the increasingly utopian mindset that he exhibits 
most evidently from 1644 onwards. The previous chapter suggested that, despite 
arguments for Milton’s distance from Bacon, they shared a belief that intellectual 
progress could bring about some form of reunification with God. This chapter will 
argue that Of Reformation was a significant precedent for the 1644 writings that Milton 
wrote while he was in correspondence with the Hartlib circle.56 Of Reformation 
illustrates for the first time Milton’s belief that society can achieve the intellectual 
progress necessary to realise the millennium through the frictional and competing ideas 
of society-wide research and thinking. Just as these ideas, which disparately appear 
throughout the anti-episcopal tracts, are more coherently articulated in Areopagitica, so 
the utopianism of these tracts is not yoked to millenarianism in the way it is in later 
works. Indeed, the elitism that largely inspires Milton’s utopian attitude in later texts 
lacks prominence at this early stage in his writing career: a key component of Milton’s 
anti-episcopal argument, based on the Presbyterian model – which he would come to 
strongly oppose in the latter part of 1649 – is that laymen should have the power to elect 
 
55 On these two poems and how they exhibit Milton’s early eschatology, see Nicholas McDowell, Poet of 
Revolution: The Making of John Milton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), pp. 176-8; and 
John Leonard, ‘The Two-Handed Engine and the Millennium at the Door’, in Edward Jones, ed., Young 
Milton: The Emerging Author, 1620-1642 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 252-77. 
56 On Milton and the Hartlib circle, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter, see, amongst 
others, Nicholas McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance in the English Civil War: Marvell and the Cause of 
Wit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 53-69; David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: 
Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 118-25. 
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local religious leaders. Milton, forging his authorial identity within the complex and 
varied landscape of 1640s pamphleteering, was also still forming his political 
philosophy and theology.57 Milton’s faith in the people between 1641-2 is the key 
reason why he does not begin to associate his millenarianism with utopianism. Milton 
had faith that the people could contribute to his eschatological ends. This chapter will 
show how the anti-prelatical tracts represent the foundation of what would become the 
utopian millennium for Milton.  
Lutz Greisiger illuminates the distinction between millenarianism and 
apocalypticism, which is often overlooked by commentators.58 Greisiger’s definitions of 
millenarianism and apocalypticism are valuable: ‘Apocalyptic and apocalypticism are 
derived from the last book of the New Testament, the Revelation (apokalypsis) of St 
John which originally served as the prototype and “reference work” for a great number 
of – mostly extra-canonical – Jewish and Christian writings.’ ‘It marks’, Greisiger 
continues, ‘not just ‘“the end” but the completion of history, the conciliation of 
contradictions, and an essentially better world to come.’ In contrast to apocalypticism, 
millenarianism refers to the part of Revelation ‘where there is revealed to the seer the 
coming of a thousand years, a millennium, of the binding of Satan and of peace and 
prosperity for the chosen part of humankind.’ This millennium is the thousand-year 
reign of Christ that was believed to foreshadow the apocalypse: ‘a penultimate period of 
near perfection preceding the actual end of history’. Greisiger explains that often 
‘apocalypticists expect that future aeon of cosmic purity and perfection to come about 
only after a millennium-like interim period in which earthly conditions will already 
reach a near-to-ideal state.’ Resonating with Smith’s analysis of the millenarian 
perfectionism of the 1640s, the concept of a ‘near-to-ideal state’ is consistent with the 
genre of ideal society, in which utopianism is situated.59 These are, moreover, ‘earthly 
conditions’ that will be elevated to ideal status, which suggests that millenarianism 
 
57 On Milton and his identity as a political pamphleteer in the 1640s, see Thomas N. Corns, ‘Milton’s 
Quest for Respectability’, in The Modern Language Review, 77/4 (1982), 769-79. 
58 For alternative discussions of seventeenth-century millenarianism, see Andrew Bradstock, 
‘Millenarianism in the Reformation and English Revolution’, in Stephen Hunt, ed., Christian 
Millenarianism: From the Early Church to Waco (Hurst & Company, 2001), pp. 77-87; and William M. 
Lamont, Godly Rule: Politics and Religion, 1603-60 (St Martin’s Press, 1969), p. 8; on sixteenth-century 
millenarianism, see Richard Bauckham, Tudor Apocalypse (Oxford: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1978); 
on Milton and millenarianism generally, see the essays in Juliet Cummins, ed., Milton and the Ends of 
Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
59 Nigel Smith, Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion, 1640-60 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 1-18. 
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could inspire individuals, such as Milton, to pursue reform on the earthly plane.60 
Milton’s desire to usher in further reform is inspired by a belief that Christ will return to 
earth before the apocalyptic close of history. In Of Reformation, Milton perceives 
England as an elect nation, observing the ‘Precedencie which GOD gave this Iland, to be 
the first Restorer of buried Truth’ (CPW i. 526). The elect stature of England in 
Milton’s ideology at this point feeds the social elitism that is evident in Of Education 
(1644), and which becomes more prominent when he works for the English republic in 
the 1650s. Well-educated statesmen are required to keep England on the path of 
Reformation towards the millennium. In later life, with the failure of the republic and 
Protectorate, Milton turns from England as an elect nation to elect individuals, such as 
Milton himself, as capable of realising eschatological change in England.  
The previous chapter has shown how important Bacon is as a precedent for 
utopian ideas in the seventeenth-century, but it is also important to acknowledge how 
his speculative philosophy was compatible with mid-century millenarianism. As a 
literary and ideological precedent, Bacon’s works represent the concept of intellectual 
progress – particularly empirical and scientific in nature – as integral to regaining the 
ideal status of knowledge and dominion that Adam enjoyed in Eden. Although Bacon’s 
millenarianism is less prominent, the idea that reform was necessary to achieve a 
newfound unity with God does share principles with later seventeenth-century 
millenarians. In his The Advancement of Learning (1605), written in the form of a letter 
to King James, Bacon acknowledges the argument, particularly made by ‘Divines’, ‘that 
knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and 
caution, that thaspiring [sic] to overmuch knowledge, was the originall temptation and 
sinne, whereupon ensued the fal of Man’ (OFB iv. 5-6). Bacon responds that ‘it was not 
pure knowledg of nature and universality’ that caused the Fall, but rather ‘the proude 
knowledge of good and evill, with an intent in man to give law unto himself, and to 
depend no more upon Gods commandments, which was the fourme of the temptation’. 
Bacon likens this former pursuit of knowledge by empirical means that he favours to ‘a 
knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in Paradise, as 
they were brought before him’ (6). Drawing inspiration and justification from 
Ecclesiastes, which he suggests was written by King Salomon, Bacon advocates 
learning that does not make the mind ‘swell or outcompasse it selfe’ (7). The image of 
swelling corresponds with the sense of transgression or overreaching that Bacon 
 
60 Greisiger, ‘Apocalypticism, Millenarianism, and Messianism’, pp. 272-3, 277-8. 
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pinpoints as the reason for the Fall. Instead, Bacon asserts that ‘God hath framed the 
minde of man as a mirrour, or glasse, capable of the Image of the universall world’ (6). 
A better understanding of the world that God created facilitates a better understanding 
of God himself; such a pursuit of knowledge does not challenge divine authority. As 
Charles Webster explains, ‘investigations conducted into secondary causes, and with 
utilitarian ends in mind, would incur no risk of transgression, but instead glorify God, 
and restore man’s dominion over nature.’61 As Milton will come to argue nearly forty 
years later, in a text dedicated to Samuel Hartlib, an intelligencer with strong Baconian 
ideas, ‘The end then of learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents by regaining to 
know God aright’ (CPW ii. 366-7). Although Milton’s educational principles were more 
specifically orientated towards the millennium, Bacon and Milton share the belief that 





Joseph Mede’s eschatology remained influential at the time when Milton, in his 
correspondence with the Hartlib circle in the 1640s, engaged with and expressed 
millenarian ideas. Mede, who became a fellow of King’s in 1613, published his seminal 
Clavis Apocalyptica in 1627, during Milton’s second year at Cambridge. As one of the 
most prominent millenarian texts of the early-seventeenth-century, the Clavis was 
translated posthumously as the Key of the Revelation in 1643 by the order of the Long 
Parliament, along with tracts from other significant millenarian writers.62 In the 
pamphleteering landscape of the early 1640s, these texts, selected and promoted by 
parliament, existed alongside other controversial millenarian tracts, such as Thomas 
Goodwin’s A Glimpse of Sions Glory (1641) and John Archer’s The Personall Raigne of 
Christ Upon Earth (1642).63 McDowell, in his biography of Milton, explains the unique 
significance of Mede in Milton’s early life at Cambridge, particularly as a figure whom 
he almost certainly would have encountered in his time at Christ’s,  
 
 
61 Webster, The Great Instauration, p. 22. 
62 These texts include Thomas Brightman, The Workes of Thomas Brightman (1644), John Napier, A 
Plaine Discovery of the whole Revelation of Saint John (1593 – reissued in 1640s(?)), and Johann 
Heinrich Alstead, The Beloved City, or The Saints Reign on earth a Thousand Yeares (1643). 
63 Stella P. Revard, ‘Milton and millenarianism: from the Nativity Ode to Paradise Regained’, in Milton 
and the Ends of Time, p. 47. 
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who combined a strong, millenarian anti-Catholicism with distaste for the harder forms of 
Calvinist predestinarianism; who made public in the mid-1630s views on devotional practice that 
he had long held and that appealed to Laudian ceremonialists, yet in his private correspondence 
lamented what he regarded as the growing authoritarianism and intolerance in the Laudian party.64 
 
The parallels with Milton are apparent: Milton’s anti-prelatical tracts mark his first 
explicit attack on the Laudian church in print; his opposition to Calvinist predestination 
would become a prominent part of his theology; and, most importantly for this study, 
his millenarianism would only become more strongly articulated in the 1640s and 
beyond.65 McDowell also observes how Milton’s pursuit of universal learning, drawing 
from the humanist ideal of ‘general learning’ and mirroring the pursuit of encyclopaedic 
learning that characterised the Hartlibian enterprise, was an ideal that suggests common 
ground with Mede’s own humanist scholarship, especially in Clavis Apocalyptica.66 
Indeed, given Milton’s lack of interest for scientific learning, which would eventually 
distance him from the Hartlib circle, Mede’s humanism would have likely encouraged 
his interest in the famous Cambridge don and his works. 
In turn, Mede also provides evidence for why someone like Milton would 
have engaged with the Hartlib circle: Mede maintained a discourse with Samuel Hartlib 
and John Dury in the 1630s, in which he was asked for his thoughts on particular tracts 
that the pair planned to publish, such as Dury’s treatise on Batavian churches.67 Hartlib, 
who had referred to his ‘high estimation’ of Mede’s ‘worthy memory’ shortly after his 
death, explicitly praises Mede’s works, particularly in comparison to the apocalyptic 
writings of Ezerel Tonge, in a letter to John Worthington: ‘The Revelation Book 
translated out of High Dutch hath almost nothing but what worthy Mr. Mede hath 
published.’68 That Hartlib was in correspondence with Worthington about Mede in the 
years prior to Worthington’s publication of The Works of Joseph Mede in 1665 is 
suggestive of Mede’s enduring impact on the development of Hartlibian thinking. 
Chapter 2 will discuss how Hartlib, as a prominent educationalist of the 1640s, was in 
 
64 McDowell, Poet of Revolution, p. 267. 
65 For an argument that Milton supported Laudianism in the early 1630s, see Gordon Campbell and 
Thomas N. Corns, John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 
84, 95. 
66 McDowell, Poet of Revolution, pp. 66-78. 
67 See letter from Mede to Hartlib, in John Worthington, ed., The Works of Joseph Mede (London, 1677), 
pp. 864-5. 
68 Letter from Samuel Hartlib to Sir Justinian Ischam, 15 August 1639, in MS IC 231A, Northamptonshire 
Record Office; letter from Hartlib to John Worthington, dated 19 November 1661, in J. Crossly, ed., ‘The 
Diary and Correspondence of Dr. John Worthington’, vol. II, in Chetham Society Vol. XXXVI 
(Manchester, 1885), pp. 71-3. 
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discourse with Milton; his desire for educational reform and belief that it was necessary 
to achieve the millennium correlated with Milton’s own ideas at the time. As a 
theologian who maintained a friendly correspondence with Hartlib, Mede represents a 
significant part of Milton’s millenarian context.69 Where Sarah Hutton suggests that 
Mede’s Laudian sympathies are at odds with Milton’s anti-prelatical tracts, McDowell 
shows how Mede was critical of Laudian authoritarianism.70 Mede, therefore, offers a 
possible context through which Milton’s anti-episcopacy developed, alongside the 
millenarianism that attended it.  
Mede’s Clavis Apocalyptica set a precedent for its interpretation of the 
various symbols of Revelation as signifiers of a coherent eschatological timeline.71 
Mede interpreted ‘synchronisms’ within Revelation, which he described as ‘when the 
things therein designed run along in the same time; as if thou shouldest call it an 
agreement in time or age: because prophecies of things falling out in the same time run 
on in time together, or Synchronize.’ In translation, the Key to the Revelation is not full 
of the rhetorical anticipation and fervour of later millenarians, such as Gerrard 
Winstanley. Instead, Mede takes a more scholarly approach to Revelation by identifying 
unity between the myriad symbols of the text. Mede’s interpretation of symbolic 
patterns in Revelation allows him to create a temporal framework from which 
synchronic predictions about end times could be made.72 Mede explains his 
interpretative approach to Revelation in the second part of the Key:  
 
For truely he that will endeavour with successe to finde out the meaning of the Apocalyptique 
visions, must first of all place the course, and connexion of them one with another according to 
things done, being thorowly searched out by the foresaid characters and notes, and demonstrated, 
by intrinsical arguments as the basis, and foundation of every solid, and true interpretation (27). 
 
Mede explains that his text was the product of careful research and contemplation of 
Revelation. The Key establishes unity from the seemingly eclectic symbolism of the 
 
69 Joseph Mede, Richard More, trans., The Key of the Revelation, searched and demonstrated out of the 
Naturall and proper Charecters of the Visions (1643), p. 1. Further references will be made 
parenthetically in the running text. 
70 Sarah Hutton, ‘The Appropriation of Joseph Mede’, in James E. Force, Richard H. Popkin, eds., The 
Millenarian Turn: Millenarian contexts of Science, Politics, and Everyday Anglo-American Life in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Dordrecht: Klewer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 8-11. 
71 Other significant contemporary millenarian texts include: John Archer, The Personall Raigne of Christ 
Upon Earth (1641), which argues for the monarchical reign of Christ on earth for a millennium; and 
Thomas Goodwin, A Glimpse of Sions Glory (1641), considered below. 
72 See Hutton, in Milton and the Ends of Time, pp. 30-1. 
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biblical text. The seven synchronisms that Mede identifies initially in the text parallel 
with his interpretation of the seven seals; the seventh seal, in turn, opens to the seven 
trumpets, the last of which heralds the ‘excellent and Emperiall Kingdom of Christ’ 
(22).  
William Twisse, a friend and correspondent of Mede, wrote a preface to the 
Key that highlights the value of the text itself and of Mede for his interpretative 
approach. In his praise of Mede’s ‘studiousnesse and dexteritie’, Twisse explains how 
Mede ‘hath drawne together the homogeneall parts of [Revelation], dispersed here and 
there, yet belonging to the same time; the indistinction whereof may expose many to no 
small errour ere he be aware’ (A4). Twisse lauds Mede as much for the interpretative 
method as for the substance of the interpretation itself. This analytical approach 
supports the millenarian conclusions of the tract. Twisse emphasises Mede’s 
‘distinction’ of ‘the clearing of the state of Christs glorious Kingdom here on earth’ 
(A8). Mede discusses this in the fifth and sixth synchronisms of the second part of his 
text, in which he explains that the millennium of Christ will follow the defeat of the 
Beast, and will be defined by the reign of Christ and his saints on Earth in the form of a 
new Jerusalem. By the early 1640s, Milton would have known of Mede, his Clavis 
Apocalyptica, and the millenarian exegesis within. As he made his first major foray into 
the world of pamphleteering, he would also likely have been aware of, if not affected 
by, the millenarian interest and focus of English government and society that resulted in 
the translation of Clavis in 1643 as the Key.73  
 
 
YOUNG MILTON AND THE MILLENNIUM 
 
The impact of Milton’s millenarian context on his works and developing theology can 
be discerned in both ‘Lycidas’ (1637) and Of Reformation (1641). Marjorie Nicolson 
has suggested that the ‘old Damœtas’ of ‘Lycidas’ refers to Mede himself.74 McDowell 
also posits that Milton may have included millenarian imagery in ‘Lycidas’ in the 
knowledge that readers at Christ’s, such as Mede, would have understood these 
references, the meaning of which has caused substantial disagreement between recent 
 
73 For Milton cutting his teeth in the 1640s world of pamphleteering, see Thomas Corns, ‘Milton’s Quest 
for Respectability’, in The Modern Language Review, 77/4 (1982), p. 771. 
74 See John Milton, ‘Lycidas’ in CWJM iii. 50-8, line 36; further references to ‘Lycidas’ will be made 
parenthetically in the running text; Marjorie Nicolson, ‘Milton’s “Old Damaetas”’, in Modern Language 
Notes, 61 (1926), 293-300. 
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critics.75 Of Reformation exhibits Milton’s millenarianism more explicitly: it represents 
an early eschatology that anticipates the ideas of the 1644 tracts.76 John Leonard 
discusses Of Reformation as a means of unpacking the meaning of the ‘two-handed 
engine’ of ‘Lycidas’.77 The difference in form between these two texts illustrates 
Milton’s decision to focus on prose during the 1640s and beyond. The decision shows 
how Milton invested his millenarianism in society and state; he would not return to 
poetry as a form of conveying the millennium until Paradise Lost and the 1671 texts, 
Paradise Regain’d and Samson Agonistes. This reflects Milton’s faith in England as a 
nation capable of realising eschatological change; in the 1660s and 1670s, with the 
Restoration monarchy firmly established, the idealised, elect individuals of Milton’s 
poetry are representative of how Milton comes to believe in individuals as vehicles for 
change, rather than in England itself. From an eschatological standpoint, the change of 
form between ‘Lycidas’ and Of Reformation suggests that Milton decided to encourage 
reform in society – in this case arguing against episcopacy that was inhibiting the 
progress of the Reformation – rather than to patiently look ahead to the imminent return 
of the ‘two-handed engine’. 
While the millenarian image in ‘Lycidas’ has often been viewed as 
equivocal, its association with end times is widely accepted: ‘But that two-handed 
engine at the door, / Stands ready to smite once, and smite no more’ (130-1). Leonard’s 
comprehensive analysis of the first of these two lines identifies Milton’s meaning as 
distinctively millenarian. Leonard separates the line into three parts: ‘(1) the 
demonstrative adjective “that”; (2) the engine itself; (3) the prepositional phrase “at the 
door”.’78 The first part is indicative of familiarity with the engine; the final part is 
suggestive of the imminence of that engine, as the phrase would have been recognised 
at the time; but the middle image of the engine is more ambiguous. The engine appears 
as a vehicle of forceful, heavenly judgement. Milton would show an interest in such 
apocalyptic climaxes later in his life: while the Son of Paradise Regain’d is an 
embodiment of self-control, he makes reference to rescuing ‘Israel from the Roman 
yoke’ through ‘Brute violence and proud Tyrannick pow’r, / Till truth were freed, and 
equity restor’d’ (i. 217, 219-20). More climactically, Samson Agonistes ends with 
 
75 McDowell, Poet of Revolution, pp. 317-18. 
76 On the relationship between Of Reformation and Areopagitica, see William Fitzhenry, ‘The Poetics of 
Embodiment in Milton’s Of Reformation’, in Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature, 72/2 
(2018), pp. 262-3. 
77 John Leonard, ‘That Two-Handed Engine and the Millennium at the Door’, in Edward Jones, ed., 
Young Milton: The Emerging Author, 1620-1642 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 270-1. 
78 Leonard, ‘Two-Handed Engine’, pp. 253-60, 277. 
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Samson bringing down ‘two massie Pillars’ with a ‘burst of thunder’ onto the Philistines 
(CWJM ii. lines 1638, 1641). The imminence of ‘at the door’ in Lycidas is also earthly, 
even domestic. Such violent divine intervention appears as a herald to the millennium. 
Indeed, while there has been some doubt over millenarian readings of ‘Lycidas’, there is 
evidence of comparable contemporary interpretations of Revelation using similar 
language to Milton’s elegy.79 
The Royall Guest (1637) by Thomas Drant (b. 1601/2) explores many of the 
ideas associated with Milton’s millenarianism in ‘Lycidas’, and thereby supports 
millenarian readings of the poem. Drant insists on his opening page that Christ will 
manifest himself on earth: ‘Wee meete here a Royall Guest, who enstated in all the 
Royalties of Heaven, yet sues for a welcome on earth’ (1). Drant positions Revelation 
3:20 from the Authorised Version – ‘Behold I stand at the doore, and Knock’ – on the 
first page of The Royall Guest. While Leonard insists that the door is not a physical door 
– that the phrase ‘at the door’ is suggestive of the imminence of Christ’s arrival – Drant 
discusses the door attached to a building: ‘Behold One is here to whom the greatest 
Monarch is more base, than the basest Boare to the greatest Monarch, one who knocks 
importunately, why shut wee Him out, why are doores blockt up against Him?’80 Drant 
also associates the edifice with a human body – ‘CHRIST yet, but in the closet of our 
hearts, will take up no lodging in us’ – and the door as ‘the doore of our hearts’ (12). 
Drant expands his analysis to include language that militarises the act of knocking, as 
depicted in ‘Lycidas’: ‘First, GOD knocks by the Ministery of His Word; this is a knock 
of power, and His, who knocks with Authority, for such is his Word, and so He 
teacheth, what strong holds will not this engine pull downe? what bulwarks of humane 
pollicie not scale, what rampiers of flesh and blood not raze and dig through?’ (17). The 
divine engine overcomes not only well-defended institutions, but also – to conflate the 
human body with a building once again – a corporeal entity. Similar to the various 
purposes of the engine that Leonard identifies in ‘Lycidas’, Drant’s engine – the word 
of God here – brings to heel through violent disembodiment those who will not obey 
Christ: ‘Men have fore-heads of Stone, necks vein’d with Adamant, hearts rib’d with 
Marble, these cannot bleed, nor those bow, nor tother blush, the Word is a hammer to 
breake this rock a peeces, a fire to melt it into softnesse, a rod to make waters of 
penitence gush from it (17).’ The corporeal imagery that Drant uses to illustrate the 
 
79 Ibid., p. 264. 
80 Thomas Drant, The Royall Guest: Or, A Sermon Preached At Lent Assises, Anno Dom, M.DC.XXXVI 
(1637), p. 11; further references will be made parenthetically in the running text. 
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power of the engine bears resemblance to Revelation: ‘out of his mouth went a sharp 
twoedged sword’ (1:16); ‘And out of his mouth goeth a sharp sword, that with it he 
should smite the nations’. McDowell argues that Milton’s ‘two-handed engine’ is most 
likely a reference to Revelation.81 The Royall Guest, therefore, shows how the idea of 
the imminent advent of Christ, in a wrathful manifestation on earth, was articulated in a 
pamphlet using language in 1637 that echoed that of ‘Lycidas’.  
Milton’s millenarianism extends to the anti-prelatical tracts, especially Of 
Reformation, though some critics have resisted this argument. In Milton’s 
Animadversions, which uses language that also resonates with ‘Lycidas’, he writes ‘thy 
Kingdome is now at hand, and thou standing at the dore. Come forth out of thy Royall 
Chambers, O Prince of all the Kings of the earth, put on the visible roabes of thy 
imperiall Majesty, take up that unlimited Scepter which thy Almighty Father hath 
bequeath’d thee’ (CPW i. 707). Christ’s second coming is imminent, and his reign will 
replace earthly kings. Janel Mueller argues that ‘there is no room for millenarianism in 
Of Reformation. The glorified saints of the peroration are quite explicitly imaged in a 
heaven beyond time’.82 The final section of Of Reformation, however, challenges this 
assertion.83 Mueller focuses on the description of the saints ‘in supereminence of 
beatifick Vision progressing the dateless and irrevoluble Circle of Eternity’, where they 
‘shall clasp inseparable Hands with joy, and blisse in overmeasure for ever’ (i. 616). 
There is little doubt that this in itself is apocalyptic and post-history. However, the 
depiction of the elect subsumed into the kingdom of heaven, which concludes the 
millenarian timeline, appears after Milton’s passionate address to Christ in heaven, in 
which he declares ‘thou the Eternall and shortly-expected King shalt open the Clouds to 
judge the severall Kingdomes of the World, and distributing Nationall Honours and 
Rewards to Religious and just Common-wealths, shalt put an end to all Earthly 
Tyrannies, proclaiming thy universal and milde Monarchy through Heaven and Earth 
[…]’ (i. 616). The imminence of ‘shortly-expected’ transfers to the highly decorative 
language that Milton uses to describe the ‘beautific vision’. The monarchy that Christ 
will establish ‘through Heaven and Earth’ is, by its terrestrial nature, millenarian. In 
 
81 McDowell, Poet of Revolution, p. 317. 
82 Janel Mueller, ‘Embodying glory: the apocalyptic strain in Milton’s Of Reformation’, in David 
Loewenstein and James Grantham Turner, eds., Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 19. 
83 For arguments in favour of the millenarianism of this section of Of Reformation, see, in Juliet 
Cummins, ed., Milton and the Ends of Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): Barbara 
Lewalski, ‘Milton and the Millennium’, p. 17; William B. Hunter, “The Millennial Moment: Milton vs. 
‘Milton’”, pp. 97-8; Stella P. Revard, ‘Milton and Millenarianism’, pp. 54-5, 62. 
 49 
May 1641, the same month as Of Reformation was first published, the Root and Branch 
Bill was introduced, which called for the removal of bishops from the Church of 
England and for church reform along Presbyterian lines. At this early stage in his 
developing eschatology, Milton viewed church reform – specifically the end of 
episcopacy – as contributing to the process of realising the millennium.  
Thomas Corns suggests that while Mueller ‘recognizes a tension between 
the apocalyptic vision and the ambitions of the individual’, she does so ‘without 
engaging the complexity with which Milton and his contemporaries regarded the 
imminence of the Apocalypse while continuing their day-to-day lives.’84 As Milton 
suggests in the peroration of Of Reformation, the millennium will occur in a time when 
England is ‘instructed and inur’d to the fervent and continuall practice of Truth and 
Righteousnesse’, populated by ‘the soberest, wisest, and most Christian People at that 
day’ (616). For millenarians like Milton, the millennium was not the product of passive 
expectation, but rather active, laborious reform. Indeed, Milton opposes those who 
would say that society ‘must not run […] into sudden extremes.’ He argues that ‘if it be 
found that these two extreames be Vice and Vertue, Falshood and Truth, the greater 
extremity of Vertue and superlative Truth we run into, the more vertuous, and the more 
wise wee become’ (i. 601). Accordingly, Milton advocates that one day a week should 
be ‘set apart wherein to examin and encrease our knowledge of God, to meditate, and 
commune of our Faith, our Hope, our eternall City in Heaven, and to quick’n, withall, 
the study, and exercise of Charity’ (i. 589). As in Areopagitica, which will be discussed 
at length in Chapter 3, Milton believes in Of Reformation that a society dedicated to 
study will increase the likelihood of realising ‘superlative Truth’ by also allowing 
Falsehood to exist and be challenged. 
Milton’s belief in the potential of the laity to become scriptural interpreters 
suggests that he held a faith in the people at this early stage of his polemical career that 
would recede from 1649 onwards. Milton explains that the ‘intellectual ray which God 
hath planted in us’ provides all people, ‘not only the wise and learned, but the simple, 
the poor, the babes’ with ‘the ability of searching, trying, examining all things’ (i. 566). 
These three present participles mirror the ‘musing, searching, revolving new notions 
and ideas’ (ii. 554) that defines the studious activity of Milton’s London in 
Areopagitica. Milton’s support of the laity, moreover, aligns Of Reformation with 
Thomas Goodwin’s A Glimpse of Sions Glory (1641), in which Goodwin directly 
 
84 Thomas N. Corns, Uncloistered Virtue: English Political Literature, 1640-1660 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 13. 
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addresses the commons themselves in rousing support of their innate, God-given 
abilities. ‘You that are of the meaner rank, common People’, Goodwin declares, ‘be not 
discouraged; for God intends to make use of the common People in the great Worke of 
proclaiming the Kingdome of his Sonne’.85 An early sign of Milton’s belief in the elect 
is nevertheless apparent towards the end of the tract: Milton suggests that, ‘if 
Conformity of Church Discipline to the Civill be so desir’d’, the prince should appoint 
‘the godliest, the wisest, the learnedest Ministers […] by whose full and free Election 
they are consecrated to that holy and equall Aristocracy’ (i. 599-600). The superlatives 
here indicate the idealised product of Presbyterian election of ministers by the people. 
While Milton, therefore, advocates greater autonomy of the people in Of Reformation, 
he also exhibits his sympathies for superior, elect individuals of society. 
The embryonic millenarian ideas of these early texts provide a valuable 
foundation from which Milton’s eschatology could develop. ‘Lycidas’ encodes 
contemporary chiliastic language in much the same way as Of Reformation mirrors the 
burgeoning interest in millenarianism in England in the early 1640s. Of Reformation in 
particular anticipates many of the ideas that would feature prominently in Milton’s 1644 
tracts: the interpretative capabilities of the laity; the unique potential of England in 
realising the millennium; and that the millennium was the product of the labour of the 
elect on earth, rather than an inevitable endpoint granted to the patient few. The most 
significant development in Milton’s intellectual context, as the following chapter will 
show, was the neo-Baconian ideas of the Hartlib circle. Milton’s involvement with the 
Hartlib circle, however brief, would help to consolidate and refine the eschatological 





The early context of Milton’s millenarianism illustrates how close the young Milton 
was to prominent eschatological ideas of his time, and how he explored such ideas in 
his early polemical prose. As McDowell has recently shown, Mede would have been a 
significant figure in Milton’s education at Cambridge, even if only because of the 
theologian’s fame following the publication of Clavis Apocalyptica. If Mede provides 
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evidence for Milton’s intellectual and physical proximity to major contemporary 
millenarian ideas, then ‘Lycidas’ and Of Reformation show how Milton was developing 
his eschatology at this early stage in his career. The following two chapters will show 
how 1644 was a significant year in Milton’s intellectual development, particularly 
through his involvement with the Hartlib circle. This chapter has shown how the seeds 
of those ideas were planted much earlier than 1644. The 1640s provided the platform 
and pamphleteering the mechanism through which Milton could hone and develop his 





























‘Regaining to know God aright’: Milton and the Hartlib Circle 
 
Milton’s involvement with the Hartlib circle through his friend, Samuel Hartlib (1600-
62), marks a significant period during which the pamphleteer encountered and 
contributed to a discourse of millenarian and utopian ideas. The Hartlib circle emerged 
primarily through the close relationship of Samuel Hartlib, who acted as a central 
intelligencer in England and Europe, and the irenicist and Presbyterian minister, John 
Dury (1596-1680). In association with the Czech educationalist, Johannes Amos 
Comenius (1592-1670), Hartlib and Dury led a diverse group of progressive 
intellectuals, who shared their belief that universal reformation could be achieved 
through the advancement of all forms of learning.86 Drawing inspiration from Bacon, 
the network believed that the institutionalised dissemination of knowledge would bring 
about reform necessary for the millennium. So passionately invested in its cause was the 
group that, by the late 1640s and early 1650s, they had achieved palpable parliamentary 
support, largely through the assistance of Sir Cheney Culpeper (1601-63), an advocate 
of the Hartlibian cause with influence in government. Charles Webster captures the 
extent of Hartlib’s influence in the mid-century: ‘A great proportion of the voluminous 
educational writings of this period was directly instigated by Hartlib, who became the 
central figure in […] the “Educational renaissance” of the commonwealth.’87 Milton’s 
Of Education (1644) was one of these writings to have been produced in response to the 
direct solicitation of Hartlib himself. This chapter will orientate Milton in a discourse 
that included the earlier utopian text by Gabriel Plattes (1600-44), A Description of the 
Famous Kingdom of Macaria (1640), and which was dedicated to an eschatological 
purpose. It is important to address not only how Of Education can be viewed from a 
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utopian perspective, particularly in comparison to Macaria, but also how, as Timothy 
Raylor suggests, Milton’s educational ideas enjoyed an afterlife in the Hartlibian texts 
of the later 1640s, specifically in those penned by Dury and John Hall of Durham 
(1627-56).88 The analysis will focus on the relationship and boundary between private 
and public spheres, which, as will be discussed in the following chapter, Milton 
continued to theorise and navigate in Areopagitica (1644). Milton’s vision for a private 
and exclusive academy facilitated the emergence of similar ideas in the Hartlibian texts 
of the late-1640s. The chapter will be split into three sections: the first will address 
Milton’s relationship to the Hartlib circle; the second will identify the utopianism of Of 
Education in comparison with Macaria; the third will consider how Milton’s proposal 
for exclusive education experienced an afterlife in Hartlibian works of the late-1640s. 
Chloë Houston has explored how Hartlib and his associates espoused both 
utopian and millenarian ideas. Houston identifies the utopianism of the Hartlib circle as 
marking a shift away from utopian fiction and the travel narrative. The Hartlibians 
desired tangible social and educational reform in order to realise the ideal of the 
millennium. As Houston explains, ‘Apocalyptic beliefs thus created a cycle of optimism 
and reform: the fact that society was improving was an indicator of the imminent 
millennium, and the fact that the millennium was coming meant that there was a need to 
improve the present society in order to prepare for it; this was God’s will.’89 Some 
critics, like J. C. Davis, have identified millenarians as lacking this will to action. Davis 
suggests that, as the millennium constituted an apocalyptic end point of history, its 
inevitability negated the need for societal reform. ‘The millenarian’s solution to the 
collective problem is then,’ according to Davis, ‘the product of a deus ex machina.’90 
The example of the Hartlibians challenges Davis’s rigid categorisation: they represent 
an active form of seventeenth-century millenarianism, which finds a more radical edge 
in groups like Winstanley’s Diggers and the Fifth Monarchists. In Hartlib’s A Further 
Discoverie of the Office of Addresse (1647), having asserted that ‘wee believe that his 
Kingdome will be set up’, he identifies the role of the Hartlibians and the Office of 
Address – an institution for collecting and disseminating knowledge that resembled 
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Bacon’s Salomon’s House that he proposes in the tract – in bringing about 
eschatological change: ‘Wee expect also, that before this Kingdome of His 
Mediatorship between God and the Elect bee ended, & given up unto the Father; the 
Restitution of all this shall be wrought in the Churches & by the Church in the World & 
therefore wee desire to sow our seed upon all waters, whiles wee have opportunity.’91 
Houston explains that, as ‘political conditions and millennial enthusiasm converged to 
make the perfect earthly community appear to be within reach, the utopia formed a 
central means of both imagining and promoting its achievement.’92 This chapter will 
explore in greater detail how Baconian utopianism – the ideal that the advancement of 
learning will bring about a return of prelapsarian dominion over nature – and Morean 
utopianism – the controlled, regulated totality that forms Davis’s definition of 
utopianism – feature in the Hartlibian writings of the 1640s.93 Of Education, written 
within the same intellectual context as other Hartlibian texts, will be interpreted within 
these same parameters.  
Timothy Raylor shows how, in Of Education, Milton is formulating an early 
proposal for an English version of the French noble academies, based on the model of 
Antoine de Pluvinel (1552-1620). The French academies offered a comprehensive 
education for gentry, which included ‘horsemanship, supplemented by some 
combination of fencing, vaulting (the art of leaping onto horses), dancing, applied 
mathematics (for fortifications), moral and political philosophy, drawing and painting, 
writing and music.’ As Raylor explains, these academies ‘greatly appealed to the 
English nobility and gentry, who enrolled in considerable numbers, usually in the 
course of […] an embryonic grand tour’.94 Milton describes his own tour to Italy during 
1638-9 in The Reason of Church Government (1642), recalling the ‘privat Academies of 
Italy’ where he was ‘favor’d to resort’, which suggests that he was aware of private, 
European educational institutions (CPW i. 810).95 As Raylor posits, Milton’s idealised 
institution in Of Education ‘was a version of a noble academy – a distinctly English, 
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reformed, and Miltonic version, to be sure; but a version nonetheless.’ As Hartlib 
himself assisted efforts by individuals, such as Balthazar Gerbier, in establishing noble 
academies in England, Raylor shows how Milton’s association with the Hartlibians 
suggests that he was emulating the noble academies in Of Education. In opposition to 
Ernest Sirluck’s argument that Milton’s lack of support for Comenius also meant a lack 
of support for Hartlib and his network, Raylor asserts that ‘Milton was, without being 
sympathetic to Comenianism, nevertheless working within the mainstream of Hartlibian 
educational reform as it was conceived during the 1640s.’96 This chapter will build on 
Raylor’s conclusion with the argument that Milton contributed a vision for private 
educationalism to an intellectual group dedicated to national reform and ‘Publique 
good’.97 
Milton’s enduring impact on Hartlibian ideology, in terms of the importance 
of private institutions contributing to a public good, is most clearly exhibited by the 
works of John Hall. Nicholas McDowell explains how Hall was engaged with both the 
Hartlib circle, and the coterie of Thomas Stanley (1625-78). Stanley served as patron to 
Hall’s studies at Durham Cathedral and St John’s College, Cambridge. Stanley also 
formed his own literary coterie in 1646-7 that longed for a return to poetic court culture. 
McDowell explains that the coterie ‘provided a private, cultured audience for each 
other’s work at a time when dramatic performance was banned and published poetry 
was under threat of censorship by a philistine Parliament.’ In June 1647, Hall left 
Cambridge to join Stanley at the Inns of Court and was admitted to Gray’s Inn. Around 
the same time, Hall was in correspondence with Hartlib and promoted Hartlib’s efforts 
with the Office of Address at Cambridge in 1646-7. ‘It is clear’, McDowell explains, 
‘that Hall had swiftly become an ardent supporter of the Hartlibian vision of knowledge 
as an endowment from God to be used for public benefit.’ Hall’s strong support for Of 
Education suggests that he was able to reconcile his engagement with the Hartlib and 
Stanley circles. As McDowell explains, ‘the political distance between the “private” and 
“public” conceptions of English intellectual culture held by the Stanley and Hartlib 
circles was […] real, and is measured by the considerable patronage that Hartlib 
received from Parliament during the 1640s.’ Milton’s major tracts in 1644, Of 
Education and Areopagitica, in their respective proximity and relationship to the Hartlib 
 
96 Raylor, ‘Education of the Aristocracy’, pp. 395-7, 404; see Ernest Sirluck, CPW, ii. 184-96; Raylor 
initially offers a revision of Sirluck’s argument in ‘A New Light on Milton and Hartlib’, in Milton 
Quarterly, 27/1 (1993), pp. 22-3; see also Webster, Samuel Hartlib, p. 42. 
97 John Dury, A Motion Tending to the Publick Good of this Age (1642), in Charles Webster, ed., Samuel 
Hartlib and the Advancement of Learning, p. 99. 
 56 
circle, exhibit an awareness of, if not an attention to, the juncture between public and 
private spheres. Hall’s positive reaction to Of Education is significant: it suggests that 




COMENIUS AND BACON: THE HARTLIBIAN CONTEXT 
 
There is an apparent tension between the Hartlibian perception of universal educational 
reform pre-1644 and Milton’s vision for private, aristocratic academies. As the 
following chapter will explore in more detail, in 1644, Milton espouses the Baconian 
ideal that the advancement of learning will achieve an eschatological end point. For 
Bacon, the advancement of learning would specifically manifest in a return to 
prelapsarian dominion over nature. As Webster suggests, Bacon’s writings encouraged 
millenarian interpretations from millenarian reformers, such as those of Hartlib and his 
associates.98 Whereas Milton’s seventh prolusion indicates that he read and admired 
Bacon (CPW i. 288-306), he explicitly asserts his disinterest in the Comenian view of 
pansophic reform that Hartlib had supported since the late 1630s: ‘to search what many 
modern Janua’s and Didactics more then ever I shall read, have projected my 
inclination leads me not’ (CPW ii. 364-6).99 Accordingly, while Milton’s educational 
vision does not share in the concept of universal learning that Comenius advocated, it 
does, as a contribution to the Hartlibian discourse, represent a desire to advance public 
good. While Raylor is sceptical of any explicitly Baconian elements in Of Education, 
Thomas Festa posits that the ‘expanded scientific breadth, and the increased spiritual 
depth, of the mature educational project owed at least as much to Milton’s sustained 
engagement with the educational thinking of Bacon as it did to his personal friendship 
with Samuel Hartlib.’100 However, Festa identifies two separate ends of learning in Of 
Education that, with an awareness of Baconian precedent, can be viewed as one. ‘The 
end then of learning’, Milton asserts early in the tract, ‘is to repair the ruins of our first 
parents by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to 
imitate him, to be like him, as we may the neerest by possessing our souls of true 
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vertue, which being united to the heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest 
perfection’ (366-7). This, Festa suggests, is distinct from Milton’s assertion that ‘I call 
therefore a complete and generous Education that which fits a man justly, skilfully and 
magnanimously all the offices both private and publike of peace and war’ (377-9).101 
Festa argues that Milton is being ‘Janus-faced’: where the first end of learning is 
‘recuperative and memorial’, the second is ‘ideological’, aligning with the classical 
republicanism that Dzelzainis identifies. The latter end of learning relates to Milton’s 
awareness of the noble academies. This study takes a middle ground between Festa and 
Raylor. Rather than separate, these two assertions are part of the same educational 
vision: Milton believed that the Baconian philosophy – that educational reform will 
serve the end of ‘regaining’ unity with God – can be achieved through his idealised 
private, educational institution. While Milton’s private educationalism contradicts the 
Comenian pansophy that the Hartlibians advocated in the early 1640s, Of Education 
remained a significant and influential contribution to the Hartlibian discourse. 
Hartlib and his associates were committed to pansophic reform in the early 
1640s. While Comenius played a significant role in directing the Hartlibian project 
towards a belief in universal reform, Bacon remained an influential precedent in the 
formulation of Comenius’s pansophic philosophy.102 In a letter that Dury wrote to 
Culpeper on 13th January 1642, which was published in A Motion Tending to the 
Publick Good of This Age (1642), he expresses the intricate relationship between the 
originators of the Hartlibian enterprise: ‘I meane Master Comenius, Mr Hartlib, and my 
selfe: For though our taskes be different, yet we are all three in a knot sharers of one 
anothers labours, and can hardly bee without one anothers helpe and assistance.’103 This 
was followed by a ‘Foederis fraterni’ or ‘fraternal pact’, signed by Dury, Comenius and 
Hartlib on 13 March 1642.104 Hartlib published Comenius’s tracts, Conatuum 
Comenianorum praeludia and Pansophiae prodomus, in 1637 and 1639 respectively, 
the latter of which he republished in translation in 1642 – the year after he had invited 
Comenius to London – under the title The Reformation of Schooles.105 As Dagmar 
Čapková explains, Comenius was inspired by the ideal of ‘panharmonia’, ‘a 
Neoplatonic conception of the whole, of the world as an organism in which 
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interrelationships played an important role and mankind is conceived as a microcosm 
within a macrocosm.’ Pansophia represented the perfect relationship between man and 
the world, through which man could attain unity with God, as the ‘truth revealed in 
Scripture’.106 In A Reformation of Schooles, Comenius makes clear the Baconian 
precedent for his philosophy: ‘It is a matter of moment, which the Lord VERULAM hath 
effected in his excellent Novum Organum, where he shewes the infallible way of 
making a narrow search into the natures of things’. Baconian empiricism was a means 
of re-establishing a prelapsarian relationship with the natural world. However, 
Comenius proceeds to interpret Baconian empiricism in a pansophic light, asking ‘why 
should wee not hope for some invention of inventions, whereby the severall inventions, 
and endeavours of so many wits, may not onely in their matter, but even in their manner 
of discovery be united into one, and made common to mankind?’. Comenius repeatedly 
advocates reform to serve a universal and common good. As A Motion indicates, the 
Hartlibians increasingly accommodated pansophic values. Pansophic good, moreover, 
served a millenarian purpose, which further aligns Comenius to Bacon: ‘We have also 
an expresse promise concerning the latter times, that Many shall runne to and fro, and 
knowledge shall be increased, Dan. 12. 4.’107 As Mark Greengrass observes, this is the 
same quote used by Bacon on the frontispiece of his Instauratio magna.108 Comenius, 
drawing from the Baconian design, facilitated the Hartlibian focus on pansophic reform, 
which was inherently universal and egalitarian.  
It is within this context that, just a year later, in 1643, Hartlib makes a note, 
in his Ephemerides, of a promising, emergent pamphleteer. ‘Mr Milton in Aldersgate 
Street’, Hartlib notes, ‘hase written many good books a great traveller and full of 
projects and inventions.’109 It is possible that Hartlib had learned this from 
correspondence within his network, or he may even have met Milton at this stage. 
Milton’s ‘projects and inventions’ that Hartlib approves of are presumably theoretical 
and institutional, anticipating the proposal in Of Education. In November 1643, Hartlib 
notes that Milton, when he was ‘living off a modest private income’, contributed three 
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shillings to the war engine of Edmond Felton.110 Milton’s modest income, prior to his 
public employment in 1649, was largely sourced from the private tuition of young 
students. Having taught his young nephews, John and Edward Philips, since his return 
from Italy, Milton took in more pupils to his house in Aldersgate in April 1643. In the 
autumn of 1645, Milton moved into a house in the Barbican, where Edward Philips 
would later recall ‘probably he might have some prospect of putting in Practice his 
Academical Institution, according to the Model laid down in his Sheet of Education.’111 
When Hartlib met Milton, then, the pamphleteer was already practising a distinctly 
private form of educationalism, designed for children of wealth and status. Hartlib 
himself had attempted to establish a private academy in Chelsea College in 1630-1 with 
William Petty. However, Of Education must be viewed in the context following 
Hartlib’s ‘fraternal pact’ with Comenius and Dury, dedicating the Hartlibian cause to 
public good. As Milton’s educational treatise was dedicated to Hartlib, it was not just a 
private educational institution established solely for private ends. Milton’s educational 
vision was intended to serve the public good. 
While Milton positioned himself away from the Comenian side of the 
Hartlibian project, he dedicates Of Education to Hartlib and his neo-Baconian 
philosophy. In the form of a letter addressed to Hartlib, Of Education was inspired by 
and written for the Hartlibian cause. Milton explains to Hartlib that, while he considers 
the ‘reforming of Education’ to be ‘one of the greatest and noblest designes, that can be 
thought on’, he would not have put pen to paper ‘but by your earnest entreaties, and 
serious conjurements’ (CPW ii. 362-3). Milton affirms that his praise for Hartlib is not 
the product of their ‘private friendship’, ‘but that I see those aims, those actions which 
have won you with me the esteem of a person sent hither by some good providence 
from a farre country to be the occasion and the incitement of great good to this Iland’ 
(363). Milton does not identify a contradiction between the private, aristocratic academy 
that he proposes and the Hartlibian efforts to reform England that he praises. To return 
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to Milton’s asserted purpose of learning, of ‘regaining to know God aright’ (367), he 
specifically refers to ‘the learned correspondence which you hold in forreigne parts, and 
the extraordinary pains and diligence which you have us’d in this matter both heer, and 
beyond the Seas’ (363). The value of international intelligencing and the idea of 
dissemination of knowledge attaining unity with God suggest a Baconian precedent. 
Rather than tolerating Comenianism, Milton should be viewed as actively praising the 
neo-Baconian project that Hartlib co-ordinated. As the final section of this chapter will 
show, Of Education is a prominent contribution to the Hartlibian discourse that redirects 
Hartlibian focus away from the universal and pansophic ideals of Comenius. 
 
 
OF EDUCATION, MACARIA AND UTOPIA 
 
Milton’s educational proposal is a rigorous and comprehensive vision for the training of 
aristocratic leaders and statesmen. Gordon Campbell and Thomas Corns describe 
‘Milton’s nightmarish model for English education’ as ‘Repressive, prescriptive, elitist, 
masculinist, militarist, dustily pedantic, class-ridden, and affectionless’.112 This 
pejorative criticism does not acknowledge that Milton, in his continued role as private 
schoolmaster, viewed his proposal as having the potential for practical application. 
Many of the qualities that Campbell and Corns identify are features of utopianism. As 
Davis argues, ‘totality, order, perfection – are cardinal characteristics of the utopian 
form.’ Utopias are intended for ‘the reorganisation of society and its institutions, by 
education, by laws and by sanctions’ in order to achieve ‘order, that social necessity.’113 
While Plattes’s Macaria exhibits similar utopian characteristics, Amy Boesky also 
identifies Macaria as part of a contemporary utopian focus on industry and institutions: 
‘these utopists envisioned a civilian corps of trained and zealous workers dedicated to 
the ideals of industry, cooperation, and productivity.’ Hartlibian educational reform 
resembles such a utopian vision.114 Where Davis does not accommodate Bacon in his 
definition of utopianism – categorising Bacon instead exclusively as a millenarian – this 
section will acknowledge the Baconian roots of institutional utopianism, as originally 
exhibited in Salomon’s House. Aware of Baconian precedent, the Hartlibians were 
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committed to the potential of specific institutions, such as the Office of Address or 
schools, as vehicles for wider societal change. Milton’s educational institution belongs 
to this Hartlibian utopian discourse. Where Boesky, moreover, suggests that Macaria is 
an ‘artisanal utopia, promising utopia not to the patrician classes, like Bacon’s New 
Atlantis, but to ordinary laborers’, it is necessary to acknowledge how the aristocratic 
education of Of Education aligns with the institutional restriction of knowledge that 
Macaria’s College of Experience maintains. Having identified the Baconianism of 
Milton’s education system, this section will proceed to compare Of Education with 
Macaria. In doing so, it will show how Of Education contributed ideas of aristocratic 
education, drawing from the French academy model, to the Hartlibian discourse that 
drew from and developed essential Baconian – and, thereby, utopian – ideas. 
Milton’s education system is structured as a linear progression from sensory 
to theoretical learning. Milton explains that ‘because our understanding cannot in this 
body found it selfe but on sensible things, nor arrive so cleerly to the knowledge of God 
and things invisible, as by orderly conning over the visible and inferior creature, the 
same method is necessarily to be follow’d in all discreet teaching’ (367-9). There was 
Hartlibian precedent for empirical learning: one of Dury’s proposals in A Motion 
Tending to the Publick Good of this Age (1642) was to establish in schools a ‘Systeme 
of things obvious to the sences of children’.115 The structure of Milton’s curriculum, 
however, is more clearly Baconian. As Festa posits, ‘Of Education […] shares the 
Baconian emphasis on empirical observation leading to universals’.116 In learning 
languages, Milton criticises a focus on multilingualism – of merely learning multiple 
languages – and instead advocates the study of ‘the solid things in them as well as the 
words and lexicons’ (369). Universities make the mistake of not ‘beginning with Arts 
most easie, and those be such as are more obvious to the sence’ (374). Milton’s ideal 
students would be trained to speak Latin ‘as neer as may be to the Italian’ (383). It is 
important for Milton that his students ‘taste’ and have ‘digested’ (373) the language, 
which suggests that this initial sensory education is practical and performative. The 
Baconian foundation of Milton’s educational proposal complements the Hartlibian 
ideology. 
Having asserted the framework of his curriculum, Milton describes its 
comprehensive and expansive content. Milton’s students begin with grammar and 
pronunciation (382-3), alongside which they study ‘Arithmetick, and soon after the 
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elements of Geometry (386). The study of classical texts will augment the general grasp 
of Latin and Greek, Milton explains: ‘Ere halfe these Authors be read, which will soon 
be with plying hard, and dayly, they cannot choose but be masters of any ordinary 
prose’ (389). Milton’s students proceed to study agriculture (388), geography and 
natural philosophy (389-90) and, with ‘the difficulties of Grammar being soon 
overcome’, they can focus Aristotle, Seneca, and other classical texts of ‘Historicall 
Physiology’. The early speculative and physical education expands to include 
trigonometry, architecture, ‘History of Meteors, minerals, plants and living creatures as 
farre as Anatomy’, followed by ‘tempers, the humors, the seasons’ (392). These initial 
studies will be complemented by the vocational experiences of ‘Hunters, fowlers, 
Fishermen, Shepherds, Gardeners, Apothecaries; and in the other sciences, Architects 
Engineers, Mariners, Anatomists’. Experiential education will ‘give them such a reall 
tincture of naturall knowledge, as they shall never forget, but dayly augment with 
delight’ (394). Although Raylor insists that this is not Baconian, it coincides with the 
Baconian framework that Milton asserts at the beginning of his proposal. At this stage 
in their education, students can proceed to some classical poetry, which is strictly not 
epic at this point – ‘the rurall part of Virgil’ (396) – alongside moral (396) and political 
(398-9) philosophies, before attending to ‘Histories, heroic poems, and Attic tragedies 
of statliest, and most regal argument’ (400-1).  
It is from this comprehensive basis that Milton’s students begin to learn the 
‘organic arts which inable men to discourse and write perspicuously, elegantly, and 
according to the fitted stile of lofty, mean, or lowly’ (401). Fittingly, rhetoric, which 
Milton would employ in his work for the republican parliament five years later, features 
at this vital, final stage of the Miltonic education. ‘To which Poetry’, Milton asserts 
dramatically, ‘would be made subsequent, or indeed rather precedent, as being lesse 
suttle and fine, but more simple, sensuous and passionate’ (403). This is not ‘the 
prosody of a verse’ that Milton’s students would already have studied, ‘but that sublime 
art which in Aristotles poetics […] teaches what the laws are of a true Epic poem, what 
of a Dramatic, what of a Lyric, what decorum is, which is the grand master peece to 
observe’ (404-5). ‘This would make them soon perceive what despicable creatures our 
common rimers and play-writes be,’ Milton asserts, ‘and shew them, what Religious, 
what glorious and magnificent use might be made of Poetry both in divine and humane 
things’ (405-6). Milton stresses that it is ‘From hence and not till now’ that they will ‘be 
able writers and composers in every excellent matter, when they shall be thus fraught 
with an universall insight into things’ (406). Milton structures his curriculum as 
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progressing from speculative, practical learning to more abstract, theoretical studies, the 
universal ideal of which is poetry. 
Martin Dzelzainis identifies classical republicanism in Of Education that, 
considering the Hartlibian context, can be viewed more accurately as utopianism. 
‘Behind the diffident pose’, Dzelzainis writes, ‘lay a deep anxiety about the malaise 
afflicting the parliamentary cause and a conviction that the only cure for it was, in 
effect, a New Model education.’ As Dzelzainis argues, Milton likely believed that 
classical education of the elite was the means through which society could be 
progressively reformed. The attention Milton places on educating students to a noble 
and virtuous standard, such as in the seemingly republican language of rousing students 
to godly patriotism (e.g. ‘enflamed’ and ‘stirred up’), supports this argument. The 
expansive education that Milton proposes suggests that he ‘saw in such classically 
educated statesmen and orators not the destruction but the salvation of the 
commonwealth.’ Milton believed that his educational system would produce the 
necessary leaders for a pre-millennial society.117 As this chapter has argued, Milton 
intended his proposal to contribute to the Hartlibian project of advancing learning to an 
eschatological endpoint. The Miltonic education is not only dedicated to an elite few, 
but it also constitutes a rigid totality. Each component of Milton’s educational blueprint 
directly and uncompromisingly serves the ends of learning he articulates at the 
beginning of the treatise. Rather than classical republicanism, Milton’s desire for 
educational reform to usher in wider progress in society, particularly in comparison with 
the Hartlibian utopia, Macaria, means that Of Education can be viewed as a mid-
seventeenth-century form of utopianism. 
Addressed to parliament and styled in conventional utopian dialogue – a 
conversation between a traveller and a scholar – Macaria retains the fictional artifice of 
More and Bacon’s utopias. In the preface, in which he directly addresses parliament, 
Plattes explains that he has ‘delivered [his] conceptions in a Fiction, as a more mannerly 
way, having for my pattern Sir Thomas Moore, and Sir Francis Bacon’.118 Houston 
suggests that Plattes intentionally locates his dialogue in London in order to identify the 
Macarian Great Council as something that the Long Parliament could emulate. ‘Plattes’, 
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Houston posits, ‘seeks to distance his utopia from the fictional elements of travel 
writing.’119 The scholar illustrates this by expressing that he feels greater satisfaction 
from the traveller’s description of Macaria, than he had felt from the utopias of More 
and Bacon (86). Plattes’s vision is, moreover, distinctively utopian in its promotion of 
systemic control. As Robert Appelbaum posits, Macaria is a state ‘governed by an 
educated elite’, in which the ‘rulers, operating on the basis of cooperative, collective, 
and “experimental” behaviour, see to the care of the body and soul alike of the members 
of the polity’.120 The Great Council of Macaria, ‘like to the Parliament in England’ (81), 
is the central authoritative body under which exist sub-councils in husbandry, fishing, 
trade by land, trade by sea, and plantations. These state institutions create the system 
that maintains order in Macaria. The legal enforcement of this order is the necessary 
utopian component that ensures its longevity (81-2). The problem of the 
disproportionate ownership of land, for instance, is resolved by penalties levied against 
anyone who ‘holdeth more land than he is able to improve to the utmost’ (82). This 
anticipates James Harrington’s more developed concept of the equal agrarian in the 
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656).121 In Macaria, if penalties do not solve the problem, 
then the transgressor is ‘banished out of the Kingdome, as an enemy to the common-
wealth’ (82). In characteristic utopian fashion, the Macarian state safeguards its own 
future through a strict penal system. 
More pertinently for the Hartlibians, state control extends to education and 
the dissemination of knowledge. Macaria’s ‘Colledge of experience’ (83), a precursor to 
Hartlib’s Office of Address, is intended to centralise knowledge of medicine. Plattes’s 
College seems to be specifically modelled on the centralisation of medicine envisioned 
by Théophraste Renaudot, which he realised in his Bureau d’adresse in September 
1640. The College in Macaria supplies parsons, who also serve as physicians for each 
parish. Medical knowledge is, therefore, centrally managed by the College. ‘Plattes’, 
Webster argues ‘was insistent that state supervision was essential, not only for 
verification of results, but also to ensure the dissemination of useful information to the 
widest public.’122 The divines, who the scholar – a divine himself – acknowledges ‘have 
great estimation with the people, and can rule them at their pleasure’, serve as an 
integral and controlled means of communicating ideas and opinions to the common 
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people. Rather than part of an artisanal utopia, as Boesky asserts, Frank and Fritzie 
Manuel argue that here ‘the Baconian priest-scientist […] is rehabilitated in modified 
form.’123 To the question of how ‘good Divines’ are identified and formed, the traveller 
answers, ‘They are all of approved abilitie in human learning, before they take in hand 
that function, and then they have such rules, that they need no considerable studie to 
accomplish all knowledge fit for Divines, by reason that there are no diversitie of 
opinions amongst them.’ This lack of ‘diversitie’ implies that the knowledge the 
Divines impart to the common people is predetermined, likely by the Great Council. In 
particular, as Divines are initially ‘approved’ for their level of education, the standard of 
knowledge must not only be determined by the state, but such education must also be 
readily available in Macaria. If that is the case, then the dissemination of knowledge in 
Macaria is self-fulfilling: a Macarian meets the standard to become a Divine through the 
education they have already received by the Divines. This is qualified by the traveller: 
‘for they have a law, that if any Divine shall publish a new opinion to the Common 
people, he shall be accounted a disturber of the publick peace, and shall suffer death for 
it’. In Plattes’s utopia, the dissemination of knowledge is carefully and brutally 
mediated by the state. New opinions are permitted to be aired once a year before the 
Great Council, but these must overcome the established ‘truth’ at that time (84). 
Although in Macaria, ‘the people doe live in great plenty, prosperitie, health, peace, and 
happiness, and have not halfe so much trouble as they have in these European 
Countreyes’ (81), this is dependent on stringent regulations that promote state control of 
a utopian standard.  
Of Education can be viewed as a utopian totality along similar lines to 
Macaria. Boesky, identifying ‘contemporary utopian interest in regulation and 
discipline’, argues that the purpose of discipline in Of Education ‘was to consolidate the 
corps of ideal students in the Miltonic academy’.124 With regard to his full, lengthy 
curriculum, Milton asserts that ‘all this may be done between twelve, and one and 
twenty’ (379); it would ‘be at once both School and University, not needing a remove to 
any other house of Scholarship’ (380). Milton’s educational vision is an educational 
totality. By encompassing such a significant proportion of education in a relatively short 
time within just one building, each school under Milton’s educational proposal is 
essentially a utopia unto itself. In his description of Latin and grammar tuition, Milton 
articulates the central purpose of the stringent educational system: ‘But here the main 
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skill and groundwork will be, to temper them such lectures and explanations upon every 
opportunity, as may lead and draw them in willing obedience, enflam’d with the study 
of learning, and the admiration of vertue; stirr’d up with high hopes of living to be brave 
men, and worthy patriots, dear to God, and famous to all ages (384-5).’ In a utopian 
fashion, Milton juxtaposes the muting power of ‘temper’ and ‘willing obedience’ with 
the animation of ‘enflamed’ and ‘stirred up’, as if inspiration in his ideal academies is 
dependent on submission. A good teacher, Milton suggests, ‘who hath the Art and 
proper eloquence’, in part ‘with the intimation of some fear’, but ‘chiefly by his own 
example’, would be capable of ‘infusing into their young brests such an ingenuous and 
noble ardor, as would not fail to make many of them renowned and matchlesse men’ 
(385). Milton’s education expects only the best – perhaps to an unrealistic degree – 
from its students.  
Milton’s educational vision aspires to perfection because it is dedicated to 
an elite group of society, which can be compared to the divines of Macaria. This 
chapter has acknowledged Raylor’s comprehensive observations of how the French 
noble academies served as an inspiration for Of Education. In Macaria, Plattes places 
the power of knowledge and its dissemination in the hands of elite, highly educated 
divines. Milton’s educational reform, while orienting intellectual power in statesmen 
rather than church officials, retains the locus of that power in elite members of society. 
Almost all aspects of Milton’s educational blueprint have some form of ulterior purpose 
for such individuals. The study of agriculture, for instance, is intended to help ‘improve 
the tillage of their country’ (388-9); the study of politics ensures that students do not 
become ‘poor, shaken, uncertain reeds […] as many of our great counsellers’, but rather 
‘stedfast pillars of the State’ (398). Whereas Dzelzainis bands the military side of 
Milton’s proposed education together with the collective whole of the classical 
republicanism of the text, Milton, in fact, believes his educational proposal superior to 
the classical precedent from which he draws inspiration, for ‘this institution of breeding 
which I here delineate, shall be equally good both for Peace and warre’ (408). Situated 
around midday, time shall be scheduled for Milton’s students to be given military 
training. They will learn to use a sword, ‘to tugge, to grapple, and to close’ (409), ‘with 
much exactness, and dayly muster, serv’d out the rudiments of their Souldiership in all 
the skill of embattailing, marching, encamping, fortifying, beseiging and battering’ 
(411). Such physical education will ensure that Milton’s students become ‘renowned 
and perfect Commanders in the service of their country’ (412). Older pupils will also 
have the opportunity ‘to ride out in companies with prudent and staid guides, to all the 
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quarters of the land: learning and observing all places of strength, all commodities of 
building and of soil, for towns and tillage, harbours and Ports for trade’ (413). The 
image of highly educated students riding out to learn more from the country they will 
ultimately lead is an aristocratic one. It presents the students of Milton’s academy as 
preparing for their roles as statesmen, as they increase their first-hand knowledge of 
agriculture, commerce, trade, and defence. Milton’s emphasis on practical learning, 
specifically in the application of the theory learned in the educational institution, is once 
again evident here. Where the divines serve as conduits of knowledge from the 
Macarian College to the people in Macaria, education is focused on aristocratic 
individuals in Milton’s academy in order to better prepare them for their roles as 
English statesmen. Both Macaria and Of Education exhibit how mid-seventeenth-
century utopianism places faith in well-educated, aristocratic individuals.  
Of Education and Macaria identify regulation and control in utopian terms 
as necessary to realise the eschatological purpose of the Hartlib circle. The 
dissemination of knowledge in Macaria is filtered through the state in a controlled 
manner comparable to the strict curriculum of Milton’s proposed educational reform. 
Both Macaria and Of Education are founded on regulated systems that control learning, 
students and, ultimately, society. The elite, aristocratic focus of Of Education, 
moreover, corresponds to the highly educated divines, in whom the responsibility for 
education is placed in Macaria. While the appointment of Plattes’s divines is not 
predetermined by class, knowledge is nonetheless managed by an elite few. As the 
following chapter will show, Milton’s aristocratic education revitalised Hartlibian 
attention to exclusive intellectualism from 1644. The Hartlibian tracts of the later 1640s 
include or show an awareness of private – and particularly aristocratic – education. 
Milton’s 1644 texts suggest that there is a significant relationship between elitism and 
utopianism, particularly in Milton’s developing ideology. 
 
 
AFTERLIFE: DURY, HARTLIB, AND HALL 
 
Milton not only effectively contributed to already-existing ideas of social reform in 
Hartlibian discourse, but his ideas also had a tangible afterlife in later Hartlibian works. 
Raylor concludes that ‘Milton’s tract played a significant part in shaping the 
Hartlibians’ understanding of the institutional and curricular structure of a reformed 
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institution of aristocratic education.’125 It is important to recognise this as a contrast 
between the Comenian dedication to universal learning in A Motion Tending to the 
Publick Good of This Age (1642) and the attention given to selective education in post-
Of Education Hartlibian tracts by Dury, such as Considerations (1647) and his 
Reformed School (1650), and Hartlib’s Parliaments Reformation (1646). It is also 
necessary to position John Hall within this evolving Hartlibian context. McDowell 
posits that Hall, in his equal engagement with both the Stanley coterie and the Hartlib 
Circle, straddles proponents of private and public intellectual cultures in England 
respectively.126 Characteristic of a private intellectual discourse, the Stanley circle was 
exclusive: Hall’s letters to Hartlib frequently encouraging him to contact Stanley 
suggest Hartlib’s lack of success in this endeavour.127 Hall’s strong support of Of 
Education, therefore, suggests that he found in Milton a bridge between private and 
public intellectual spheres. Hall’s interest also exhibits how Milton’s treatise continued 
to play a role in the developing Hartlibian ideology and enabled Hall to formulate his 
own original perspective of private intellectualism. 
There is a transition in Hartlibian publications from the distinctly Comenian 
A Motion and the post-Of Education tracts that consistently endorse some form of 
selective educational vision. In A Motion, Dury espouses a public view of educational 
reform: ‘That a Publique good is nothing else but the universall private good of every 
one in the life of God; for that which serveth the turne of some only, although they may 
be many, and even the greater part, is not to be counted truly Publique; but that is 
properly Publique which is common, and reacheth alike unto all’ (99). Dury 
unequivocally advocates universal learning that serves a public and common good. A 
Motion notably differs from Dury’s proposal in Considerations Tending to the Happy 
Accomplishment of Englands Reformation (1647), in which he envisions four different 
types of school in his reformed society: ‘The First for the Vulgar, whose life is to be 
Mechanicall. The Second for the Gentry and Nobles, who are to beare Charges in the 
Commonwealth. The Third for Scholars, who are to teach others Humane Arts and 
Sciences. And the Fourth for the sons of the Prophets, who are Seminary of the 
Ministery.’128 Considerations evidently does not conform to the egalitarian ideal of 
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universal ‘Publique good’ that Dury advances in A Motion. These schools entrench class 
boundaries. Dury also advocates the banishment of any individuals who ‘spend their 
time in Idleness, in riot and vanity’, or who ‘live disorderly, and cannot be reduced to 
any certain Employment’ (124). Hartlib initially discussed the concept of idleness, 
which is prominent in More’s Utopia and in Gerrard Winstanley’s utopian text, The 
Law of Freedom (1652), in The Parliaments Reformation (1646). In this proposal for 
workhouses for the poor, Hartlib asserts that ‘the major part of the people doe never 
move to any good work willingly before they are commanded; and the command must 
be upon a penalty too, else they will doe little’.129  
As Parliaments Reformation attests, the change of Hartlibian attitude to 
accommodate private, selective educational ideas began in the pivotal year of 1646, 
after which Hartlibian tracts increasingly adopted Miltonic ideas. The two-year hiatus 
between Of Education and 1646 can be partly explained by the first civil war, which 
was in its final stages between April and June 1646, and Dury himself having to look 
after his sister, Jean Dury (fl. 1638-48), who between June 1644 and May 1645 troubled 
her brother as she became romantically involved with Henry Appelius, an associate 
from Hartlib’s network.130 Dury references these difficulties with his sister as a reason 
why he did not reply to Henry Robinson’s letter, which he received in November 1644, 
until 24 April 1646.131 Accordingly, it is in April 1646 that Dury references his ‘next 
taske’, which is ‘the subject of education in the Academie’. He includes an ‘Idea of 
education’ in a letter to Hartlib dated 4 May 1646, in which he references that he has 
‘something more particular of the heads to bee elaborated concerning the education of 
Nobles’. The ‘second part of the Idea of Education’ is included in a letter to Hartlib on 
12 May.132 Given that Dury goes on to write the manuscript pages for Reformed 
Librarie-Keeper (1650) in August 1646, it is possible that the letter is an early draft of 
his Reformed School. In the latter text, Dury exhibits a utopian awareness of the need 
for ‘outward Authority and Power to restrain exemplary disorderlinesse, or of inward 
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Conviction’.133 The third part of Dury’s proposed education, which covers the ages of 
13/14-19/20, similar age parameters to that proposed in Of Education, borrows from 
Milton’s model. This is the order of Dury’s education: agriculture, natural history, 
architecture, moral philosophy, economics, mathematics, natural philosophy, logic, 
rhetoric, poetry, and history (163-4). The emphasis on ‘Sense’ (153-4, 159), which Dury 
identifies as an early, formative form of a child’s education, recalls the empirical 
aspects of Milton’s educational treatise. 
In the same early part of 1646, Milton is also referenced in – and deleted 
from – educational proposals in Hartlib’s hand. The first, dated to February 1646 and 
written in a mixture of English, Latin and German, was originally entitled ‘Mr Miltons 
Academie’, but was changed to ‘Mr Lawrence Academie’, which may refer to Richard 
Lawrence (d. 1684), who founded a school for twenty boys at Lambeth in 1661.134 
While there are clear Hartlibian elements in the proposal, including ‘An Office of 
Learned Addresse’ and ‘House of Sensuals’, it also contains more Miltonic elements, 
such as a ‘Schoole and Councel of Warre’, alongside ‘exercise of shooting out of a long 
Bow’s’ and ‘Also with Crosse-bow’s’. While such physical exercise does not exactly 
resemble the martial training of Of Education, the amended title suggests that Hartlib 
was thinking about Milton when drafting these ideas. In another undated page of notes, 
entitled ‘Gymnasticae’, Hartlib lists the ‘Art of moulding et Turning. Art of distilling. 
Art of Fortification’, and questions ‘How a childs spirit may bee enobled by certain 
Exercises?’. In a more extended list of recreational exercises for young boys, Hartlib 
includes cross-bow shooting, both in German – ‘Nach dem ziel schießen mit armbrust’ 
– and Latin – ‘sagittare’.135 He also twice references ‘equitare’ or horse-riding, which, 
as we have seen, was a major part of the Miltonic education. Elsewhere, Hartlib 
discusses riding as an essential quality, especially for nobility: ‘For of al outward 
qualities, to ride faire is most cumelie for himself most necessarie for his Contri, et the 
greater he is in the blood, the greater is his praise, the more he doth exceede al other 
therin.’136 The skill of horsemanship will benefit England as much as noble heritage 
determines superiority. To return to 1646, on 14 April, Dury wrote a letter to Hartlib in 
which he asserted his support for the ‘waye of Aristocracy, which doth unite most the 
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Body, & is strongest to uphold state Authority’. Rather than democratically elected, 
Dury writes that an ‘Aristocracy which hath its foundation upon a priority & 
superiority, not derived from the multitude’ is preferable. Dury’s assertion anticipates 
Hartlib’s assistance of Colonel John Humphrey’s proposal for a noble academy in 
England, which Raylor dates to around 1647.137 In an early edition of the proposal, 
Hartlib seems to have changed the order of Humphrey’s curriculum to place oratory and 
poetry later, before the martial training of fencing, riding, and ‘Exercise of armes’, a 
structure which resembles Of Education and Reformed School.138 From 1646, then, the 
Hartlibians were showing an increasing acceptance of and engagement with the 
importance of aristocratic education and how more private, exclusive institutions could 
benefit the public good. 
Hall came into contact with and began writing for Hartlib within this 
context. It was in 1646 that, in his essay ‘Of Fables’, Hall expressed his support for 
Bacon and More’s utopias: ‘what rare Common-wealths have beene molded, by Sir 
Thomas Moore, Campanella, &c. What a stupendious Fabrick of a Colledge for Nature, 
hath great Saint Albanes reard’.139 Between November 1646 and April 1647, Hartlib 
harnessed Hall’s interest in utopianism by requesting him to translate utopian texts by 
Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) and Johann Valentin Andreae (1586-1654).140 In his 
translation of Andreae’s Christianae Societatis Imago (1620), entitled A Modell of 
Christian Society (1647), which is discussed in the following chapter, Hall laments that 
there are too few intellectuals of his age ‘as have wholly espoused themselves to great 
and publick endeavours’.141 It was during this time, in March 1647, that Hall was 
writing his own ‘Idea of a Commonwealth & Colledge in a Romance’, called 
‘Leucenia’, which he never finished and was ultimately lost.142 On 2 January, moreover, 
 
137 See Raylor, ‘Education of the Aristocracy’, p. 397. 
138 HP, 47/8/9A-B; other versions at 47/8/5A-6B, 7A-8B; see also Hartlib’s involvement with Balthazar 
Gerbier (1592-1663) and his The Interpreter of the Academie for Forrain Languages, and All Noble 
Sciences, and Exercises (1653), at HP 10/2/27/1A-8B; see generally 10/2/1-47. 
139 John Hall, ‘Of Fables’, in Horae Vacivae, or, Essays. Some Occasional Considerations (1646), p. 196; 
for an overview of Hall’s twenty-seven letters to Hartlib, see G. H. Turnbull, ‘John Hall’s Letters to 
Samuel Hartlib’, in The Review of English Studies, 4/15 (1953), pp. 221-33; on Milton and Hall in the 
1650s, see Blair Worden, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England: John Milton, Andrew Marvell 
and Marchamont Nedham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 283-5; for a recent comparison of 
Milton and Hall in terms of the Irish Rebellion, see John Cunningham, ‘Milton, John Hall, and Thomas 
Waring’s Brief Narration of the Rebellion in Ireland’, in Milton Quarterly, 53/2 (2019), pp. 69-85. 
140 McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance, pp. 55-6. 
141 John Hall, A Modell of Christian Society (Cambridge, 1647), sig. A3-4.  
142 See Hall to Hartlib, late March 1647, 60/14/39B; see also John Davies, ‘An Account of the Author of 
this Translation, and his Words’, in John Hall, trans., Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of Pythagoras 
(1657), sig. b2. 
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Hall, having acknowledged his own ‘back-wardness to the Publick service’, suggests 
that ‘A sole office’ should be established for ‘the gatherings of Experiments’, such as 
that which ‘great Verulam feigns in his new Altantis’. Hall believed that a Hartlibian 
institution, anticipating the Office of Address, would be preferable to the ‘Invisible 
College’ advocated by Robert Boyle (1627-91): ‘me thinkes better for a Colledge then 
Correspondence’.143 Hall identified a Hartlibian institution serving the public good as 
utopian in Baconian terms. David Norbrook acknowledges that this ‘emphasis on public 
life placed him in disagreement with Stanley’.144 Joad Raymond also discusses the 
ambiguity of Hall’s ‘quasi-Royalist allegiances’ and his involvement with the 
Parliamentarian cause, such as his editorship of Mercurius Britanicus in 1648.145 While 
Stanley was Hall’s patron, and was the dedicatee of Hall’s 1646 Poems, following the 
end of court culture and the royalist defeat in the first civil war, Hall believed in the 
potential of the state-funded and public-serving institution of the Hartlib circle. 
The ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’, theorised by the Stanley circle, which Hall 
explains to Hartlib in his correspondence in April 1647, illustrates and complicates the 
distinction between the Stanley and Hartlib circles, and Hall’s involvement within 
them.146 Between March and April 1647, Hall explains in his letters to Hartlib that, 
having visited a sick Stanley, ‘some Gentlemen ar gatrhing [sic] an Academy for 
Ingenuitys of humane learning & one of them came with me to crave your advise & 
assistance.’ Two weeks later, on 13 April, Hall sends to Hartlib both a description of the 
Academy for Ingenuitys in his own hand and, due to the illegibility caused by writing 
pain, includes a more formal copy in scribal hand, entitled ‘A Short Model of Society’. 
Hall explains to Hartlib in the following letter that he ‘was ever of the opinion that it 
was far too slight, to advance any way the Publique being rather a private Conglobation 
of some for (in a manner) private.’ Hall’s criticism not only highlights his reservations 
about private intellectual institutions, but it also reiterates his belief in the Hartlibian 
project. Although McDowell suggests that we do not know Hartlib’s reaction to the 
Academy of Ingenuitys, in a letter likely dated to 26 April 1647, Hall expresses to 
Hartlib ‘I am extreamly sorry I so freely Communicated my Thoughts to yow of our 
utopian Academy’, assuring Hartlib that he ‘made […] show of a great deal of Negative 
 
143 Hall to Hartlib, 2 January [1647], HP 9/10/1A-2B. 
144 Norbrook, Writing the Republic, p. 169. 
145 Joad Raymond, ‘John Hall’s “A Method of History”: A Book Lost and Found’, in English Literary 
Studies, 28/2 (1998), pp. 268-9. 
146 For a discussion of the ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’, see McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance, pp. 61-2; 
Turnbull, ‘John Hall’s Letters’, p. 230. 
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applause of it (I mean I objected nothing) because I knew the other Agents wedded to 
there own opinions’, and accepting Hartlib’s ‘most Judicious Censure’.147 Given Hall’s 
criticism of the Academy on 20 April, it seems likely that this is what he is referring to 
in the letter dated ‘26th’.148 Hall’s apologetic tone in the letter suggests that Hartlib may 
have disapproved of Hall’s criticism of the Academy. As this chapter has shown, 
Hartlib and his associates were increasingly supportive of private institutions and the 
aristocracy for serving public good. Although Stanley was too busy with the Armilla 
Nigra – the Latin name for the Black Riband – to become involved in the Academy, it is 
possible that Hartlib saw more potential than Hall in the private institution.149 
Hall’s reaction to the ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’ is interesting given that it 
shares the private and aristocratic nature of Milton’s educational proposal. The 
Academy is managed by a President and Orator, under which are a ‘Secretarie library-
keeper & Master of the Ceremonies’. Each of its sixty members – or ‘Essentials’ – 
would be ‘at least a Gentleman of blood & coat-armour’. They are elected through a 
character reference, ‘for the Enquiry affter his parts & manners’, and are required to pay 
a subsidy of ‘noe lesse then 4lb a yeare’ to the Academy, alongside a book donation to 
the library. Hall explains that Essentials would participate in weekly debates: they are 
tasked ‘publiquely to discourse before the President, these discourses to bee carefully 
reserved & registred, for the Peculiar use of the Society’. By only benefitting the 
Academy, these discussions illustrate the privatised, self-fulfilling nature of the 
intellectual community. The recording of discourses, moreover, corresponds with the 
annual task of Essentials to provide ‘a Paper of Verses and some choice discourse as 
allso those that were Poetically inclined’, which are ‘gathered up, the choisest cull’d & 
printed under the name off the Academy’. In contrast to the Office of Address, 
knowledge and literature are internally moderated rather than internationally and 
nationally disseminated. By 1651, William Rand (1617-63), a physician who Hartlib 
identifies alongside Milton as a potential commissioner for the ‘Councel for schooling’, 
explains that he ‘would define Ingenuity to be an uprightnes & gallantry of mind, 
makeing a man owne truth & justice though to the prejudice of his owne interest’.150 
Hall would agree with Rand’s definition in the context of the Hartlib circle. His 
 
147 McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance, p. 62; Hall to Hartlib, 29 March 1647, HP 9/10/5A-6B; 13 April 
1647, HP 60/14/30A-31B; John Hall, ‘A Short Model of Society’, 13 April 1647, HP 26/20/1A-2B; Hall 
to Hartlib, 20 April 1647, HP 60/14/32A; Hall to Hartlib, 26 [April? 1647], HP 60/14/35A. 
148 Turnbull suggests this conclusion in ‘John Hall’s Letters’, p. 230. 
149 McDowell refers to the ‘Armilla Nigra’ as ‘a secret society formed out of grief for the ruin of the 
Stuart court’, in Poetry and Allegiance, p. 65.  
150 HP 47/13/4A; Rand to Hartlib, 1 September 1651, HP 62/27/1A. 
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reservations of the ‘Academy of Ingenuitys’ seem to be inspired by its private and 
exclusive nature, which bears resemblance to Milton’s aristocratic educational vision. 
Indeed, Hall even refers to a desire ‘to enlarg to Horsmanship, Fencing, etc’.151 Hall’s 
support for Milton’s educational vision, in contrast to his criticism of the ‘Academy of 
Ingenuitys’, seems to be because the treatise is dedicated to public good, regardless of 
its private nature. 
Hall’s ardent support for Of Education illustrates how Milton’s tract 
continued to navigate the evolving Hartlibian distinction between public and private 
intellectual spheres in 1646-7. Whereas Hall describes ‘A Short Model’ as ‘too slight’, 
Dury had expressed in July 1644 his dislike for the ‘brief & generall’ Of Education that 
Hartlib had sent to him; Culpeper similarly in November 1645 suggested that Milton’s 
treatise had ‘some good sprincklings’ but was lacking in not ‘descendinge enowght into 
particulars’.152 Hall was more enthused by Milton’s proposal. Having indicated to 
Hartlib that Milton had been in contact with him a few days previously, on 21 
December 1646, Hall expresses his desire to maintain regular correspondence with 
Milton: ‘I am much ambitious of the acquaintance of Mr Milton (who is said here to be 
the Author of that excellent discourse of Education you were pleased to impart) I 
beseech you be a means to bringing us a Correspondency if you can.’ Hall’s keen desire 
to maintain communications with Milton, which he reiterates on 8 January 1647, 
suggests just how much Of Education must have impressed him. However, in late 
March 1647, around the same time as Hall visited Stanley and first heard about the 
‘Academy of Ingenuitys’, Hall makes reference to Milton’s lack of support for the 
‘Enclosed Originall’ – a reference perhaps to a proposal given to Milton by Hartlib or 
Hall himself – after which there is no extant evidence of further communications 
between Milton and Hall. Hall bands Milton’s aloof response alongside Stanley’s lack 
of communications with Hartlib: ‘I am sorry Mr Milton dos abundare suo sensu I wish I 
cold not Complain the like of my dear Stanley (To whom expect a letter as yow desire 
next Week) But I hope I shall win or him when I come to Remain at London as I shall 
shortly.’153 These two proponents of exclusive intellectual reform are equally resistant 
to what was presumably a proposal for universal learning. The difference is that Hall 
remains optimistic that he could sway his patron, whereas Milton, three years after the 
 
151 John Hall, ‘A Short Model of Society’, 13 April 1647, HP 26/20/1A-2B. 
152 Dury to Hartlib, 21 July 1644, HP 3/2/43B; Culpeper to Hartlib, 12 November 1645, HP 13/122A. 
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publication of Of Education, is presumably now a lost cause. Hall’s enthusiasm for 
Milton’s private educational vision, in contrast to his criticism of the ‘Short Model’, can 
be explained in that Of Education remained dedicated to the Hartlibian project, even if 
its author, in 1647, began to distance himself from the circle, most likely due to his lack 
of support for scientific learning. Milton’s treatise exhibits how a private institution 
could serve the public good, which is a belief – particularly in terms of the aristocracy – 
that Hall and Hartlibian tracts from 1646 increasingly espouse.  
Hall’s proposal for educational reform, An Humble Motion to The 
Parliament Of England Concerning The Advancement of Learning (1649), illustrates 
how he processed his mutual involvement with Hartlib and Stanley and their respective 
groups. Joad Raymond suggests that Hall’s Advancement of Learning was written ‘in 
the spirit of Milton and Hartlib.’154 Hall does, however, make an original contribution to 
the Miltonic and Hartlibian ideas that he had encountered: he establishes a distinction 
between the term ‘private’ and the aristocratic heritage with which it is associated in 
contemporary discourse. Hall acknowledges that, while some commonwealths have 
‘withered under the decay of Learning’, never  
 
have they been so fortunate under any governours as those who comming from a noble education, 
and a right observation and deduction of things (which may well make a man learned, though he 
never had seen a book) were neither subject to these wilde evagations, nor savage rudenesses 
which unturored Natures, through the want of a better discipline, were apt to fall into.155 
 
The parenthesis interjects a meritocratic perspective that Hall proceeds to develop: 
‘many private men born amidst the dregs of the people, & not capable of any such high 
hopes, have by this means far overtopped men of antiquity and ancient discent’. Hall 
refers to Augustus, ‘who though his Cradle was not private, yet in his first accesse to 
business, was not onely left in a private capacity, but surrounded by an inimical faction’ 
(8). Hall divorces the word ‘private’ from an exclusively aristocratic definition, placing 
greater emphasis on the potential of a uniquely talented individual, regardless of their 
heritage. He also maintains his support for universal learning: ‘What means were used 
to keep it in a few hands in a corner (like a great exile, thrust away by contrary power) 
till some better times, must now be used to disperse it through the face of the earth, and 
 
154 Joad Raymond, ‘Hall, John’, in ODNB. 
155 John Hall, An Humble Motion to the PARLIAMENT of England Concerning the ADVANCEMENT of 
Learning: And the Reformation of the Universities (1649) p. 8. Further references will be made 
parenthetically in the running text. 
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make it tread as far as mankind’ (18). In January, Hall had referred to ‘private men’ 
working in an institution resembling Salomon’s House.156 In Advancement of Learning, 
he returns to this utopianism by discussing the value of scientific and empirical 
experiments in Baconian terms, as they will force ‘Nature […] into an open veracity and 
pure nakednesse’ (44). Hall articulates his own definition of ‘private’ as a form of elite 
individual who serves the public good: graduates of Milton’s academy as well as 
members of the Hartlib network fit into this categorisation. Hall’s Advancement of 
Learning epitomises how the Hartlibians developed an increasingly tolerant view of 
private intellectualism following the first civil war. While Milton distanced himself 
from the circle during this period, it seems as though his ideas enjoyed an afterlife in 





Milton’s contribution to the Hartlib circle marks an early stage in which he encounters 
contemporary utopianism and millenarianism. From Platte’s Macaria in 1641 to Hall’s 
Advancement of Learning in 1649, utopian concepts are discussed, accommodated and 
creatively adapted in a discourse that has at its heart Baconian philosophy and 
eschatology. Milton’s vision of elite, aristocratic academies, nationally instituted and 
serving the Hartlibian and Baconian end goal, channelled the Hartlibian interest away 
from exclusively universal Comenianism and towards a more tolerant view of exclusive 
and private learning. Hall’s engagement with the circles of both Hartlib and Stanley 
marks his positive response to Of Education as particularly valuable. Milton’s private 
academy represents a selective institution that serves the public good in explicitly 
Hartlibian language. Where Dury accommodates an aristocratic educational 
establishment into both Considerations and Reformed School, Hall articulates a more 
original view of the private sphere as representing elite individuals, who, determined 
meritocratically or by birth, serve a public good. As this study will show, Milton’s faith 
in elite individuals becomes increasingly entrenched over his polemical and literary 
career. This early Hartlibian context illustrates how such elitist ideas cross-fertilised 
with utopianism and millenarianism. The following chapter will show how the tension 
between public and private spheres, particularly in relation to the utopianism and 
millenarianism exhibited by contemporary Hartlibian tracts, is more prominent in 
 
156 Hall to Hartlib, 2 January [1647], HP 9/10/2A. 
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Areopagitica, as Milton navigates the growing Presbyterian and Independent divide. In 
1644, Milton formulates a complex relationship between utopian ideas of state 
regulation and educational advancement within the millenarian milieu of mid-
seventeenth-century England. The Hartlibians were central to this ideological 
































Truth, Toleration, and Utopia in Areopagitica 
 
Of Education was not the only tract of 1644 to address the advancement of knowledge 
in Hartlibian terms. Where Of Education marks Milton’s response to Hartlib’s project, 
Areopagitica (November, 1644) represents his contribution to the efforts of Henry 
Robinson (1604-64) and his associates in the toleration controversy.157 Recent 
typographical research into Areopagitica and contemporary tolerationist tracts suggests 
that Milton published Areopagitica through the same clandestine printers as the 
Robinson circle: Matthew Simmons and Thomas Paine.158 This chapter will not only 
incorporate this evidence into its analysis of Milton’s engagement with tolerationism, 
but it will also consider how Areopagitica, less directly, represents Milton’s continued 
contribution to the Hartlibian discourse, particularly in the form of John Dury’s An 
Epistolary Discourse (July, 1644). Dury, in his ecumenist desire to maintain church 
unity, remained defensive of mainstream Presbyterianism in response to An 
Apologeticall Narration (January, 1644), the first major assertion of Independent views 
in print. Robinson himself responded to Dury’s tract in a letter of the same year.159 Just 
as Milton straddled discourses of public and private intellectualism in Of Education, 
which were discussed in the previous chapter, so too does he exhibit strong support for 
individual liberty of conscience, endorsed by the Robinson circle, and, in Hartlibian 
fashion, a desire for national progress in Areopagitica. This chapter will show how 
Milton engages with the toleration controversy through a pamphlet that exhibits a form 
of Baconian utopianism intended to recover a lost, millenarian ‘Truth’. This is the first 
time that Milton envisions utopianism – specifically, in a Baconian, intellectual form – 
as a means of ushering in the millennium. Many of these ideas were anticipated by Of 
Reformation, as discussed in Chapter 1, but they lacked the more consolidated and 
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developed form of Areopagitica. The tract also further exhibits Milton’s complex 
approach to public and private realms of intellectual and religious activity. While the 
public and private in Areopagitica are yoked together, Milton’s vision for those who 
can advance the Reformation in England, borne from millenarian fervour, becomes 
increasingly narrow in scope, centring on the private and individual sphere – 
specifically of elect individuals – in his later writings. The desire for public good in 
Areopagitica, and the role of the private individual in realising this, therefore, represents 
a standard against which his later tracts, from the late 1650s and beyond, can be 
compared. 
Thomas Corns has analysed the toleration context of Areopagitica in 
comparison with Roger Williams’s Bloudy Tenent (1644).160 Bloudy Tenent was 
published by the same clandestine printers as Areopagitica; Williams participated in the 
subterranean tolerationist movement of the Robinson circle in 1644.161 Corns suggests 
that, while Milton’s views on toleration may have more closely aligned with Williams’s 
belief in complete, encompassing toleration in the late 1650s, some form of 
Presbyterian sympathy remains in Areopagitica, particularly given that only two years 
previously he had written in support of the Presbyterian ministers, Smectymnuus, in the 
anti-prelatical tracts. Corns argues that Milton identified with both the authors of An 
Apologeticall Narration, such as Philip Nye – who, signalling the beginning of 
Independency, requested from the developing Presbyterian mobilisation a limited form 
of toleration in the form of non-separating Congregationalism – and also more extreme 
tolerationists, like Williams:  
 
Like Nye, he had assumed he could be in dialogue with men such as Thomas Young and the other 
Smectymnuans, whose efforts they had recently seconded. But he had developed, too, an 
awareness of his own differences from presbyterians, both in the heterodoxy of his doctrinal 
position, specifically and explicitly about divorce reform, and in his perspective on the extent to 
which sectaries should be tolerated. 
 
While Corns detects Presbyterian language in Areopagitica – ‘he persistently speaks the 
language of “we” and “us”, as though he and they were still comrades, as in his anti-
prelatical campaign of 1641-2’ – it is important to remember that Milton was staunchly 
opposed to attempts to implement Presbyterianism nationally, which he was aware was 
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a potential outcome of the Westminster Assembly: ‘While things are yet not constituted 
in Religion, that freedom of writing should be restrain’d by a discipline imitated from 
the Prelats, and learnt by them from the Inquisition to shut us up all again into the Brest 
of a licenser must needs give cause of doubt and discouragement to all learned and 
religious men’ (CPW ii. 541).162 Dury’s irenicism and central role in the Hartlib circle 
nevertheless suggest that he was more likely to respond to well-argued cases for liberty 
of conscience. As Milton continued to be in discourse with the Hartlib circle in 1644, 
Dury’s An Epistolary Discourse (1644), in which the Presbyterian minister opposes the 
Independent argument of An Apologeticall Narration, represents the kind of 
Presbyterian that Milton would have wanted to reason with in Areopagitica. Indeed, 
Dury’s Considerations Concerning the Present Engagement (1649), in which he 
encouraged citizens to take the Oath of Allegiance to the new republic, ‘earned him the 
undying hatred of presbyterians’, which suggests that his support of Presbyterianism in 
An Epistolary Discourse was irenic rather than zealous.163 As we shall see, where 
Dury’s dedication to public good necessitates his opposition to individual liberty of 
conscience in An Epistolary Discourse, Milton reconciles this conflict in Areopagitica. 
As a contribution to Hartlibian discourse, Areopagitica establishes a relationship 
between liberty of conscience and public good, possibly in answer to Dury’s tract. 
Dury’s An Epistolary Discourse will help to illustrate the conflicting religious context 
of 1644 and how Milton, recently a supporter of Presbyterianism against prelacy and 
now printing Areopagitica on a press associated with the Independent Robinson circle, 
can be situated in this context. ‘The vision of Areopagitica’, Corns continues, ‘is of a 
new Jerusalem for the saints to dwell in; for both men, that vision is as much utopian as 
millenarian.’164 This chapter will address in greater depth the relationship in 
Areopagitica between the public and national achievement of the millennium and the 
Baconian and utopian advancement of learning that requires individual liberty of 
conscience. 
The recent typographical study of ‘Damaged Type and Areopagitica’s 
Clandestine Printers’ identifies Areopagitica as part of a series of tracts published 
anonymously by Matthew Simmons and Thomas Paine. Ernest Sirluck observed in his 
annotations to the Yale edition consistencies between Areopagitica and Henry 
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Robinson’s Liberty of Conscience (1644), and even William Walwyn’s Compassionate 
Samaritane (1644).165 More recently, James Egan has considered Milton’s rhetorical 
strategy in Areopagitica in contrast to tolerationist tracts from 1644, such as Robinson’s 
Liberty of Conscience, positing that ‘Areopagitica may be read as a process of 
participating in the toleration controversy while at the same time communicating the 
uniqueness of his role.’166 Through analysis of damaged type, the new research of 
Christopher Warren (et al.) materially aligns Milton with the clandestine tolerationist 
tracts of 1644: Areopagitica was printed using the same type as tracts published by 
other members of the Robinson network, such as Williams and Walwyn.167 Alongside 
Liberty of Conscience, John the Baptist (1644), Bloudy Tenent, and Compassionate 
Samaritane, the study identifies Areopagitica, Of Education, Tetrachordon (1645), and 
Colasterion (1645) all as having been printed by Paine and Simmons.168 John Coffey 
goes as far as to suggest that Robinson financed – or indeed owned – the press on which 
Areopagitica and the other Independent tolerationist tracts were published.169 This 
chapter will use this evidence to further investigate Milton’s involvement with both the 
Hartlib and Robinson networks. While Dury defended the mainstream Presbyterian 
argument in An Epistolary Discourse, Robinson, who wrote to Dury about the tract just 
two weeks prior to the publication of Areopagitica, would become increasingly 
involved with the Hartlibian project, ultimately establishing an ‘Office of Addresses and 
Encounters’ in Threadneedle Street, London.170 David Como’s observation is pertinent: 
rather than placing ‘ideas into abstract and discrete categories – anabaptist, separatist, 
antinomian, independent, and so forth – the fact is that at the fringe of the puritan 
community, these boundaries were not always apparent.’171 
David Norbrook considers Milton’s engagement with the public sphere in 
Areopagitica within the context of the Hartlib circle. Norbrook suggests that, as Hartlib 
had solicited Milton to write Of Education, the intelligencer may also have encouraged 
him to write Areopagitica. He also acknowledges that there are Baconian elements of 
Areopagitica that suggest Milton still participated in the Hartlibian enterprise. There is 
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evidence that Hartlib disseminated Areopagitica within his network, and even that he 
considered translating the tract into German, but received criticism from Joachim 
Hübner (1610-66) in response.172 Norbrook further indicates that Cheney Culpeper 
(1611-63) read and was inspired by Areopagitica. A letter from Culpeper to Hartlib, 
dated to 20 November, around the time of Areopagitica’s publication, which espouses 
the view that books have vitality, resembles Milton’s argument that ‘Books are not 
absolutely dead things’ (CPW ii. 492): ‘havinge firste freede ourselves from a slavishe 
reverence of some fewe men or books’.173 For Norbrook, in Areopagitica, Milton is 
‘turning his linguistic gifts to the public service’, which was helped by the fact that the 
tract ‘displays greater trust in the broad masses of the people than his later writings’.174 
This chapter will analyse the relationship between public and private spheres in 
Areopagitica, particularly in the context of Hartlib’s network. While Norbrook spends 
time arguing that Milton intended to align London with Athens in Areopagitica, there is 
just as much value in exploring the relationship between public and private spheres 
within the context of Milton’s involvement with contemporary intellectual circles. In Of 
Education, Milton proposed an exclusive, aristocratic education system that appeared at 
odds with the central ideology of the Hartlib circle for a public advancement of 
learning; in Areopagitica, there is a tension between individual liberty of conscience 





Areopagitica was written within a diverse and complex intellectual and textual context, 
in which wider political changes and growing support for Presbyterianism in parliament 
were prominent. Abbe Blum argues that Areopagitica ‘encodes much that is 
symptomatic of what was occurring in England at this tumultuous time’, and that it 
shows ‘how the realms of “public” and “private” are historically defined.’ Specifically, 
Blum argues that Milton’s defence of authorial ownership and authority against the 
Licensing Act of 1643 is representative of a conflict between private and public 
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Roman Empire’, in The Seventeenth Century, 33/1 (2018), pp. 48-54. 
173 See Culpeper to Hartlib, 20 November 1644, HP 13/55A-56B. 
174 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, pp. 123-5, 136, 131. 
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spheres.175 In Milton’s engagement with both the Hartlib and Robinson circles, he 
shows in his writings a developing awareness and theorisation of the relationship 
between private and public spheres. Where the Independent resistance to national 
Presbyterianism in the form of the Robinson circle has been explored, Dury’s 
contribution to this discourse in support of the Presbyterians through An Epistolary 
Discourse, Robinson’s response to Dury, and how this particular context illuminates 
Areopagitica, lacks such attention. Whereas Walwyn in Compassionate Samaritane 
responds directly to An Apologeticall Narration, arguing that its authors’ call for 
toleration is too limited, Dury defends Presbyterianism, arguing that the Independents’ 
request should not be implemented.176 In Areopagitica, Milton endorses ideas that had 
been previously articulated by Robinson and Walwyn, whilst also advocating 
contribution to the public good in Hartlibian terms. The contrast between the ‘public 
edification’ that Dury propounds in An Epistolary Discourse, which is formed from 
millenarian and Baconian ideals, and the individual liberty of conscience proposed by 
the Robinson circle that Milton espouses in Areopagitica warrants further attention.  
Toleration in Areopagitica, and its limits, are best understood within the 
wider context of the Robinson circle. Arguments against the Licensing Act had already 
been made in 1644 by Robinson and Walwyn. In Liberty of Conscience, Robinson 
argues that the ‘combat’ of religious debate ‘must be fought out upon eaven ground, on 
equal termes, neither side must expect to have greater liberty of speech, writing, 
Printing, or whatsoever else, then the other.’177 Walwyn, in Compassionate Samaritane, 
explicitly refers to the ‘Ordinance for licensing of Bookes’, which, while having good 
intentions, ‘namely the prohibition of all bookes dangerous or scandalous to the State, is 
become by meanes of the Licensers (who are Divines and intend their interest) most 
serviceable to themselves (scandalous books being still disperst) in the stopping of 
honest mens writings […]’.178 The difference with Areopagitica is that Milton places 
greater value on books as vital and influential public artefacts than either Robinson or 
Walwyn. As such, he establishes an indissoluble relationship between freedom of the 
press and liberty of conscience; the two concepts, for Milton, are interdependent. Where 
Robinson criticises the suppression of voices by Synods who instruct scriptural 
 
175 Abbe Blum, ‘The Author’s Authority: Areopagitica and the labour of licensing’, in Mary Nyquist, 
Margaret W. Ferguson, eds., Re-Membering Milton: Essays on the Texts and Traditions (New York: 
Methuen, 1987), pp. 75, 78-82. 
176 William Walwyn, Compassionate Samaritane (1644), pp. 1-3; Dury, An Epistolary Discourse (1644), 
pp. 21-3; further references to Epistolary Discourse will be made parenthetically in the running text. 
177 Henry Robinson, Liberty of Conscience Or The Sole means to obtaine Peace and Truth (1643), p. 17. 
178 Walwyn, Compassionate Samaritane, p. 39, see also pp. A4, 70-1; see CPW ii. 84-7. 
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interpretation (42), Milton argues that vocalised grievances, such as that which his 
oratory persona represents in Areopagitica, should be ‘freely heard, deeply consider’d, 
and speedily reform’d’ (487). However, Milton asserts later in the tract that ‘writing is 
more publick than preaching’ (547). He grants greater power to books than either 
Robinson or Walwyn, asserting that it is necessary  
 
to have a vigilant eye how Bookes demeane themselves, as well as men; and thereafter to confine, 
imprison, and do sharpest justice on them as malefactors: For Books are not absolutely dead 
things, but doe contain a potencie of life in them to be as active as that soule was whose progeny 
they are; nay they do preserve as in a viol the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect 
that bred them (492). 
 
While books should be published freely, Milton acknowledges the need to address bad 
books post-publication. He does not, therefore, advocate a complete, uncompromising 
freedom of the press. By the same argument, however, he also stresses that good books 
must not be licensed, for ‘as good almost kill a Man as kill a good Book’ (492). Milton 
personifies books as having authorial vitality that enables them to wield substantial 
influence, which can both be of benefit to and endanger society.  
Milton develops a close relationship between the public artefact of the book 
and the private voice of the author in Areopagitica. ‘By using the trope of books as 
men,’ Nigel Smith argues, ‘Milton finds an apt metaphor of many collaborating bodies, 
healthy in their active juxtaposition, as opposed to the dominant royalist image of the 
body politic.’179 The conflict between differing views, which Robinson acknowledges 
above, is envisioned by Milton as textual, in which differences represent a collaborative 
effort in the pursuit of ‘Truth’. In Milton’s idealised depiction of London, discussed 
later in this section, he describes the unified effort of a ‘vast City’, where ‘the shop of 
warre’ serves ‘to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed Justice in defence of 
beleaguer’d Truth’ (553-4). Milton refers to the ‘warfaring Christian’ (514), who, as he 
explains later in the tract,  
 
hath furnisht out his findings in all their equipage, drawn forth his reason as it were a battell 
raung’d, scatter’d and defeated all objections in his way, calls out his adversary into the plain, 
offers him the advantage of wind and sun, if he please; only […] for his opponents then to sculk, 
 
179 Nigel Smith, ‘Areopagitica: Voicing Contexts, 1643-5’ in Politics, Poetics and Hermeneutics in 
Milton’s Prose, p. 117. 
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to lay ambushments, [and] to keep a narrow bridge of licencing where the challenger should passe 
(562).180 
 
Licensing in this metaphor inhibits the combative dialectic of ideas and opinions that 
Milton idealises. As this textual conflict is necessary in the ‘wars of Truth’ (562), 
Milton ‘cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d, that 
never sallies out and sees her adversary’ (514). The public entity of the book manifests 
the individual voice of the author; Milton reduces the boundary between author and text 
in order to facilitate intertextual disagreement, through which Truth can be realised. For 
Milton, books are potent because they are vital. By manifesting an animate, authorial 
voice, books can be a force for good just as they can endanger a society.  
Milton’s perception of heresy in Areopagitica reflects his defence of liberty 
of conscience and his awareness of the vitality of books. In Of Civil Power (1659), 
Milton, drawing from the Greek etymology, argues that ‘heresie, by what it signifies in 
that language, is no word of evil note; meaning only the choise or following of any 
opinion good or bad in religion or any other learning […]’ (CPW vii. 247).181 It is 
important to note that Of Civil Power was written as an address to Richard Cromwell’s 
parliament, which, as Janel Mueller notes, were comprised largely by conservative 
Presbyterians.182 Fifteen years earlier, Milton, not explicitly drawing on the Greek 
etymology of ‘heresy’, nevertheless references in his historical narration Dionysius 
Alexandrinus, ‘a person of great name in Church for piety and learning, who had wont 
to avail himself much against hereticks by being conversant in their Books; untill a 
certain Presbyter laid it scrupulously to his conscience, how he durst venture himselfe 
among those defiling volumes’ (CPW ii. 511). In this example, Milton defends the need 
to read and interpret heretical ideas and opposes Presbyterian resistance to that freedom. 
Responsibility is afforded to the interpreter to judge what is false or heretical. As the 
Yale edition references, in The History of the Council of Trent (1619) by Paolo Sarpi 
(1552-1623), Sarpi writes that Dionysius, ‘being reprehended by his Priests for these 
causes, and troubled with these respects, had a vision that hee should reade all bookes, 
 
180 See Genelle C. Gertz-Robinson, ‘Still Martyred after All These Years: Generational Suffering in 
Milton’s Areopagitica’, in ELH, 70/4 (2003), p. 979. 
181 For discussions of Milton’s perception of heresy, see Nigel Smith, ‘Paradise Lost and Heresy’, in 
Nicholas McDowell, Nigel Smith, eds., Oxford Handbook of Milton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 510-24; Tobias Gregory, ‘How Milton Defined Heresy and Why’, in Religion & Literature, 45/1 
(2013), 148-160. 
182 Janel Mueller, ‘Milton on Heresy’, in Stephen B. Dobranski, John P. Rumrich, eds., Milton and 
Heresy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 22. 
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because hee was able to judge of them’ (CPW ii. 511, note 88).183 Milton’s argument in 
Areopagitica is that people are morally bound to judge books in order to contribute to 
the production of truth and hence do not require pre-publication licensing to protect 
them. 
While Milton defended the need for individuals to read and interpret 
heretical ideas, this did not mean he tolerated such ideas. Just as Milton stops short of 
advocating a complete free press, acknowledging that some texts may be damaging to 
society, so he qualifies his argument for tolerance, explaining that ‘I mean not tolerated 
Popery, and open superstition’, for that ‘which is impious or evil absolutely either 
against faith or maners no law can possibly permit, that intends not to unlaw it self’ 
(565).184 The limits of Milton’s toleration indicates a similarity between his argument 
for free press and that of liberty of conscience in Areopagitica: the force of the 
argument in both examples, and their qualifications – or limitations – are mirrored. The 
Licensing Act should be withdrawn in order for different voices, materially constituted 
in texts, to be heard and debated; equally, just as some books found pernicious after 
publication can be removed, some religious beliefs, especially Catholicism, cannot be 
tolerated. Such religious views published in pamphlets, which represent Falsehood, can 
be tackled through printed responses from proponents of Truth, like Milton. The 
emphasis that Milton places on textual potency and the limitations that he imposes on 
his philosophy of toleration mark how he developed ideas that were already present in 
the writings of the Robinson circle. Writing within the Independent tolerationist 
framework of the Robinson circle, Milton established a more direct relationship 
between the private, individual role of the author and the public product of the text.  
The Hartlibian context of 1644 tolerationism illuminates the relationship 
between private and public spheres, as represented by the ideas of liberty of conscience 
and free press, in Areopagitica. Some critics have acknowledged that it is necessary to 
consider Areopagitica as an extension of Milton’s engagement with the Hartlib network 
in Of Education.185 Given that Of Education was published on the same press as 
Areopagitica, the proximity of both texts to Hartlibian discourse is significant. An 
Epistolary Discourse is a collection of Dury’s letters to Philip Nye and John Goodwin 
from June-July 1642 and one to Hartlib himself in response to An Apologeticall 
 
183 Milton also read of Dionysius in Eusebius, as he references in his Commonplace Book (CPW i. 377). 
184 See Corns, ‘Limits of Toleration’, p. 72. 
185 See Smith, ‘Voicing Contexts, p. 105; Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, pp. 122-5. 
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Narration, co-authored by Nye and Goodwin, amongst others, from March 1644.186 
Dury’s correspondence indicates how he anticipates the early Independent argument for 
non-separating Congregationalism that Goodwin and Nye, alongside the other ministers, 
would propose in An Apologeticall Narration. As a consequence, it also pre-empts how 
An Epistolary Discourse would oppose An Apologeticall Narration. The first letter 
printed in An Epistolary Discourse, dated 24 June-4 July 1642, details Dury’s irenic 
attempt to unite the Calvinist and Lutheran churches.187 The form of ‘Toleration’ that he 
describes in Epistolary Discourse is not a ‘bare Toleration’, but rather a ‘publique 
protection of Brotherhood, whereupon I conceived a Toleration would follow of it selfe 
in matters of lesser difference’ (2).188 Greater tolerance between churches will ‘set 
forward the Reformation of Protestant Churches, unto that period whereunto it may be 
Gods assistance be brought’ (1). Although Kenneth Gibson argues that Dury was not 
millenarian like fellow Hartlibians, his irenicism maintained an eschatological 
purpose.189  
Dury’s ‘publique protection of Brotherhood’ (2) is nevertheless distinct 
from individual liberty of conscience. As Dury explains in his letter dated 7-17 March 
1644, having not received adequate responses from Goodwin and Nye, An Apologeticall 
Narration has shown him that their tolerationist argument serves their own benefit, 
rather than that of the public: ‘For I see that their aime is rather Private than Publick, 
and that their whole Way is answerable to a particular Interest, to commend themselves 
in a distance from others, by some distinct practises wherein they suppose they come 
nearer to the right Way of Church government than others doe’ (17). Dury opposes any 
form of toleration that would cause separation, however limited. Even non-separating 
 
186 Dury references these letters in correspondence with Hartlib: see HP 27 June 1642, 2/9/8; 4 July 1642, 
2/9/8A; 10 July 1642, 2/9/10A; 24 July 1642, 2/9/12A. 
187 Hartlib forwards this letter to Goodwin on 6 July; see Hartlib to Goodwin, 6 July 1642, HP 7/27/30A-
B; Charles Webster associates Dury’s irenicism with his eschatology in The Great Instauration, pp. 21, 
see also 32, 34. 
188 For discussions of Dury’s irenicism, see Jeremy Fradkin, ‘Protestant Unity and Anti-Catholicism: The 
Irenicism and Philo-Semitism of John Dury in Context’, in Journal of British Studies, 56 (2017), 273-94; 
Anthony Milton, ‘“The Unchanged Peacemaker”? John Dury and the Politics of Irenicism in England, 
1628-1643’, in Mark Greengrass, et al., Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation: Studies in 
Intellectual Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 95-117; Kenneth Gibson, 
‘John Dury’s Apocalyptic Thought: A Reassessment’, in Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 61/2 (2010), 
pp. 302-3; and Keith Thomas, ‘The Utopian Impulse in Seventeenth-Century England, in Dominic Baker-
Smith, C. C. Barfoot, eds., Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 1987), p. 39. 
189 Gibson, pp. 209-303; for an argument of Dury as a millenarian, see Richard H. Popkin, ‘The End of 
the Career of a Great 17th Century Millenarian: John Dury’, in Pietismus und Neuzeit, 14 (1998), 203-20; 
for a broader and more recent discussion of Dury’s eschatology and irenicism, see Fradkin, pp. 273-5.   
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Congregationalism, which the apologists requested, endangered the ‘fraternall union’ 
(3) that Dury viewed as necessary to advance the Reformation. He associates organised 
churches – and tolerance between such institutions – with the public good; individual 
liberty of conscience is representative of private, selfish interest. Dury explains that ‘to 
keep the Unitie of the Spirit in the bond of Peace entire, and to prevent occasions which 
may be taken to abuse Libertie, a few should yeeld unto many, except they can fairely 
perswade those many to yeeld unto them: and if both sides in matters Tolerable should 
intend mutually to yield to one another, their Way will be, not to separate from each 
other, but to keep the interest of love and Communion entire (22).’ Dury’s overriding 
message is that religion should be organised. The toleration he advocates is 
denominational and ecumenic: different churches should tolerate each other in order to 
achieve ‘the universall end of Publique Edification in the Communion of Saints’ (14). 
Dury associates public, brotherly unity with an eschatological end point; individual 
religious liberty impedes progress to that end. 
Milton’s idealised vision for London at the end of Areopagitica exhibits his 
view of how individuals can contribute to national, eschatological progress. In his ideal 
London, the studious efforts of individuals contribute to a city-wide collaboration of 
‘labouring the hardest labour in the deep mines of knowledge’ (562) in order to help 
recover and defend ‘beleaguer’d Truth’ (554). Milton explains that his ideal society will 
‘joyn, and unite into one generall and brotherly search after Truth’, for ‘the perfection 
consists in this, that out of many moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are 
not vastly disproportionall arises the goodly and gracefull symmetry that commends the 
whole pile and structure’ (554). Although it is tempting to interpret Milton here as 
advocating a modern sense of free press, as an organised, societal effort, there are 
limitations to the freedom enjoyed in his London. The repeated use of the word 
‘brotherly’ is important here. Dury uses the word to describe his irenic efforts (2) in 
Epistolary Discourse, and explains at length what he means by the term ‘Brother’ (12-
13): to Dury, a brother would share ‘the same interest in God […] and doth call him 
Father upon the same grounds which I do; namely, by vertue of the same new Covenant 
whereby I am united unto God in Christ’ (13). Robinson, in a letter dated 5 November 
1644, and published by Hartlib alongside Dury’s responses in Some Few 
Considerations Propounded, As so many Scruples by Mr. Henry Robinson in a Letter to 
Mr. John Dury upon his Epistolary Discourse (July 1646), responds to Dury in support 
of his idea of brotherly discourse:  
 
 89 
You approve the casting off subjection and absolute obedience unto Episcopacy, but would not 
have dissolved the brotherly correspondencie in a Presbyterie; and certainly it should not be, but it 
must then continue brotherly; we must run hand in hand like brothers, so long as we can keep a 
good conscience both towards God and man […].190  
 
As Dury acknowledges in a subsequent letter, dated to 24 April 1646, also printed in 
Some Few Considerations, Robinson, despite his strong advocacy of religious freedom 
in Liberty of Conscience and John the Baptist, agrees with him here (26). Indeed, 
Robinson’s continued support of the Hartlib network throughout the late 1640s and 
early 1650s suggests that such opposing ideas as his and Dury’s did not exist in discrete, 
separate categories. While Milton may not be making a reference to Dury’s Epistolary 
Discourse, or indeed Presbyterianism in general in his use of ‘brotherly’ in 
Areopagitica, his idealised London straddles the boundary between the ideal of 
individual liberty of conscience and the realisation of public progress, or, more simply, 
between private and public spheres. The individual efforts of citizens in Milton’s 
London contribute to a society-wide enterprise in much the same way as Milton’s wider 
argument in Areopagitica establishes a relationship between private author and public 
textual artefact. Like Robinson, Milton seems to have sought reconciliation with 
Presbyterianism. The Independent idea of liberty of conscience and the concept of 
public good with which Dury defends Presbyterianism against Independency in 
Epistolary Discourse are united in the idealised London that Milton envisions in 
Areopagitica, possibly in the hope that a Presbyterian like Dury would listen to 
arguments for liberty of conscience. 
While Areopagitica participated in the efforts of the Robinson circle, it also 
extended Milton’s contribution to the Hartlibian programme. Areopagitica can be 
identified as the earliest stage in which Milton’s support of Presbyterianism in the anti-
prelatical tracts gave way to his opposition to their national aspirations, which would 
further manifest in his rejection of Presbyterian ‘backsliders’ in The Tenure of Kings 
and Magistrates (1649), and ultimately, his own vision for congregationalist churches in 
The Readie and Easie Way (1659). In a year of radical religious change, Areopagitica 
represents Milton’s first criticism of the Presbyterians in language that resonates with 
 
190 Samuel Hartlib, ed., Some Few Considerations Propounded, As so many Scruples by Mr. Henry 
Robinson in a Letter to Mr. John Dury upon his Epistolary Discourse: With Mr. Dureys Answer thereunto 
(July 1646). Further references will be made parenthetically in the running text; see also copy letter, dated 
to 8 November 1644, at HP 10/11/1A-8B; Dury references ‘Brotherly Correspondency’ in Considerations 
Tending to the Happy accomplishment of Englands Reformation in Church and State (May 1647), p. 6, 
regarding the Office of Address, an enterprise in which Robinson was involved. 
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contemporary early Independents. It nevertheless also encodes the language of ‘public 
good’ that Dury articulates both as a Presbyterian minister and a Hartlibian. Dury’s 
exclusive position on public progress and national organisations is at odds with Milton’s 
advocacy of individual liberty of conscience as a means to realise a national effort in the 
reconstitution of millenarian truth. However, just as Milton contributed a private and 
exclusivist view of educationalism in Of Education to a group of Baconians intending to 
enact national intellectual and educational reform, so the participation of Areopagitica 
in both the Robinson and Hartlib discourses, the latter represented by Dury in this case, 
is less contradictory than it appears. While Areopagitica, therefore, participates in the 
Independent discourse of the Robinson circle, it also maintains ideas of public progress 
that align with Dury’s contribution to the tolerationist debates of 1644. In a year in 
which Milton engaged with both the Hartlib and Robinson networks, Dury is a prime 
example of a Presbyterian who may have attended to Milton’s arguments in 
Areopagitica. Areopagitica can be viewed as a text intended to promote the Independent 
argument of liberty of conscience using language that may have influenced individuals 




TRUTH & UTOPIA 
 
Within the framework of private and public spheres, Milton establishes a relationship 
between utopianism and millenarianism that becomes increasingly prominent in his 
1650s writings and beyond. This chapter has already discussed Milton’s ideal of truth as 
the purpose of his vision for London and how it lies at the centre of his metaphor of 
conflicting texts, but its millenarian and materialist meaning requires further 
exploration. This section will posit that the embodied ideal of ‘Truth’ represents the 
product of the Baconian form of utopianism that Milton exhibits in Areopagitica. It has 
been recognised that Milton expresses reservations about utopian idealism in 
Areopagitica: ‘To sequester out of the world into Atlantick and Eutopian polities, which 
never can be drawn into use, will not mend our condition; but to ordain wisely as in this 
world of evill, in the midd’st whereof God hath plac’d us unavoidably (526).’191 Nigel 
 
191 For a discussion of Milton’s criticism of utopianism in Areopagitica, see Jude Welburn, ‘Divided 
Labours: Work, Nature, and the Utopian Impulse in John Milton’s Paradise Lost’, in Studies in 
Philology, 116/3 (2019), pp. 511-12. 
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Smith, however, argues that the ‘aspersions which Milton casts upon utopias here are 
typical of the Janus-faced modes of apprehension which Areopagitica comes to 
recommend.’ Smith explains that as ‘they are ideal the Utopia and the New Atlantis are 
unattainable’; they are nevertheless still capable, as Milton acknowledges in An Apology 
against a Pamphlet (1642), of ‘teaching this our world better and exacter things, then 
were yet known, or us’d.’192 The Baconian philosophy of an intellectual exchange of 
knowledge, which promises eschatological realisation and which is essentially 
Hartlibian, is at the heart of Areopagitica.  
This chapter has provided evidence for Milton’s continued proximity to 
Hartlibian ideas. It is now necessary to compare Areopagitica to Dury’s Reformed 
Librarie-Keeper (1650), the original manuscripts for which date back to August 1646, 
in letters to Hartlib.193 Dury’s Librarie-Keeper provides a contemporary standard of 
Baconian utopianism against which Areopagitica will be interpreted. As the Librarie-
Keeper was published alongside a supplement to Dury’s Reformed School (1648), both 
texts together mirror Milton’s major 1644 works, Of Education and Areopagitica. 
However, where Dury’s Librarie-Keeper exhibits a distinctly public and 
institutionalised form of Baconian utopianism, Areopagitica, characteristic of the tract 
as a whole, maintains a fluid relationship between author, text, and millenarian Truth. 
Milton, in the tolerationist context of 1644, establishes a relationship between utopia 
and the millennium that will become increasingly prominent in his later prose and 
poetry. 
Milton’s developing conception of a unity of spirit and matter frames how 
he depicts books in Areopagitica. As Stephen Fallon explains, Milton increasingly 
developed a form of animist materialism in response to contemporary mechanism, such 
as that of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Milton’s materialism was inspired by his 
monistic view of the body and soul, which Fallon identifies as early as the 1643-5 
divorce tracts. However, he acknowledges that these are just ‘intimations of materialist 
monism’, and that the ‘articulation of a mature and thoroughgoing monism will wait 
until the late 1650 and 1660s.’194 Where Of Reformation exhibited developed dualist 
ideas, early monist formulations are apparent in Milton’s depiction of Truth and its 
 
192 Smith, ‘Voicing Contexts’, p. 116; Milton, An Apology against a Pamphlet Call’d a Modest 
Confutation of the Animadversions upon the Remonstrant against Smectymnuus (1642), in CPW i. 881. 
193 See Dury to Hartlib, 18 August 1646, HP 3/3/24A-29B; 25 August 1646, HP 3/3/30A-31B; copy 
extracts at HP 47/14/1A-8B, 1/15/1A-4B. 
194 Stephen Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century 
England  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 107-11, 79-89, 96. 
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relationship to books in Areopagitica. As the previous section identified, Milton grants 
books a remnant of authorial vitality in Areopagitica. As Genelle Gertz-Robinson 
asserts, Milton imagines ‘books as bodies, giving texts a worldly agency that reflects the 
prolific powers of their authors.’195 Books ‘contain a potencie of life in them to be as 
active as that soule was whose progeny they are; nay they do preserve as in a viol the 
purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that bred them’ (492). As Milton 
notes later in Areopagitica, it was ‘from out the rinde of one apple tasted, that the 
knowledge of good and evill as two twins cleaving together leapt forth into the World’ 
(514). The close, familial relationship between good and evil means that books may 
contain both, and so must be read and judged by perceptive readers accordingly. Milton 
continues by blurring the distinction between material text and spiritual vitality: ‘a good 
Booke is the pretious life-blood of a master-spirit, imbalm’d and treasur’d up on 
purpose to a life beyond life’ (492). Rather than just a material artefact, a book can also 
possess a transcendent spirituality. Through licensing, Milton asserts, ‘we spill that 
season’d life of man preserv’d and stor’d up in Books’, and it is for this reason that  
 
we see a kinde of homicide may be thus committed, some times a martyrdome, and if it extend to 
the whole impression, a kinde of massacre, whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an 
elementall life, but strikes at that ethereall and fift essence, the breath of reason it selfe, slaies an 
immortality, rather then a life (493). 
 
Milton not only challenges the boundary between the material and animate, but also 
between the animate and transcendent. A book possesses an immanent vitality that is 
both material and supernal. While there remain dualistic ideas in Areopagitica, the 
relationship between spirit and body is much closer in the tract than in Of Reformation.  
Milton’s early form of animist materialism aligns with Bacon’s empirical 
philosophy, in which tangible matter is essentially animate. As Graham Rees explains, 
Bacon believed that ‘spirits are imprisoned within the tangible bodies of the earth’s 
crust and surface’, which ‘gave the speculative philosophy a measure of unity or 
theoretical integrity which joined together the celestial and terrestrial realms in an 
articulated system’.196 In Sylva Sylvarum, under the title of ‘Experiment Solitary 
 
195 Gertz-Robinson, ‘Generational Suffering in Milton’s Areopagitica’, p. 965; cf., on Of Reformation, 
Fitzhenry, ‘Poetics of Embodiment’, 262-79. 
196 Graham Rees, ‘Atomism and “Subtlety” in Francis Bacon’s Philosophy’, in Annals of Science, 37 
(1980), p. 553; for a more comprehensive discussion of Bacon’s natural philosophy in these terms, see 
Rees, OFB vi. liv-lxiv; see also Rees, ‘Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor in Bacon’s Natural 
Philosophy?’, in AMBIX, 24/2 (1977), pp. 110-125. 
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touching the Secret Processes of Nature’, Bacon explains that the ‘Spirits or 
Pneumaticals, that are in all Tangible Bodies, are scarce known’, and that they are ‘the 
most Active of Bodies.’ Resonating with Milton’s explanation that books are ‘as active 
as that soule was whose progeny they are’, Bacon explains that when these spirits ‘come 
to Plants and living Creatures, they call them Soules.’ Bacon clarifies: 
 
For Spirits are nothing else but a Naturall Body, rarified to a Proportion, & included in the 
Tangible Parts of Bodies, as an Integument. And they be no lesse differing one from the other, 
than the Dense or Tangible Parts: And they are in all Tangible Bodies whatsoever, more or lesse: 
And they are never (almost) at rest: And from them, and their Motions, principally proceed […] 
most of the Effects of Nature […].197 
 
Bacon’s idea of a natural, connective system, which bears resemblance to the 
Neoplatonic and hierarchical image that Raphael conveys to Adam in Paradise Lost (v. 
468-505), illuminates Milton’s theory of spirits – particularly ‘master-spirits’ – in 
Areopagitica.198 Fallon affirms that ‘in Bacon the young Milton would have found a 
natural philosophy in which the inanimate and animate are located along a continuum of 
matter’. 199 Spirits animate tangible material in Bacon’s philosophy; spirits, transferred 
from authorial vitality, animate books in Areopagitica. Bacon explains in Novum 
organum that the ‘Latent Processes’ created by spiritual animism in matter require 
empirical study, as he widely advocates in Instauratio magna: ‘For since every natural 
action is carried out per minima, or at least by bodies too small to impinge on the sense, 
no one can hope to be able to govern or change nature unless he has by due means 
understood and observed them’ (OFB xi. 211).200 While empiricism is more evident in 
Of Education, Milton’s developing theory of a spectrum of matter and spirit mirrors 
aspects of Bacon’s speculative philosophy.  
Milton’s metaphorical depiction of Truth in Areopagitica embodies his 
emergent monistic theology and aligns with his chiliasm. Gertz-Robinson identifies a 
relationship between the millenarian expectancy and martyrdom in Areopagitica, 
 
197 Bacon, William Rawley, ed., Sylva Sylvarum: Or A Naturall Historie (1626), p. 31. 
198 For the universal hierarchy of Paradise Lost, see Chapter 7, pp. 192-6 of this thesis. 
199 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, p. 114. 
200 For further explanation and discussion, see Rees, ‘Atomism’, p. 569. 
 94 
epitomised in the idea of Truth.201 Milton’s millenarianism is personified in the 
corporeal metaphor of Truth: 
 
Truth indeed came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape most 
glorious to look on: but when he ascended, and his Apostles after him were laid asleep, then strait 
arose a wicked race of deceivers, who as that story goes of the Ægyptian Typhon with his 
conspirators, how they dealt with good Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as 
they could find them. 
 
‘We have not yet found them all,’ Milton explains to his parliamentary audience, ‘nor 
ever shall doe, till her Masters second comming; he shall bring together every joynt and 
member, and shall mould them into an immortall feature of lovelines and perfection’ 
(549). The millennium is associated with the unification of Truth, whose body had been 
broken apart and her remains scattered. In his characteristic millenarianism, Milton does 
not suggest that society should patiently await this chiliastic reunification. Rather, 
through greater tolerance and the dissemination of ideas, society can work ‘to unite 
those dissever’d peeces, which are yet wanting to the body of Truth’ (550-1): ‘To be 
searching what we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find 
it (for all her body is homogeneal and proportionall) this is the golden rule in Theology 
as well as in Arithmetick, and makes up the best harmony in a Church’ (551). The 
process of re-embodying Truth is realised in Milton’s London, where citizens ‘joyn, and 
unite into one generall and brotherly search after Truth’ (554). The metaphor of Truth 
illustrates Milton’s belief that diversity of religious ideas and scriptural interpretation 
constitute millenarian unification, just as the disjointed body parts of Truth unify to 
create a homogenous whole. The metaphorical formulation of Truth represents Milton’s 
developing monism at this stage in the 1640s. The process of writing transfers spiritual 
animation to a text, which in turn contributes to a wider, societal effort to reanimate and 
thereby reconstitute the body of Truth. 
Dury’s Reformed Librarie-Keeper more evidently draws on Baconian 
precedent of monumentalised utopianism in Solomon’s House than Milton’s vision for 
London, especially as the Hartlibians were invested in establishing the Office of 
Address at the time. Kevin Dunn asserts that the Office of Address ‘shows itself as an 
incompletely democratized form of Bacon’s House of Salomon, a version in which the 
 
201 Gertz-Robinson, ‘Generational Suffering in Milton’s Areopagitica’, pp. 976-8; see also John R. Knott 
Jr., ‘“Suffering for Truths sake”: Milton and Martyrdom’, in Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics, pp. 153-
70. 
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aristocratic Brethren distribute information to people and state alike’.202 The Office of 
Address, however, realised an idea of Michel de Montaigne, which had also been put 
into practice in Paris in 1630 by Théophraste Renaudot (1586-1653) as the Bureau 
d’adresse et de rencontre.203 Renaudot’s Bureau was designed to centralise 
communication, providing a means through which unemployed individuals could find 
work, purchases could be made by connecting buyer and seller, and, between 1633-42, 
weekly conferences could be held, at which prominent scholars gave talks to a public 
audience.204 Renaudot was also specifically dedicated to the improvement of the 
efficacy and distribution of medicine. In September 1640, just a few months before 
Plattes’s Macaria – in which Plattes proposed a centralised institution for medicine – 
the Cour des Monnaies granted Renaudot permission to set up laboratories at the 
Bureau.205 In the Hartlib Papers, there is a copy of L’Usage Et Commodite Des 
Bureaux D’Addresse (1639), which details the operations of the bureaux. John Dury has 
made marginal notes to this copy that reads as a list of the different potential functions 
of the bureaux.206 It is likely that Plattes was aware of Renaudot’s developments in 
centralising medicine when he was writing Macaria, especially given that the College 
of Experience in Macaria is designed to centralise the dissemination of medical 
knowledge. The Hartlibian Office of Address was modelled on the precedent 
established by Renaudot’s bureaux in Paris as much as it was inspired by Bacon’s 
Salomon’s House. 
In his Considerations Tending to the Happy Accomplishment of Englands 
Reformation in Church and State (1647), Dury describes the Office as a state institution 
‘whereunto all Men might freely come to give Information of the Commodities which 
they have to be imparted unto others’, and from where an individual can receive 
information about such commodities: ‘this Office will be a Center of all Mens 
satisfactions to gaine their Interest in each other for mutuall help.’ As a collaborative 
 
202 Kevin Dunn, ‘Milton among the Monopolists: Areopagitica, Intellectual Property and the Hartlib 
Circle’, in Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation, p. 186. 
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enterprise, it will facilitate ‘Mutuall Communication’, which is ‘the Chief fruit of all 
Society’.207 Dunn asserts that, in their opposition to monopolisation, which encouraged 
‘the conflation of public and private’, the Hartlibians proposed ‘a system of private acts 
that benefit the larger public’.208 Cheney Culpeper, for instance, identified the Office, by 
dismantling monopolies, such as ‘the monopoly of trade’ and ‘monopoly of Equity’, as 
serving an apocalyptic purpose: ‘thus will Babilon tumble, tumble, tumble.’209 Like 
Milton, the realisation of public good had an eschatological purpose for the Hartlibians. 
Culpeper also illustrates how Milton’s ideas in Areopagitica may have 
circulated within the Hartlib circle and influenced the ideas of prominent members. 
Norbrook has observed how Culpeper’s letters in November 1644, only a few days 
before Thomason received his copy of Areopagitica, exhibit ideas that closely resemble 
Milton’s.210 McDowell also shows how Culpeper, later in the 1640s, advocates liberty 
of conscience and strongly criticises the Presbyterians in a manner that resembles 
Milton’s views at the time.211 Miltonic ideas, in fact, can be discerned in a number of 
Culpeper’s letters leading into early 1645. On 20 November, in a letter that Norbrook 
believes suggests Miltonic influence, Culpeper is specifically concerned with preserving 
the ideas of Gabriel Plattes, who had published The Profitable Intelligencer just a week 
before: 
 
I cannot but conceive wee shall by degrees (havinge firste freede ourselves from a slavishe 
reverence of some fewe men or bookes) try every spirit & that as well in rationall as spirituall 
thinges; & yf wee can once redeeme ourselves into this liberty, I am very confidente that Mr Plats 
thoughts (though they lye a while under grounde) will yet then like corne that dothe soe) afforde 
the better harveste. 
 
Culpeper stresses that ‘our resolution must be to plante to posterity though our selves 
may not perhaps hope to injoy any other part or fruite of the action than to have done 
it’.212 Culpeper believes in ‘preservation only & not to prepare for the presse’, which, 
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 97 
while it appears distinct from Milton’s argument in Areopagitica, shares with Milton the 
belief that good ideas of private men should serve a public good. Indeed, in a letter 
dated 4 January 1645, Culpeper expresses concern about the condition of Plattes’s death 
in poverty, which may partly have been caused by Culpeper not being able to ‘sende 
[Hartlib] what I promised’ in November due to his own diminishing funds that he 
explains to Hartlib on 18 December 1644 and reiterates in January. Culpeper does, 
however, reassert his desire to support Hartlib ‘in the preservinge of [Plattes’s] children 
I meane his books & ingenuities which yf you looke after in time may (I conceive) fall 
into your handes & by your care be improved to the publique good & his honor’.213 That 
Culpeper identifies Plattes’s books and ideas as ‘children’ grants them the kind of 
authorial vitality that pervades Milton’s writing in Areopagitica. Culpeper’s keen desire 
to preserve Plattes’s texts suggests that the Hartlibians did, like Milton, believe in the 
value of private authors contributing to a public good. However, the stronger emphasis 
and enthusiasm that Culpeper exhibits towards Plattes’s works over Plattes himself 
aligns with the emphasis on public book over private author in Dury’s Librarie-Keeper, 
which differs from Milton’s argument in Areopagitica. 
While the Office of Address depends on the involvement and contribution 
of private individuals, for which the Office serves as a communicative catalyst, in 
Dury’s Librarie-Keeper, the dissemination of information is more institutionalised. 
Dury’s Librarie-Keeper envisions the role of an individual librarian in managing 
national and international textual categorisation and commerce. Just as Hartlib intended 
to establish the Office of Address in Oxford, so Dury proposes the library-keeper to be 
employed at a university or college, with the Bodleian Library at the centre of the 
library-keeper’s research and thinking. Catherine J. Minter identifies similarities 
between the role of the library-keeper and the warden of the Office of Address. Minter 
explains that both institutions ‘are charged with the keeping of lists and catalogues as 
indexes to the information in their possession’, and that they are both to ‘cultivate a 
correspondence with learned men at home and abroad’.214 Dury explains that the 
Warden of the Office manages ‘all manner of Registers, Inventaries, Catalogues and 
Lists containing the Peculiar Objects wherof he should furnish Information for Addresse 
to such as shall desire it’, both ‘within and without the Kingdome’.215 The role of the 
 
213 See Culpeper to Hartlib, 18 December 1644, pp. 205-6; 4 January 1645, p. 208. 
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library-keeper is, however, far more detailed and central to Librarie-Keeper than that of 
the warden in Considerations. Dury recommends the keeper is paid £200, a significant 
increase of the £50-60 paid by the Bodleian Library at the time, as his role is not just the 
‘bare keeping of the Books.’216 The keeper is ‘to keep the publick stock of Learning, 
which is in Books and Manuscripts to increas it and to propose it to others in the waies 
which may bee most useful unto all’ (18). After creating an inventory, Dury proposes 
that ‘the waie of Trading with it, both at home and abroad, is to bee laid to heart both 
for the increas of the stock, and for the improvement of it to use’. The keeper should 
maintain correspondence ‘with those that are eminent in everie Science, to Trade with 
them for their profit’ (19). Any new international texts that have not yet been 
publicised, should be used to trade with texts from English individuals. Each year, 
moreover, the ‘Librarie-keeper should bee bound to give an account of his Trading, and 
his Profit’, which is then presented to ‘the chief Doctors of each facultie of the 
Universitie’ (21). Texts are, therefore, very much a commodity in Dury’s idealised 
library. Similar to the Merchants of Light in Bacon’s utopia, who acquire knowledge 
from outside of Bensalem, Dury’s library-keeper is tasked with procuring international 
texts for public dissemination. As Vera Keller explains, ‘Hartlib and his associates 
stressed far more sharply than Bacon […] how society could be considered a market-
place.’217 While Dunn describes the Hartlibians as theorising private contributions to a 
public effort in the Office of Address, the institutionalised role of the library-keeper and 
the mercantile commodification of books in Dury’s Librarie-Keeper suggest that they 
were prepared to fully invest in the public sphere as a means of opposing privatisation 
and monopolisation. In doing so, the role of the author is reduced, if not eliminated, in 
favour of the tangible artefact of the book. As an individual, the library-keeper is the 
embodiment of the system, who catalyses the process of public textual dissemination. 
Similar to his approach to toleration, Milton’s depiction of the dissemination 
of knowledge in Areopagitica blurs the line between private and public spheres. At its 
heart, Areopagitica can be read as a utopian vision for the advancement of learning, 
which will help to usher in the millennium. However, as Milton’s London exhibits, the 
process of reconstituting truth, however collaborative, is not institutionalised. This 
distinguishes Milton’s vision from both Bacon’s Salomon’s House, and the Hartlibian 
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intelligencing organisations. Milton, in fact, while he identifies Truth as ‘our richest 
Marchandize’ (548), also asserts that ‘Truth and understanding are not such wares as to 
be monopoliz’d and traded’ (535). The form of institutionalised trading of texts as 
monetised artefacts that Dury envisions in Librarie-Keeper is absent from Milton’s 
vision for London. For Milton, by contrast, the process of individual study and 
composition is necessary for the propagation of knowledge:  
 
there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new 
notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and fealty the approaching 
Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and 
convincement. What could a man require more from a Nation so pliant and so prone to seek after 
knowledge (554). 
 
The synthesis of these ideas, where ‘moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes […] 
commends the whole pile and structure’ (554), contributes to the unification of Truth. 
Milton’s early understanding of the unity of spirit and matter means that, in the 
relationship between the processes listed above and the reconstitution of Truth, the 
public artefact of the text is not permitted a commodified status, as it is for Dury. Trade 
would inhibit the author-book-Truth relationship that Milton depicts in Areopagitica. 
Areopagitica, therefore, exhibits a form of Baconian utopianism distinct from that of 
Hartlib and his associates. Where the Hartlibians invest exclusively in the public 
institutionalisation of knowledge, Milton maintains some form of authorial agency in 
Areopagitica. For both Milton and the Hartlibians, the millennium nevertheless 
remained an essential endpoint of their intellectual and intelligencing endeavours. 
Milton’s utopianism and millenarianism are rendered within his complex 
and developing theory of spirit and matter in Areopagitica. A comparison with Dury’s 
Librarie-Keeper illuminates the quasi-Baconian relationship between author, books, and 
millenarian Truth in the tract. The utopian idea of the advancement of knowledge 
bringing about eschatological change is at the heart of Areopagitica. However, where 
Dury envisions an institution that commodifies texts to establish a system of trading 
knowledge, in the shape of Salomon’s House, such an institution is tellingly absent from 
Areopagitica. Although Milton rejects utopian idealism in Areopagitica, in the mindset 
of An Apology, he envisions a world of ‘better and exacter things’ that shares in the 
Baconian foundation of Hartlibian philosophy. Books are an integral stepping-stone 
from author to millennium. They, therefore, manifest both spirituality and materialism 
that marks them above commodification. Citizens in Milton’s London serve this higher, 
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eschatological purpose. In Hartlibian fashion, they contribute to a public good, but 
unlike Dury’s Librarie-Keeper, they retain their private, individual participation to that 
end. The reason for this can be best discerned in terms of the religious liberty that 





The individual agency that Milton affords his citizens in his idealised London, which 
they use to serve a chiliastic greater good, represents an early form of Milton’s belief in 
religious liberty. In J. C. Davis’s definition of utopianism, the lack of institutional 
control in Milton’s London would prevent it from being classed as utopian.218 As this 
chapter has argued, however, Milton exhibits a form of Baconian utopianism, which is 
illuminated by his interaction with the Hartlib network. Milton’s citizens do not 
patiently await the millennium. They are, instead, invested in a collaborative, city-wide 
effort to studiously search for, compose and reconstitute Truth. This section will argue 
that this service represents the religious form of liberty that Milton will continue to 
advocate in his later poetry and prose. In order to better identify Milton’s religious 
liberty, it will be necessary to consider how such a form of liberty is formulated in John 
Hall’s translations of Johann Valentin Andreae’s (1586-1654) Christianae Societatis 
Imago (1620) and Christiani Amoris Dextera Porrecta (1620), which Hall received 
from Hartlib on 23 November 1646, and published in February 1647 as A Modell of a 
Christian Society and The Right Hand of Christian Love offered. Hall’s writings will 
provide further evidence for the cross-fertilisation of ideas between Milton and the 
Hartlibians that persisted in the later 1640s. 
Hall’s translations of Andreae’s works suggest a continued Hartlibian 
interest in utopianism in the late 1640s. However, these particular texts share more with 
Dury’s irenicism than Plattes’s utopianism. Having lamented that the civil war was 
inhibiting the advancement of learning and ‘publick endeavours’ on Comenian terms, 
Hall in his introduction to A Modell calls for international commerce in Baconian 
language, in which ‘Commodities are dispers’d into several Countries to occasion 
mutuall relief and consequently Commerce […] since one Countrey can neither 
 
218 Davis, Utopia and Ideal Society, pp. 26, 31-6, 61. 
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engrosse all great spirits, nor one great spirit all knowledge.’219 Vera Keller observes 
that Hall ‘seized upon the idea of the divine market’ in Andreae’s tract.220 Hall’s 
translation appears to share Dury’s mercantile institutionalism. McDowell, moreover, 
identifies a consistency between Hall’s prefatory comments and his translation, where 
Andreae envisions a Christian society in which ‘good men and desirous of heaven […] 
might comfort themselves with mutuall charity, and free communication of all 
necessaries and ornaments of this life’ (8). As McDowell explains, this is a ‘fraternity of 
Lutheran intellectuals […] who dedicate themselves to the discovery of divine truth 
through the study of nature and the advancement of all branches of knowledge.221 Dury 
similarly advocated a ‘fraternall unity’ for advancing the Reformation in his Epistolary 
Discourse. Andreae describes his fraternity in the attendant tract to A Modell, The Right 
Hand of Christian Love offered: ‘Christian friendship is the concurrence of good men in 
Christ, with the purpose to serve God aright’. In Hall’s translation, Andreae envisages 
fraternal, intellectual collaboration: ‘men vers’d in diverse faculties and studies meet 
together’ and a ‘Directour, who having heard the opinions of all, extracted what seemed 
best, being carefull to remedy their evils and provide for their good’, collated this 
information and ‘was admitted to a universall contemplation of affairs, and breviary of 
all Learning’ (24-5). Faculties of study, represented by twelve ‘Colleagues’, include, 
amongst others, theology, history, economics and natural philosophy (28-47).222 
Andreae envisions a collaborative Christian society dedicated to the advancement of 
learning in the service of God. 
This idea of intellectual advancement as a form of service aligns A Modell 
with the religious liberty of Areopagitica. In his Epistolary Discourse, Dury explains 
that the ‘fraternall unity’ he idealises, which Andreae similarly promotes, will realise 
‘the unblamable Libertie of the Sonnes of God in the Kingdom of their Father, to serve 
him, and declare the praises of his goodnesse towards us […] in the great Congregation’ 
(6). Davis explains the relationship between freedom and service in the seventeenth-
century concept of Christian liberty. Davis suggests that ‘we should not automatically 
identify liberty with personal autonomy’: ‘liberty of conscience meant submission to 
God, therefore, and not to self.’ For such seventeenth-century proponents of religious 
liberty, they ‘must not be bound by worldly authorities but only in order to submit to a 
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higher but mutable and, in some senses, inscrutable authority.’223 Andreae’s ideal 
society is framed in precisely these terms: 
 
The scope of this Christian society is solely this, to follow all means of knowing truth and doing 
good, to make use of what is already found out, to discover things falsely reputed for truths, to 
renounce all customes of the world to obey the commandments of Christ, or in a word to represent 
and expresse the doctrine and manners of our Saviour, in heart, gesture and expression (11). 
 
There is a direct relationship between distance from worldly affairs, advancing 
knowledge, and serving God. In language more consistent with Areopagitica, in Right 
Hand, Hall’s translation reads that ‘none ought to be accounted truly and really 
Christians, but who so earnestly and ardently labour for heaven’ (69-70). Milton 
describes his vision for London as ‘the mansion house of liberty’ (553-4). Rather than 
simply freedom from the ‘iron yoke of outward conformity’ (563), however, a citizen in 
Milton’s idealised city experiences the freedom of ‘labouring the hardest labour in the 
deep mines of knowledge’ (562), in order to ‘bring his helpful hand to the slow-moving 
Reformation which we labour under’ (565). These are the ‘free and ingenuous sort of 
such as evidently were born to study’, who write ‘not for lucre, or any other end, but the 
service of God and truth, and perhaps that lasting fame and perpetuity of praise which 
God and good men have consented shall be the reward of those whose publisht labours 
advance the good of mankind’ (531). Milton’s idealised citizens write out of service to 
God: study and composition secures the millennium. The millennium, as an end point 
for Milton’s London, necessitates the framework of religious liberty in Areopagitica. 
Milton’s citizens do not just write because they have liberty to do so, but because they 
have liberty to serve God, and writing is a form of that service. Hall’s translation of A 
Modell suggests not only that he shared Milton’s belief in religious liberty as a 
necessary prerequisite for the advancement of learning in the service of divine or 
eschatological ends, which helped to shape his translation, but also that these were ideas 
endorsed by Hartlib and his associates around the time that Dury wrote his letters to 
Hartlib for the Librarie-Keeper. Areopagitica exhibits, if not synthesises, essential ideas 
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While Areopagitica was printed within the context of the Robinson circle, this chapter 
has shown that the tract continued to participate in the mainstream Hartlibian discourse, 
both in 1644 and in the later 1640s. The relationship between private and public spheres 
is prominent in the tract, as it is in Of Education. Milton advocates individual liberty of 
conscience, but the limitations of his argument and his advocacy of public good permit 
comparison with Dury’s Presbyterian promotion of ‘public edification’. Although 
Milton focuses on the role of the individual author in Areopagitica and does not 
advocate the commodification of texts as Dury does in Librarie-Keeper, his vision for 
London represents a form of Baconian, collaborative utopianism in its purpose to 
advance knowledge in order to realise the millennium. The key difference between 
Areopagitica and Librarie-Keeper is illustrated by Hall’s translations of Andreae: 
religious liberty. Dury, just as he promotes institutionalism in Librarie-Keeper, believes 
in toleration within the public and irenic construct of churches. While he does not 
accommodate the individual liberty of conscience that Milton advocates, he can be 
viewed as a Presbyterian who Milton thought may have been swayed by his argument 
for toleration in Areopagitica. For Milton, religious liberty is necessary to propagate 
service to God. This service, in turn, secures societal progress towards the millennium. 
Such progress, however, is intellectual: Truth is the embodied ideal of utopian 
intellectual advancement and its end achievement of the millennium. The ideal of Truth 
is the earliest form of the utopian millennium that Milton realises in his prose. 
Areopagitica is, therefore, an essential standard of Milton’s developing utopian and 
millenarian ideology, from which the later development of his ideas in his prose and 
poetry will be compared. The relationship, in particular, between religious liberty, 
utopianism, and the millennium is prominent in Milton’s late-1650s works. In 1644, 
Areopagitica exhibits Milton’s contribution to a diverse cross-fertilisation of ideas, at 










Millenarian Radicalism: Milton, Winstanley and Cary 
 
Milton’s 1649 writings were written in a period of widespread excitement for and 
expectation of the millennium of Christ, which was further galvanised by the regicide of 
Charles I on 30 January. Critics have associated Milton with the sectarian radicalism 
that displayed this eschatological fervour most strongly.224 This thesis endorses the view 
of seventeenth-century radicalism proposed by Jonathan Scott, that much of 
seventeenth-century theological and political thinking was new and subversive – and 
therefore radical – but that radicalism existed on a spectrum, rather than in a binary 
dynamic between radical and non-radical. ‘English radicalism,’ Scott asserts, ‘was the 
English revolution.’225 This chapter will argue that, while Milton participated in the 
radical political changes of the nascent republic and fostered his own developing 
heretical theology, he was distant from the sectarianism that flourished during the 
period. Gerrard Winstanley (1609-76) and the Digger colonies that he helped to 
establish are widely accepted as an ideologically extreme form of seventeenth-century 
radicalism.226 Mary Cary (1621-53), an early Fifth Monarchist writer, who wrote 
multiple tracts before Fifth Monarchism became established and organised in late 1651, 
offers a millenarian vision that is almost as inclusive as Winstanley’s, but which places 
faith in the actions of the nascent republic. Cary’s belief in the republic would be 
rewarded after her death by the significant Fifth Monarchist representation in the 
‘Barebones’ Parliament of 1653.227 Cary and Winstanley are particularly valuable as 
contemporary millenarian thinkers of Milton in how they perceived the eschatological 
potential of the republic, or lack thereof, and in how they viewed themselves as 
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individual prophets in relation to the public process of realising the millennium. While 
Milton shares the millenarianism of both Winstanley and Fifth Monarchists, he invests 
his eschatological faith exclusively in the republic, which differs from Winstanley’s 
Digger colonies, and he also advocates the contribution of statesmen to public good, 
rather than individual prophets like Cary and Winstanley. A comparison between Cary, 
Winstanley and Milton brings into greater focus how Milton perceived the participation 
of private individuals in public affairs in the period surrounding the emergence of the 
English republic. This chapter will show how Milton invests his millenarianism in the 
republican regime that employs him, and how this encourages a more exclusive vision 
of the participation of elite individuals in the realisation of the second coming that 
necessarily distinguishes him from Cary and Winstanley. 
Mid-seventeenth-century English radicalism has been viewed as a series of 
sectarian movements that primarily involved lower orders of society. Christopher Hill 
made this influential characterisation of the period in The World Turned Upside Down. 
It was to this view of seventeenth-century sectarianism that Hill compares Milton, 
suggesting that ‘we should see him living in a state of permanent dialogue with radical 
views which he could not wholly accept, yet some of which greatly attracted him.’228 
Since Hill, Warren Chernaik has posited that the critical consensus regarding Milton 
and Winstanley is one of a binary disparity between elitism and radicalism: ‘Despite the 
valiant efforts of Christopher Hill in Milton and the English Revolution to forge links 
between Milton and the “popular radical traditions” of the seventeenth century, Milton 
and Winstanley are still, in the conventional view, sharply contrasted as elitist and 
radical democrat.’229 Hill himself acknowledges that Milton was ‘highly elitist’, but, in 
contrast to Chernaik’s view, his argument for Milton’s proximity to contemporary 
sectarianism remains influential.230 David Loewenstein, for instance, in his analysis of 
Milton’s conception of England as a nation, suggests that Milton embraced ‘the 
dramatic outburst of sectarian activity’ in 1640s England. As with Chernaik, this leads 
Loewenstein to align Milton to contemporary sectarianism, and the Levellers.231 More 
recently, David Williams has argued for ‘the notable depth of Milton’s sympathy with 
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Leveller principles’.232 More recent criticism appears to agree with Chernaik: he argues 
that Milton, Winstanley and the Levellers ‘share in a common project: the creation of a 
public sphere of discourse which, by its very existence, challenged the hegemony of 
traditional ruling elites.’233 This chapter will show that, while Milton shared 
Winstanley’s millenarian fervour in 1649, during the course of the year his growing 
disillusionment with the English people encouraged him to remove popular 
participation from his conception of the public sphere – the emergent English republic – 
which thereby excluded sectarians like Winstanley and his Diggers.  
This chapter intends to contribute to the reorientation of Milton’s ideas in 
the seventeenth-century radical milieu.234 Nicholas McDowell argues that many 
seventeenth-century radicals were, in fact, well-educated, and used ‘their access to elite 
discourses of cultural authority to shape the development and expression of their 
heterodox ideas’. McDowell suggests that only Winstanley and the Diggers ‘support the 
argument that organised radical religion flourished amongst the bottom half of the 
population.’ While Cary’s ideas would be represented as high as parliament – through 
Fifth Monarchist members of the Nominated Assembly in 1653 – as a female prophet, 
in the late 1640s she, like Winstanley and his Digger theology, lacked such 
representation.235 Where McDowell addresses how Milton relates to university-educated 
radicals, this chapter will consider how Milton’s millenarianism is similar to and yet 
distinguishes him from sectarians who, in particular, valued their ability as private 
individuals to contribute to the public effort of realising the millennium.236 Thomas 
Corns has argued that Milton, in the early 1640s, intentionally styled himself apart from 
the contemporary sectarians with whom opponents often associated him.237 As 
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discussed in the previous chapter, it is Milton’s independent attitude that likely led him 
to distance himself from the Hartlib circle in the late-1640s. Milton’s millenarianism 
may be the clearest means through which he could be aligned to Winstanley and Cary, 
but it is also, in relation to the development of his eschatology from 1644, the 
characteristically elitist form of Milton’s millenarianism that identifies his differences 
from them.  
The development of Milton’s political philosophy over the course of 1649 
exhibits how his involvement with the republic influenced his developing political 
ideas. Stephen Fallon observes that whereas the Tenure of Kings and Magistrates 
(1649) was written as the ‘work of a private citizen’, the Observations (1649) and 
Eikonoklastes (1649) ‘are works commissioned by the Council of State.’ In the Tenure, 
Fallon observes that Milton identifies the people, who he argues have the sovereign 
right to depose a tyrannical ruler, as ‘the naturally free, those who are not held in the 
grip of custom, those not dazzled by monarchy.’ Fallon suggests that this attitude was a 
necessary product of Milton’s role as a statesman for a republic that required a political 
theory to justify its existence: ‘Milton found himself caught in the toils of a circular 
logic: only the upright are “the people”, even (and especially?) if they are in the 
minority, and one knows the upright by their disposition on the question of who 
comprise “the people”.’238 McDowell acknowledges the incongruity of Milton’s 
political philosophy in his successive 1649 tracts in the Oxford Complete Works. With 
regards to Observations, McDowell posits that the ‘Calvinist distinction between 
magistrates and private persons that Milton had worked to demolish in the first edition 
of the Tenure – but which appears to edge back into the second edition – has become 
one of the structuring principles of his defence of the authority of the purged or “Rump” 
parliament.’ The substantial changes to Milton’s political philosophy, which Martin 
Dzelzainis describes as a ‘volte face’, illustrates ‘the anxieties that Milton increasingly 
felt in spring 1649 both about the future of the English republic […] and the capacity of 
the English people to maintain the conditions of civil and religious liberty for which 
they fought.’239 
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The changes in Milton’s political philosophy during the course of 1649 were 
concurrent with his growing disaffection with the English people. Paul Hammond 
argues that Milton was concerned that ‘some peoples are simply not fit to be free.’ 
Hammond observes Milton’s ‘oscillation between restrictive and non-restrictive 
definitions of “the people”’, and how he uses pejorative epithets, such as ‘throng’ and 
‘noises’, to describe them. ‘For Milton’, Hammond explains, ‘the exercise of liberty 
[…] entailed rational moral choice, and he thought that many people were insufficiently 
rational or moral to recognize or to pursue true liberty, even when it was offered to 
them.’240 Daniel Shore identifies in Eikonoklastes an early manifestation of a ‘fit-
though-few’ trope that Milton articulates in Paradise Lost (vii. 27-31). Shore discusses 
this trope in relation to the expansion of the public sphere in the 1640s.241 He argues 
that ‘Milton’s representations of an immutably divided audience seem to deny the 
possibility of an authentic public sphere.’ To reconcile this contradiction, Shore posits 
that Milton uses these representations as ‘active, rhetorical, instrumental gestures that 
seek to shape the audience in the process of describing it.’ Shore continues: ‘The elitist 
impulse is perhaps the most powerful social control he employs for rhetorical purposes. 
He brings readers to a consciousness of audience only so that they can immediately 
surpass and dissociate themselves from the many to join the elite few.’242 The latent 
elitism that this study has traced in Of Education and Areopagitica becomes more 
entrenched in 1649 as Milton became directly involved in developing and defending 
English republicanism in a society that was unready – or ‘unfit’ – for such 
unprecedented changes to the political landscape. This chapter will show how Milton’s 
perception of the involvement of private individuals in contributing to the public good, 
a concept which featured prominently in Areopagitica, encodes the turbulent political 
atmosphere of 1649. As such, he becomes increasingly distant from Winstanley, whose 
egalitarian millenarianism idealised a conflation of private and public spheres, and 
Cary, who, while identifying the republican parliaments as saints, maintained the 
essential importance of all private individuals, including female prophets like herself. 
 Winstanley and Cary represent different responses to the eschatological 
excitement that attended the turbulent events of the 1640s and 1650s. Winstanley, 
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forced to leave his work as a cloth merchant in London, moved to Cobham in 1643, 
where he ‘was able to maintain a relatively settled – if precarious – existence […] as a 
farmer or grazier.’243 It was following this move, between 1643-8, that ‘Winstanley 
underwent a period of acute religious struggle and depression […] and that his 
heterodox religious positions began to develop significantly’.244 As Gurney suggests, 
Winstanley’s mythopoeic theology took a radical turn in The New Law of Righteousnes 
(1649), which was written concurrent with the trial of Charles I. By 16 April 1649, 
Winstanley had joined William Everard (1602-51) and other disenfranchised labourers 
on St George’s Hill, to establish the emergent Digger community.245 Cary’s 
millenarianism, which, as Jane Baston suggests, pre-empted the mainstream Fifth 
Monarchist ideas in the 1650s, similarly transitions from abstract theology to a more 
focused and increasingly utopian blueprint.246 Unlike Winstanley, however, instead of 
an organised sect, Cary invested her hopes in the republican parliament. While Cary’s 
works have often been collectively defined as a utopian, this chapter will argue that 
Cary’s utopianism becomes more apparent in the early 1650s. Like Winstanley, her 
earlier works are millenarian rather than utopian.247 Whereas the organised Fifth 
Monarchist sect from late 1651 would advocate a theocratic regime ruled by the elect, 
Cary, whose death in 1653 preceded the representation of these ideas in the Nominated 
Assembly, published tracts that are predominantly more tolerant and inclusive, 
identifying all those who helped to defeat the king as elect.248 The chapter will begin 
with a comparison of the different millenarian visions of Milton and Winstanley, before 
comparing Cary’s belief in freedom of conscience with Milton’s own. The final section 
will address how Milton’s perception of private and public spheres not only differs to 
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ESCHATOLOGICAL EXPECTATIONS: MILTON AND WINSTANLEY 
 
Milton’s response to and employment by the emergent republic in 1649 orientates his 
chiliasm in relation to Winstanley. For Milton, the millennium was promised by the 
regicide of January 1649, which served as a sudden climax to the uncertainty of 1648, 
where the prospect of a settlement with Charles was widely anticipated. Although 
Thomas Corns has shown that Milton does not explicitly advocate republican ideas in 
his regicide tracts, he is nonetheless, as Fallon suggests, assisting the fledgling republic 
in ‘cobbling a set of intuitions and nascent principles into a coherent and explicitly anti-
monarchic political theory.’249 Winstanley’s millenarianism, by contrast, is more 
vibrantly subversive in its mythopoeic form. Although his Digger writings increasingly 
show an awareness of the republican institutions that impede the progress of his 
communist colonies, Winstanley’s egalitarian vision is extreme: it anticipates, at least 
prior to 1652, the replacement of economic, social, and political structure with Digger 
communes, including the republican regime that Milton worked for. While Milton’s 
millenarianism identifies how he engaged with a major contemporary theological 
movement, the manner in which it becomes dependent on the republic marks a disparity 
between his chiliasm and that of Winstanley. 
Milton’s use of the postlapsarian natural condition of man as a precedent for 
his argument in the Tenure illustrates how his polemical voice in defence of the 
parliamentarian efforts leading up to the regicide is distinguished from that of the 
defender of religious liberty in Areopagitica. Corns has shown how there is a stylistic 
transition from Milton’s tracts of the early 1640s to those following the regicide, where 
‘the image density falls […] and his imagery loses the luxuriance that characterizes it 
earlier’: ‘politics and political writing assumed for Milton a deadly seriousness.’250 
Accordingly, Milton’s political persona influences how he conveys his millenarianism. 
In Areopagitica, as discussed in the previous chapter, Milton had asserted the 
importance of textual conflict, through which authors of good books could help to 
reconstitute millenarian truth and thereby assist in defeating falsehood. As part of this 
argument, Milton refers to the postlapsarian natural ‘state of man’, which is ‘that doom 
which Adam fell into of knowing good and evill, that is to say of knowing good by 
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evill’. Milton asks ‘what wisdome can there be to choose, what continence to forbeare 
without the knowledge of evill?’ The true ‘warfaring Christian’ is he who is able to 
confront falsehood and choose truth (CPW ii. 514-15). In the Tenure, by contrast, 
Milton returns to the postlapsarian natural state of man to buttress his argument for 
natural law as supporting the autonomy of private individuals. Natural law placed 
emphasis on individual action and served as ‘a barometer by which people must adapt 
their worldly laws to come as close as possible in a fallen world to enacting and obeying 
divine law.’251 Elizabeth Oldman suggests that it ‘measures the extent to which men can 
recapture and behave in conformity with standards of prelapsarian ideals in his motives 
and actions.’252 In the Tenure, Milton encodes natural law into his conception of 
prelapsarian liberty: ‘No man who knows ought, can be so stupid to deny that all men 
naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of God himself, and were 
by privilege above all the creatures, born to command and not to obey: and that they 
liv’d so’ (CWJM vi. 155). Milton then articulates his own vision for postlapsarian 
history, which, like the natural state of man in Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), is chaotic 
and violent, requiring ‘common league to bind each other from mutual injury’ (155). 
The people, therefore, entrusted individuals who ‘they chose above the rest’: ‘Not to be 
thir Lord and Maisters […] but, to be thir Deputies and Commissioners, to execute, by 
vertue of thir intrusted power, that justice which else every man by the bond of nature 
and of Cov’nant must have executed for himself, and for one another’ (155). Milton 
argues that the prelapsarian authority enjoyed in Eden necessitates the autonomy of the 
private individual in the postlapsarian world. Milton’s defence of ‘arbitrement’ (156) – 
the capacity to decide for oneself – contributes to his argument for the individual to 
decide how to obey divine law.253 In Areopagitica, the postlapsarian condition of man is 
defined by his obligation to reconstitute divine Truth; in the Tenure, postlapsarian man 
has the freedom to constitute governmental authority. By 1649, Milton had decided to 
invest his faith in governmental authority, rather than on the collaborative labour of 
society, as exemplified by his vision for London. Milton’s millenarianism in the Tenure, 
which is often associated with his defence of religious freedom, lacks the prominence 
that he affords it in Areopagitica. Milton exclusively defends the legality of the actions 
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of purged parliament leading up to the regicide, which secured his employment by the 
nascent regime soon after the tract was published. 
Winstanley, by contrast, places more emphasis on the prelapsarian ideal of 
Adam’s dominion over nature, the return of which he directly associates with the 
millennium. John Rogers explains that, for Winstanley, the ‘gradual realization of a 
social utopia is figured throughout his work […] as a return to the Edenic state of 
communality.’254 The realisation of this communist paradise was the product of the 
immanent manifestation of Christ, in the form of an internalised millennium that 
‘enables him to equate the Second Coming with the gradual transformation of 
humanity.’255 Charles Webster describes Winstanley as exhibiting ‘a kind of intuitive 
Baconianism’ in that he envisioned that ‘his communes would undertake the more 
effective exploitation of nature.’256 In his The New Law of Righteousnes (1649), the 
final book in Several Pieces Gathered Into One Volume (1649) and written concurrently 
with Charles I’s trial, Winstanley identifies the importance of man’s ruling over nature 
in Eden in an unconventional image of natural equality: ‘In the beginning of time the 
whole Creation lived in man, and man lived in his Maker, the spirit of Righteousnesse 
and peace, for every creature walked evenly with man, and delighted in man, and was 
ruled by him; there was no opposition between him and the beast, fowls, fishes, or any 
creature in the earth […]’ (CWGW i. 478).257 Winstanley conveys the return to this 
prelapsarian ideal as a ‘freedom of the spirit’, which contrasts to ‘the bondage of the 
flesh’: ‘for every one was made to be a Lord over the Creation of the Earth, Cattle, Fish, 
Fowl, Grasse, Trees, not any one to be a bond-slave and a beggar under the Creation of 
his own kinde’ (i. 502).  
As Winstanley explains in The Breaking Day of God (1648), internal 
bondage is a manifestation of the Beast of Revelation and also the product of Adam’s 
original sin. ‘If you desire to know the Beast’, Winstanley declares, ‘look first into your 
own hearts, for there she sits’. In contrast to Milton, Winstanley aligns the postlapsarian 
Adam with the Beast: the ‘unrighteous Adam, that dammed up the water springs of 
universall liberty, and brought the Creation under the curse of bondage’. The 
postlapsarian Adam brought about the mercantile society founded on property and 
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commerce that Winstanley condemns.258 ‘Millenarianism in Winstanley’, the Oxford 
Complete Works editors explain, ‘is as much of an internal spiritual process as it is an 
external transformation’ (CWGW i. 57). The immanent manifestation of the ‘new Law 
of righteousnesse’ (i. 476), which is simultaneously a spiritual law and the ‘King of 
Righteousnesse’ (i. 473) – or Christ himself – will bring about the radical communist 
transformation of society necessary to achieve a ‘common treasury’ (i. 482; 507; 511), 
by killing the ‘first Adam’ (i. 482), in anticipation of the second Adam, Christ himself. 
The prelapsarian ideal not only takes precedence in Winstanley’s eschatological vision, 
but it also actively replaces the postlapsarian condition of society. Milton’s use of a 
postlapsarian precedent, as opposed to the prelapsarian ideal that Winstanley enshrines 
in his writings, is indicative of his focus on the present republican – or at least anti-
monarchical – moment, rather than in anticipation of the millennium to come. It is 
possible that Milton and Winstanley were writing the Tenure and the New Law at the 
same time; they were certainly writing their tracts in response to the same contemporary 
events. The significant difference, therefore, is that Milton writes anachronistically, in 
defence of the events that have led to the regicide; Winstanley, by contrast, anticipates 
his radical vision for the millennium, which would ultimately see an end to the 
republican regime that would employ Milton later in 1649.  
Indeed, it is only after he has been employed by the republic that Milton 
invests his prose with prospective millenarian zeal. In the first edition of the Tenure, 
Milton links Satan’s offer of temporal authority in Luke 4 to where ‘the Dragon gave to 
the beast his power’: ‘which beast so autoriz’d most expound to the tyrannical powers 
and Kingdoms of the earth’ (160).259 In the second edition of the Tenure, however, the 
first issue of which McDowell dates to between September-October 1649, in the writing 
that Milton adds to the end of the tract about divines, the apocalyptic focus shifts from 
retrospective to expectant. Milton anticipates ‘he who is our only King, the root of 
David, and whose Kingdom is eternal righteousness, with all those that Warr under him, 
whose happiness and final hopes are laid up in that only just & rightful kingdom (which 
we pray incessantly may com soon, and in so praying wish hasty ruin and destruction to 
all Tyrants)’ (184). Milton associates the imminent advent of the millennium with the 
end of tyranny. Barbara Lewalski asserts that in Eikonoklastes, published in early 
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November 1649, ‘Milton makes his most direct application of apocalyptic symbols to 
contemporary politics’.260 The animadvertive rhetoric with which Milton systematically 
deconstructs and confutes Eikon Basilike (1649) is distinct from the mythopoeic voice 
that Winstanley employs to signify the radical change he proposes in his pre-Digger 
writings. Having quoted a line of Eikon Basilike that asserts the ‘protection of God over 
all Kings’, Milton refutes the alleged voice of the martyred king with reference to 
Revelation 17 and 18. ‘To bind thir Kings in Chaines, and thir Nobles with links of 
Iron,’ Milton asserts, ‘is an honour belonging to his Saints […] and first to overcome 
those European Kings, which receive thir power not from God, but from the beast’ 
(422-3). These kings will eventually join ‘thir Armies with the Beast, whose power first 
rais’d them’, and ‘they shall perish with him by the King of Kings against whom they 
have rebell’d […] This is thir doom writt’n [Rev. 19] and the utmost that we find 
concerning them in these latter days; which we have much more cause to beleeve, then 
his unwarranted Revelation here’ (423). Milton puns on the word ‘revelation’, 
encouraging readers to interpret for themselves the biblical Revelation rather than the 
false account or ‘revelation’ of Charles himself. Milton predicts that monarchy in both 
England and Europe as a whole will be defeated by Christ at the second coming. By 
deconstructing the king’s image, Eikonoklastes contributes to the anticipatory, 
eschatological effort. Given the proximity of their publication, the millenarian sentiment 
that both the second edition of the Tenure and Eikonoklastes share seems to belong to 
the same period of 1649, after the regicide in January and after the Rump declared 
England a commonwealth on 19 May. While both the Tenure and Eikonoklastes 
anachronistically focus on the period surrounding the trial and execution of the king, the 
expectant millenarianism of the tracts should be viewed within the context of the newly 
established English commonwealth. 
Whereas Winstanley invests his chiliastic zeal in an original and radical 
vision of the common treasury, Milton’s millenarianism seems to be aligned to his work 
for the republic in 1649. The retrospective focus of the Tenure is at odds with the kind 
of anticipatory rhetoric that characterises eschatological works of the period, such as 
Winstanley’s. In the argument of the Tenure, Milton shows a development from his 
ideas in 1644: the postlapsarian freedom he advocates in the Tenure is to grant authority 
to a sovereign power, which is far removed from that of Areopagitica, where the 
collaborative effort of Milton’s idealised London assists in reconstituting Truth and 
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ushering in the millennium. Where Winstanley offers a vibrant and complex vision of 
millenarian society, which he attempts to realise in the work of the Diggers later in 
1649, Milton loses the visionary tendencies that characterised Areopagitica as the 
republic itself takes precedence. Part of the reason for Milton’s faith in the republic was 
the liberty of conscience that he enjoyed under the regime, which identifies a significant 
common ground with Cary. 
 
 
TOLERATION AND THE MILLENNIUM: MILTON AND CARY 
 
While Milton’s focus on the republic distinguishes him from Winstanley’s expectant 
millenarianism, Cary, in her early form of Fifth Monarchism, associates the 
parliamentary actions of the late 1640s with her eschatology. As the Fifth Monarchists 
were increasingly represented in the parliaments of the early 1650s, Cary’s belief that 
the republic was necessary for the realisation of the fifth monarchy strengthened. It is 
important to acknowledge that both Milton and Cary believed in liberty of conscience. 
For Milton, as the previous chapter has shown, toleration was essential for realising his 
millenarian vision. Cary shared Milton’s support for the republic’s actions in 1649, in 
the expectation that they would bring about greater toleration for unorthodox views like 
her own, and thereby help to usher in the fifth monarchy. This comparison with Cary, 
however, will also illustrate how Milton exhibits greater concern than Cary about the 
actions of the Presbyterians, particularly in their support of a national church and 
monarchism, before Pride’s Purge. Milton’s ‘Digression’ of The History of Britain 
(1670), appended to Book Three of the History and not published until 1681, in which 
he expresses his dissatisfaction with the parliamentary actions of the 1640s, illustrates 
Milton’s concerns with contemporary Presbyterians. Critics have argued for a variety of 
dates for the ‘Digression’, from early 1649, to 1660, to around 1670.261 Thomas Fulton 
has recently argued for a date before Pride’s Purge, in 1648; McDowell similarly 
suggests that ‘the virulent anti-Presbyterianism of the “Digression” resembles that of the 
 
261 For the 1649 dating, see Nicholas Von Maltzahn, Milton’s History of Britain: Republican 
Historiography in the English Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 22-48, and 
‘Dating the Digression in Milton’s History of Britain’, in Historical Journal, 36/4 (1993), pp. 945-56; 
Woolrych argues for a 1660 date in ‘The Date of the Digression in Milton’s History of Britain’, in R. 
Ollard and P. Tudor-Craig, eds., For Veronica Wedgwood These: Studies in Seventeenth-Century History 
(Collins, 1986), pp. 217-46, and ‘Dating Milton’s History of Britain’, in The Historical Journal, 36/4 
(1993), pp. 929-43; Blair Worden argues for a later date, around 1670, in Literature and Politics in 
Cromwellian England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 410-26. 
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unpublished sonnets and the 1649 prose.’262 The 1648 dating, which this chapter 
supports, will help to make the argument that, while Milton shared essential values of 
toleration with Cary, his opposition to Presbyterianism necessarily distinguishes him 
from her early Fifth Monarchism. The section will show that Milton’s philosophy of 
toleration was often articulated within his arguments against contemporary 
Presbyterianism.  
Cary addressed her exegetical analysis and millenarianism to parliament as 
early as 1647. As Jane Baston argues, Cary had published multiple tracts by the time 
other major Fifth Monarchists began writing. By 1653, the year of Cary’s death, she had 
published tracts in the non-militant phase of Fifth Monarchism; Anna Trapnel (fl. 1642-
60), the female Fifth Monarchist who has received the most critical attention, belongs to 
the period in which Fifth Monarchism turned to aggressive opposition of the 
Protectorate.263 Cary’s writings, therefore, represent an emergent and developing form 
of Fifth Monarchism, in which the inherent elitism characteristic of the movement is 
more inclusive. In A Word in Season (1647), Cary’s first published tract, she directs her 
writing to ‘you Chaire-men […] you that sit at the Sterne, you that are the heads and 
rulers of the people, and are in places of authoritie’.264 It is in her instructions to 
parliament that Cary, using the imperative refrain ‘Be wise ye Rulers, and be 
instructed’, asserts that they must ‘let Jesus Christ raign over you […] who as a King 
must only raign in the conscience of his people, and govern them by his own Lawes: 
and therefore make you no Laws for the consciences of his people, nor suffer any to do 
it by any authority derived from you’ (3). Cary specifically defends the freedoms of 
prophets: ‘Be wise and be sure you do not stop the mouths of the Prophets of Jesus 
Christ’ (4). Loewenstein suggests that ‘Cary recognizes – and gives voice to – the desire 
of other frustrated women prophets and preachers […] who, forbidden or unable to 
speak, have yet to see fulfilled their visionary yearnings’.265 It is partly for this reason 
that she supports the actions of parliament: she is able to publish and express her 
 
262 Fulton, Historical Milton, p. 129; McDowell, CWJM vi. 8-9. 
263 Baston, ‘Mary Cary and Fifth Monarchism’, p. 1; on Anna Trapnel, see Debra Parish, ‘Anna Trapnel: 
Prophet or Witch?’, in Lisa Hopkins and Aidan Norrie, eds., Women on the Edge in Early Modern Europe 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019), 113-36; and Katherine Gillespie, Domesticity and 
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Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 62-114. 
264 Cary, A Word in Season (1647), sig. A3; all future references to Cary’s works will be to the original 
publication and will appear parenthetically in the running text; see Warburton, ‘Mary Cary’s Millennial 
Visions’, pp. 18-20. 
265 Loewenstein, ‘Scriptural Exegesis’, p. 138. 
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millenarian vision without resistance at this early stage in the Fifth Monarchist 
movement. 
Cary continued to approve of parliamentary proceedings over the next year: 
in The Resurrection of The Witnesses (1648), she identifies parliament as the two 
witnesses of Revelation 13. Cary embarks on a lengthy and comprehensive exegesis in 
the tract, in which she asserts that the royalists embodied the Beast of Revelation, 
which, from 1645, was gradually defeated by the Witnesses, or the parliamentarians 
(82-99). The parliamentary army, ‘being new modelled, and having a great many 
precious Saints in it’, in April 1645, ‘began to march against the enemy, and then had a 
Spirit of life from God, that entred into them’ (99). In ‘The Application’ section of The 
Resurrection, in which she analyses her exegesis, Cary addresses those who supported 
the parliamentarian effort and reassures them that ‘You have cause to rejoyce in all that 
you have done therein: for you see it was a most just and righteous act, and God hath by 
it brought a most glorious worke to passe, in the bringing of this Kingdome from that 
vassallage to Rome’ (165). Cary then addresses parliament and, more specifically, 
Fairfax himself. She encourages parliament to ‘goe on, to deal well with all the 
Witnesses and servants of Jesus Christ […] whether they be such as are commonly 
called Presbyterians or Independents, or Anabaptists’ (178-9). To Fairfax, she explains 
that ‘the hearts of all the Saints in England, are generally knit unto you, and the eyes of 
all the Saints in England are upon you, most Noble General’ and that he has ‘special 
encouragement’ to continue the ‘suppressing of the Beast, and defending all the Saints’ 
(179). Cary’s explicit and direct address to parliament not only exhibits how she 
associates parliament with the fifth monarchy, but also how her perception of religious 
freedom incorporates irenicism. She dreams of a day when ‘these distinctions and 
difference might be all laid aside, and that all that belong to Jesus Christ might only be 
called Saints’ (173). The elitism characteristic of Fifth Monarchism is more 
accommodating in Cary’s early works, as she identifies multiple denominations, 
provided they support the parliamentary effort, as saints. 
Milton’s defence of liberty of conscience, by contrast, invariably draws on 
the anti-Presbyterian sentiment that featured in his writings from 1644. Baston suggests 
that Cary’s defence of free speech for prophets aligns with Milton’s argument for 
freedom from pre-publication license in Areopagitica.266 In A Word, Cary responds to a 
possible objection that her claims for tolerance could lead to an increase in ‘erroneous 
 
266 Baston, ‘Mary Cary and Fifth Monarchism’, p. 7. 
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persons’ airing their views. Cary argues that even after clergy have been ordained, ‘they 
may preach erroneous doctrine, and prove scandalous in their lives’ (7). As the previous 
chapter has shown, Milton argues against pre-publication licensing because he believes 
such texts should be published first and their ideas addressed and confuted, if necessary. 
However, while Milton may have viewed Dury as the kind of Presbyterian that he could 
have won over with his argument in Areopagitica, his opposition to Presbyterian 
attempts to institute a national religion remain prominent in the ‘Digression’. Milton’s 
belief in liberty of conscience often fuelled his opposition to Presbyterianism in the 
period. In the ‘Digression’, Milton initially discusses the lack of political progress, 
which he describes as ‘justice delai’d’, possibly referring to the proceedings of the 
Treaty of Newport between September-December 1648, during which Woolrych 
suggests ‘it is likely enough that Milton went through a period of despondency’ (CPW 
v/1 443).267 Milton then turns to religion, explaining that ‘if the state were in this plight, 
religion was not in much better’ (447), citing as an example the Westminster Assembly 
of Divines, which was established in 1643 to reform the Church of England and bring it 
closer to the Scottish Presbyterian church. Milton asserts that ‘thir intents were cleere to 
be no other then to have set up a spirtual [sic] tyrannie by a secular power to the 
advancing of thir owne authorit[ie] above the magistrate’ (447). Milton’s disaffection 
with the current state of affairs in the ‘Digression’ is distinct from Cary’s ardent praise 
of the actions of parliament in 1648. Where Cary responds to the tensions between 
Presbyterians and Independents with a call for unity and broad toleration, Milton, 
although not explicitly siding with the Independent faction, criticises the stalled 
progress of the parliamentarian effort that was impeded by the Presbyterian desire for 
settlement and only solved by the purge of such members by the Independents in 
December. Milton’s disillusionment with Presbyterianism, therefore, supports a 1648 
dating of the ‘Digression’. 
Milton’s position hardens in 1649 as he responds to Presbyterian opposition 
to the trial of the king and subsequent regicide. Introducing the refutation and peroration 
of the Tenure, Milton, referring to the Presbyterians, explains that, due to ‘the tongues 
and arguments of Malignant backsliders’, the ‘examples which follow shall be all 
Protestant and chiefly Presbyterian’ (166). ‘Milton’, McDowell explains, ‘charges the 
Presbyterians with self-interested reversion to the very clerical authoritarianism against 
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which they had fulminated in their pulpits and took arms against on the battlefield.’268 
Milton opposes these ‘Apostate Scarcrowes’, who ‘with the unmaskuline Rhetorick of 
any puling Priest or Chaplain’, interpret scripture ‘with a double contradictory sense, 
transforming the sacred verity of God, to an Idol with two Faces’ (153-4). The duplicity 
of their scriptural interpretation in this passage, which alludes to the equivocating weird 
sisters of Macbeth, doubles as a broader comment on the Presbyterians as ‘revolters 
from those principles […] which are the necessary consequences of thir own former 
actions’ (151).269 While Milton’s opposition to the Presbyterians aligns with the purpose 
of the Tenure – and permits him to rhetorically attack those who had offered scathing 
responses to his divorce tracts and against whom he was arguing in Areopagitica – it 
also belies a deeper anxiety about the potential for a settlement between the Rump and 
the purged Presbyterians.  
Milton’s Articles of Peace … Upon all which are added Observations 
(1649), published in May, most clearly expresses this anxiety. On 28 March, Milton was 
tasked by the commonwealth with making observations on the ‘Complicacion of 
interest’ in Ireland. Milton’s pamphlet included most prominently the original tracts and 
commentary on the Articles of Peace (1649), an agreement between the Catholic 
confederacy and the Marquess of Ormond, James Butler (1610-88), and Necessary 
Representation (1649), issued by the Belfast Presbytery, which opposed the regicide 
and the new republic.270 The Observations has been interpreted for Milton’s 
characterisation of the Irish as ‘Barbarians’ (235) and ‘Savages’ (239) and how this 
anticipates Cromwell’s campaign in Ireland in August 1649.271 There is evidence, 
however, that Milton was more concerned with Presbyterianism in the tract.272 Blair 
Worden explains that, in April 1649, Cromwell encouraged a settlement with the purged 
Presbyterians, which resulted in a declaration intended ‘to settle religion according to 
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presbytery, and a full maintenance to the ministers’.273 It seems appropriate that Milton, 
having opposed similar attempts in 1644 and 1648, would have felt anxious at the 
renewed possibility of a permanent Presbyterian settlement in England.274 While it is 
likely that Cromwell would have defended religious toleration following a Presbyterian 
settlement, a national church would have inevitably impinged on the religious liberty 
that Milton defended from 1644 onwards. Indeed, it is possibly due to Council of 
State’s insistence on toleration that his discussions with the Presbyterians fell through. 
Milton’s concerns about the Presbyterians in Observations resemble those of the 
‘Digression’, but with the republic now realised, the need to defend against Presbyterian 
opposition was that much greater. 
Milton’s Observations, then, is as much a defence of religious liberty 
against Presbyterianism as it is criticism of the Irish and Ormond. In his commentary on 
the Necessary Representation, Milton’s response to the assertion that ‘we oppose the 
Presbyteriall government, the hedg and bulwark of Religion’ exhibits how his continued 
defence of religious liberty infringes on the republic’s recent attempts at settlement. 
Milton claims that the assertion is an ‘impudent falshood, having established it with all 
freedom, wherever it hath been desir’d.’ This brief and limited attempt at appeasement 
reverts to the critical tone that was evident in the Tenure: 
 
Nevertheless as we perceive it aspiring to be a compulsive power upon all without exception […] 
or to require the fleshly arm of Magistracy in the execution of a spirituall Discipline, to punish and 
amerce by any corporall infliction those whose consciences cannot be edifi’d by what authority 
they are compell’d, we hold it no more to be the hedg and bulwark of Religion, than the Popish 
and Prelaticall Courts, or the Spanish Inquisition (244). 
 
Milton’s criticism extends beyond the Belfast Presbytery. Identifying the Presbyterian 
church with Catholicism and episcopacy, the latter which he had opposed since the early 
1640s, Milton comments on the threat to individual conscience that a tyrannical, 
‘compulsive power’ poses. Earlier in the tract, Milton had commented ‘that Church 
Censures are limited to Church matters’ and ‘that affaires of State are not for their 
Medling’: bishops ‘have the least Warrant to be Pragmaticall in the State’ (240). Milton 
explains that the role of clerics, such as the Belfast Presbytery, is essential in combating 
heresy, as the Solemn League and Covenant does not in ‘any way engage us to 
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extirpate, or to prosecute the men, but the heresies and errors in them’. This accords 
with Milton’s argument in Areopagitica, where the absence of pre-publication licensing 
permits heretical ideas to be disseminated and then, if necessary, confuted post-
publication. Divines must attend to ‘the diligent preaching and insisting upon sound 
Doctrin, in the confuting not the railing down errors […] and by the powr of truth, not 
of persecution, subduing those authors of hereticall opinions’ (243). Observations, 
therefore, coincides with the central millenarian argument of Areopagitica: liberty of 
conscience is necessary in order to permit good writers – proponents of Truth – to 
openly oppose and defeat Falsehood, or writers of heresy. Although Milton’s language 
lacks the luxuriance of his pre-republican tracts, his support of the republic depends on 
his belief in religious liberty, which coincides with the eschatological theology he had 
been articulating since 1644. 
Cary’s first post-revolutionary tract, The Little Hornes Doom and Downfall, 
which was printed alongside A New And More Excellent Mappe or Description of New 
Jerusalems Glory, was published in 1651 and exhibits how she perceived the republic 
as a group of Fifth Monarchists. Within her extensive exegesis of Daniel 7:24-6, Cary, 
having identified Charles as the symbolic ‘little horn’, asserts that the regicides who put 
Charles on trial were saints: ‘Thus it is also evidently the sense of these verses 
compared together, that by judgment sitting is meant, a certaine number of Saints, that 
by the wisdome, providence, and power of the most High, were convened together, and 
invested with power and authority […] to judge this little Horne, and do justice upon 
him’ (34). In accordance with her argument for religious unity in A Word and 
Resurrection, Cary envisions the defeat, trial, and execution of the late king as enacted 
by a group of saints. While Milton remained steadfastly opposed to the Presbyterians, 
Cary retrospectively enshrines the actions of the early republic as Fifth Monarchist, 
disregarding factional and denominational distinctions. Cary identifies ‘those whom the 
beast, and his adherents the Popish, and prophane party […] most opposed, and hated’ 
as those ‘who most desired to worship God in his Ordinances in their purity, such as 
they termed Roundheads, Puritans, Independents, Presbyterians, Anabaptists, Sectaries, 
Precisians, and what not?’ (22). The rhetorical question is indicative of Cary’s 
ecumenical disregard for such categories: all who have contributed to the 
parliamentarian and republican effort are saints. Cary’s passionate call for a unity 
between Presbyterian and Independent factions in Resurrection – ‘O unite, unite, unite! 
since your God hath made you one in his love, O be you one in your love one to 
another’ (172) – is answered in the retrospective application of her exegesis.  
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Cary’s irenicism meant that she supported the Presbyterians in a way that 
marks her apart from Milton’s entrenched anti-Presbyterian attitude. Cary had clear 
justification for her unwavering optimism: her requests for parliament to continue their 
efforts in defeating the royalists in 1648 were answered with the regicide in 1649; by 
1653, moreover, there was substantial Fifth Monarchist representation in the Nominated 
Assembly. Milton was no Fifth Monarchist and, as the comparison with Winstanley in 
this chapter has shown, he maintained his own specific, idiosyncratic form of 
millenarianism. Toleration of individual conscience, as this study has argued, was 
central to that vision. Where Milton exhibits a belief in the public good with Dury in 
1644, which was part of Dury’s anti-Independent argument, by 1648-9 there is no 
association between public good and Presbyterianism in Milton’s eyes. Instead, 
Presbyterianism represented a ‘spiritual tyrannie’ as much as Charles in the Tenure is 
defined as a tyrant. While Milton and Cary share a belief in the republic, which 
Winstanley did not, Cary still shares Winstanley’s idealism: she dismantles religious 
distinctions in her tracts as much as Winstanley dismantles social boundaries. As a 
republican statesman, Milton is distant from this millenarian radicalism. He shared 
essential eschatological ideas and excitement with Cary and Winstanley, but his 
millenarian zeal manifested in a decidedly different way to these radicals. Cary’s voice 
as a radical female exegete may have coincided with contemporary events of the state, 
but they did not coincide with the writings of a republican statesman. 
 
 
PRIVATE STATESMAN AND PUBLIC PROPHETS 
 
Milton’s perception of public and private spheres undergoes a significant transition in 
1649 that further distances him from Cary and Winstanley. In Areopagitica, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, Milton defended the right of private individuals to 
contribute to a public good. Milton defended liberty of conscience and opposed pre-
publication licensing, in the belief that individuals should be able to express views and 
judge books in the public process of reconstituting Truth and ushering in the 
millennium. The relationship between private and public spheres returns in the first 
edition of the Tenure, where Milton argues for the legal right of a group of private 
individuals – in this case the Army – to act against the king, as they did in Pride’s 
Purge. Following his employment by the republic, however, Milton changes his 
argument in the second edition of the Tenure to exclusively refer to parliament and 
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magistrates. In Eikonoklastes, moreover, his disaffection with the English people 
negated the possibility for there to exist a worthy group of private individuals. By 
contrast, for both Winstanley and Cary, who belonged to poorly represented segments 
of seventeenth-century society, the significance of the private individual and the 
potential for such an individual to contribute to public, millenarian good, was an 
essential part of their self-identification and self-worth as prophets. In her exegetical 
tracts, Cary is clearly aware of the societally imposed limitations of being a female 
radical, especially when she addresses a male-dominated parliament.275 As a Digger, 
Winstanley identified himself as part of a group of poor, agrarian labourers that 
participated in a wider, public – and universal – process: the millennium itself.276 
Milton’s change of argument illustrates how his role as employee of the state influenced 
his writings and how it further removes him from the radicalism of Winstanley and 
Cary. As a private individual, in early 1649, he defended the agency of private 
individuals; as a statesman, in late 1649, he defended the agency of the government he 
worked for, a decision that was reinforced by his growing perception of the unfit 
English people. 
Milton’s central argument in the first edition of the Tenure is a defence of 
the right of private individuals to overthrow a tyrant. As we have seen, Milton argues 
for individual ‘arbitrement’ through the postlapsarian history he delineates, from which 
he locates sovereign power originally in the people: ‘It being thus manifest that the 
power of Kings and Magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferr’d 
and committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all, in 
whom the power yet remaines fundamentally, and cannot be tak’n from them, without a 
violation of thir natural birthright’ (157). Unlike Hobbes, whose argument in Leviathan 
(1651) for the authorisation of a sovereign by the people negates the right of the people 
to oppose the sovereign after the covenant has been established, Milton suggests that a 
monarch and magistrate are entrusted with power that can easily be retracted.277 Milton 
goes as far as to assert, with regard to a monarch, that the people can ‘either choose him 
or reject him or depose him though no Tyrant, meerly by the liberty and right of free 
born Men, to be govern’d as seems to them best’ (159). Unlike the religious liberty that 
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Milton advocates in Areopagitica and will defend again in The Readie and Easie Way, 
Milton, as Togashi explains, ‘draws on classical conceptions of liberty and its opposite, 
slavery, in order to articulate what an ideal government is under which the people can 
truly be said to be free.’278 Quentin Skinner has defined this as the neo-roman argument 
for republican liberty, given that it draws from the ideas of classical Rome and was a 
prominent view of liberty in the early English republic.279 Milton’s defence of the 
autonomy of the people appears to align with Areopagitica: the actions of the Army in 
purging parliament and putting the king on trial contribute to public good, just as 
different writers participate in a public millenarian process in Areopagitica. 
However, the Tenure accommodates the elitist tendencies that had been 
prominent in Milton’s printed writings since 1644, which anticipates the transition away 
from support for private individuals in the second edition of the tract. Milton asserts in 
the second edition that ‘indeed I find it generally cleere and positive determination of 
them all […] who have writt’n on this argument; that to doe justice on a lawless King, is 
to a privat man unlawful, to an inferior Magistrate lawfull’ (185). Rather than a volte 
face, critics have recognised that there is more consistency between the two editions of 
the Tenure.280 ‘For Milton in the Tenure,’ Fallon argues, ‘the “people” are not every 
adult […] but the naturally free, those who are not held in the grip of custom, those not 
dazzled by monarchy.’281 Accordingly, Milton’s most explicit assertion of republican 
liberty assumes that the people are not capable of removing themselves from self-
imposed bondage: 
 
If men within themselves would be govern’d by reason, and not generally give up thir 
understanding to a double tyrannie, of Custom from without, and blind affections within, they 
would discerne better, what it is to favour and uphold the Tyrant of a Nation. But being slaves 
within doors, no wonder that they strive so much to have the public State conformably govern’d to 
the inward vitious rule, by which they govern themselves. 
 
 
278 Togashi, ‘Milton and the Presbyterian Opposition’, p. 60. 
279 See Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 17-19; 
Ibid., ‘Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power’, in Cécile Laborde, John Maynor, eds., 
Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 85. 
280 Dzelzainis argues for a volte face between the editions in Political Works, xviii; Togashi disagrees 
with Dzelzainis in ‘Milton and the Presbyterian Opposition’, pp. 69-74; for arguments of greater 
consistency between the two editions, see Fulton, Historical Milton, pp. 168-73, and Fallon, ‘Nascent 
Republican Theory’, p. 315. 
281 Fulton, Historical Milton, pp. 168-73; Fallon, ‘Nascent Republican Theory’, p. 315.  
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Milton declares that ‘none can love freedom heartily, but good men’, as ‘the rest love 
not freedom, but licence’ (151). Milton in Defensio Secunda (1654) would laud 
Cromwell for exhibiting the self-control that he wishes the English people had (CPW 
iv/2. 667-8). Even in the first edition of the Tenure, Milton expresses a concern that 
some of the English people were incapable of exerting the self-control necessary to 
participate in the republic as private individuals. 
Milton’s perception of certain individuals as more capable and worthy than 
the broader English people reflects an attitude that he had held in print since Of 
Education. Early in both editions of the Tenure, Milton writes about the role of the elite 
in the aftermath of a successful insurrection against the king, similar to that which 
England had experienced in the civil wars: ‘then comes the task to those Worthies 
which are the soule of that enterprize, to be swett and labour’d out amidst the throng 
and noises of Vulgar and irrational men’ (152). Milton envisions a distinction between 
the elite few and the common sort in their respective roles within the new regime. As 
this study has recognised, Milton values such ‘Worthies’, those whom his educational 
system in Of Education would have produced, above the general English people. This is 
reiterated soon after in Milton’s suggestion of who can decide whether a monarch is 
tyrannical: 
 
But who in particular is a Tyrant cannot be determin’d in a general discours, otherwise then by 
supposition; his particular charge, and the sufficient proof of it must determin that: which I leave 
to Magistrates, at least to the uprighter sort of them, and of the people, though in number less by 
many, in whom faction least hath prevaild above the Law of nature and right reason, to judge as 
they find cause (154). 
 
Hammond observes that Milton uses a ‘series of restrictive clauses’ to narrow the 
definition of the people who possess such power to an elite few.282 Robert Filmer 
recognised a tension between Milton’s argument for popular resistance to tyranny and 
his conception of the people: ‘nay J. M. will not allow the major part of the 
Representors to be the people, but the sounder and better part only of them […] If the 
sounder, the better, and the uprighter part have the power of the people, how shall we 
know, or who shall judge who they be?’283 To answer Filmer’s question, where Milton 
locates such individuals to be in the Army in the first edition of the Tenure – as those 
who have enacted the Purge that he is justifying – in the second edition, these 
 
282 Hammond, Milton and the People, p. 120. 
283 Robert Filmer, Observations Concerning the Originall of Government (1652), p. 13. 
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individuals are republican statesmen, to whom Milton now identifies himself as 
belonging. In both editions there are limitations to which private individuals can 
participate in public activities; the second edition, however, narrows participation to 
statesman such as Milton himself. While Milton’s elitism in the first edition of the 
Tenure anticipates the greater restrictions he imposes on the private participation in the 
second edition, his employment by the republic is a key catalyst in bringing about this 
specific change to his argument. 
Winstanley, by contrast, envisions a conflation of private and public 
spheres, and asserts that the immanent millennium will initially rise up in the common 
sort. Winstanley makes clear in his New Law, that the Law of Righteousness will 
manifest in each individual without prejudice: 
 
But this is not done by the hands of a few, or by unrighteous men, that would pul the tyrannical 
government out of other mens hands, and keep it in their own heart, as we feel this to be a burden 
of our age. But it is done by the universall spreading of the divine power, which is Christ in 
mankind making them all to act in one spirit, and in and after / one law of reason and equity 
(CWGW, i. 503-4). 
 
This is why the mercantile and private system of ‘This is mine, and that is yours’ will 
end in favour of universal, public cultivation of the common treasury, where the ‘earth 
shall be common to all’ (i. 506). At the present moment, in early 1649, Winstanley 
asserts that the ‘Father now is rising up a people to himself out of the dust, that is, out of 
the lowest and despised sort of people, that are counted the dust of the earth, man-kind, 
that are trod under foot’ (i. 508). The commons, beginning practically in the Digger 
movement a few months after the publication of New Law, will lead this revolution of 
returning common land to the people, away from private hands. The radical vision of 
New Law extends to the ‘swaggering confidence’ of the first Digger work, the True 
Levellers Standard Advanced, published in April 1649.284 Winstanley explains how his 
vision of an egalitarian common treasury will unify society and collapse the boundary 
between public and private spheres: ‘Not inclosing any part into any particular hand, but 
all as one man, working together, and feeding together as Sons of one Father, members 
of one Family; not one Lording over another, but all looking upon each other, as equals 
in the Creation’ (ii. 10). While Winstanley is giving voice to his fellow Diggers, he is 
also representing the Digger enterprise as a unified effort, anticipating what will happen 
 
284 See CWGW, i. 81. 
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to the rest of society as the Law of Righteousness rises up in them. Through this 
process, the common people take ownership of the public sphere by effectively 
becoming it: the unified effort of the commons will gradually subsume private land 
ownership and trade as the Law of Righteousness manifests in the wealthy as well as the 
poor. 
Cary’s self-identification as a female radical informs her defence of private 
individuals contributing to the public good of the fifth monarchy. In her address to 
Francis Rous and Thomas Boon at the beginning of Resurrection, Cary praises them as 
‘glorious Starres, shining with a great deal of splendour in Your Countrey […] in the 
publikeness of Your spirits’. Despite recognising their public role as members of 
parliament, Cary asserts that ‘though I publish it under Your name and favour, yet doe I 
not thereby desire You to patronize any thing in it’. ‘I need desire no Patron’, Cary 
stresses, ‘For great is the truth, and it will prevail’ (A10-11). Cary defends her right as a 
private individual – and particularly as a female prophet – to communicate the truth. It 
is interesting, therefore, that she chooses to include prefatory accounts of Hugh Peters 
(1598-1660), a prominent regicide and close associate of Cromwell, Henry Jessey 
(1603-63), a nonconformist minister whose views of reconciling Christianity and 
Judaism correspond with Cary’s own in Little Horns (pp. 139-68), and Christopher 
Feake (1612-83), who, along with other prominent Independents, spearheaded the first 
major organised gathering of Fifth Monarchists in December 1651.285 However, these 
male authorities are preceded by Cary’s dedication of the tract to three prominent 
women: Elizabeth Cromwell (1598-1665), Bridget Ireton (1624-62), Cromwell’s 
daughter, and Margaret Rolle, wife of Henry Rolle (1589-1656), Lord Chief Justice and 
member of the Council of State.286 Cary acknowledges that ‘God hath selected and 
chosen out your Ladiships, and placed you in some of the highest places of honour’ 
(A4), from which they have served as ‘the exaltation […] of that great King of Saints, 
the Lord Jesus; whom you love in sincerity, and for the setting up of whose glorious 
Kingdome in the perfection of it, you longingly waite’ (A5). Cary identifies in them 
‘that indwelling presence of the holy spirit’, which they are ‘demonstrating to all Saints’ 
(A5). While Cary relies more on male authority in Little Horns, partly because Fifth 
Monarchism was becoming an established movement, she nonetheless identifies herself 
as a female saint and private prophet with the prominent public roles of these women. In 
 
285 On Cary’s anti-Semitism, see Warburton, ‘Mary Cary’s Millennial Visions’, pp. 127-33; see Capp, 
Fifth Monarchy Men, pp. 58-9. 
286 See Loewenstein, ‘Scriptural Exegesis’, pp. 136-8. 
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A Word, Cary asserts ‘let all the people, from the highest to the lowest, from the King 
that sits upon the Throne, to him that sits upon the Dunghill […] attend to the insuing 
discourse’ (A3). In Resurrection, this inclusivity extends to encompass female prophets 
as well as male. Within Cary’s inclusive vision of England as a society of saints, not 
only can ‘fifth monarchy men’ of all descriptions contribute to the fifth monarchy, but 
so can fifth monarchy women. 
Milton’s negative attitude towards the people, by contrast, only becomes 
more entrenched as he writes against the extremely popular Eikon Basilike in 
Eikonoklastes. Daniel Shore suggests that Milton employs a ‘fit-though-few’ trope in 
Eikonoklastes, through which he limits participation in the public sphere. It is also 
possible to discern, more simply, that Milton becomes more frustrated and disillusioned 
with the commons as Eikon Basilike remains overwhelmingly popular. In the second 
edition of Eikonoklastes, published between July and December 1650, some of Milton’s 
changes to the tract reflect this developing disaffection. In the preface, Milton 
acknowledges that ‘well it might have seem’d in vaine to write at all; considering the 
envy and almost infinite prejudice likely to be stirr’d up among the Common sort’. 
However, ‘it shall be ventur’d yet, and the truth not smother’d, but sent abroad, in the 
native confidence of her single self […] to finde out her own readers; few perhaps, but 
those few, such of value and substantial worth, as truth and wisdom’ (280). In 1650, 
Milton exhibits a clear change of attitude to 1644: he no longer accommodated the 
potential of private individuals to contribute to his chiliastic ideals, as his vision of 
London in Areopagitica enshrines; rather, truth, that which he communicates in his 
writings, will find the few worthy readers to serve the millennium privately.287  
Milton’s role as republican statesman from 1649, therefore, distinguishes 
him from the radical visions of Cary and Winstanley. As Milton has to articulate the 
voice of the nascent republic, his perception of worthy private individuals must 
necessarily transition to the republic itself, a collection of individuals who are enacting a 
public good and with whom he self-identifies. Indeed, his definition of the public sphere 
is now the republic: whereas public good takes on an exclusively millenarian form for 
Cary and Winstanley, it is also necessarily republican in Milton’s mindset as a 
statesman. As the divorce tracts suggest, Milton would also not have approved of Cary’s 
own specific participation in the public sphere as a woman, regardless of her religious 
or radical status. Not only did Milton argue for a separation of roles between sexes 
 
287 Cf. Eikonoklastes, CWJM vi. 424, where Milton similarly increases his criticism of the commons in 
the second edition. 
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(Tetrachordon (1645), CPW ii. 597), but, in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce 
(1643), he uses this distinction to assert the exclusive role of women in the private, 
domestic sphere, while men were able to venture ‘abroad’ to the public, political sphere 
(ii. 334-5, 347-6).288 Milton’s criteria for private participation in the republic was 
exclusive in early 1649 and only became more so through 1649 and 1650. Milton’s 
increasingly exclusive definition of those capable of overthrowing a tyrant, therefore, 
distances him from both the radical millenarians considered in this study and from his 





In the landscape of seventeenth-century English radicalism, Milton’s views and writings 
must be considered within their republican setting. Milton’s defence of the regicide and 
his role in the unprecedented political changes of the late 1640s and 1650s may have 
been radical, but it is neither comparable to Winstanley’s communist vision nor to 
Cary’s inclusive Fifth Monarchist millenarian society. Milton is perhaps, as the 
following chapter will show, best compared to the Fifth Monarchists of the 1650s – 
those who emerged prominently towards the end of Cary’s life – whose elitist belief that 
only the saints could bring about the millennium in England aligns with Milton’s own 
eschatology. This chapter has recognised that Milton’s millenarianism only becomes 
prominent in his tracts after he is employed by the fledgling republic. As Areopagitica 
attests, this is likely due to the value he places on freedom of conscience. However, 
unlike in Areopagitica, Milton increasingly loses faith in the people to contribute to this 
public good during the post-revolutionary period of 1649-50. As a republican statesman, 
Milton perceived himself as belonging to the group that had changed the English 
political landscape for the better, and which was capable of maintaining this progress; 
the people, in their unaltered belief in the monarchy, proved themselves unworthy of 
such elect status. As radical millenarians, Winstanley and Cary envisioned significant 
and far-reaching changes to the socio-economic and political spectrums. The republic 
was only part of their millenarian process. While Milton, as the following chapter will 
 
288 On Milton’s perception of women in the divorce tracts, see Diane Purkiss, ‘Whose Liberty? The 
Rhetoric of Milton’s Divorce Tracts’, in Oxford Handbook of Milton, pp. 186-99; Maria Magro, ‘Milton’s 
Sexualized Woman and the Creation of a Gendered Public Sphere’, in Milton Quarterly, 35/2 (2001), 98-
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suggest, did not view republicanism as an idealised end in itself – this is a view better 
discerned in Marchamont Nedham – he also did not share a belief in such a radical 
overhaul of society and politics. Milton invested his millenarian hope in the republic in 
a way that necessarily excluded contemporary sectarians from realising their radical 
visions for end times. The radical event of the English republic, which Milton continued 
to support in its various incarnations during the 1650s, resisted the rise of both the 
Diggers and the Fifth Monarchists, while maintaining the participation of individual 






























Utopia & Republicanism: Milton and ‘that scribling Knave 
Nedham’289 
 
Marchamont Nedham (1620-78), serial turncoat, prolific newsbook writer and 
pamphleteer, was one of Milton’s closest colleagues as the statesmen navigated the 
turbulent early years of the new republic. Their republican careers were immediately 
entwined: Milton was tasked with seeking out Nedham from hiding following the 
latter’s previous employment by the monarchy; he was subsequently appointed as 
licenser to Nedham’s republican newsbook, Mercurius Politicus, in January 1651. As a 
result of their close professional proximity, according to Anthony Wood and Edward 
Philips, the pair became great friends.290 Whereas some critics have argued that this 
friendship corresponded to ideological similarities, particularly in that the pair worked 
closely together on joint projects, this chapter will posit that Nedham and Milton’s 
political thought became increasingly distinct as the Interregnum progressed.291 
Nedham’s The Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated (1650) exhibits the 
interest theory that was prominent in his writings throughout the 1650s.292 The theory of 
accommodating interests necessarily differs from the more totalising, utopian vision of 
Winstanley’s The Law of Freedom in a Platform (1652). While Milton does not 
explicitly articulate a utopian vision, his Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio (1651) defends 
a specifically elect part of the English people that differs from Nedham’s more inclusive 
interest-led analysis of the state of political affairs. This early distinction between 
Milton and Nedham is mirrored throughout the 1650s: Milton, as the following chapter 
will show, proposes a more utopian vision in his The Readie and Easie Way (1659), 
 
289 See The History of the Second Death of the Rump (1660), p. 1. 
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while Nedham retains his belief that competing interests are conducive to a healthy 
republic in Interest Will Not Lie (1659). The intervening years exhibit how Nedham’s 
faith in the populism of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), particularly the Discorsi 
(1531), distinguishes him from the utopian and millenarian Milton. The disillusionment 
that Milton continues to harbour with the English people, as this study has shown, 
coincides with his millenarianism: a people unworthy of liberty are also unworthy of the 
millennium. Nedham’s republican populism, in turn, aligns with his lack of faith in the 
millennium. A fully realised republic on the Machiavellian model is the idealised 
endpoint of the republican project as Nedham sees it. By 1657, Nedham’s ‘letters from 
Utopia’ satirise the kind of idealism manifest in utopianism and millenarianism, while 
explicitly subverting Harringtonian utopianism, with which, as the following chapter 
will show, Milton’s late republican tracts align. 
Central to the republican theory that emerged in the 1650s was classical 
republicanism, and, for Milton and Nedham, the manner in which Machiavelli 
influenced the reception and interpretation of classically republican ideas in the period. 
J. G. A. Pocock’s seminal book, The Machiavellian Moment, firmly placed Machiavelli 
in English republican discourses of the mid-seventeenth-century. Paul Rahe has since 
argued that Machiavelli’s revision of certain classically republican ideas meant that he 
had less influence on classical republicans in the English revolution like Milton, who, 
Rahe posits, did not allow ‘the thinking of Niccolò Machiavelli to shape in any 
fundamental way the manner in which he wrote about, defended, and surreptitiously 
tried to guide the nascent English republic in strictly political affairs.’293 Jonathan Scott, 
in Commonwealth Principles, postulates a more inclusive definition of classical 
republicanism that accommodates both Greek and Roman origins. Scott suggests that 
Machiavelli participated in a classically republican discourse that became prominent in 
the republican phase of the 1650s.294 Significantly for this study, Scott includes not only 
Machiavelli, but also Thomas More in the chronological development of classical 
republicanism: he suggests that More’s ‘Utopia not only combines the metaphysics and 
community of property of Plato’s Republic, but does so within a humanist context 
 
293 On Machiavelli’s break from classical republicanism, see Markus Fischer, ‘Machiavelli’s Rapacious 
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which is self-consciously anti-Roman.’ Scott explains that, in the mid-seventeenth-
century, ‘two principles informed this commonwealth discourse’: ‘The first was that 
whatever its constitutional form, government must be directed to the public good. The 
second was that it must be legal and constitutional […] rather than the product of the 
will of a single person.’295 During the English revolutionary period, these classically 
republican ideas were used to oppose monarchy: Charles I was defined as a tyrant, 
which meant that his actions were inhibitive to public good. Scott’s inclusive definition 
of classical republicanism, therefore, suggests that Milton’s interest in Machiavelli in 
1651-2, as evidenced by his Commonplace Book, is compatible with his continued 
belief that certain individuals were better endowed with a capacity for reason in the 
political sphere, which is foundational to Aristotle’s ideal polity in his Politics.296 It also 
suggests that Nedham’s advocacy of Machiavelli did not negate his classical 
republicanism. Scott explains that seventeenth-century classical republicanism ‘was 
characterised by the combination not only of Greek and Roman sources, but, more 
challengingly, of Plato and Machiavelli’.297 This chapter will discuss Milton and 
Nedham within this classically republican context. Given More’s role in the 
development of these ideas, the prominence of utopianism in republican texts of the 
1650s is more congruous than it may initially appear. Where Nedham satirises Morean 
utopianism in 1657, Milton edges closer to the utopianism that characterises his 1659 
vision for the republic.  
As this study has argued, utopianism manifested in various forms in the 
mid-seventeenth-century. In 1644, Milton articulated a form of Baconian utopianism 
that was prevalent in the Hartlib circle; by 1659, as the following chapter will show, he 
espoused the form of totalising utopianism depicted in More’s Utopia and defined by J. 
C. Davis.298 Rosanna Cox discusses Milton’s The Readie and Easie Way in relation to 
Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ (1657) and James Harrington’s The Commonwealth of 
Oceana (1656). ‘Even those writers like Milton’, Cox explains, ‘and the journalist and 
polemicist, Marchamont Nedham, who are not always comfortable with the utopian 
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form, are nevertheless fascinated by its possibilities.’299 Cox identifies Of Education as 
utopian, but stops short of including Areopagitica.300 This is partly because she uses the 
utopian idealism that Milton opposes in Areopagitica (CPW ii. 526) as a general 
definition of utopianism for the period. Whereas Davis has categorised different forms 
of ideal society, the utopianism that Cox defines is effectively an ideal society.301 It is 
with this definition of utopianism that Cox argues that ‘Nedham’s rejection of utopias is 
the corollary to his rejection of political modelling in times of acute political crisis and 
at moments when the commonwealth is under threat. The problem with utopias, as 
becomes clear in the penultimate letter, is the fiction of the ideal state and the 
ramifications of this fiction in the wider political sphere.’302 While fiction and artifice, 
as the following chapter will show, remained significant features of utopias in the mid-
seventeenth-century, utopianism was also acknowledged in contemporary texts as 
advocating a stringent, totalising regime. Thomas Hall (1610-65) in his A Confutation of 
the Millenarian Opinion (1657) identified utopianism alongside millenarianism as 
jointly idealistic, unlike the true manifestation of Christ’s kingdom: ‘the Lord at last 
would bring us, not to a Millenarian, Utopian, Imaginary, Terrestrial Kingdom; but to a 
Real, Caelestial and Everlasting Kingdom’.303 Thomas Bancroft (1596-1658), by 
contrast, in his poem The Heroical Lover (1658), in which the hero Antheon leaves his 
home in New Atlantis and goes in search of his lover, Fidelta, whom he eventually finds 
in Utopia, identifies the stringent nature of Utopia. The Utopians, ‘Hating the names of 
injury & strife, / As bitter enemies to the sweetest life’, established ‘good laws amongst 
them’ that ‘were / (Like those of famous Sparta) so severe / That such as dar’d offend, 
were never spar’d’.304 The Utopians remove internal conflict in society and state 
through controlling regulations. Utopianism is distinct from the interest theory that 
Nedham consistently advocates. Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, therefore, in which he 
creates a fiction similar to Bancroft’s, exhibit a concern for how this kind of utopianism 
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– both idealistic and stringent – could be realised in a republic like that described by 
Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656). 
This chapter will also offer an interpretation of Milton and Nedham’s 
ideological differences, which contrasts with recent criticism to the contrary. Blair 
Worden’s Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England offers an extensive analysis 
of the relationship between Milton and Nedham, from the viewpoint that the two 
republican writers not only thought similarly, but also worked closely together in the 
production of Mercurius Politicus. Worden gives new life to the argument that Milton 
had a significant input in the editorials of Politicus between 1650-1. In particular, he 
suggests that ‘Politicus anticipated, and seems to have hoped to provide, replies to 
Defensio from Salmasius or others, which would heighten the controversy and enable 
Milton to respond in writings that would raise it further.’305 Williams suggests that, 
within his educational editorials, Nedham had made subversive comments against 
Cromwell’s rise in power, and the possibility that he may take the crown himself. Given 
that Milton had permitted this commentary on Cromwell, he argues that this was part of 
the reason for Milton’s dismissal as licenser for Politicus in January 1652. Similarly, 
within his wider argument for Milton’s Leveller sympathies, Williams suggests that a 
March 1652 editorial exhibits a defence of Levelling that may have been penned by 
either Milton or Nedham, or both.306 Levelling, however, as we shall see, is a contrary 
form to successive assemblies that Nedham criticises in the interest theory of The Case. 
Rather than arguing for Milton’s influence over Politicus, it is more valuable to explore 
and acknowledge Nedham’s intellectual independence and autonomy. As this chapter 
will show, Nedham develops his own increasingly anti-utopian ideology apart from 
Milton; Mercurius Politicus is part of that process.  
The first section of this chapter will address the differences between the 
interest theory of The Case and the elitism of Milton’s first Defensio. The second will 
show how Milton and Nedham respectively respond to the Protectorate in 1654, in 
Defensio Secunda and A True State of the Case of the Commonwealth. The final section 
will focus on Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, arguing that Nedham’s continued 
opposition to utopianism informs his continued support for the Protectorate, however 
begrudgingly. 
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‘INTEREST IS THE TRUE ZENITH OF EVERY STATE’: DEFENDING THE NEW 
REPUBLIC 
 
Like Nedham in The Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated (1650), Milton was 
tasked with defending the republic against Defensio Regia pro Carolo I (1649), penned 
by Claudius Salmasius (1588-1653), in Defensio Pro Populo Anglicano (1651). In The 
Case, his first tract for the republic, Nedham waded into the Engagement controversy 
that followed the introduction of the mandatory Oath of Engagement in support of the 
republic early in 1650.307 Whereas contemporary de facto theorists, such as Anthony 
Ascham (1614-50) and Francis Rous (1581-1659), argued that the Rump parliament 
was de facto in power, which necessitated obedience, Nedham went one step further to 
assert that a de facto government was also valid de jure.308 In Milton’s Defensio, his 
first Latin polemic for the republic, his animadvertive rhetoric refutes Salmasius’s 
argument as he defends the revolutionary actions of parliament in 1648-9. The crucial 
difference between Milton and Nedham’s republican defences lies in the latter’s use of 
interest theory, which, as Raymond explains, he ‘had developed from Machiavelli, 
Guicciardini, and especially the Duc de Rohan’: ‘Nedham was committed to “interest” 
as a means of analysis, and as a powerful means of linking theory to practice.’309 As 
Nedham asserts in The Case Stated between England and the United Provinces, in this 
Present Juncture (1652), ‘Interest is the true Zenith of every State and Person, 
according to which they may certainly be understood, though cloathed never so much 
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with the most specious disguise of Religion, Justice and Necessity.’310 Although 
Nedham uses such profiling as a means of identifying areas of anti-republican interest in 
England, it also anticipates the successive governments that he would advocate in 
Mercurius Politicus, in which succession of parliaments ensures that different views can 
be represented. Milton’s argument in his first Defensio, by contrast, maintains a 
distinction between a superior and more virtuous part of the people – the sanior pars – 
and the wider populace, which he had exhibited throughout 1649. Although neither 
Milton nor Nedham endorse the kind of utopianism that Winstanley depicts in his Law 
of Freedom – Nedham, in fact, addresses the Diggers as a form of anti-republican 
interest – Milton’s attitude towards the people in the Defensio, as an extension of the 
views he expressed in 1649, prefigures the utopian standpoint he will come to espouse 
in The Readie and Easie Way.    
Nedham’s The Case addresses ‘those two Parties whereof the world 
consists; viz: the Consciencious man, and the Worldling.’311 He does so by dividing The 
Case into two parts: the former addresses the conscientious man with his de facto 
argument; the latter meets the self-interest of the worldling with his interest theory 
analysis. Nedham explains that  
 
The former will approve nothing but what is just and equitable; and therefore I have labored to 
satisfie him (as I have done my Self) touching the Justice of Submission: The latter will imbrace 
any thing, so it make for his Profit; and therefore I have shewn him the Inconveniences and 
Dangers, that wil follow his opposition of a settlement (sig. A3). 
 
‘Where Nedham differs from the typical pamphleteer’, Raymond explains, ‘is that, 
instead of dismissing the latter, and persuading readers to identify with the former, he 
seeks to persuade both through diligence and the reasoned appeal to self-interest.’312 
Even at this early stage in his republican career, in a tract in which he is proving his 
worth to a form of government he had once opposed in print, Nedham is fashioning his 
own distinct view of republicanism. Nedham’s awareness of the interests of different 
parties encourages him to include the interests of the people in a way that Milton, as we 
 
310 Nedham, The Case Stated between England and the United Provinces, in this Present Juncture (1652), 
p. 23; see also Rahe, ‘Machiavelli in the English Revolution’, in Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican 
Legacy, pp. 11-12. 
311 Marchamont Nedham, The Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated (1650), A3r; further 
references will be made parenthetically to page numbers in the running text. 
312 Raymond, ‘Marchamont Nedham’, p. 381; see Fischer, ‘Machiavelli’s Rapacious Republicanism’, pp. 
xlvi-xlvii. 
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have seen, generally avoids. In the Discorsi, which Nedham admired and the ideas of 
which he serialised in editorials of Mercurius Politicus in 1651-2, Machiavelli 
acknowledges that ‘in every republic there are two different tendencies, that of the 
people and that of the upper class’, which leads to ‘disturbances between the nobles and 
the plebeians’, but that contemporary republics in Italy ‘give more consideration to the 
noises and cries arising from such disturbances than to the good effects they produced’. 
A solution to this, Machiavelli asserts, is ‘that every city must possess its own methods 
for allowing the people to express their ambitions’.313 Nedham accommodates the views 
of the people and addresses them in an accessible way because he believes, as 
Machiavelli does, that the ambitions of the people are represented in a healthy republic. 
His identification of non-republican interests in The Case enables him to show the 
worldling that these various parties and factions inhibit, if not prohibit, popular 
interests. 
Nedham identifies four anti-republican interests in post-revolutionary 
England that oppose the popular interest: royalists, the Scottish, Presbyterians, and 
Levellers. The pamphleteer effectively yokes the first three interests together to exhibit 
how they all strived collectively to oppose the superior republican interest that he is 
defending in the tract. In the section ‘On the Scots’, Nedham addresses the ‘Kirke-
Interest’, which he identifies as essentially Presbyterian in character, and from which he 
anticipates an extension of the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643: ‘the Scots might 
easily have translated the Covenant union as good as an absolute National union, by 
gaining a Joynt-Interest with us in our Affairs for ever’ (50-1). The problem with 
Scottish interest, which naturally aligns with the Presbyterian interest in the third 
section, is that, by combining various interests together, it tyrannically inhibits the 
popular interest that Nedham is acknowledging in his address to the worldling. The 
danger with the English and Scottish Presbyterians creating a ‘new Scotish 
Combination’ (67) is that it will be ‘destructive to every mans Interest of Conscience 
and Liberty’ and it will establish ‘an intolerable Tyranny, over Magistrates and People’ 
(64).314 The combined interest of Scottish and the English Presbyterians, which is made 
possible by discussions between them and Prince Charles, is a danger to both the 
political and religious interests of the worldling, and indeed the English commonwealth 
 
313 Machiavelli, Discorsi, Book 1, Chapter 5, in Julia Conway Bondanella, Peter Bondanella, trans., eds., 
Discourses on Livy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 29-30. 
314 For a discussion of Nedham and the Presbyterians, see Rahe, ‘An Inky Wretch: The Outrageous 
Genius of Marchamont Nedham’, in The National Interest, 70 (2002), pp. 62-4; cf. Rahe, Against Throne 
and Altar, pp. 190-4. 
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as a whole. Like Milton, Nedham identifies Presbyterianism as limiting and 
endangering religious liberty; unlike Milton, however, as we shall see, he supports and 
defends the interest of the people. In line with Machiavelli, he identifies the English 
republic as permitting popular ambition to be represented and realised in a way that the 
other interests he addresses do not. 
Milton’s first Defensio, by contrast, favours an elect part of the English 
people as singularly capable of realising the virtue and success of the English republic 
that he defends. Raymond shows how Milton addresses different audiences in his 
Defensio. While Salmasius is the most obvious member of his audience – he refers to 
Salmasius with derogatory epithets such as ‘windbag’ (67) and, more regularly, ‘slave’ 
(73) – Milton also isolates the Europeans to whom he defended the nascent republic. 
Raymond argues that the English people, as a third audience, ‘Latin-reading and 
otherwise, […] are repeatedly separated from the European readership.’315 While he 
purports to defend the English people – populo Anglicano – Hammond observes that 
Milton struggled with articulating precisely who fulfils his definition of the people.316 
Milton argues in the preface of the Defensio that ‘if a commonwealth which is in 
difficulties with factions, and protects itself with weapons, concerns itself with the 
healthy and sound part only, and neglects or excludes the rest, whether they are 
commoners or aristocrats, it is certainly just enough.’317 The translation of ‘sanae & 
integrae […] partis’ here as ‘healthy and sound part’, which has also been translated as 
‘sound and upright side’ (CPW iv. 317), has connotations of mental and physical health 
(‘sanus’) and of wholeness or completeness (‘integer’).318 Where Nedham suggests that 
a republic more effectively secures the interests of the people, through which he 
encourages the commons to avoid the factions he opposes, Milton proposes that in a 
factious commonwealth, favouring superior individuals is justified.  
In Milton’s argument in the Defensio that the people, in the form of the 
Army, during Pride’s Purge acted against the king rather than parliament, he finds it 
necessary to explicitly articulate his definition of the people. Elizabeth Sauer explains 
 
315 Raymond, ‘John Milton, European: The Rhetoric of Milton’s Defences’, in Oxford Handbook of 
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318 For the original Latin, see Milton, Johannis Miltoni Angli Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio (1651), in 
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that the ‘representation of the people in terms of a qualitative principle rather than 
numerical majority in constitutionalism is grounded in the Aristotelian political concept 
of government by the most worthy.’ The concept of the sanior pars, which Milton 
describes later in the Defensio, was prominent in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
and the ‘distinction that Marsilius of Padua articulated in the following century between 
the populus (the nobles) and the plebs (the lower-class masses) resonated even through 
to the early modern era.’319 In answer to Salmasius’s question about whether it was the 
people ‘who maimed the commoners of the lower house, by putting some of the 
members to flight, etc?’, Milton answers 
 
It was the people, I say. For why should I not say that the action of the better, that is the healthier, 
part of the government, in which resides the true power of the people, was the act of the people. 
What if the majority in parliament should prefer to be slaves, and to offer the commonwealth for 
sale – should not the minority be allowed to prevent this and keep their liberty, if it lies in their 
power? (181-2) 
 
The phrase ‘pars potior, id est sanior’ (‘the better, that is the healthier part’) echoes the 
language Milton used in the preface to describe the better part of the people. Here, 
where ‘sanior’ means ‘healthier’, ‘potior’ can translate as both ‘preferable’ and ‘more 
powerful’. The comparative form of these adjectives indicates the superior quality of 
this part of the people that Milton defends. Milton viewed the better part of the people 
as the middle sort: 
 
You then inveigh against the common people, saying that ‘being blind and dull, it does not have 
the skill of ruling; nothing is more puffed up, empty, changeable and inconstant’. All these things 
suit you very well; and of the lowest rabble indeed are even true, but not likewise of the middle 
sort. Of their number are the men who are almost the most sensible and skilful in affairs. As for the 
rest, luxury and opulence on the one hand, poverty and need on the other, generally divert them 
from virtue and the study of statesmanship (194).320 
 
In 1649, as the previous chapter showed, Milton consistently identified the superior and 
upright apart from those who are, in the words of Eikonoklastes, ‘like a credulous and 
hapless herd, begott’n to servility’ (CWJM vi. 424). Milton’s defence of the established 
 
319 Elizabeth Sauer, ‘Milton’s Defences and the Principle of “Sanior Pars”’, in Laura Lunger Knoppers, 
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English republic to a European audience bears resemblance to these vernacular 
arguments. Virtuous men, who are more commonly found in the middle sort, are better 
suited to participating in the commonwealth. 
By favouring certain parts of the people over others, Milton’s defence of the 
English republic is necessarily distinguished from Nedham’s. At the end of The Case, 
Nedham delivers ‘A discourse of the excellency of a Free-State, above a Kingly 
Government’, in which he draws on Machiavelli’s Discorsi. Nedham explains how, in 
‘the Florentine’s subtile discourses upon Livy’, Machiavelli ‘compares such as have 
been educated under a Monarchy or Tyranny, to those Beasts which have been caged or 
coop’t up all their lives in a Den […] and if they be let loose, yet they will return in 
againe, because they know not how to value or use their Liberty’ (80). Nedham’s 
awareness of the poorly educated people informs his decision to separate The Case into 
two sections, and to serialise the Discorsi in the educational editorials of Mercurius 
Politicus. It is also this attitude, and his knowledge of Machiavelli, that leads him to 
argue for a populist vision of a republic: ‘Therefore (Machiavell saith) not he that 
placeth a virtuous Government in his own Hands or Family, and Governs well during 
his naturall life; but he that establisheth a lasting Form for the Peoples constant 
Security, is most to be commended’ (86).  
A specific part of the English republic that Nedham defends, which aligns 
with Milton’s enduring commitment to religious freedom, is liberty of conscience. In 
further opposition to Presbyterianism, which he describes as ‘the great Pretenders of 
Nationall Uniformity in Religion’ and ‘those high imperious Uniformity-mongers, that 
would have men take measure of all Opinions by their own’, Nedham asserts ‘that 
variety of Opinions can be no way destructive of Publique Peace’ (90-1). Just as 
Nedham’s ‘free state’ permits popular interests to be represented, so it also allows a 
diversity of religious opinions to exist within the state. ‘Toleration’, Raymond argues, 
‘continued to be central to Nedham’s vision of a flourishing commonwealth, and I think 
it was a foundation of his personal religion and his public politics.’321 While Milton 
would agree with Nedham’s defence of religious freedom here, as this study has shown, 
Milton viewed liberty of conscience as necessary to realise the millennium, which is a 
different kind of freedom to the one that Nedham advocates in The Case. Whereas 
Nedham’s free state encourages the participation of the people in government – partly, 
in Machiavellian terms, to vent ambitious tendencies – Milton in the first Defensio 
 
321 Raymond, ‘Marchamont Nedham’, p. 89. 
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defends a part of the English people capable of serving the idealised end point of the 
millennium: ‘“The Messiah is a king”: we acknowledge, we rejoice and we pray that he 
may come as quickly as possible, for he is worthy, and no-one is like him or able to 
follow him’ (99). The ‘Son of God for whom we wait’ (153), although not as explicit as 
in 1644, is no less significant in Milton’s first Defensio. Although Milton shares with 
Nedham a belief that it is important for there to be a variety of religious opinion in a 
commonwealth, he does so for a different reason: religious liberty in Milton’s 
commonwealth helps to realise the millennium; Nedham’s defence of religious liberty – 
the ‘variety of Opinions’ – by contrast, reflects his wider belief in popular participation 
in government. For Milton, while his classical republicanism encourages him to 
denounce Salmasius and monarchism as slavery, he also advocates the religious liberty 
defined by J. C. Davis: ‘liberty of conscience meant submission to God, therefore, and 
not to self.’322 
In Winstanley’s utopia, The Law of Freedom, he similarly draws on this 
form of religious liberty in a significant manifestation of a utopian millennium. In its 
direct address to Cromwell, The Law of Freedom represents Winstanley’s final – and 
possibly desperate – promotion of change to the power structures of a society that had 
resisted the formation of his ‘common treasury’. While Winstanley remains dedicated to 
the commons, the society he proposes manifests the law of righteousness, which had 
been prominent in his millenarian works, in a distinctly utopian vision. Winstanley 
explains to Cromwell that he has decided ‘to present this Platform of Commonwealths 
Government unto you, wherein I have declared a full | Commonwealths Freedome, 
according to the Rule of Righteousness, which is Gods Word.’323 Freedom within 
Winstanley’s commonwealth is no less dependent on the ‘Rule of Righteousness’ than it 
was in the millenarianism of The New Law of Righteousnes (1649). J. C. Davis argues 
that Winstanley transitions in his conception of ideal society: ‘His early works had been 
afire with millenarian expectation, his social attitudes illuminated by the optimism of 
the perfect moral commonwealth theorist. In his last work he was a utopian.’324 Michael 
Rogers argues against Davis and suggests that ‘Winstanley did not make the radical 
aboutface’, but instead his ‘thought on crime and punishment reflects both the popular, 
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radical tradition of law reform in the revolutionary era and realistic lessons in common 
cultivation and state power learned in the Digger colonies.’325 As this study has argued, 
Davis’s uncompromising distinction between millenarianism and utopianism does not 
reflect the cross-fertilisation of ideas between these two forms of ideal society in 
seventeenth-century England. The previous chapter suggested that the ‘Law of 
Righteousness’ was central to Winstanley’s millenarian vision, as an immanent 
manifestation of the millennium and even Christ himself that would bring about radical 
communist change and establish the ‘common treasury’.326 In the Law of Freedom, the 
Law manifests as a stringent, utopian totality. Although Winstanley no longer 
anticipates an immanent realisation of the millennium, he does still base the model of 
his utopia on the prelapsarian ideal: ‘the Law of common Preservation, Peace and 
Freedom, was the righteous Law that governed both Adam and his household’ (313). In 
contrast to a ‘Kingly Government’ (305), therefore, Winstanley explains that the 
‘Commonwealths Government governs the Earth without buying and selling; and 
thereby becomes a man of peace, and the Restorer of ancient Peace and Freedom’ (309). 
Many of the characteristic elements of Winstanley’s millenarianism survive in his 
utopia. The difference is that Winstanley, with his Digger enterprise having failed, now 
depends on state apparatus rather than divine intervention, in order to more effectively 
appeal to Cromwell and the Rump. 
 Not only does Winstanley’s form of religious liberty invite comparisons 
with Milton, but he positions the stringent hierarchical structure of his utopia in contrast 
to ‘Machivilian cheats’ (357). These ‘cheats’ resemble the factional interests that 
Nedham is aware of and strives to accommodate in his republican theory. In 
Winstanley’s history of the ‘Rise of Kingly Government’, he explains that ‘politick wit’ 
drew ‘people out of Common Freedom into a way of Common Bondage’, as the ‘Kingly 
spirit seats himself’ in the people: ‘And then he went about to establish buying and 
selling by Law, whereby the people had some ease for a time, but the cunning 
Machavilian spirit got strength thereby to settle himself King in the Earth’ (307). 
Although it remains unclear whether Winstanley had more than a basic understanding 
of Machiavelli, he does identify self-interest with the machinations that led to the 
establishment of monarchy, and which signified the end of the original common 
treasury. Winstanley’s ‘Commonwealths Officer,’ therefore, ‘is not to step into the 
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place of Magistracy by policy, or violent force, as all Kings and Conquerors do; and so 
become oppressing Tyrants, by promoting their self-ended Interests, or Machiavilian 
Cheats, that they may live in plenty, and rule over their Brethren’ (315). The patriarchal 
hierarchy in Winstanley’s utopia is nevertheless rigid: parliament is the highest 
authority, under which are county senates or judges courts, under which are the powers 
of towns, cities, or parishes.327 To reinforce this totality, at the very foundation of the 
state, fathers serve as officers, the authoritarian leaders, in each private family. Within 
this system, the local roles in every town, city, or parish – peace-maker, overseers, 
soldiers, task-masters – are collectively represented in the county senate. The various 
county senates, moreover, are controlled by the laws of parliament, and the other 
components of state-wide governance: Commonwealth’s Ministry, Post-masters, and 
the Army (321-31). Winstanley emphasises physical work to avoid the kind of 
Machiavellian, interest-led political participation that Nedham favours: ‘Therefore to 
prevent idleness and the danger of Machivilian cheats, it is profitable for the Common-
wealth, that children be trained up in Trades and some bodily imployment, as well as in 
learning Languages, or the Histories of former ages’ (357). Whereas Nedham decides to 
provide the commons with a Machiavellian education in Mercurius Politicus, 
Winstanley believes that education is necessary to avoid the kind of Machiavellian 
factional interests that Nedham advocates.  
Nedham himself opposes the Diggers in the fourth and final interest on the 
Levellers that he addresses in The Case. It was necessary for Nedham, who had actively 
supported the Levellers in the late 1640s, to distance himself from the group in his first 
tract for the republic.328 In The Case, Nedham explains that the democratic form 
advocated by the Levellers was damaging to a free state because ‘the multitude is so 
Brutish, that […] they are ever in the extreames of kindnesse or Cruelty; being void of 
Reason, and hurried on with an unbridled violence in all their Actions, trampling down 
all respects of things Sacred and Civill, to make way for that their Liberty’ (71). This 
kind of riotous environment is precisely the situation that Nedham’s free state sets out 
to avoid by permitting popular representation in successive parliaments in a way that 
prevents the ‘Anarchy and Confusion’ that results from Levelling. From the Levellers, 
Nedham turns to the Diggers, which were still active in their communes at the time: 
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Lastly, from Levelling they proceed to introduce an absolute Community. […] we see there is a 
new Faction started up our of ours, known by the name of Diggers; who, upon this ground, That 
God is our common-Father, the earth our Common-Mother, and that the Originall of Propriety was 
mens pride and Covetousnesse, have framed a new plea for a Returne of all men ad Tuguria, that 
[…] we might renounce Towns and Cities, live at Rovers, and enjoy all in common (79). 
 
Nedham opposes Winstanley’s communism in much the same way that Winstanley 
rejects Machiavellian philosophy, especially in its focus on self-interest. While 
Winstanley’s utopia is distinct from the millenarian ideal of the common treasury, it 
creates a structure in order to realise some form of communism, such as a rejection of 
property ownership. Nedham disagrees with the radical overhaul of society that the 
Diggers advocate. Winstanley’s absolutist utopia, with its authoritarian and patriarchal 
power structures, is far removed from Nedham’s interest-led republican free state. 
Communism and utopianism, therefore, are at odds with Nedham’s interest theory, and 
the republican philosophy he draws from it. 
In the early post-revolutionary period, Milton and Nedham offer distinctive 
defences of the nascent republic that establish their form of republicanism at the time in 
relation to contemporary utopianism and anticipate the development of their ideas 
throughout the 1650s. Nedham’s interest theory, as Winstanley’s opposition to 
Machiavelli suggests, is not compatible with a utopian totality. His awareness of 
different interests, moreover, includes the popular interest of the worldling, to whom he 
addresses the second part of The Case. Milton’s awareness of the commons, by contrast, 
leads him to define the people that he defends in the first Defensio as the middle sort, 
the worthy and capable individuals that he prioritised in 1649. Winstanley wrote the 
Law of Freedom to more effectively appeal to Cromwell for reform. While it had little 
or no impact following its publication, and is evidently distanced from Nedham’s 
Machiavellianism, the religious liberty of the ‘Rule of Righteousness’ recalls Milton’s 
own commitment to the millennium, which remains implicit in the Defensio. The 
republic was a means to an eschatological end for Milton; for Nedham, the free state of 
the republic, which represented different interests and maintained religious toleration, 
was a sufficient end in itself. It is this distinction between the two pamphleteers that 
ultimately leads Milton to endorse utopianism more explicitly in 1659, while Nedham 
satirises it in 1657. Milton’s growing disillusionment with the English people continues 




1654: THE PROTECTORATE AND FIFTH MONARCHISM 
 
Milton and Nedham’s respective apologies for the Protectorate, Defensio Secunda 
(1654) and A True State of the Case of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and 
Ireland (1654) further illustrate how the two pamphleteers differed in their responses to 
the significant changes in the English political landscape in the 1650s. The Nominated 
Assembly, nicknamed the ‘Assembly of Saints’ because of its large Fifth Monarchist 
representation, suffered from significant in-fighting, particularly on the subject of tithes, 
during its brief sitting between July and December 1653. Along with a group of 
frustrated MPs, Cromwell engineered its dissolution on 8 December, after which the 
Instrument of Government was drafted on 16 December that gave executive power to 
Cromwell as Lord Protector.329 Where Nedham denounces the actions of the Nominated 
Assembly and Fifth Monarchism, Milton focuses on the Protectorate itself, particularly 
the figure of Cromwell. This was partly because Defensio Secunda, published on 30 
May, was a response to Regii Sanguinis Clamor Ad Coelum (1652) by Peter du Moulin 
(1601-84), who criticises Cromwell in the tract. It was also, however, because Milton 
identified in Cromwell the idealised qualities of self-control that he had called for in 
1649, and which belonged exclusively to the sanior pars.  
There has been disagreement between critics about the extent to which 
Milton supported the Protectorate.330 ‘Milton’s approval of the protectorate,’ Worden 
asserts, ‘hesitant from the start, soon yielded to barely concealed antagonism.’331 Tobias 
Gregory disagrees with this view, arguing that while Milton’s support of the 
Protectorate in 1654 differs from his opposition to single-person rule in The Readie and 
Easie Way (1659), this is likely because the single person on the horizon in 1659 was 
Charles II. In ideological terms, Gregory explains how Milton would have valued 
Cromwell’s policy of religious tolerance: ‘In both domestic and foreign policy, 
Cromwell aimed at the pan-Protestant unity that Milton urges from Areopagitica 
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forward, whereby differing sorts of Protestants should set aside their “neighbouring 
differences” and join to advance the incomplete work of the Reformation.’332 While 
Nedham also supported Cromwell’s policy of toleration, his focus in A True State is in 
defending Cromwell’s actions in dissolving the Nominated Assembly. As McDowell 
suggests, he shows that it was ‘as an essential and urgent action to preserve civil liberty 
and national security.’333 Milton’s lack of explicit opposition to the Fifth Monarchists, 
therefore, invites a comparison between the Fifth Monarchist millenarian vision of a 
godly elect leading society with totalising control and Milton’s own views on the social 
elite that would safeguard societal progress towards the millennium. While the previous 
chapter showed how Milton’s elitism distinguishes him from the inclusive tolerationist 
philosophy of Mary Cary, stronger comparisons can be made with the Fifth 
Monarchism that emerged from 1653.  
The difference between Milton and Nedham’s commentary on the 
Nominated Assembly could not be starker. Milton’s criticism is brief and to the point: 
 
Another Parliament was convened anew, and the suffrage granted only to those who deserved it. 
The elected members came together. They did nothing. When they in turn had at length exhausted 
themselves with disputes and quarrels, most of them considering themselves inadequate and unfit 
for executing such great tasks, they of their own accord dissolved the Parliament.334 
 
This serves more as an account of rather than a commentary on the Barebones 
Parliament. Milton observes the inaction and in-fighting of the assembly, but any 
criticism is implicit. In his A True State, by contrast, Nedham is extensively critical of 
not only the Nominated Assembly, but also specifically of the Fifth Monarchist faction 
within it. Having identified the dangers of religious intolerance and maintaining his 
strong belief in successive governance, Nedham writes of how the Nominated 
Assembly ‘took upon them ordinarily to administer Law and Justice, according to their 
own wills, and endeavoured to perpetuate the Office of Administration in their own 
hands, against the will of the People’.335 Characteristic of the editor of Politicus, 
Nedham is averse to any form of government that removes power from the people. This 
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leads him to target the Fifth Monarchist representation in the Assembly, employing 
interest theory to warn against ‘how the common Interest of this Nation would have 
been swallowed up by a particular Faction’ that ‘would have utterly confounded the 
whole course of Natural and Civil Right, which is the only Basis or foundation of 
Government in this world’ (18). As we have seen, Nedham was averse to factions that 
eclipsed the common interest of the republican state, particularly given that Nedham’s 
vision for the republic was in support of popular interests. 
Nedham’s significant opposition to the actions of the Fifth Monarchists 
suggests why he would have supported a regime that protected religious liberty. 
Raymond argues that Nedham’s ‘writings contain the clearest exposition of the 
opposition between Fifth Monarchists and the principles of Government.’ He explains 
that Nedham, who had attended Fifth Monarchist meetings in secret, had written to 
Cromwell in mid-November 1653 with the recommendation that he fix ‘the Nations 
Interest & your own, upon some solid ffundamentals [sic], in reference to the State both 
of Religion & Politie.’336 The request was, in many respects, fulfilled by the Instrument 
of Government.337 In December, Nedham attended another meeting in which he 
reported suggestions that the ‘little horn’ was not Charles II, but he that ‘is to make war 
with the saints, that is, to set himself against them, and prevail in his design’; by 
February 1654, Nedham was making the observation to Cromwell that such a meeting 
‘diminishes your reputation among foreigners, who expect changes, because they are 
proclaimed from the pulpit, and great things are made of it, though it is but a confluence 
of silly wretches.’338 In A True State, Nedham condemns the assertion ‘That godly 
persons, though of small understanding, and little ability of mind in publick Affairs, are 
more fit for Government than men of great knowledg and wisdom’ (25). In his most 
explicit commentary on millenarianism, Nedham opposes the view of godly power 
taking precedence over civil authority on earth, arguing that Christ himself declared that 
‘his Kingdom is not of this world’. As Nedham’s advice to Cromwell suggests, his anti-




336 Referenced in Raymond, ‘Framing Liberty’, pp. 336, 337. 
337 See Benjamin Woodward, Perceptions of Monarchy without a King: Reactions to Oliver Cromwell’s 
Power (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013), pp. 70-1. 
338 See ‘Volume 42: December 1653’ and ‘Volume 66: February 1654,’ in Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., 
Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1653-4 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
1879), 279-328 and 381-426. 
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Nor must it be forgotten here, what a Rock such men are ready to rush upon, who shall endeavour 
to twist the Spiritual and Civil Interest both in one, and so make the Church and State of the same 
extention, as they do who hold that none ought to be in Authority but Saints by calling; for, in this 
there is a recurring to the very Papall and Prelatick principle (27). 
 
Like Milton, Nedham advocates keeping the ‘Spiritual and Civil Interest’ separated; he 
values the liberty of conscience that this secures. Unlike Milton, however, Nedham 
articulates a strong and extended argument against the Fifth Monarchists. His defence of 
the Protectorate, therefore, becomes a defence of religious and civil liberty against 
millenarian extremism, as he believes that the Protectorate ‘might hereafter barr up the 
way against those manifold inconveniences, which we have felt under other fleeting 
Forms’ (27). 
The Fifth Monarchism that emerged in 1653, although lacking a coherent 
ideology, manifested a significant and influential form of utopian millenarianism. 
Rather than patiently awaiting the second coming, the saints believed that they had to 
lay the foundations for the fifth monarchy by forming a government managed by the 
elect: ‘Until Christ arrived,’ B. S. Capp explains, ‘the government was to be by the 
small minority who formed the elect, organized into a church-parliament based on the 
Jewish sanhedrin.’339 Fifth Monarchist representation in the Nominated Assembly 
signifies how close the saints were to power. On 1 August 1653, when the Fifth 
Monarchists constituted part of the Nominated Assembly, William Aspinwall (1605-62) 
published A Brief Description of the Fifth Monarchy, which effectively resembled a 
manifesto for the sect. As Aspinwall explains, the saints shall form ‘the supream 
Councel of the State or Nation’, from which they are ‘to study how they may enlarge 
the Kingdom of Christ, and demolish the Kingdom of Antichrist’. The saints will 
choose ‘faithful and choice men’ to model every city in accordance with Christ’s perfect 
laws. Aspinwall explains the manner in which these men will be chosen: 
 
Now all subordinate Officers, whether Judges, Clerks, &c. Collectors of Customs, & Tributes, 
Treasurers, &c. are places of trust, and comprehended under that name of Exactors, and unto these 
the wisdome of God saw it needfull to add Vissitors, or Overseers, not only to have inspection into 
their actions, but to controul or restrain them, and if cause require, to acquaint the supream 
authority or Councel, whose office it is to call them to account, & censure them according to their 
 
339 B. S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 138. 
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merit, placing faithfull men in their steads, & so preserve the Civil Government sound and 
upright.340 
 
This stringent political system, inspired by the ideal of Christ’s millennial reign, is a 
valuable example of utopian millenarianism. Even Mary Cary, who’s early Fifth 
Monarchist works, as we have seen, were inclusive, encodes this more characteristically 
elitist attitude in her Twelve Humble Proposals (1653). Directly addressing the 
Nominated Assembly, Cary suggests that parliament should implement a decentralised 
political system with ‘Commissioners in every County’. These should be managed by 
the ‘choicest men in each County for holiness of life, and freedom from covetousnesse, 
and for wisdom, prudence and understanding’. This meritocratic attitude, however, 
belies a more elitist side when, in discussing the various roles in Fifth Monarchist 
society, she acknowledges that ‘some men of mean parts, may be fit onely for mean 
imployments; whereas other imployments require men of better parts’.341 As Cary died 
in 1653, we do not know what she thought of the premature dissolution of the 
Nominated Assembly or of the growing Fifth Monarchist militarism in the late 1650s. 
What Twelve Humble Proposals nevertheless suggests was that she did begin to espouse 
the utopian millenarianism of her Fifth Monarchist contemporaries. 
Before the dissolution of the Nominated Assembly, some Fifth Monarchists 
idealised Cromwell in a similar manner to Milton in Defensio Secunda, and in a way 
that reflects their utopianism. In April 1653, John Rogers (1627-c.1665) endorses 
Cromwell to ‘choose the men that must governe this Commonwealth (being that it is the 
judgement of many faithful discerning Ministers, and others, that you are called 
thereunto of God.).’ ‘So Moses’, Rogers reminds his reader, ‘did choose able men to be 
Rulers’.342 In the following month, John Spittlehouse (1612-57), in A Warning-Piece 
Discharged (1653), similarly envisions Cromwell as a second Moses: ‘under God we 
are the most ingaged to the present General of all the men in the Nation, because the 
Lord hath every way fitted him with the strength, courage and valor of the aforesaid 
Moses’. The Newcastle Fifth Monarchists were equally supportive of this form of 
governance. These saints rejoice at the news that ‘such eminent, holy, and faithful men’ 
have been appointed in the Council of State, who, along with Cromwell, they regard as 
 
340 William Aspinwall, A Brief Description of the Fifth Monarchy, OR KINGDOME, That shortly is to 
come into the World (1653), pp. 4, 6. 
341 See Mary Cary, Twelve Humble Proposals To the Supreme Governours of the three Nations now 
assembled at Westminster (1653), pp. 10-12. 
342 John Rogers, To His Excellency the Lord Generall Cromwell (1653) (single sheet). 
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most worthy ‘to make choice of the holiest and best affected men to rule us out of all 
Counties’. Their utopian reasoning is, moreover, evident: ‘And truely we may see 
herein the wonderfull and secret working of God, that as the Parliament did new model 
the Army before there was any good issue of the War; so the Army must new model a 
Parliament, before there be any good issue of the Peace.’343 The concept of ‘new 
modelling’ parliament in accordance with Fifth Monarchist values is consistent with 
Aspinwall’s suggestions for purges and reform. Fifth Monarchist elitism, therefore, 
complements their utopian millenarianism just as it invariably attends that of Milton.  
Milton’s panegyric to Cromwell in Defensio Secunda suggests an alignment 
with Fifth Monarchist ideas and, in turn, distance from Nedham. Togashi has provided 
valuable context for the praise of Cromwell by millenarian ministers from the early 
1650s.344 Similarly, the immediate millenarian context of the Fifth Monarchists, 
particularly given their involvement in the Nominated Assembly that preceded the 
Protectorate, can illuminate an interpretation of Defensio Secunda. At the beginning of 
the peroration of Defensio Secunda, Milton’s praise of Cromwell is announced with 
exclamation: ‘Cromwell, we are deserted! You alone remain. […] there is nothing in 
human society more pleasing to God, or more agreeable to reason, nothing in the state 
more just, nothing more expedient, than the rule of the man most fit to rule. All know 
you to be that man, Cromwell!’ (iv/2. 671-2). Milton’s praise of Cromwell the man is 
commensurate with his support for the single rule of the Protectorate. He expresses his 
gratitude that Cromwell decided to ‘come down so many degrees from the heights and 
be forced into a definite rank, so to speak, for the public good’ (672). Cromwell’s role 
as Lord Protector is the paragon of a private individual contributing to the public good, 
which Milton had ardently defended since 1644. In Milton’s eyes, Cromwell 
represented an ideal member of the sanior pars, who possessed the necessary qualities 
of self-control that, as he suggests in the Tenure, distinguished the better part of the 
people from those ‘govern’d to the inward vitious rule’: 
 
he was a soldier well-versed in self-knowledge, and whatever enemy lay within – vain hopes, 
fears, desires – he had either previously destroyed within himself or had long since reduced to 
 
343 A Perfect Diurnall, 16-23 May, pp. 2718-19. 
344 Togashi, ‘Contextualizing Milton’s Second Defence of the English People: Cromwell and the English 
Republic, 1649-1654’, in Milton Quarterly, 45/4 (2011), pp. 225-30. 
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subjection. Commander first over himself, victor over himself, he had learned to achieve over 
himself the most effective triumph (iv/2. 667-8).345 
 
Milton seems to be aware of the personal crisis that Cromwell experienced in 1628 that, 
as John Morrill explains, led to the ‘religious conversion which henceforth dominated 
his life.’346 Milton reminds his readers later in the peroration that they need to resist and 
expel internal tyrants of ‘avarice, ambition, and luxury’ (680). Given Milton’s 
increasingly entrenched disillusionment with the people, there is good reason for his 
belief in an individual like Cromwell, who not only exuded many of the personal 
qualities that Milton idealised, but whose office supported the policy of toleration that 
he advocated. 
Milton’s peroration is as much exhortation as it is panegyric. The imperative 
tone that Milton employs to make requests of Cromwell illustrates his continued self-
identification as a defender of the English people. Milton begins by reminding 
Cromwell to ‘Consider again and again how precious a thing is this liberty which you 
hold’, and that if ‘the republic should miscarry, so to speak, and as quickly vanish, 
surely no greater shame and disgrace could befall this country’ (671). To avoid such a 
fate, Milton suggests that Cromwell should populate his counsels with ‘men who are 
eminently modest, upright, and brave, men who […] have learned finally that liberty is 
to be cherished’. ‘These men,’ Milton explains, ‘come not from the off-scourings of the 
mob or of foreign countries. They are no random throng, but most of them citizens of 
the better stamp, of birth either noble or at least not dishonorable, of ample or moderate 
means’ (674). Having explicitly praised the regicides that he deems worthy of counsel, 
Milton makes a substantial request for church freedom: 
 
Next, I would have you leave the church to the church and shrewdly relieve yourself and the 
government of half your burden (one that is at the same time completely alien to you), and not 
permit two powers, utterly diverse, the civil and the ecclesiastical, to make harlots of each other 
and while appearing to strengthen, by their mingled and spurious riches, actuall to undermine and 
at length destroy each other. 
 
The passage echoes Milton’s sonnet to Cromwell of 1652, in which he calls on 
Cromwell to ‘Help us to save free Conscience from the paw / Of hireling wolves whose 
 
345 See The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, CWJM vi. 151; cf. Togashi, ‘Contextualizing Milton’s 
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346 See John Morrill, ‘Cromwell, Oliver (1599-1658)’, in ODNB (2004). 
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gospel is their maw’ (CWJM iii. 288).347 As with Nedham, Milton clearly saw in the 
Protectorate a means to maintain the religious toleration that he had enjoyed since 1649. 
Unlike Nedham, Milton articulated this support for Cromwell in explicitly elitist and 
anti-populist terms. 
In accordance with Areopagitica, Milton’s defence of liberty of conscience 
in Defensio Secunda depends on freedom of the press. Milton requests that Cromwell 
‘permit those who wish to engage in free inquiry to publish their findings at their own 
peril without the private inspection of any petty magistrate’. This means that ‘so will 
truth especially flourish’ and the ‘censure, the envy, the narrow-mindedness, or the 
superstition of the half-educated’ will be prevented. It is from this that Milton 
encourages Cromwell himself to ‘listen to truth or falsehood’ instead of ‘those who do 
not believe themselves free unless they deny freedom to others, and who do nothing 
with greater enthusiasm or vigor than cast into chains, not just the bodies, but also the 
consciences of their brothers, and impose on the state and the church the worst of all 
tyrannies, that of their own base customs or opinions’ (679). Where in Areopagitica, in 
an address to the Long Parliament, Milton had promoted freedom from pre-publication 
licensing as a means of maintaining liberty of conscience, in Defensio Secunda, he is 
able to shift from this familiar defence to a direct address to the Lord Protector himself. 
In a reverse of the context of Areopagitica, Milton addresses an idealised leader who he 
believes is capable of choosing truth over falsehood. As such, Cromwell does not 
require ‘brothers’, like the Presbyterian brethren, to impose a state church on England. 
The panegyric to Cromwell and the exhortation illustrate how Milton’s elitism and 
millenarianism are connected. Fifth Monarchists like Spittlehouse idealised Cromwell 
as a means to their millenarian ends, just as Milton does in Defensio Secunda. As 
Milton turned away from the people, so he invested his eschatological faith in an 
idealised individual like Cromwell. The self-control that Milton discerns in Cromwell, 
which he identifies as a characteristic of a free man, anticipates the inner utopia that 
Milton will idealise in the figure of the Son in Paradise Regained (1671). In Defensio 
Secunda, Milton makes a request to the people to emulate the qualities of the Protector. 
While the Protectorate may not permit the kind of popular participation that Nedham 
advocates, it protects the religious liberty that Milton had defended since 1644.  
Milton and Nedham produced substantially different apologies of the 
Protectorate in 1654 that illustrate how both pamphleteers continued to diverge 
 
347 See Woodward, Perceptions of a Monarchy, pp. 82-5. 
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ideologically in the 1650s. Nedham’s strong opposition to the Fifth Monarchists defines 
A True State. His fear of a Fifth Monarchist government that would limit religious 
liberty seems to have encouraged his support of the Protectorate in 1654. Indeed, in The 
Observator, published between October and November 1654, Nedham offered a 
scathing critique of the ‘Paperworm, by name Spittlehouse, you may call him Spit-fire, 
or Squib-crack’, who had recently published An Answer to one part of the Lord 
Protectors Speech, or a Vindication of the Fifth Monarchy-men. Nedham warns that 
their ‘Carnall divisions and Contentions’, if they manage to ‘quell an Authority’, will 
throw ‘Themselves and their Monarchy into Anarchy, and the Commonwealth into 
Blood and Confusion.’348 Where Nedham fears a sectarian overthrow of government in 
England, Milton offers no such explicit opposition to the Fifth Monarchists. By 1659, in 
The Readie and Easie Way, Milton would criticise the ‘Ambitious leaders of armies’ 
and ‘thir own tyrannical designs’, which, once overcome, would mean ‘no more 
pretending to a fifth monarchie of the saints; but much peace and tranquilitie would 
follow’.349 As Stella Revard observes, Milton removed this from the second edition of 
the tract in 1660. ‘To criticise the actions of the Fifth Monarchists,’ Revard argues, ‘is 
not the same as dismissing their millenarian views.’350 In the second edition, Milton 
replaces his criticism of the Fifth Monarchists with familiar criticism of Presbyterianism 
and episcopacy, both of which Milton suggests the restored monarchy – with the 
Restoration now imminent and inevitable – may reintroduce. While Milton, as the 
previous chapter has shown, was no sectarian radical, his ideas nonetheless exhibit a 
relationship between elitism, millenarianism and utopianism that align with the 
emergent – if not at times divergent – eschatology of the Fifth Monarchists. By lauding 
Cromwell as an epitome of self-control, Milton shows how his faith in the individuals 
capable of bringing about the millennium grew ever narrower during the 1650s. In 
1654, then, the distance between A True Case and Defensio Secunda mirrors that of the 
first Defensio and The Case: Nedham’s opposition to factionalism and belief in 
toleration leads him to support the Protectorate, even though it does not permit the 
popular participation he advocates; Milton, by contrast, having defended the sanior 
pars, can more naturally invest his hopes in an idealised individual, like Cromwell. The 
key difference that leads Milton to articulate a more comprehensive utopian vision in 
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1659 and Nedham to satirise the genre in 1657 is millenarianism. As the Fifth 
Monarchists show, the perfection of the millennium serves as a representation of 
potential perfection on earth. Where Nedham lacks this belief and instead endorses a 
Machiavellian republic as an ideal to which the emergent English republic should 
aspire, Milton views English republicanism as a steppingstone to chiliastic perfection. 
 
 
A UTOPIAN SATIRE 
 
Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, published as editorials in Mercurius Politicus between 
March and April 1657, are a significant commentary on – if not parody of – 
contemporary utopianism. J. G. A. Pocock suggests that Nedham ‘feared identification 
with the Good Old Cause and with Harrington’ following the publication of The 
Excellencie in 1656, which led him to produce the letters that led ‘unswervingly back to 
Nedham’s old Hobbesian contention that we should submit to de facto authority even 
when its form is monarchical.’351 Cox argues that Nedham aligned himself with 
Cromwell’s pragmatic decision to inaugurate the Protectorate: the letters, Cox suggests, 
represent an opposition to the idealism of utopianism and general political modelling 
that necessitate his support for the Protectorate, just as, in 1653, the Protectorate was 
‘the only option given the conflict between factions and their competing constitutional 
models.’ ‘Nedham’s rejection of utopias’, Cox asserts, ‘is the corollary to his rejection 
of political modelling in times of acute political crisis and at moments when the 
commonwealth is under threat.’352 Taking the form of satirical and fictional letters, 
Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ are able to serve as a commentary on contemporary 
events while remaining equivocal enough that any political criticism is implicit. Irony is 
particularly prominent in Nedham’s satire: the letters simultaneously praise political 
changes in Utopia resembling the recent history of the Protectorate and convey a 
farcical craniotomy to remove seriousness from the populace. Nedham’s joco-serio 
style seems most unambiguously critical in its parody of Harrington and Hobbes in the 
final letter. Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ encode the reservations about utopianism he 
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had exhibited in 1654. They also, given the potential for Cromwell to take the crown 
himself at the time, permit a critical interpretation of the Protectorate. 
The threat of utopianism infiltrating the political establishment was tangible: 
Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana was published only the year before. 
Nedham had supported the Protectorate in 1654 for offsetting the influence, if not 
political domination, of the Fifth Monarchists; his ‘letters of Utopia’, while more 
ambiguous than A True State, suggest Nedham’s continued support of the Protectorate 
is equally dependent on Cromwell’s resistance to the new utopian interest. Nedham, the 
classical republican and Machiavellian populist, is quick to assert that any political form 
– even the Protectorate – should only remain while it is necessary. In the letters, his 
joco-serio style, as Raymond acknowledges, ‘reached its apogee, and he most closely 
welded serious political criticism with a dry, comic style.’353 As Nedham reports in 
Mercurius Politicus, on 31 March 1657, Cromwell was presented with the Humble 
Petition and Advice, which had been debated in parliament throughout February and 
March, and which served ‘to commend the Title and office of a King, in this Nation’ to 
Cromwell.354 While Cromwell ultimately turned down this offer, the threat of the 
Protectorate potentially becoming a monarchy would have been at the forefront of 
Nedham’s mind as he wrote the letters. Through the fictional form of the ‘letters from 
Utopia’, Nedham is able to simultaneously comment on contemporary events, assert his 
opposition to utopianism, and more easily maintain his distance from any suggestions of 
subversive political commentary in the editorials.  
In Nedham’s introductory first letter from Utopia, his correspondent 
identifies the editorials themselves and the ideal society that they represent as founded 
on a joco-serio style. Following ‘so lamentable a Fate befaling our Founder’, Thomas 
More, who, ‘by being but once in his daies in earnest’, was beheaded in 1535, the 
Utopians, the correspondent explains, resolved ‘To live in Jest, and never to be in 
Earnest, except it be in order to die.’355 This coincides with the correspondent’s 
explanation ‘that whatever I write is no further in earnest than you please to make it so’. 
The ‘News’ that the correspondent provides to Nedham is that  
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This renowned City and Commonwealth of Utopia hath been sorely afflicted with an infectious 
Itch of scribbling political discourses, caused by a Salt humour first bottel’d in the Braine pan, and 
then breaking out at the fingers ends. The world hath run a madding here in disputes about 
Government, that is to say about Notions, Forms, and Shadows, and the grand Pols of the Town 
[…] have so often (like Lucians philosophers) ended their Conventions in a Quarrel […] (7643). 
 
The Utopian problem reported resembles the kind of factional squabbling with which 
Nedham characterised the poor organisation of the Fifth Monarchists, and which he 
believed a popular free state would prevent. In an extreme and absurd state intervention, 
the Utopian magistrate 
 
gave order to put the whole society of Pols into the Hospital of the Incurabili, to have their Sculls 
opened and searched with a long Sword, and so served up the green-sauce, as a fit punishment for 
presuming to break the Fundamentall Law of Utopia, by daring to be in earnest, and appear in 
print so profound and serious Projectors (7643). 
 
This radical and ridiculous political move epitomises the subversive nature of these 
editorials: Nedham parodies not only the fiction commonplace in utopian tracts, but also 
the stringent penal system that defines the Morean style of utopianism that this study 
has traced in the mid-seventeenth-century. Nedham invests himself in this comical 
utopian vision by rendering the ‘Fundamentall Law’ of this Utopia ‘To live in Jest, and 
never to be in Earnest, except it be in order to die.’ 
The subsequent letters read like a fictional representation of the events of 
the 1650s, but in a way that invites comparisons with contemporary utopianism. In the 
third letter, dated 19-26 March, the correspondent explains how ‘wee Utopians had 
hitherto been mistaken touching the notion of Liberty’, as, possibly in further opposition 
to the Levellers – John Lilburne having been released on parole from his imprisonment 
in Dover Castle in 1656 – ‘the High Shoon, the Leveller, and the Enthusiast, thought it 
lay in having no land-Lord no Law, no Religion, save his own Phantsie’. ‘Thus while 
they sate still,’ the correspondent explains, 
 
and the People ran out into endless Factions, still further and further from a Settlement, there was 
in conclusion no visible means left, to keep the old Race of Kings from over-running our Estates 
and Liberties, had not the most excellent Basilides, that Renowned Prince, resolved to encounter 




Much like Cromwell’s Protectorate warded off the danger of factionalism in the form of 
Fifth Monarchists, Basilides steps in to take over from the Senate. As the correspondent 
reports in the second letter, Basilides had recently given the ‘order for the Assembling 
of the Senate this week’, which resembles Cromwell’s own Protectorate parliaments. 
Although Nedham, as this chapter has acknowledged, supported Cromwell in 1654, by 
styling the Cromwellian figure as a Prince, he implicitly anticipates the offer of 
kingship that Cromwell would receive just five days after the publication of the letter. 
Nedham uses a parody of the utopian mode to ambiguously comment on the 
Protectorate. In this letter, Nedham could as much be praising as criticising Cromwell. 
There is a similar ambiguity in the first resolve that is passed by the Utopian 
Senate, which is reported in the 26 March- 2 April letter. As the correspondent 
describes,  
 
That in the Electing of Members to serve for the respective Provinces and Boroughs in the Senate 
of Utopia, the People do, together with the Interests and Trusts reposed in those Members, resign 
up to them all their Wit, Wisdome, and Understanding; so that the Wisdome of the Senate, is the 
Wisdome of the whole people, and contrary Opinion (whatever the pretence be) is adjudged 
Faction (7690). 
 
Similar to the Cromwellian figure of Basilides, this resolve is equivocal: the 
representation of popular interests was central to Nedham’s political philosophy from 
The Case forward, but the intolerant attitude towards ‘contrary Opinion’ appears more 
in keeping with the totality that often defined contemporary utopias. It is possible that 
Nedham is referring here to a faction like that of the Fifth Monarchists, but as we will 
see in Nedham’s ‘letter from Oceana’, he may also be passing comment on such a strict, 
regulated state. ‘That where a Civill Power is to be setled,’ the correspondent suggests, 
‘we cannot all be Princes.’ While Nedham may genuinely believe that interests, like 
those of the Fifth Monarchists, need to be suppressed, he had only the year before 
published The Excellencie, collating his Machiavellian editorials of 1651-2, in which he 
characteristically espoused interest theory. It is in a political system of popular 
participation that the ambitions of common ‘Princes’, who act in their own self-interest, 
can be realised, and factionalism thereby prevented. Nedham had argued that the 
alternative, a state that does not accommodate popular interest, would, as Machiavelli 
suggests, lead to popular disaffection and revolution. This ambiguity is representative of 
the letters as a whole: Nedham permits both interpretations of support and criticism of 
the Protectorate. As the correspondent emphasises, the Utopians came to understand 
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‘That all Forms of Government are but temporary Expedients, to be taken upon Tryal, 
as necessity and right Reason of State enjoyns in order to the publike safety’ (7692). 
The quasi-Protectorate role of Basilides in the letters, which is establishing ‘the Form of 
the Three Estates’ that was promised by the Humble Petition and Advice, only exists 
out of necessity. Nedham may be encouraging the people of England to be as 
understanding as the Utopians are in his letters; he also may be reminding Cromwell not 
to fall into the intolerant system exemplified by utopianism, especially if he were to 
accept the crown. 
After Cromwell rejected the crown on 31 March, Nedham in the letters 
focuses on the stringent nature of contemporary utopianism, and its potential threat to 
contemporary society. Nedham’s criticism of utopianism is directed at Harrington and, 
to a lesser extent, Hobbes. In the first letter, following the ‘Operation’ of satirical 
craniotomy, Nedham’s correspondent reports that ‘here landed a jolly Crew of the 
Inhabitants of the Island of Oceana, in company of the learned Author himself, they 
having been sent hither with him, by order of the most Renowned Prince Archon’, 
alongside ‘Mr Hobbs’ and, emblematic of Nedham’s ‘joco-serio’ style, ‘that wondrous 
wise Republican called Mercurius Politicus’. Whereas Nedham would have little need 
of the operation to remove seriousness, Hobbes and Harrington appear to have arrived 
having heard of the event, ‘it being a Cure that this Country is famous for’. In the final 
letter, from Oceana this time, dated 2-9 April, Nedham offers a pastiche of Harrington’s 
The Commonwealth of Oceana. Recalling the meticulous list of orders that Harrington 
included in Oceana, the correspondent refers to ‘the Agrarian-Wits of the five and 
fiftieth order’, after which Nedham seems to deliberately obfuscate the list of political 
roles in Harrington’s commonwealth, with one figure, the ‘Non-sincer’ – appropriately 
sounding like ‘nonsense’ and ‘not sincere’ – comically serving only ‘to provide Boxes 
of all Colours of the Rainbow’ (7706) for the ballot. In this letter, Nedham’s joco-serio 
style spars with the stringent system of the equal agrarian that Harrington idealises in 
Oceana, which Davis describes as ‘a self-contained system capable of harnessing men’s 
natural behaviour into a harmonious social whole.’356 While Harrington’s utopian 
republicanism – and, as the following chapter will show, millenarianism – was not as 
dangerous a faction as Fifth Monarchism, in 1657 it was gathering support. By 
dedicating a whole letter to Harrington’s Oceana, Nedham appears to view the stringent 
utopianism of Harrington’s Oceana as an undesirable – perhaps even a threatening – 
 
356 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, p. 238, see generally pp. 206-40. 
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alternative to the Cromwellian Protectorate. Given that this letter was published after 
Cromwell had rejected the crown, Nedham may have found renewed energy and reason 
to satirise opposing factions to the Protectorate, rather than the Protectorate itself. 
The correspondent goes on to criticise Harrington and Hobbes as a kind of 
organised utopian faction. Harrington, the correspondent explains, has agreed to settle 
Henry Ferne (1602-62), the bishop of Chester, whose letters in opposition to Oceana 
were published by Harrington in Pian Piano (1656), in a ‘fat Bishoprick, if he please 
but to wright against him.’ Nedham seems to be suggesting that Harrington engineered 
the correspondence that was published in Pian Piano, a conclusion he may have drawn 
because Harrington’s sister sent Ferne a copy of Oceana and requested his commentary. 
In Nedham’s Oceana, Ferne is financially rewarded for his criticism of Harrington. With 
regard to Harrington, the correspondent explains that ‘I have done with him, and all the 
Builders of Castles in the aire’, but  
 
I desire the Wits to beware of him and his Antagonist; for those Worms in their Brains, which 
were at first but as Mogats, are improved to such a magnitude, by feeding upon Politick Notions, 
that their Sculls being opened with a Goose-quill of their own, the one was delivered of that 
Monster Leviathan, and the other lately voided at least a Conger (7706). 
 
The operation that Harrington and Ferne undergo illustrates how Nedham perceives 
Harrington’s utopianism as becoming more organised in 1657. The vermian imagery in 
the passage represents Hobbes’s influence over Harrington.357 Where Harrington is 
‘delivered of that Monster Leviathan’, Ferne is ‘voided’ of a conger, a type of eel. The 
reference to ‘feeding upon Politick Notions’, moreover, which appears to have 
increased the ‘magnitude’ of Harrington’s ideas, recalls the ‘green-sauce’ that was 
‘served up’ in the comparable cranial operation described in the first letter from Utopia 
(7634).358 The operations are invasive and feminising in the verb ‘delivered’. They end 
the cycle of utopian influence – of one writer ‘feeding’ on another – that is 
representative of an organised faction. Harrington has consumed Hobbes’s ideas such 
that Harrington effectively gives birth to a leviathan in a process that expunges the 
seriousness of his work. Whereas Nedham had used Hobbes’s writings in The Case, in 
1657, he associates Hobbes with his criticism of Harringtonian utopianism. To complete 
 
357 According to the OED, the word ‘vermis’ would be associated with the brain in the nineteenth-century. 
358 The OED defines ‘green sauce’ as ‘A sauce of a green colour made from herbs’; see also Henry 
Buttes, Dyets Dry Dinner (1599) sig. P2, ‘Greene Sauce. Made of sweete hearbes, as Betony, Mint, Basill 
[…] Eaten with flesh […] exciteth appetite.’ 
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this paradoxical image, Ferne himself had commented on the influence of Leviathan on 
Oceana in the correspondence that Harrington published in Pian Piano.359 If in 
Nedham’s satirical vision of Oceana, Ferne is working for Harrington, then he equally 
needs to be delivered of utopian seriousness. Nedham’s utopian satire, which becomes 
more focused in this final letter, is partly inspired by an awareness of the potential 
dangers of a Harringtonian faction. The utopian, stringent political systems that 
Harrington and Hobbes envision in Oceana and Leviathan are precisely the kind of 
societies that Nedham warns against in the letters.  
The ‘letters from Utopia’ represent a form of utopian satire that further 
distinguishes Nedham from Milton. As the following chapter will show, Milton, while 
he opposes Harrington in his prose tracts of 1658-9, nevertheless exhibits the kind of 
utopianism and millenarianism apparent in Harrington’s utopian and political writings 
and Hobbes’s Leviathan. Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’, while intentionally 
ambiguous, offer a rejection of utopianism that the pamphleteer specifically locates in 
Oceana in the final editorial. While his parody of the fictional artifice of utopias does 
suggest a rejection of idealism, he also opposes the idea of the utopian totality, as 
represented by Oceana in the last letter. His support of Cromwell and the Protectorate, 
then, is equivocal: Basilides, while a prince, gives substantial political powers to the 
Senate; the Senate, however, imposes a stricter mode of governance than Nedham’s 
Machiavellian populism, which he had reasserted the previous year, would permit. 
Nedham’s pastiche of utopianism, which takes an explicitly critical tone in the ‘letter 
from Oceana’, suggests that, as in 1654, he would support Cromwell so long as the 
Protectorate could resist the onset of factionalism. Indeed, after Cromwell’s rejection of 
the crown on 31 March, Nedham had renewed reason to directly satirise Harrington in 
the ‘letter from Oceana’ editorial, dated 2-9 April. Where Milton would use the 
breakdown of the Protectorate to issue his own vision for ideal society on a utopian and 
millenarian basis, Nedham, who had opposed the millenarian faction of the Fifth 







359 Harrington, Pian Piano, in Pocock, ed., The Political Works of James Harrington (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 370-1. 
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Nedham’s Machiavellian republicanism represents a significant counterpoint to 
Milton’s elitist, millenarian, and increasingly utopian thinking during the Interregnum. 
Where Nedham’s belief in interest theory informs the populist republican ideology that 
he develops in the early-1650s, Milton’s disillusionment with the English people only 
encouraged him to turn to elite individuals. One of the most significant moments of 
divergence for Milton and Nedham was 1654: Nedham offers scathing opposition to the 
Fifth Monarchists as a faction that threatened the security of the republic, while Milton 
praises Cromwell in millenarian and elitist terms that align with similar praise from 
Fifth Monarchists like Spittlehouse and Rogers. Nedham’s utopian pastiche in 1657 
extends his opposition to factionalism, but this time focuses on utopianism itself in the 
form of Harrington’s Oceana. Nedham’s commentary on utopianism is less explicit, but 
the satire itself is unmistakable; the ‘letter from Oceana’, written after Cromwell has 
rejected the crown, exhibits Nedham’s concerns about Harrington, and his hope that the 
Protectorate will resist a Harringtonian faction just as it had a Fifth Monarchist one. 
Nedham would maintain his joco-serio style in Newes from Brussels (1660), 
impersonating a member of Charles Stuart’s court in a critical commentary that marks 
how resistant he was to change allegiances once again. Milton, by contrast, would 
articulate his most explicit utopian vision in The Readie and Easie Way.360 As the 
following chapter will show, while Milton may have been critical of Harrington’s 
contemporary works, this did not prevent him from espousing similar ideas, just as his 
criticism of Fifth Monarchism did not prevent him from advocating utopian 
millenarianism. While Milton can be interpreted for his classical republicanism, he was 
also a millenarian. As the English people increasingly exhibited their unworthiness, so 
the pamphleteer decided to finally turn to a utopian form of government that could 








360 Cf., Joad Raymond, ‘The Cracking of the Republican Spokes’, in Prose Studies, 19/3 (1996), 255-74. 
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6 
‘A Commonwealth is held immortal’: Milton, Hobbes, and 
Harrington361 
 
Marchamont Nedham’s depiction of James Harrington (1611-77) and Thomas Hobbes 
(1588-1679) in his satirical Utopia suggests a relationship between the two political 
theorists that illuminates Milton’s 1659-60 texts. The utopianism of Hobbes’s Leviathan 
(1651) and Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) appears as the 
relationship between permanence of the state and obedience of its citizens within a 
totality that, as J. C. Davis explains, aspires to perfection.362 The concept of 
representation is central to the utopianism of Leviathan and Oceana: the utopian artifice 
of Oceana is self-evident in the model of Oceana itself; in Leviathan, the image of the 
Leviathan relates to Hobbes’s concept of representation and authorisation.363 While 
Milton lacks such an artifice in The Readie and Easie Way (1660), he does envision an 
ideal society dedicated to permanence and obedience, partly in response to Harrington’s 
The Rota (1660) and The Ways and Means (1660). However, Milton’s utopianism is, as 
this study has shown, invariably related to his millenarianism. Milton returned to 
advocating religious freedom with fervour following the restoration of the Rump 
Parliament in May 1659, publishing both Of Civil Power and Considerations in the 
same year. Contrary to the distinction that Davis suggests between seventeenth-century 
utopian and millenarian thought, the millennium, as this study has been arguing, was the 
perfect ideal to which utopian writers regularly aspired.364 The relationship between 
church and state in Leviathan and Oceana will indicate how the millennium was 
integrated with Hobbes and Harrington’s utopianism. Although all three writers exhibit 
their idiosyncratic visions for church and state, the millennium, and liberty, this chapter 
will argue that these are qualitative rather than substantive differences. The comparison 
with Hobbes and Harrington’s political philosophies will bring Milton’s peculiar form 
 
361 The Readie and Easie Way, in CWJM vi. 496. 
362 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, pp. 37-8. 
363 On Hobbes and representation, see Quentin Skinner, From Humanism to Hobbes: Studies in Rhetoric 
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 190-3; Noel Malcolm, CETH iii. 15-17; 
on stability and permanence, see Jonathan Scott, ‘The Rapture of Motion: James Harrington’s 
Republicanism’, in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), pp. 150-2. 
364 Davis, Utopia and Ideal Society, p. 36. 
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of utopian millenarianism into greater relief and identify how Milton’s ideal studious 
society in Areopagitica is reasserted in his 1659-60 tracts. The chapter will be 
structured into three sections: the first will focus on utopianism; the second will discuss 
different views on liberty, and how this relates to utopianism; the final section will show 
how millenarianism relates to and inspires the utopianism of these writers.  
Richard Tuck posits that Leviathan ‘may indeed be the greatest piece of 
utopian writing to come out of the English Revolution.’ Tuck acknowledges how 
Hobbes positions Leviathan within the history of failed commonwealths that precede it, 
most evidently in the final section of the text, ‘Of the Kingdom of Darkness’. In his 
comparison of Leviathan and More’s Utopia, Tuck observes the mutual attention to ‘the 
management of labour and the attack on luxury’, and the mutual aversion to other 
societal institutions, such as universities and the church. It is for this latter reason, in 
part, that ‘the most strikingly utopian feature of Leviathan is its account of religion’. 
Tuck posits that Hobbes’s theology in Leviathan, the most notable transition from his 
earlier works, was intended partly to remove any rival to the sovereign; ‘but it goes 
much farther than that, since Hobbes devoted a great deal of effort to the construction of 
a new kind of Christianity’. The purpose of this religious revision is to remove some 
forms of fear from the people. Just as ‘God wishes Job to learn that he is as nothing 
compared with the Leviathan’, so the Leviathan state, which is a ‘Mortal God’, purges 
some forms of fear from those who live without pride. By constituting themselves in 
‘the artificial man who feels no fear’, citizens are free of it, ‘their sense of their own 
individual importance reduced to nothing in the face of their commonwealth.’365 The 
relationship between religion and utopia that Tuck has identified in Hobbes will be 
explored further through the intellectual framework that this study has been tracing: 
utopian millenarianism. While there is value in Tuck’s comparison between More, 
Rousseau and Hobbes, Harrington and Milton offer a more immediately illuminating 
comparison to the political philosopher.  
Jonathan Scott shows how Hobbes and Harrington’s respective philosophies 
and theologies were closely related.366 In his ‘Rapture of Motion’ essay, Scott explains 
that both ‘Leviathan and Oceana have the same object: stability and peace.’ In Oceana, 
this security is achieved by a lack of autonomy: ‘political participation is actually 
 
365 Richard Tuck, ‘The Utopianism of Leviathan’, in Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau, eds., Leviathan After 
350 Years (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 125 128, 136-8. 
366 For another discussion of Hobbes and Harrington in relation to the utopian tradition, see Nigel Smith, 
Literature and Revolution in England (London: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 173-4. 
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restricted to the tedious repetition of prescribed rituals which cannot be changed.’367 
Scott’s argument correlates with Davis’s suggestion that the perfection of Harrington’s 
commonwealth is indicative of his utopianism. In contrast to arguments for 
Harrington’s meritocracy, Davis posits that the class system in Oceana is rigid, and that 
the equality of the state manifests within each class, and not across the entire society.368 
Davis continues: ‘To Harrington, at least, Oceana was a self-contained system capable 
of harnessing men’s natural behaviour into a harmonious social whole. Its great merit 
was its ‘entireness’. It answered every possibility. It was a total, utopian solution.’369 In 
Davis’s eyes, despite the self-defined equality of the equal agrarian, Harrington ‘took a 
dismal view of men’s capacities for individualism’, convinced that most men would 
defer to leadership. Scott takes this one step further by arguing that, as participation in 
Oceana manifests in a permanent systemic cycle, it marks, ‘no less than in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, the abolition of the participatory basis of classical citizenship.’ Harrington’s 
ideal of a senate proposing and a popular assembling resolving laws, which is at the 
heart of Oceana and his later texts, accommodates participation from the people. 
Harrington’s political framework, however, exists within a system of rotation that 
conflicts with – or, as Scott suggests, negates – popular, autonomous participation. 
Unlike the theory of rotation that Nedham advocates, the utopian permanence and 
regulation of Harrington’s equal agrarian limits the autonomy of political participation. 
The equal agrarian is a system of social designation, in which economic equilibrium 
secures political rotation and state permanence. Scott extends this comparison between 
Hobbes and Harrington to include their equally materialist philosophies of motion.370 
Scott argues that Harrington established, ‘following Hobbes, an artificial copy of the 
natural art of God. Nature was a universe whose planets and stars (Harrington’s “orbs” 
and “galaxies”) moved in perpetual circular motion. By so copying nature’s perfection 
Harrington believed he had harnessed for politics its very immortality.’371 This chapter 
will develop this understanding of Harrington’s relationship to Hobbes through the 
utopianism and millenarianism that both writers share with Milton. The connection 
 
367 Scott, ‘Rapture of Motion’, pp. 149, 151. 
368 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, pp. 221-3; for an argument of Harrington’s meritocracy, see Blair 
Worden, ‘James Harrington and The Commonwealth of Oceana, 1656’, in David Wootton, ed., 
Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society 1649-1776 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 
pp. 95-6. 
369 Davis, Utopia and Ideal Society, p. 238.  
370 On the subject of Hobbes’s materialism, see also Stephen Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, pp. 
3-8, 31-9; and John Rogers, The Matter of Revolution, pp. 4-6. 
371 Scott, ‘Rapture of Motion’, pp. 151, 160. 
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between utopianism, liberty and millenarianism in Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton 
identifies an unexpected relationship between the three writers. 
This chapter will also address the close relationship that Blair Worden 
identifies between Nedham and Harrington. Worden asserts that ‘there were many 
arguments in Oceana that had been anticipated […] by Marchamont Nedham.’ He 
identifies the ‘fundamental insistence of both writers on the rotation’, the dual chambers 
of governance and successive governance as evidence for Nedham and Harrington’s 
intellectual homogeneity.372 However, successive parliaments have different purposes 
for Nedham and Harrington: Nedham, as his educational editorials attest, advocated 
popular participation, for which rotation of parliaments was a means of ensuring that 
this ideal was maintained; Harrington, by contrast, believed in eternal rotation, which 
would ensure the permanence of the republic. As Nedham’s ‘letters from Utopia’ 
suggest, utopianism distinguishes Nedham from Harrington and Hobbes. Nedham did 
not advocate a totalising state that regulated the actions of its people; he believed in the 
capacity of the people to realise their republican potential. As this chapter will show, 
Harrington’s belief in freedom was systemic: as with Hobbes and Milton, the people are 
components in a wider process, which for Harrington was eternal rotation. This chapter 
will, therefore, argue that, in contrast to Worden’s assertion that both Nedham and 
Harrington ‘shroud classical aspirations to political deliverance in apocalyptic 
language’, the ideal of the millennium is more prominent in Oceana than Nedham’s 
work.373 As the previous chapter showed, Nedham is distinct from Milton because of his 
anti-utopian values and his lack of millenarianism. Nedham is similarly distinct from 





The development of Harrington’s political ideals and the form in which he presents 
them in the 1650s illustrates the shift of utopianism itself from artifice to realistic 
application. The fictional element of the utopian genre, which originates in More’s 
Utopia and is maintained in Bacon’s New Atlantis, is traditionally in the form of a travel 
 
372 Worden, ‘Harrington’s Oceana: Origins and Aftermath, 1651-1660’, in David Wootton, ed., 
Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, pp. 111-12; see also, Worden, ‘James Harrington and 
The Commonwealth of Oceana, 1656’, pp. 89-91. 
373 Worden, ‘Origins and Aftermath’, p. 112. 
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narrative.374 As Pocock suggests, Harrington’s Oceana is more of a model than utopia; 
it is intended to serve as a direct mirror of 1650s England in order to encourage its 
realisation.375 While it appears more utopian in its form than, for instance, Winstanley’s 
The Law of Freedom, as Davis suggests, the utopianism of Oceana is more evident in 
the carefully constructed detail and stringently constructed form of the state. 
Harrington’s desire for the pragmatic application of utopian ideas, moreover, which 
challenges contemporary criticism of utopian idealism – such as Milton’s own in 
Areopagitica – meant that Harrington parted with the fiction of Oceana in his later 
works. Accordingly, the condensed form of Aphorisms Political (1659), which is 
reflected in The Rota (1659) and A System of Politics (1661), is gnomic. Rather than 
removing from the extensive detail of Oceana, this enables Harrington to communicate 
his complex political philosophy in a more accessible form. As Pocock acknowledges, 
the gnomic ‘style of writing […] marks an enormous advance in the clarity and 
readability of Harrington’s work’.376 Harrington’s aphorisms may lack the fictional 
component of the utopian genre, but, just as this study has shown some of Milton’s 
works to exhibit utopian ideas, so Harrington’s later tracts, in promoting an ordered 
commonwealth on the Oceanic model, distil Harrington’s utopianism. Harrington’s self-
conceded indebtedness to Hobbes – ‘I have opposed the politics of Hobbes, to show him 
what he taught me’ – invites a comparison between the fictional artifice of Leviathan 
and that of Oceana; Milton’s awareness of and opposition to Harrington’s aphoristic 
tracts in 1659-60 similarly requires further analysis.377 The fictions of Leviathan and 
Oceana nevertheless distinguish Hobbes and Harrington from Milton. For Hobbes and 
Harrington, the concept of representation, which encompasses both the political and 
artistic, is central to the form of utopianism that this chapter will trace and discuss. 
Milton, writing on the eve of the Restoration, and making direct reference to 
Harrington’s contemporary tracts, lacks any form of utopian fiction, but, as a 
comparison with Hobbes and Harrington will show, he exhibits utopianism no less than 
these contemporaries.378 This study has shown that mid-seventeenth-century utopianism 
 
374 For a discussion of the travel narrative in utopian texts, see Houston, Renaissance Utopia, pp. 1-30. 
375 J. G. A. Pocock, The Political Works of James Harrington (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), p. 101; Houston, Renaissance Utopia, pp. 4, 144-5. 
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377 James Harrington, The Prerogative of Popular Government, in Political Works of James Harrington, 
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378 On Milton’s relationship to ‘utopias of industry’, see Amy Boesky, Founding Fictions: Utopias in 
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was an interpretation of the precedent established by More and Bacon. While some of 
the texts addressed in this thesis are not explicit utopian blueprints, they espouse 
essential utopian ideas. A comparison between Milton, Hobbes, and Harrington shows 
how the central utopian values of control and obedience existed separate from the 
traditional utopian form.  
It is necessary first to address the concept of representation, both political 
and artistic, with which both Hobbes and Harrington engage. In Leviathan, Hobbes’s 
utopianism is formed from political representation, which is in turn generated by the 
process of authorisation. In order to avoid the natural condition of chaos, a group of 
people covenant with a person or assembly of people, through which they ‘Authorise all 
the Actions and Judgments, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if 
they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected 
against other men’ (CETH iv. 264). Noel Malcolm observes that authorisation is the 
most marked difference between Leviathan and Hobbes’s earlier texts, Elements of Law 
(1640) and De Cive (1642). Malcolm explains that all ‘problems are solved in Leviathan 
with the introduction of the concept of authorization.’ Through this process, citizens 
take ownership of the actions of the sovereign. Unlike Milton’s belief in popular 
resistance to tyranny in The Tenure, Hobbes argues that citizens cannot resist the 
sovereign because they own and have authorized all sovereign actions.379 While the 
assumption of a biddable populace is indicative of utopian idealism, the process of 
authorisation also accommodates the utopian values of control and regulation, as 
citizens must adhere to the decrees of the sovereign, of which they are themselves co-
authors. As Quentin Skinner shows, Hobbes’s authorisation creates two persons: the 
‘artificial’ person of the sovereign, and the person of the state.380 Hobbes himself names 
the person of the state: ‘This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a 
COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great 
LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we 
owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence’ (CETH iv. 114). Later in the text, 
Hobbes addresses the etymology of ‘person’, explaining that ‘When they are considered 
as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered as 
 
379 See Noel Malcolm, CETH iii. 15-17 for an analysis of Hobbes’s use of authorisation in Leviathan. 
Malcolm argues that this is the most significant departure in the political theory of Leviathan from 
Hobbes’s previous works (15). 
380 Quentin Skinner, From Humanism to Hobbes, p. 358. Skinner’s wider argument is useful in 
positioning Hobbes’s political philosophy within the context of contemporary parliamentarian arguments 
for ideas of the state and those of royalist absolutists. 
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representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned ox Artificiall 
person’ (iv. 244). Through popular authorisation, political representation is conveyed as 
the paradoxical process of a group of people subsuming into one person. Jon Parkin 
posits that Hobbes was intentionally paradoxical, as paradox – ‘that is, something which 
the reader does not understand – naturally creates wonder.’381 While the process of 
representation in Leviathan is utopian – a means of preventing a return to natural chaos 
– that representation is depicted in a utopian artifice that relates to the idea of 
paradoxical wonder.  
The paradox of Hobbesian representation is best exhibited by the initial 
description of the Leviathan state, which is itself depicted on the frontispiece of 
Leviathan. The process of authorisation is embodied in the material totality of the 
Leviathan in just the same way as this totality is conveyed in the embellished 
frontispiece. As a ‘Mortal God’, the Leviathan state necessitates wonder, and, more 
importantly, obedience. As we will see later in this chapter, it is a representation of the 
‘Immortal God’ on Earth. The Leviathan is a representative, utopian entity that is 
uncompromisingly universal in its scope and power: 
 
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in 
latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man […] and in which, the Soveraignty is an 
Artificiali Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other Officers 
of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment […] are the Nerves, that do 
the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the 
Strength; Salus Populi (the peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull 
for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and 
Will […] Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politic were at first 
made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in 
the Creation (ii. 16). 
 
The frequent use of ‘art’ and ‘artificial’ signifies the importance of representation in this 
passage. Citizens are corporeal constituents of the Leviathan state; they are represented 
within the artificial and total entity. As the Leviathan is an artificial person, it ‘is the 
Actor; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR’ (ii. 244). The visual 
language at the beginning of the text, which reflects the image of the frontispiece itself, 
accords with this theatrical concept: the Leviathan performs the role of its constituent, 
 
381 Jon Parkin, ‘Hobbes and Paradox’, in A. L. P. Martinich, Kinch Hoekstra, eds., The Oxford Handbook 
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authorial parts. Skinner explains in detail how Hobbes’s use of visual forms in his 
works was part of a humanist tradition that was intended to help readers more easily 
‘see’ the ideas discussed in humanist texts. Skinner also observes that there is a striking 
contrast between the frontispiece of De Cive and that of Leviathan. Not only is the 
sovereign depicted in the latter frontispiece constituted by bodies – representative of the 
Leviathan state itself – but it also wields a bishop’s crozier, which replaces the scales in 
De Cive, alongside a sword that appears in both.382 Such a change is itself suggestive of 
the greater power over religion that Hobbes affords the sovereign in Leviathan, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter. Rather than just helping a reader to visualise, 
however, the frontispiece contributes to the paradoxical wonder of the text. The 
Leviathan sovereign looms over the state as the embodiment of the utopian totality. 
Although Hobbes does not structure Leviathan as a travel dialogue, or even a fictional 
‘model’ like Harrington’s Oceana, the Leviathan itself is an artifice constructed by the 
process of representation that defines Hobbes’s political philosophy in Leviathan. The 
people are authors of the Leviathan artifice just as they are bound by the act of 
authorisation. Representation is, therefore, central to the utopianism of Leviathan. 
Harrington’s is the most explicit utopian artifice of the writers considered in 
this chapter.383 Like Leviathan, Oceana exhibits a clear relationship between artistic 
representation and the utopian qualities of stability and obedience. Lacking a travel 
narrative, Harrington depicts in Oceana an ideal commonwealth that represents a clear 
model for his vision of a perfect England. Within this artifice, Lord Archon – 
Harrington’s fictional Oliver Cromwell – implements the utopian scheme in Oceana. 
Archon, who possesses Machiavellian individual powers that he retains in ‘The 
Corollary’ of the tract, helps to convey and defend the thirty orders that comprise the 
constitution of Harrington’s ideal commonwealth. Archon begins by debating with 
concerned nobles the significance of the equal agrarian - a system that structures wealth 
to establish an economic equilibrium in order to prevent the imbalance of property 
distribution and, thereby, corruption - and the ballot system, both of which are integral 
to Harrington’s utopian system. Archon alone, however, asserts the value of subsequent 
orders, without evidence of further debate. Like Milton, Harrington’s view of debates 
was less democratic than it might appear.384 Where in Areopagitica, the debating and 
 
382 Skinner, From Humanism to Hobbes, pp. 222-4, 273-6. 
383 For an overview of historical criticism on Harrington’s utopianism, see Rachel Hammersley, James 
Harrington: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 10-12. 
384 On the significance of debating in Harrington’s political philosophy, see Hammersley, pp. 149-50. 
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studious society that Milton idealises serves the purpose of uncovering a lost 
millenarian truth, debates in Harrington’s commonwealth are a component of the wider 
system of perpetual rotation. Debate in the senate of Oceana is a process of division that 
provides for the popular assembly that which they choose to make law: ‘Dividing and 
choosing, in the language of a commonwealth, is debating and resolving; and 
whatsoever upon debate of the senate is proposed unto the people, and resolved by 
them, is enacted auctoritate patrum jussu populi, by the authority of the fathers and the 
power of the people, which concurring make a law.’385 The fictional debates between 
the Archon and nobles in Oceana serve the purpose of illustrating the value of the equal 
agrarian and the ballot system by addressing potential criticisms, just as the dual 
assembly system – the senate to propose and the popular assembly to resolve political 
matters – is constructed to ensure the unassailable permanence of the Oceanic state. 
While Harrington’s belief in debates in the senate and resolution in the popular 
assembly appears like a classically republican endorsement of popular participation, it 
serves the end purpose of stability and perfection: ‘a commonwealth’, Lord Archon 
asserts after he has explained all thirty constitutional orders of Oceana, ‘rightly ordered, 
may for any internal causes be as immortal or long-lived as the world’ (218). The 
various characteristic components of Harrington’s utopia serve this ideal end purpose: 
the equal agrarian prevents corruption by ensuring that aristocratic individuals cannot 
own more than £2000 of land; the system of rotation similarly ensures that the state self-
perpetuates as neither assembly has complete control or absolute sovereignty; 
Harrington’s attention to detail, which Davis identifies, is indicative of the systemic 
regulation that pervades Oceana.386 Harrington intends the fiction of Oceana to make 
his peculiar political system appear more immediately realisable in 1650s England. 
Although the role of representation in Oceana is different to that of Leviathan – 
Harrington focuses on conventional utopian fiction rather than political representation – 
there is a relationship between fictional artifice and utopian values in both texts. As 
Harrington’s conventional utopian form invites comparison with the concept of political 
and artistic representation in Leviathan, so Harrington’s aphoristic writings, as we shall 
see, invite comparison with Milton’s contemporary tracts, in which he showed direct 
awareness of Harrington. 
 
385 James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., The Commonwealth of 
Oceana and A System of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 24. All further 
references to Oceana will be made to this edition parenthetically in the running text. 
386 See Glen Bowman, ‘Justice in a World Turned Upside Down: Utopian Visions in the English Civil 
War and Revolution’, in Contemporary Justice Review, 8/4 (2005), pp. 404-5. 
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Despite lacking the utopian artifice of either Leviathan or Oceana, Milton’s 
The Readie and Easie Way engages no less with the utopian ideas that Harrington 
exhibits in his contemporary texts. Published around 21-22 February 1660, The Readie 
and Easie Way shows awareness of Harrington’s The Rota and The Wayes and Meanes 
Whereby an Equal & Lasting Commonwealth May be suddenly introduced, published 
on 9 January and 6 February respectively. Milton’s implicit references to Harrington 
suggest his awareness of the contemporary Harringtonian intellectual movement that 
promoted rotation, the ideas of which were central to the Rota Club, which met during 
the winter of 1659, and produced, through Harrington, The Rota itself.387 With the 
Rump restored on 6 May 1659, there was a real sense among republicans that there was 
a second chance to implement republicanism in England. Milton himself may even have 
attended the Rota Club during this period.388 As Milton’s objective was, like Hobbes 
and Harrington, the security and stability of the commonwealth, he equally shared their 
desire for permanence. However, unlike Harrington, Milton believed that permanence 
could be achieved through a single aristocratic assembly that would sit without change 
or rotation: 
 
And although it may seem strange at first hearing, by reason that mens minds are prepossessed 
with the notion of successive Parliaments, I affirme that the Grand or General Councel being well 
chosen, should be perpetual: for so thir business is or may be, and oft times urgent; the 
opportunitie of affairs gaind or lost in a moment (CWJM vi. 495).  
 
Milton acknowledges the Harringtonian ideology of rotation – ‘the notion of successive 
Parliaments’ – that was openly discussed in the Rota Club and promoted by republicans 
like Henry Neville (1620-94).389 Harrington explains in Oceana that the Oceanic 
political system is constructed by ‘the senate debating and proposing, the people 
resolving, and the magistracy executing by an equal rotation through the suffrage of the 
people given by the ballot’ (34). The system appears aphoristically in The Rota, in 
which the triennial rotation of the senate and popular assembly is reasserted (809), 
which secures the ‘perpetual revolution or rotation’ (820) necessary to maintain the 
equal agrarian of Harrington’s commonwealth; and also in The Ways and Means (824-
5). In the first edition of The Readie and Easie Way, Milton argues that ‘successive and 
 
387 On The Rota Club, see Hammersley, James Harrington, pp. 249-59. 
388 See Stephen B. Dobranski, ‘Where “Men of Differing Judgements Croud”: Milton and the Culture of 
the Coffee House’, in The Seventeenth Century, 9 (1994), p. 44. 
389 On Neville and Harrington, see Hammersley, p. 5; and Pocock, Political Works, p. 101. 
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transitory Parlaments’ are ‘much likelier continually to unsettle rather then to settle a 
free government’; in the second edition, he adjusts this section by acknowledging that 
‘partial rotation’ is viewed by some as necessary ‘to prevent the setling of too absolute 
power’, but insists that there is an associated ‘danger and mischance of putting out a 
great number of the best and ablest’ (495-7). While Milton’s aristocratic commonwealth 
is evidently distinct from Harrington’s Oceanic model, they both share a desire for 
permanence. The utopian in Milton and Harrington saw that to achieve this permanence, 
there must be some form of restriction, which draws from and informs their perception 
of the people. 
The perception of citizens as components of a wider totality, rather than 
active participants of the state, is shared by all three writers. Harrington and Hobbes 
share a materialist view of the people in Oceana and Leviathan. Harrington explains 
that ‘The materials of a commonwealth are the people; and the people of Oceana were 
distributed by casting them into certain divisions, regarding their quality, their ages, 
their wealth, and the places of their residence or habituation, which was done by the 
ensuing orders’ (75). Harrington’s systematic and pervasive categorisation distinguishes 
the people into freemen and citizens, young and old, wealthy and poor; habituation (75-
7) is, moreover, integral to establish and maintain Harrington’s equal agrarian. 
Harrington’s concept of equality is better termed as balance: all citizens must remain 
within their class status and be led by a ‘natural aristocracy’ (23). Later in Oceana, an 
orator explains that ‘neither by reason nor by her experience is it impossible that a 
commonwealth should be immortal, seeing the people, being the materials, never dies, 
and the form, which is motion, must without opposition be endless’ (99). The people are 
substantive, rather than autonomous: they feed the system of rotation that ensures 
permanence by avoiding the human potential for corruption (218). The idea of motion 
and opposition here recalls Hobbes’s materialism: ‘that when a thing is in motion, it will 
eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it’ (CETH iv. 26). Harrington’s 
eternal rotation exemplifies Hobbesian motion: the equal agrarian, by eliminating 
corruption, ensures that the rotation and progress of Oceana is perpetual.  
This similarity extends to Hobbes’s view of citizens in the Leviathan state. 
Hobbes refers to the people as a ‘multitude’ in their natural state, from which they 
transform through the process of covenanting in a political sense into citizens and in a 
material sense into the person of the state (iii. 260-6).390 Hobbes describes the stability 
 
390 For a discussion of Hobbes’s view of the people, see Hammond, Milton and the People, pp. 140-5. 
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of a commonwealth in bodily terms as avoiding ‘internal diseases’, which relates to the 
corporeal entity of the Leviathan discussed earlier in this chapter. Regarding 
commonwealths, Hobbes explains  
 
For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the 
Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be 
dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the 
Matter; but as they are the Mukers [sic], and orderers of them (iii. 498). 
 
Hobbes acknowledges, in accordance with Harrington, that a commonwealth can be 
permanent so long as its constituent parts, the people, do not cause disease in their 
authorisation of the sovereign. Hobbes identifies the paradoxical relationship between 
the people acting simultaneously as material ‘Matter’ and ‘Mukers’ (‘makers’) of the 
Leviathan through the process of authorisation. Hobbes illustrates this point by 
comparing a sovereign, whose power authorised by the people is not absolute, to ‘the 
bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents’, which ‘are subject either to untimely 
death, or […] breaking out into biles and scabbs’ (iii. 499-500). Hobbes’s graphic image 
emphasises how the people are, as in Oceana, formative materials in constructing a 
commonwealth. They may have the power to authorise the sovereign, but in doing so, 
by becoming ‘makers’, they also become the subordinate ‘matter’ of the 
commonwealth. For Hobbes and Harrington, materialism influences the role of the 
people in their ideal commonwealths. In Oceana, the people constitute a totality of 
equality, in which they form a part of a system of eternal rotation; in Leviathan, they 
constitute a paradoxical corporeal totality, in which their antecedent authorisation yields 
any potential for active participation. 
Milton’s perception of the people, which is directly related to his utopianism, 
more closely aligns him with Hobbes and Harrington than their political differences 
suggest. Martin Dzelzainis identifies a lengthy excursus in the second edition of The 
Readie and Easie Way that has been underexplored. Dzelzainis focuses his explanation 
of ‘Milton’s repudiation of populism’ on Machiavelli’s Discorsi, ‘the founding text of 
renaissance republicanism’, to which he argues Milton refers.391 The excursus, however, 
is phrased in Miltonic rather than Machiavellian terms: Milton expresses his anti-
populism in the characteristic elitist language and oligarchic ideology of the tract as a 
 
391 Martin Dzelzainis, ‘Harrington and the Oligarchs: Milton, Vane, and Stubbe’, in Dirk Weimann and 
Gaby Mahlberg, eds., Perspectives on English Revolutionary Republicanism (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 
pp. 27-9; for the excursus itself, see CWJM vi. 499-501. 
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whole. As Paul Hammond explains, the political landscape had changed significantly 
since the first edition of The Readie and Easie Way, which contributed to Milton’s 
growing disillusionment with the people: General Monck permitted the return of the 
purged royalist parliamentary members to government on 21st February, at the time of 
publication for the first edition of The Readie and Easie Way.392 In contrast to 
Harrington’s fear that an exclusively oligarchic assembly would be prone to corruption, 
which he acknowledges in the examples of Athens, Sparta and Rome, Milton asserts 
that a popular assembly is incapable of governance, as ‘none being more immoderate 
and ambitious to amplifie thir power, then such popularities’ (499). Milton proceeds to 
criticise the Harringtonian system of ‘annual rotation […] as is lately propounded’ as 
‘unweildie with thir own bulk’ to meet ‘from so many parts remote to sit a whole year 
lieger in one place, only now and then to hold up a forrest of fingers, or to convey each 
man his bean or ballot into the box, without reason shewn or common deliberation’ 
(499). While Milton may well be referring to the cost of popular gatherings of large 
Harringtonian assemblies, he is also degrading popular participation to the synecdoche 
‘forrest of fingers’ and suggesting that they vote without the qualities exhibited by the 
aristocratic ‘perpetual Senat’ that he idealises. To complete his elitist denunciation of 
populism, Milton continues by asserting that the people are ‘incontinent of secrets, if 
any be imparted to them, emulous and always jarring with the other Senat.’ The 
inability to maintain control and utilise reason resonates with Milton’s impassioned 
criticism of the ‘inconstant and Image doting rabble’ in Eikonoklastes (CWJM vi. 424). 
In the latter half of the excursus, Milton offers a compromise to the 
Harringtonian system, in which he accommodates a Miltonic version of Harrington’s 
utopian totality. Milton’s alternative option is ‘to wel-qualifie and refine elections’, 
which avoids ‘the noise and shouting of a rude multitude’ by allowing  
 
only those of them who are rightly qualifi’d, to nominat as many as they will; and out of that 
number others of better breeding, to chuse a less number more judiciously, till after a third or 
fourth sifting and refining of exactest choise, they only be left chosen who are the due number, and 
seem by most voices the worthiest (501). 
 
This process of systemic exclusivism, despite lacking the meticulous details of 
Harringtonian utopianism, is no less utopian in its desire to generate stability through 
reducing the powers of the people. Milton, moreover, proposes educational reform that 
 
392 Hammond, Milton and the People, p. 190. 
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would ‘make the people fittest to chuse, and the chosen fittest to govern’ by teaching 
them the qualities that he would expect of his idealised aristocratic assembly. Hammond 
explains that Milton’s is ‘an analysis not only of why the ordinary people are currently 
unfit to choose their rulers, but also of why the current potential rulers are unfit to 
govern.’393 Education in the Miltonic commonwealth is part of the selective process of 
‘sifting and refining’; the people are worthy only when they can exhibit the idealised 
qualities that can result from an education like that which Milton proposes in Of 
Education: ‘vertue, temperance, modestie, sobrietie, parsimonie, justice’. The product 
of this education, besides the list of qualities, is that the people ‘shall not then need to be 
much mistrustfull of thir chosen Patriots in the Grand Councel’. Instead, ‘several 
ordinarie assemblies’ will be established ‘in the chief towns of every countie, without 
the trouble, charge, or time lost of summoning and assembling from far in so great 
number’ and without the ‘wariest rotation’ (501). Not only do Milton’s proposals 
resemble Harrington’s concentric society, in which ‘parishes annually pour themselves 
into the hundreds, the hundreds into the tribes, and the tribes into the galaxies’ (118), 
but both Harrington and Milton also envision societies in a federated form comparable 
to More’s Utopia, in which there are fifty-four cities that ‘be all set and situate alike, 
and in all points fashioned alike’.394 Milton had referred to this in the first edition as ‘if 
every countie in the land were made of a kinde of subordinate Commonaltie or 
Commonwealth’ (517). In the excursus, Milton adds to his previous vision for miniature 
commonwealths, which are managed by the ‘nobilitie and chief gentry’ with the self-
determination to ‘make thir own judicial laws’ (517), with the allowance of well-
educated and intricately-selected popular contributions. Although he lacks specific 
detail, these are miniature totalities that permit popular participation in terms that ensure 
sovereignty remains exclusively centralised in the Grand Council. Milton’s 
decentralised popular participation is a development of Harringtonian republicanism: as 
Milton explains towards the end of the tract, his federated form is not ‘many Sovranties 
united in one Commonwealth, but many Commonwealths under one united and 
entrusted Sovrantie’ (519). Although this suggests that Milton is challenging 
Harrington, he is also – in much the same way as Harrington challenges and learns from 
Hobbes – accommodating Harringtonian ideas. The excursus, therefore, exhibits 
Milton’s attempt to reconcile Harringtonian republicanism and utopianism with his 
oligarchic elitism and disillusionment with the people. In doing so, Milton shows how 
 
393 Ibid., p. 202. 
394 More, Utopia, p. 50; see also Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, p. 31. 
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he, Harrington and Hobbes share a view of the people as components for an end 
purpose of state stability and permanence.  
 
 
LIBERTY AND THE PEOPLE 
 
The particular and idiosyncratic perceptions of liberty that all three writers exhibit in 
their utopian works inform both their affinity to utopianism and their treatment of 
religious freedom and millenarianism. Quentin Skinner has discussed at length the neo-
roman view of liberty that was determined by a free state and is defined by the absence 
of arbitrary power. As the exercise of independent autonomy and agency, freedom is 
distinguished from slavery or servitude.395 Skinner argues that we ‘find the republican 
theory vehemently reaffirmed in the course of the 1650s by such leading apologists for 
the English commonwealth as Marchamont Nedham, John Milton, William Sprigg, and 
above all James Harrington in his Oceana of 1656.’396 This form of negative liberty 
was, according to Skinner, distinct from that of Hobbes.397 This chapter will contend 
that the shared utopianism of Milton, Hobbes, and Harrington informs an understanding 
of their perceptions of liberty. As the previous chapter showed, Nedham, lacking the 
millenarianism that the final section of this chapter will discuss, did not pursue 
perfection in the form of a totality of stability, and instead challenged that idea with his 
anti-utopian editorials of 1657. Republicanism and its attendant participatory liberty 
were, for Nedham, an end in itself. Given their shared utopianism, it is necessary to 
address how this informs our understanding of the form of liberty that Milton, Hobbes, 
and Harrington respectively advocated. 
Hammersley, agreeing with Skinner, uses Harrington’s repudiation of a part 
of Hobbes’s chapter 21, ‘Of the Liberty of Subjects’, as evidence for Harrington’s neo-
Roman perception of liberty.398 Hobbes asserts in point 8 of Chapter 21 of Leviathan 
that in the process of authorisation, the ‘full and absolute Libertie in every Particular 
man’, which results in the natural state of ‘perpetuall war’, is transferred to the state 
itself: ‘every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it 
 
395 See Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, pp. 17-19; 36-40; 68; cf. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A 
Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
396 Skinner, ‘Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power’, in Cécile Laborde and John Maynor, 
Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 85. 
397 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, pp. 10-11, 59-60. 
398 Hammersley, James Harrington, pp. 72-4; see also Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, pp. 85-6. 
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shall judge […] most conducing to their benefit’ (CETH iv. 332). Free commonwealths, 
therefore, are not constituted by citizens who possess a comparable degree of liberty. 
Harrington responds in Oceana by asserting that ‘He might as well have said that the 
estates of particular men in a commonwealth are not the riches of particular men, but the 
riches of the commonwealth; for equality of estates causeth equality of power, and 
equality of power is the liberty not only of the commonwealth, but of every man’ (20). 
Harrington rejects the manner in which Hobbes places sovereignty above property 
ownership; liberty in Oceana is determined by the systemically regulated equilibrium of 
property. Although Harrington may advocate individual liberty, he does so in terms of 
the equal agrarian, which, as we have seen, is a form of utopian totality. Hobbes 
explains that his perception of liberty is not exclusive to one particular form of 
government: 
 
There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word 
LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie 
from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether the Common-
wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedom is still the same (333). 
 
Harrington responds firstly in terms of anti-monarchism, satirically suggesting that ‘the 
greatest bashaw is a tenant, as well of his head as of his estate, at the will of his lord’, 
and then, characteristically, in terms of property: ‘the meanest Lucchese that hath land 
is a freeholder of both, and not to be controlled but by the law; and that framed by every 
private man unto no other end (or they may thank themselves) than to protect the liberty 
of every private man, which by that means comes to be the liberty of the 
commonwealth’ (20). Once again, Harrington refers to the equal agrarian as a means of 
securing liberty in Oceana. Whereas Hobbes views liberty as transferred by the people 
to the Leviathan sovereign, Harrington believes that individual liberty constitutes the 
liberty of the commonwealth.399 As we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, 
Hobbes and Harrington’s contrasting political ideologies do not negate their mutual 
utopianism. It is necessary to identify how the relationship between utopianism and 
liberty manifests in both Hobbes and Harrington, which is best understood in terms of 
the materialist determinism that they share. 
 
399 Cf. Oceana, pp. 13-14, where Harrington claims that his equal agrarian proves that ‘covenants are but 
words and breath.’ 
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While Harrington objects to a specific point in chapter 21 of Leviathan, he 
makes no comment on the mechanist philosophy that Hobbes espouses, which features 
prominently in Oceana.400 Hobbes’s determinism, which draws from his Calvinistic 
beliefs – even if he may have misinterpreted Calvinism as some critics suggest – is a 
defining feature of his ideology.401 As A. P. Martinich explains, ‘Hobbes’s commitment 
to predestination is for him the logical consequence of orthodox and traditional 
Christian doctrine.’402 The concept of predestination, of a sequence of causality that 
originates in a creator, informs Hobbes’s perception of liberty: ‘LIBERTY, or 
FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean 
externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrationall, and 
Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall’ (CETH iii. 324). For Hobbes, liberty manifests in 
a motional and mechanistic process. As this liberty is also determined by material 
reality, so long as motion and action are not impeded, even an imprisoned individual 
retains Hobbesian liberty. Hobbes expands on the paradoxical relationship between 
liberty, necessity and free will: 
 
Liberty, and Necessity are consistent; as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of 
descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because 
they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, because every act of mans will, and 
every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a 
continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) they proceed from 
necessity (326). 
 
The actions of individuals have liberty because they are the authors of those actions, 
even if those actions are determined by a prime mover, such as God, or, in political 
terms, by the sovereign.403 This resembles the form of freedom that this study has 
identified in utopian texts: in order to attain perfection, which is often associated with 
the millennium, liberty must exist within a system. For Hobbes, this philosophy is 
exemplified in the artificial process of representation. ‘The Liberty of the Subject’, 
Hobbes explains, ‘lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, 
 
400 On Hobbes’s philosophy of motion, see Malcolm, pp. 17, 49. 
401 For a discussion of Hobbes’s misconception of Calvinism, see Alan Cromartie, ‘Hobbes, Calvinism, 
and Determinism’, in Laurens Van Apeldoorn, Robert Douglass, eds., Hobbes on Politics and Religion 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 95-7.  
402 A. P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 273. 
403 See R. E. Ewin, ‘Artificial Chains’, in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 11/1 (2003), pp. 
1-2. 
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the Soveraign hath praetermitted’ (328). Citizens are at liberty to act only in accordance 
with the will of the sovereign, the decisions of whom they have already authorised.  
Harrington shares Hobbes’s mechanist philosophy: in Oceana, liberty is 
similarly utopian. The concept of motion in Harrington’s philosophy is at the centre of 
his ideal of rotation. Harrington believed that in nature, the celestial movement of 
extraterrestrial objects was a form of ‘perpetual rotation’. ‘By so copying nature’s 
perfection,’ Scott explains, ‘Harrington believed he had harnessed for politics its very 
immortality.’404 Hobbes himself used the word ‘perpetuall’ in Leviathan to describe the 
constant, chaotic motion of the natural state of mankind, which the Leviathan state 
channels and manages: ‘a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power’ (ii. 150). 
In ‘The Corollary’ of Oceana, the figure of Archon alludes to Plato’s description of how 
God, having completed the creation, ‘saw his own orbs move below him: for the art of 
man (being the imitation of nature, which is the art of God) there is nothing so like the 
first call of beautiful order out of chaos and confusion, as the architecture of a well-
ordered commonwealth’ (244). The concept of artistic representation that we saw earlier 
in relation to utopianism and political representation extends to the act of creation itself: 
Oceana mirrors the perfect order of celestial orbit. This characteristic interpretation of 
the philosophy of motion is founded on determinist mechanism: ‘Unless a man will 
deny the chain of causes, in which he denies God, he must also acknowledge the chain 
of effects; wherefore there can be no effect in nature that is not from the first cause, and 
those successive links of the chain without which it could not have been’ (218). 
Although Harrington’s commonwealth resembles neo-Roman liberty, it is not therefore 
distinct from Hobbes’s mechanistic view of liberty. For both Hobbes and Harrington, 
freedom exists within a system. As Oceana is a representation of the perfect universe, its 
citizens, despite being free to participate within the system, are also determined by it: 
‘And as man, seeing the world is perfect, can never commit any such sin as can render it 
imperfect or bring it unto a natural dissolution, so the citizen, where the commonwealth 
is perfect, can never commit any such crime as can render it imperfect or bring it unto a 
natural dissolution’ (218). The eternal rotation of the Harringtonian commonwealth is 
immune to dissent. In much the same way, the citizens of the Leviathan commonwealth 
cannot disobey due to the societal construct of law; the Oceanic citizen, by comparison, 
participates in a system that inexorably self-replenishes regardless of that participation. 
To return to Hobbes and Harrington’s perceptions of the people, as the people are 
 
404 Scott, ‘A Rapture of Motion’, p. 160. 
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societal components in a wider system, the reality and experience of liberty in these 
respective ideal societies are necessarily determined by that system. As representations 
of a determinist universe, these commonwealths exemplify the controlling and 
regulatory form of liberty that this study has identified as inherent to seventeenth-
century utopianism. 
Milton’s formulation of liberty in The Readie and Easie Way aligns with 
that of Harrington and Hobbes. Where Hobbes and Harrington present their ideal 
commonwealths as representations of God and his determinist universe, for Milton, the 
commonwealth served the ideal end point of the millennium. In 1659-60, Milton 
returned with renewed optimism to the subject of religious freedom. As Davis explains, 
the concept of religious freedom in the seventeenth-century is distinct from civil 
freedom and was not simply defined in terms of toleration. Paradoxically, freedom from 
arbitrary civil power was necessary to ensure full subjection under an omnipotent deity. 
Davis posits: 
 
What was wrong then with a tyrannical civil authority was not that it deprived its subjects of their 
liberty or humanity in some secular sense but that it could prevent their agency under God; it got 
in the way of christian subjection. With an active, interventionist, engaged God, the true end of 
christian liberty was its self-immolation in submission to the Divine will.405 
 
This study has identified Milton’s form of liberty in Areopagitica, in which freedom 
from pre-publication licensing ensured that studious citizens could labour in the search 
for millenarian truth; it has also shown how toleration remained prominent in Milton’s 
belief in and defence of the fledgling republic. By the late 1650s, Milton defined his 
particular perception of religious freedom in De Doctrina Christiana, which will be 
discussed further in the next chapter: 
 
Christian freedom is that whereby, with Christ freeing [us], we are freed from the slavery of sin—
and likewise from the prescript of the law and of human beings—like manumitted [slaves], so that, 
having become sons after being slaves, [and] adults after being children, we may be slaves to God 
in charity through the spirit of truth as our guide (CWJM viii/2. 717).406 
 
 
405 J. C. Davis, ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution’, in The Historical 
Journal, 35/3 (1992), p. 521; see also pp. 522-5. 
406 See also Jason A. Kerr, ‘De Doctrina Christiana and Milton’s Theology of Liberation’, in Studies in 
Philology, 111/2 (2014), pp. 356-60. 
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Where Milton may have viewed subjection to a monarch as the condition of being 
‘slaves within doors’ (CWJM vi. 151), he also actively embraces the freedom to serve 
God in a form of slavery. In his advocacy of religious freedom in A Treatise of Civil 
Power in Ecclesiastical Causes (1659), one of Milton’s issues with religious adherence 
to civil power is that Protestants cannot fulfil their submission to God. Milton is 
concerned that ‘we receive again the spirit of bondage to fear’ in place of ‘the spirit of 
adoption to freedom’ brought about by Christ, ‘if our fear which was then servile 
towards God only, must be now servile in religion towards men: strange also and 
preposterous fear, if when and wherin it hath attaind by the redemption of our Saviour 
to be filial only towards God, it must be now servile towards the magistrate’ (CPW vii. 
226). Milton discusses freedom and servility in equal terms of service to God that is 
inhibited and endangered through state control over religion. Although lacking this 
mature expression, Milton’s defence of free press in Areopagitica is determined by his 
belief in society serving God, as his vision for London exemplifies in the peroration of 
the tract. Milton’s conception of freedom, therefore, is inspired by a desire to serve and 
contribute to eschatological progress. Rather than patiently awaiting the second coming, 
service meant active earthly contribution to the chiliastic cause. For Milton, this is the 
most evident source of freedom in his utopianism: by identifying liberty with servitude 
in his conception of religious freedom, Milton would understandably identify freedom 
within a system in his ideal societies both as a conceptual mirror of religious freedom 
and as a means of achieving the ideal form of pious servitude requisite for the 
millennium. 
Milton’s conception of religious freedom informs how he envisions the 
implementation of his utopian project of scriptural study in his late republican tracts. 
Milton envisions the religious education proposed in Considerations Touching the 
Likeliest Means to Remove Hirelings out of the Church (1659) as capable of making the 
people worthy of society-wide biblical study, which would, as in Areopagitica, help to 
usher in the millennium. To encourage the accessibility of biblical text, Milton proposes 
that all scripture be ‘translated into English with plenty of notes’, and that there should 
be found ‘some wholesome body of divinity […] without school-terms and 
metaphysical notions, which have obscured rather than explained our religion’. By 
encouraging some services to take place outside of churches, even as far as agricultural 
barns, Milton believes ‘that by such meetings of these, being, indeed, most apostolical 
and primitive, they will in a short time advance more in Christian knowledge and 
reformation of life, than by the many years’ preaching of such an incumbent […]’ 
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(CPW vii. 305). He even suggests that it would be beneficial to the promotion of 
Christian liberty to ‘erect in greater number all over the land schools and competent 
libraries to those schools, where languages and arts may be taught free together’. 
However, the intention of such a free education seems to be that by making ‘all the land 
[…] better civilized’, the common people ‘should not gad for preferment out of their 
own country, but continue there thankful for what they received freely, bestowing it as 
freely on their country, without soaring above the meanness wherein they were born’ 
(CPW vii. 306). This thesis has addressed Milton’s concerns about the aptitude of the 
people, especially in the 1650s. The education that Milton proposes in Considerations 
would ensure that the commons would be able to contribute to the betterment of society, 
while maintaining the role of the elect in leading wider societal progression. Where in 
Areopagitica, Milton had offered a more optimistic view of the people, his vision for a 
studious society in Of Civil Power reflects his increased disillusionment with them. As 
he explains in Of Civil Power, ‘nothing more protestantly can be permitted than a free 
and lawful debate at all times by writing, conference, or disputation of what opinion 
soever, disputable by scripture’ (vii. 251). This resembles the ideal London, constructed 
‘in defence of belaguer’d Truth’, where ‘there be pens and heads […] musing, 
searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present’. Just as in 
Areopagitica, where ‘moderat varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes’ produce ‘the 
goodly and gracefull symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure’ (CPW ii. 
553-5), the freedom that Milton advocates in Of Civil Power is defined by a societal 
system of scriptural interpretation. The difference with Milton’s vision in Of Civil 
Power is that education is now used as a tool for realising his eschatological goal; in 
1644, Milton’s view of education was exclusively aristocratic. Liberty of conscience for 
scriptural study serves the ideal end purpose of the millennium. Just as in Hobbes and 
Harrington, the ideal of perfection – the ‘advancement of truth’ that Milton advocates in 
Of Civil Power (vii. 245) – necessitates a systemic form of liberty. 
In each ideal society considered in this chapter, the people serve a higher 
purpose. Systemic apparatus is necessary to ensure that the people fulfil that purpose. In 
Hobbes and Harrington, this draws from their mechanistic philosophy, as their utopias 
are representative of mechanism in nature. For Milton, his belief in free will does not 
detract from the equally systemic form of liberty that he espouses. As obedience to God 
is a form of servitude, in Milton’s philosophy a society exercises its Christian freedom 
when it is dedicated to scriptural interpretation in pursuit of millenarian truth, in which 
the people are components in a wider process just as they are for Hobbes and 
 184 
Harrington. It is in the relationship between religious and civil power – as this study of 
their differing perspectives of liberty suggests – that the nuanced differences between 





As this study has shown, utopian thinkers often drew inspiration and purpose from the 
prospect – whether it be imminent or distant – of the millennium of Christ. As the 
section above suggests, Milton exemplifies this paradigm in 1659-60.407 Although the 
debates over the significance of religion in Hobbes and Harrington remain contested, 
this study maintains that eschatology was central to their respective utopias.408 Integral 
to this analysis is their respective views on the relationship between church and state: 
Hobbes espoused a radical and indissoluble unity between church and state; Milton, as 
we have seen, advocated religious freedom in congregationalist and Independent terms; 
Harrington sought a mid-point between these two views, in which he maintained a 
national church alongside tolerance for sectarian beliefs through liberty of conscience. 
The major difference between Milton’s millenarianism and that of Hobbes and 
Harrington is that he viewed the millennium as an ideal that could be ushered in through 
reform. Hobbes and Harrington, by contrast, perhaps in opposition to active 
millenarians, such as the Fifth Monarchists or Henry Vane, integrated their 
millenarianism into the representational framework of Leviathan and Oceana. For 
Hobbes and Harrington, the millennium was realised through their political philosophy; 
for Milton, political reform was a necessary stepping-stone to an eschatological end. A 
comparison between millenarianism and utopianism in the political philosophy of these 
 
407 See Stella P. Revard, ‘Milton and Millenarianism: From the “Nativity Ode” to Paradise Regained’, in 
Milton and the Ends of Time, pp. 54-5.  
408 On Hobbes and religion, see A. P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan; Johan Olsthoorn, ‘The 
Theocratic Leviathan’, in Laurens Van Apeldoorn, Robert Douglass, eds., Hobbes on Politics and 
Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 10-28; and Tuck, ‘The Civil Religion of Thomas 
Hobbes’, in Nicholas Philipson and Quentin Skinner, eds., Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 120-38; on Harrington and religion, see Mark Goldie, 
‘The Civil Religion in James Harrington’, in The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 197-222; Ronald Beiner, ‘Civil religion and 
anticlericalism in James Harrington’, in European Journal of Political Theory, 13/4 (2014), 388-407; and 
Luc Borot, ‘Religion in Harrington’s Political System: The Central Concepts and Methods of 
Harrington’s Political Solutions’, in Perspectives on English Revolutionary Republicanism (Farnham: 
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three writers is integral to understanding how Milton was situated within the spectrum 
of 1650s utopian millenarianism. 
Although Milton lacked the fervour of Of Reformation on the eve of the 
Restoration, he exhibited with no less conviction the belief that society could help to 
usher in the millennium.409 Where Clay Daniel has recently asserted that the ‘restoration 
of the monarchy and its causes […] is the dominant theme’ of The Readie and Easie 
Way, this chapter agrees with N. H. Keeble’s suggestion that central to Milton’s 
political proposals in 1659-60 was ‘the subordination of the political to the religious.’410 
As this study has shown, Milton’s belief in liberty of conscience predominantly focuses 
on the freedom to interpret scripture.411 It is through this philosophy that Milton, in Of 
Civil Power, asserts that a Protestant who ‘to his best apprehension follows the 
scripture, though against any point of doctrine by the whole church received, is not a 
heretic’ (CPW vii. 251). Just as Milton endorses and exemplifies this philosophy in the 
scriptural analysis for and composition of De Doctrina Christiana (CWJM viii/1. 9), so 
he proposes a society in The Readie and Easie Way, as discussed above, dedicated to 
scriptural interpretation reminiscent of the model initially envisioned in Areopagitica.412 
Elizabeth Sauer acknowledges how ‘Milton’s identification of the nation with the fight 
for freedom of conscience and with resistance to a settled religion’ was at the heart of 
his 1659 tracts and ‘laid the groundwork for De Doctrina Christiana.’413 So central was 
liberty of conscience to Milton’s political proposals in 1659 that he was ‘prepared to 
severely limit civil liberty’: a commonwealth will only flourish, Milton suggests, ‘when 
either they who govern discern between civil and religious, or they only who so discern 
shall be admitted to govern’ (CPW vii. 243).414 Milton’s insistence on a separation of 
church and state further illustrates how religious freedom is a necessary means to 
achieve eschatological ends: the worthy individuals permitted to govern in The Readie 
and Easie Way would need to exhibit this commitment to religious freedom and 
congregational separation from the state. As Milton lobbied government in 1659 to 
 
409 See Of Reformation, in CPW i. 616: ‘thou the Eternall and shortly-expected King shalt open the 
Clouds to judge the severall Kingdomes of the World […] proclaiming thy universal and milde Monarchy 
through Heaven and Earth’, as discussed in Chapter 1 b) of this thesis. 
410 Clay Daniel, ‘The Epic Calm in The Readie and Easie Way’, in Studies in English Literature 1500-
1900, 60/1 (2020), p. 94; Keeble, CWJM vi. 89. 
411 Milton’s belief in the freedom to interpret scripture is discussed at length in Chapter 8, pp. 294-301. 
412 See De Doctrina Christiana, CWJM viii/1. p. 9. 
413 Elizabeth Sauer, ‘Disestablishment, Toleration, The New Testament Nation: Milton’s Late Religious 
Tracts’, in The Oxford Handbook of Milton, p. 327. 
414 See Keeble, ‘“Nothing Nobler Then a Free Commonwealth”: Milton’s Later Vernacular Republican 
Tracts’, in The Oxford Handbook of Milton, p. 309. 
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liberate English Protestantism from ‘force on the one side restraining, and hire on the 
other side corrupting the teachers thereof’ (245), he also saw this freedom, on the terms 
of liberty discussed in the previous section, as necessary to help realise the millennium 
through a studious community like that presented in Areopagitica. 
Harrington, who advocated both a national church and liberty of conscience, 
makes implicit reference to Milton’s Considerations in his Aphorisms Political (1659). 
Harrington likely alludes to Milton in aphorism XXIX, with the parentheses added in 
the second edition of the tract: ‘To hold that hirelings (as they are termed by some), or 
an endowed ministry, ought to be removed out of the church is inconsistent with a 
commonwealth.’415 Although it is impossible to prove Robert W. Ayers’s suggestion, 
that, regarding the aphorisms that concern religion following XXI, ‘Harrington 
expanded them on reading The Likeliest Means’ (CPW vii. 518), the aphorisms do 
identify Harrington’s theological differences with Milton in 1659.416 Harrington’s civic 
religion encompasses both national religion and liberty of conscience.417 He explains in 
Aphorisms that, as the ‘major part of mankind giveth itself up in the matter of religion 
unto the public leading’ (XXXI), ‘there must be a national religion’ (XXXII), but that 
the ‘minor part’ should be permitted liberty of conscience in much the same way as the 
major part through their conscience decide to endorse national religion (XLI-XLII) 
(766). These carefully articulated aphorisms reiterate Harrington’s assertion in the 
preliminary of Oceana that ‘a man that, pleading for the liberty of private conscience, 
refuseth liberty unto the national conscience, must be absurd’ (39). In 1659, Milton 
exemplifies this absurdity to Harrington. National religion is a necessary product of 
liberty of conscience in much the same way as an ‘endowed clergy’ is the product of a 
national religion (XLV-XLVI) (767). The reason for Harrington’s entrenched 
opposition to Milton on the subject of church and state, and the effort he takes to justify 
them in Aphorisms, can be better understood when considered alongside the religious 
policy depicted in Oceana. 
In Oceana, religion is instituted in a similar manner to the idealised political 
system, which invites comparisons with the utopian dimensions of that system 
discussed above. When Harrington discusses the sixth order in Oceana, central to the 
justification of forming a national religion is the ability to interpret scripture: Harrington 
 
415 James Harrington, Aphorisms Political, in Political Works of James Harrington, p. 765. Hereafter 
referenced parenthetically. 
416 See also Pocock, Political Works, p. 111; Hammersley, James Harrington, p. 206. 
417 See Goldie, ‘The Civil Religion of James Harrington’, pp. 206-20. 
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explains that a commonwealth ‘can never be secure that she shall not lose the Scriptures 
and by consequence her religion, which to preserve she must institute some method of 
this knowledge, and some use of such as have acquired it, which amounteth unto a 
national religion’ (82-3). It is for this reason that the universities are charged, under the 
authority of the state-managed council of religion, to interpret scripture and disseminate 
this learning to the national churches (200-202). As Hammersley suggests, ‘this was 
because he believed that the people needed to be publicly led in religion, just as they did 
in politics, and a national church was a means of providing such guidance.’418 Although 
Milton, as shown above, believes like Harrington and Hobbes that the people are 
components in a wider system, he affords them greater individual potential to interpret 
scripture than Harrington. Milton views education, as we have seen, as a means of 
ensuring the people are capable of fulfilling their potential as scriptural interpreters. 
Religion in Oceana resembles its political system: the universities, as outlined in the 
sixth order, provide ministers that the people, after a year, vote to keep or replace, in 
much the same way as the senate proposes and the popular assembly ratifies acts and 
laws of government. The ability to interpret scripture distinguishes university-educated 
individuals from the laity just as the elite individuals of the senate are superior in their 
political judgment to the people. To further clarify the mirror between religion and 
politics in Oceana, it is necessary to consider how religion contributes to the 
permanence of Oceana as a representation of God’s universe. 
This is best understood through comparison with Hobbes, whose views on 
religion were a significant contribution to his political philosophy in Leviathan. As Jon 
Parkin suggests, ‘almost all of his readers would be shocked by the extraordinary 
theology elaborated in Parts 3 and 4 of Leviathan.’419 Pocock, in his analysis of 
Hobbes’s eschatology and perception of history, stresses the importance of the 
eschatological third and fourth parts of Leviathan in Hobbes’s philosophy as a whole.420 
Johan Olsthoorn has recently argued against critics who interpret the latter half of 
Leviathan as secularising. However, in Olsthoorn’s analysis of the relationship between 
representation and religion, he suggests that subordinate ecclesiastical entities exist in 
the Leviathan state outside of the representational system while not detracting from the 
 
418 Hammersley, James Harrington, p. 207. 
419 Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 92. 
420 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Time, History and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes’, in Pocock, ed., 
Politics, Language, and Time (Methuen, 1972), pp. 160-2; see also A. P. Martinich, The Two Gods of 
Leviathan, p. 261. 
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absolute sovereignty of the civil sovereign.421 As Hobbes presented an indissoluble 
relationship between church and state, the sovereign is the unequivocal head of the 
national church. The paradoxical process of authorisation and representation in the 
political framework of Leviathan, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, is 
central to the religious system in Hobbes’s ideal society: ‘For so God the Father, as 
Represented by Moses, is one Person; and as Represented by his Sonne, another Person; 
and as Represented by the Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority from 
them derived, is a third Person; and yet every Person here, is the Person of one and the 
same God’ (CETH iv. 776). The hierarchical transference of power here is embodied by 
the earthly representatives of God, who constitute the divine person of that same God. 
There is no difference between the process of authorisation, through which citizens 
constitute the political person of the Leviathan, and the Leviathan’s representation of 
God: the Leviathan is a ‘Mortal God’ in representation of the ‘Immortall God’ (iv. 260). 
In accordance with Hobbes’s materialist philosophy, he explains that the ‘Kingdome 
therefore of God, is a reall, not a metaphorical Kingdome’ (v. 642), and existed under 
the jurisdiction of Moses in Israel, who acted as God’s ‘Viceroy or Lieutenant’ (640). 
As such, this kingdom, which was lost upon the election of Saul until civil states once 
again endorsed Christianity, is distinct from ‘when Christ shall come in Majesty to 
judge the world, and actually to govern his owne people, which is called the Kingdome 
of Glory’ (644), and will manifest specifically in Jerusalem (702). Not only does 
Hobbes use this interpretation of biblical history to oppose active millenarians, such as 
the Fifth Monarchists (726), but he also uses the prospect of the millennium to grant 
representative powers to the civil sovereign. To return to the example of scriptural 
interpretation, Hobbes gives absolute power to the sovereign, who acts as vicegerent to 
God: ‘Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth 
holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his 
Commandments’ (744). Similar to Oceana, the utopian system of representation is 
mirrored in the religious institution of Leviathan. While subordinate ecclesiastical 
entities exist in Hobbes’s commonwealth, they remain subject to sovereign dictate. 
Milton, whose 1659-60 works lack the representational model of Leviathan and the 
utopian artifice of Oceana, did not believe in as close a relationship between the 
millennium and his ideal society. As Hobbes illustrates, representation is central to the 
eschatology of Leviathan just as it informs our understanding of its utopianism. 
 
421 Johan Olsthoorn, ‘The Theocratic Leviathan’, in Laurens Van Apeldoorn, Robert Douglass, eds., 
Hobbes on Politics and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 12, 21. 
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The manner in which Harrington identifies the millennium as Oceana itself 
in Oceana illustrates the nuanced difference between the Hobbes-Harrington utopian 
millennium, and that of Milton. It was Pocock who identified that Harrington made the 
radical decision to ‘equate the republic with the millennium’ as a ‘climactically 
satisfactory solution of the problem of republican immortality.’422 Davis argues directly 
against this view of Pocock’s, which he believes is a contradiction, asserting instead his 
exclusivist view of utopianism as separate from millenarianism, against which this 
study has been contending.423 Luc Borot similarly argues that, when ‘the fictional 
framework of Oceana was removed’, Harrington’s later texts lack the millenarianism 
identified by Pocock.424 It is evident that there is a relationship between utopianism and 
millenarianism in Oceana. The ideal of perfection in Harrington’s commonwealth 
draws from the perfect rotation in God’s universe. Where Hobbes believed that the 
Hebraic commonwealth could be emulated by the Leviathan state and would serve as an 
interim between Mosaic Israel and the millennium, Harrington believed, as Eric Nelson 
suggests, ‘that it is within the reach of any human community to restore the pristine 
Hebrew theocracy.’425 Unlike Hobbes, Harrington makes no explicit distinction between 
this kingdom of God and the millennium: 
 
Now if you add unto the propagation of civil liberty, what is so natural unto this commonwealth 
that it cannot be omitted, the propagation of the liberty of conscience, this empire, this patronage 
of the world, is the kingdom of Christ. For as the kingdom of God the Father was a 
commonwealth, so shall be the kingdom of God the Son; the people shall be willing in the day of 
his power (231-32). 
 
This is most clearly expressed in a passage at the end of Oceana, in which Archon 
apostrophises Oceana in language reminiscent of the Song of Solomon. Declaring that 
‘Oceana is as the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the valley’, Archon identifies the 
utopian commonwealth as ‘queen of the earth […] holy spouse of Jesus’ (233). 
Although this is within the utopian fiction of Oceana, just as Harrington’s utopianism 
remains prominent in his later works, so the millennium, as the ideal that Oceana 
emulates, remains implicit in his later political philosophy as the ideal of perfection that 
 
422 Pocock, Political Works, p. 73; see also Blair Worden, ‘Harrington and the Commonwealth of 
Oceana’, pp. 101-5. 
423 Davis, ‘Pocock’s Harrington: Grace, Nature and Art in the Classical Republicanism of James 
Harrington, in The Historical Journal, 24/3 (1981), pp. 695-6. 
424 Borot, ‘Religion in Harrington’s Political System’, pp. 155-7. 
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Harrington’s utopianism strives to emulate. In both Leviathan and Oceana, the 
representational philosophy at the heart of each utopian artifice exhibits a millenarian 
dimension. For both Hobbes and Harrington, the idea of permanence was secured by the 
fact that their ideal commonwealths in some way represented the godly commonwealth 
of Israel. 
Stability for Milton’s commonwealth, by contrast, was necessary for society 
to help usher in the millennium itself. For Hobbes and Harrington, the millennium is in 
some way represented in their ideal commonwealths. For Milton, a societal 
collaboration of scriptural interpretation on utopian terms, which he institutionalises in 
The Readie and Easie Way in contrast to the idealised London of Areopagitica, and 
which neither Hobbes nor Harrington were capable of emulating in their Erastian 
theologies, was necessary to realise the millennium. Milton explains in both editions of 
The Readie and Easie Way that with the ‘Grand Councel being thus firmly constituted 
to perpetuitie […] there is no cause alleage’d why peace, justice, plentifull trade an all 
prosperities should not thereupon ensue throughout the whole land’, a stability which 
can last ‘Even to the coming of our true and rightfull and only to be expected King, only 
worthie as he is our only Saviour, the Messiah, the Christ, the only heir of his eternal 
father, the only by him anointed and ordaind since the work of our redemption finishd, 
Universal Lord of all mankinde’ (CWJM vi. 503). Revard suggests that this passage of 
millenarian fervour is reminiscent of Of Reformation, in which Milton ‘encourages the 
English people to persevere in truth and righteousness’, in anticipation of ‘the Eternall 
and shortly-expected King’.426 The difference in The Readie and Easie Way, of course, 
is, with Milton’s disillusionment with the English people reaching its apogee, his 
utopian proposal systemically regulates the role of the people in society. By securing 
the permanence of English society through the Grand Council and the attendant system 
of scriptural research, Milton ensures that England will be prepared for, if not help to 
usher in, the millennium. Milton’s form of utopian millenarianism is, therefore, 
distinguishable from that of Hobbes and Harrington by his insistence on liberty of 
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This analysis of the utopianism and millenarianism of Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton 
has served to better appreciate Milton’s peculiar form of utopian millenarianism in 
comparison with contemporary ideal societies. The utopian artifices that both Hobbes 
and Harrington integrate into Leviathan and Oceana align with their theories of 
representation, which, in turn, align with the millenarian theologies of both utopias. 
Milton, lacking any fictional utopian component in his 1659-60 works, also does not 
identify his ideal commonwealth as millenarian or godly. He nevertheless does, in echo 
of and development from the ideas of Areopagitica, accommodate the utopian, systemic 
form of freedom that is prominent in both Leviathan and Oceana. Whereas Nedham, 
lacking the theological and millenarian components of his contemporaries considered in 
this chapter, believed in popular participation and used Mercurius Politicus as a 
platform for republican education, Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton all represent the 
people in their societies as components in the wider utopian totality. Even Milton’s 
strong advocacy of liberty of conscience and religious toleration in the late republican 
period, was a means to an end: religious freedom is necessary to help uncover the lost 
millenarian truth. Hobbes, Harrington, and Milton, therefore, exhibit a spectrum of 
1650s utopian millenarianism. The desire for perfection, modelled by the millennium, is 
achieved through state regulation, in which liberty is necessarily defined in its relation 
to rather than absence of the state system. For Milton, The Readie and Easie Way was 
the closest that he came to a utopian model in his prose works. As Paradise Lost will 
show in the following chapter, the utopian millenarian ideas that Milton had been 
developing over the course of his political career, having not been effectively realised in 














Paradise Lost and the Utopian Millennium 
 
Milton most clearly envisions his utopian millennium in his epic poetry. Where 
Paradise Lost depicts the process of attaining a millenarian paradise, Paradise 
Regained, which will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis, represents the 
utopian millennium itself in the symbolic figure of the Son. Prelapsarian Eden – in itself 
reminiscent of Baconian empirical philosophy discussed in Chapter 2 – is lost because 
of a lack of obedience; in turn, the postlapsarian millennium is promised to Adam in 
exchange for his obedience. The process that Adam and Eve undergo between these two 
paradisal ideals is one of disunification from and reunification with Heaven. Heaven is 
utopian in Paradise Lost. As a militarised totality, Milton establishes a distinction 
between transgression, which results in lapsarian repercussions, and obedience, which 
brings with it the security of the millennium that is prophesied in the final books of the 
poem. The military order of Heaven reflects the hierarchy of the collective universe of 
Paradise Lost. In accordance with the literal sense of ‘fall’, to sin – or transgress – 
results in descending this universal hierarchy: Satan and the apostate angels descend 
from Heaven to Hell; Adam and Eve descend from prelapsarian paradise in Eden to 
postlapsarian mortality.427 In order for Adam and Eve to reascend, however, they must 
be educated. Raphael’s prelapsarian teachings and the postlapsarian education that 
Michael provides in Books XI and XII, with the intervening Fall, represent the learning 
Adam must undergo to realise his obedience. As Chapter 6 discussed at length, the 
liberty that Milton espouses is religious: the liberty to serve God. As such, Adam’s 
education provides him with the means through which he can rehabilitate by choosing 
to serve God, just as he chose to disobey. The emphasis on Adam as an individual, who 
at the end of the poem chooses obedience in a display of self-control, recalls Milton’s 
celebration of a similar quality in Cromwell in Defensio Secunda, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, and anticipates the inner utopia of the Son of Paradise Regain’d, which will 
be discussed in the following chapter. While the utopian millennium is not explicitly 
depicted in Paradise Lost, many of the utopian and millenarian ideas discussed in this 
 
427 For a definition of sin as transgression, see Milton, De Doctrina Christiana, in CWJM viii/1. 413: ‘Sin, 
as it is defined by the Apostle himself, is anomia or transgression of the law, 1 John 3:4.’ 
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study are manifest in the poem and serve as an important foundation for its realisation in 
the brief epic that follows. 
The concept of obedience in Paradise Lost remains central to critical 
debates about the poem. Historically, discussions of obedience have pervaded criticism 
of Satan and God. The Romantic view of Satan as the hero of Paradise Lost found 
seminal support in William Empson’s Milton’s God, in which he defined the God of the 
poem as a Stalinist tyrant.428 Satan’s rebellious nature, moreover, encourages 
interpretations of the radical Milton. David Loewenstein suggests that Satan’s 
ambiguity allows him to represent the varied mid-seventeenth-century political 
landscape, including an ‘antimonarchical revolutionary or heretic’. Rather than 
encouraging ‘readers to make literal equations between its mythic characters and major 
historical figures’, Loewenstein argues that Paradise Lost ‘constantly challenges its 
engaged readers by showing them how to discern the treacherous ambiguities and 
contradictions of political rhetoric and behaviour.’429 Warren Chernaik, moreover, 
argues for the ambiguity of Milton’s ‘religious, political and ethical beliefs’. He posits 
that ‘Milton’s political views, like his religious beliefs, are radical in some respects, 
conservative in others.’ Where Chernaik spends an entire chapter explaining the Old 
Testament character of Milton’s God, with only the Son’s sympathy offering a contrast 
in Book III, this is preceded by a chapter on Satan’s rebellion, in which he finds 
parallels with Milton’s own experience in Restoration England: ‘After the Restoration, 
Milton lived under a civil magistrate he considered oppressive and illegitimate, and a 
central issue in Paradise Lost and in Samson Agonistes is how to conduct oneself under 
such conditions.’430 The problem that Chernaik tries to answer is how Milton can justify 
the ways of an Old Testament God to men and exhibit the radical tendencies that he 
discusses elsewhere.431 This thesis has identified Milton’s radicalism as distinct from 
that of contemporary sectarians in the 1650s. If we, therefore, separate sectarian 
radicalism, which Chernaik associates with Milton, from the God of Paradise Lost, then 
Milton’s emphasis on obedience, especially in a utopian context, is congruous with his 
wider ideology. Obedience to authority had been key to Milton’s political philosophy 
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for much of his polemical career; the role of obedience in his radical theology and epic 
poetry was no different.  
This study supports a view of obedience that Michael Schoenfeldt asserts, 
which resembles the form of religious freedom discussed in the previous chapter. 
Schoenfeldt posits that, ‘both before and after the Fall, moral authenticity and 
psychological autonomy emerge from the practices of obedience.’ He is emphatic that 
Milton ‘articulates autonomy in the language of obedience.’432 This is, in many 
respects, an effective description of the paradoxical nature of Milton’s conception of 
religious freedom. As this chapter will show, education fosters Adam’s will to obey, 
especially in Michael’s postlapsarian teachings. Amy Boesky contributes to this view 
of Paradise Lost with her argument that Heaven represents a military totality. Boesky 
suggests that the growth of utopian thinking in the seventeenth-century was associated 
with a form of military ideology that stemmed from Cromwell’s New Model Army. 
However, where Boesky postulates that utopianism becomes more militarised 
following Cromwell, this thesis maintains that discipline was at the heart of utopianism 
from its inception in More’s Utopia.433 The militarised representation of Milton’s 
Heaven extends to Hell: the apostate angels resemble heavenly order until they have to 
pile into Pandaemonium. Indeed, this chapter will argue that the entire universe of 
Paradise Lost is structured as a hierarchical, though mutable, structure that both 
punishes transgression by ‘falling’ down the laddered order of the universe, and 
provides the elevated status of Heaven as an ideal to aspire to, especially for Adam and 
Eve both before and after the Fall. 
Cedric Brown perceptively addresses how the ideal of obedience, 
particularly through the figure of Adam, is realised through education. Brown identifies 
the significance of the triangular relationship between the epic narrator, Adam, and the 
reader in Paradise Lost, expanding the boundaries of Milton’s education from the 
confines of his fictional universe.434 In his essay, ‘Godly Senates and Godly Education’, 
Brown also aligns Paradise Lost to Milton’s political works, arguing that ‘Milton’s 
political language was never free from the categories of religious and moral definition’. 
As such, Brown identifies the godly republicanism that Milton had advocated in The 
 
432 Michael Schoenfeldt, ‘Obedience and Autonomy in Paradise Lost’, in Thomas Corns, ed., A 
Companion to Milton (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 363-4. 
433 Amy Boesky, ‘Milton’s Heaven and the Model of the English Utopia’, in Studies of English 
Literature, 36/1 (1996), pp. 92-4. 
434 Cedric C. Brown, John Milton: A Literary Life (London: Palgrave Macmilllan, 1995), pp. 164-6, 171-
4. 
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Readie and Easie Way, and which Brown compares to Harrington, in the poem: ‘in 
times of adversity, when men have fallen and the fit are few, when the great efforts for 
renewal seem to have failed, there may be a turning to the basics of godly discipline, 
and a need to reaffirm the providential scheme.’435 This chapter will agree with Brown’s 
argument that Paradise Lost is ‘directed at the spiritual discipline of [Milton’s] 
countrymen’ through the framework of utopian millenarianism that this study has 
observed and analysed. As Paul Hammond explains, the poem ‘was written […] at a 
time when Milton was contemplating the imminent or actual defection of the English 
people from their God-given task of embracing liberty and thereby offering an example 
of true Protestant freedom to the rest of Europe.’436 Obedience is a necessarily pervasive 
theme in Paradise Lost if Milton wanted to encourage the English people away from the 
monarchism that he considered inhibitive to the progress of the Reformation. However, 
given Milton’s disillusionment with the English people at the time, the emphasis on 
Adam as an individual is emblematic of Milton’s elitism. As the process of Adam’s 
transgression, fall, and rehabilitation anticipates the redoubled emphasis on individual 
heroes in the 1671 poems, it serves as an example to fit readers, however few. 
This chapter will also use De Doctrina Christiana to support readings of 
Paradise Lost. With the Miltonic provenance of the treatise now firmly established, 
critics have used De Doctrina as an effective tool for interpreting Milton’s theology, 
and, in turn, Paradise Lost.437 As De Doctrina was likely completed at the end of the 
1650s, it may well have briefly coincided with the composition of Paradise Lost, 
which is often attributed to between 1658-63. Emma Wilson has argued that Ramist 
logic, which was a mode of structuring knowledge and was used in De Doctrina, is 
discernible in Paradise Lost, particularly in Adam’s speeches. However, where 
Wilson, drawing from Mordechai Feingold, suggests that there was a division between 
Baconian scientific study and logic in this period, this chapter will show how 
empiricism, which was at the heart of the Baconian philosophy, is a prominent feature 
 
435 Cedric Brown, ‘Great Senates and Godly Education: Politics and Cultural Renewal in Some Pre- and 
Post-Revolutionary Texts of Milton’, in Quentin Skinner, et al., eds., Milton and Republicanism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 46-51, 59-60. 
436 Hammond, Milton and the People, p. 217. 
437 For the Miltonic provenance, see Gordon Campbell, et al., eds., Milton and the Manuscript of De 
Doctrina Christiana (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); for valuable readings of De Doctrina and 
Paradise Lost, see William Poole, Milton and the Making of Paradise Lost (New Haven: Harvard 
University Press, 2017), pp. 91-104; and Samuel Fallon, ‘Milton’s Strange God: Theology and Narrative 
Form in Paradise Lost’, in ELH, 79/1 (2012), 33-57. 
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of Adam’s experience in Eden.438 Indeed, the representation of Adam’s dominion over 
nature is the idealised endpoint of Bacon’s natural philosophy. Instead of a Ramist 
structure of knowledge, the chapter will show how freedom to interpret scripture is 
depicted in Milton’s epic poetry. 
The first section of this chapter will address the hierarchy of the universe of 
Paradise Lost, which will be compared in the second section to the militarised totality 
of Milton’s Heaven. The third section will address the empiricism intrinsic to Adam’s 
early existence in Eden, while the final section will consider the importance and 
necessity of the postlapsarian education in the final two books of the poem. Having 
transgressed and fallen from the prelapsarian paradise, Adam must rehabilitate by 
returning to the heavenly totality through obedience. 
 
 
‘VARIOUS FORMS, VARIOUS DEGREES’: MILTON’S UNIVERSAL 
HIERARCHY 
 
The hierarchy of Milton’s universe in Paradise Lost is representative of the form of 
regulatory utopianism that this study has been tracing. Raphael’s explanation of a 
universal structure to Adam in Book V reflects the scala naturae of Neoplatonist 
philosophy. Clay Daniel argues that Raphael is not a Neoplatonist and that Adam in 
fact articulates Neoplatonist ideas that Raphael resists, but he does so by arguing that 
this hierarchy is not central to the poem.439 David Williams argues that Raphael’s 
Neoplatonism works against the otherwise egalitarian and ‘levelling’ existence of 
Adam and Eve. Williams identifies Raphael as maintaining hierarchical ideas that had 
ended when God poured ‘his Equal Love’ on the Edenic pair (viii. 228-9). He 
questions how Raphael can ‘suddenly forget on earth that heaven’s feudal order was 
dissolved, and that he himself had renounced hierarchy?’440 Williams references the 
point in Book III where the angels ‘to the ground / With solemn adoration down they 
cast / Their crowns inwove with amaranth and gold’, but this not only coincides with 
 
438 Emma Annette Wilson, ‘The Art of Reasoning Well: Ramist Logic at Work in Paradise Lost’, in The 
Review of English Studies, 61/248 (2009), pp. 59-61; cf. Mordechai Feingold, ‘The Humanities’, in T. H. 
Ashton, Nicholas Tyacke, eds., The History of the University of Oxford, vol. iv (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 211-358. 
439 Clay Daniel, ‘Milton’s Neoplatonic Angel?’, in SEL, 44/1 (2004), pp. 173-80. 
440 Williams, Milton’s Leveller God, pp. 194, 199; cf. Nigel Smith, who offers a strong rebuke of some of 
Williams’s arguments in his review, ‘David Williams. Milton’s Leveller God’, in The Review of English 
Studies, 69/291 (2018), 790-93. 
 197 
the angels being ‘lowly reverent / Towards either throne they bow’ – an act of 
inferiority, not equality – it also follows God’s announcement to the Son that, it is only 
following the apocalypse and at the end of history, ‘thou thy regal sceptre shalt lay by’ 
(iii. 350-52; 349-50; 339). The point at which ‘God shall be all in all’ (341) has not 
happened by the time Raphael descends to Eden; the universal hierarchy remains firm 
and established. Indeed, it is through this hierarchy that the idealised millenarian 
endpoint of godly unity shall be achieved. The ‘New Heav’n and Earth, wherein the 
just shall dwell’ still requires ‘tribulations long’ (335-6), which resembles the kind of 
laborious study that Milton undertakes in the composition of De Doctrina, and which 
he idealised in Areopagitica and The Readie and Easie Way, or the obedience that 
Adam enacts at the end of Paradise Lost. John Rogers, whose analysis of Milton’s 
engagement with mid-seventeenth-century vitalist philosophy in both De Doctrina and 
Paradise Lost is valuable, also suggests that Milton espouses ‘egalitarian vitalism’.441 
As we shall see, Milton’s universal hierarchy is not only defined by his animist 
materialism and monism, which is comparable to Bacon’s speculative philosophy, but 
its structure – through which obedience promises ascension and disobedience 
necessitates descension – epitomises the controlling framework of many utopias 
discussed in this study.442 Milton’s universal hierarchy is a form of utopianism that 
anticipates the millennium. 
Raphael’s description of the universal hierarchy is formed from a language 
of animist monism. Where Chapter 3 identified Milton’s developing theory of a unity 
between spirit and matter in Areopagitica, Raphael shows how his mature monistic 
theology is palpable in Paradise Lost.443 Milton articulates this philosophy in De 
Doctrina:  
 
man is an animate being [animal], inherently and properly one and individual, not twofold or 
separable – or, as is commonly declared, combined or composed from two mutually and 
generically different and distinct natures, namely soul and body – but that the whole man is soul 
and the soul is man; namely a body or substance which is individual, animated, sensitive, and 
rational […] (CWJM viii/1. 303). 
 
441 Rogers, The Matter of Revolution, pp. 112, see generally 103-44. 
442 On Bacon’s spiritual animism, see Graham Rees, ‘Atomism and “Subtlety” in Francis Bacon’s 
Philosophy’, in Annals of Science, 37 (1980), p. 553; for a more comprehensive discussion of Bacon’s 
natural philosophy in these terms, see OFB vi. liv-lxiv; see also Rees, ‘Matter Theory: A Unifying Factor 
in Bacon’s Natural Philosophy?’, in AMBIX, 24/2 (1977), pp. 110-125. 
443 For a discussion of Milton’s mature animist materialism, see Stephen Fallon, Milton Among 
Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991), p. 81. 
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In response to Adam’s mundane question about how earthly food compares to that of 
Heaven, Raphael, who is described as a ‘winged hierarch’ (v. 468) at this point, 
articulates a comparison between Heaven and Eden that is defined by the ‘gradual 
scale’ (483) between spirit and body. In Raphael’s description, God is connected to the 
entire hierarchy: ‘O Adam, one almighty is, from whom / All things proceed, and up to 
him return’ (469-70). In this way, creatures are ‘created all / Such to perfection’, but 
are also thereby ‘Indued with various forms, various degrees / Of substance’, such that 
‘more refined, more spiritous, and pure, / nearer to him placed or nearer tending’ (471-
2; 473-4; 475-6).444 This is a scale of divine perfection; all creatures are connected to 
God through this hierarchy. The metaphor of a plant that Raphael incorporates here, 
where from root to bloom marks a scale of substance, illustrates the aspirational ideal 
of reaching towards the status of the ‘consummate flower’, from which ‘Spirits 
odorous breathes’ (481-2). The ethereal odour of the flower represents to Adam the 
heavenly ideal that Raphael anticipates when he says ‘time may come when men / 
With angels may participate’ (493-4). The spectrum of matter to spirit signifies the 
potential for corporeal man to become spiritual angel. Accordingly, Milton’s angels are 
able to eat, defecate, and have sex (v. 404-13; viii. 615-29).445 The promise that 
Raphael makes to Adam that he and Eve may be able to ‘participate’ with angels is 
supported by Milton’s monism and eschatology. As Juliet Cummins argues, the 
‘unfallen and regenerate human beings evolve toward a more materially and spiritually 
refined state on earth, anticipating their reformation at the end of time.’446 While there 
is a material connection between God and all his creatures, this does not mean that they 
are equal; it is a vertical and linear hierarchy that encourages obedience.447 
Raphael goes on to explain how an individual like Adam can navigate the 
universal hierarchy, using language that corresponds with the philosophy of liberty that 
Milton had been developing over a number of years. Shortly following Raphael’s 
 
444 On Milton’s God and materialism, see Neil D. Graves, ‘“The whole fulness of the Godhead dwells in 
him bodily”: The Materiality of Milton’s God’, in Christianity and Literature, 52/4 (2003), 497-522, and 
Ibid., ‘Typological Aporias in Paradise Lost’, in Modern Philology, 104/2 (2006), 173-201. 
445 See Poole, Milton and the Making of Paradise Lost, p. 101. 
446 Juliet Cummins, ‘Matter and Apocalyptic Transformations in Paradise Lost’, in Milton and the Ends 
of Time, p. 169. 
447 For another discussion of the animist materialism of Raphael’s speech, see David Quint, ‘“Things 
Invisible to Mortal Sight”: Light, Vision, and the Unity of Book 3 of Paradise Lost’, in Modern 
Language Quarterly, 71/3 (2010), 229-69. 
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explanation of the hierarchical universe of animist monism, he explains the 
relationship between free will and obedience:  
 
Attend: that thou art happy, owe to God;  
That thou continuest such, owe to thyself, 
That is, to thy obedience; therein stand. 
This was that caution given thee; be advised. 
God made thee perfect, not immutable; 
And good he made thee, but to persevere 
He left it in thy power, ordained thy will 
By nature free, not overruled by fate 
Inextricable, or strict necessity; 
Our voluntary service he requires,  
Not our necessitated […]    (v. 520-30) 
 
Schoenfeldt describes this as ‘definition by negation’, which captures the taut balance 
between the ideal of obedience and the reality and mutability of free will.448 Raphael’s 
speech is emblematic of Milton’s view of liberty: the reality of free will risks 
transgression, but the ideal of Heaven – and the promise of accessing spiritual paradise 
– necessitates obedience, especially when the alternative is a fall akin to that of Satan, 
which Raphael subsequently describes. Such freedom within a penal structure is 
reminiscent of many utopias: in Harrington’s Oceana, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the freedom of political participation is measured and contained within an 
eternal system of rotation, the equal agrarian. Freedom exists in a system. The 
difference with Milton is that he places more emphasis on the individual, who chooses 
to serve God, however much the system encourages that choice.  
Milton’s animist monism helps to illuminate his views on freedom, 
especially within the unorthodox theology he delineates in De Doctrina. The animist 
condition of Milton’s monism distinguishes him from contemporary materialists, such 
as Hobbes. As the previous chapter acknowledged, Hobbes’s was a mechanistic 
materialism, in which all ‘life is but a motion of Limbs’. Hobbes’s mechanism 
necessitates determinism; freedom is negatively defined by the absence of 
impediments: ‘LIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifieth (properly) the absence of 
opposition; (by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion;) and may be 
applied no less to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational’ (CETH iv. 324). 
 
448 Schoenfeldt, ‘Obedience and Autonomy in Paradise Lost’, p. 367. 
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As freedom can be applied to inanimate creatures, then it is merely a temporary 
condition of existence, rather than a vitalist reality; free will must give way to 
predetermined motional influences. Fallon asserts that Milton responded to such 
mechanism with a vitalist view of matter being ‘individual, animated, sensitive, and 
rational’.449 Rogers has similarly identified Milton’s ‘autonomous universe’ in 
Paradise Lost in contrast to ‘the direct and ongoing intervention of a powerful 
sovereign’ that defines the experience of the Hobbesian man.450 Milton explains in 
more explicit detail the nuances of this view of freedom in De Doctrina. In his 
discussion of Christian freedom, Milton asserts: 
 
Christian freedom is that whereby, with Christ freeing [us], we are freed from the slavery of sin—
and likewise from the prescript of the law and of human beings—like manumitted [slaves], so that, 
having become sons after being slaves, [and] adults after being children, we may be slaves to God 
in charity through the spirit of truth as our guide (CWJM viii/2. 717).  
 
Jason A. Kerr argues that serviamus, translated in the Oxford edition as ‘we may be 
slaves to’, emphasises ‘the active exercise of Christian liberty’.451 J. C. Davis captures 
the essence of this view of freedom, which readily applies to Milton: ‘liberty of 
conscience meant submission to God […] and not to self.’452 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this philosophy of freedom is distinct from the neo-Roman 
conception of freedom as a condition separate from slavery, a form of negative liberty 
prominent in republican philosophy that Milton employed in his tracts for the English 
republic. Milton’s Christian individual is free – particularly free in conscience – in 
order to serve God. Milton enacts this service in De Doctrina through scriptural 
interpretation that he structures in a Ramist system: he exercises his freedom to serve 
through unorthodox interpretation and carefully structured textual dissemination.  
Milton’s exegetical study is laborious and a kind of servitude, but it helps 
to unearth the ‘truth’ that is so difficult to ascertain in a postlapsarian age. Kerr extends 
Milton’s view of freedom to the reader of De Doctrina: ‘Rather than appeal to a 
mystical sense of interpersonal interconnections, Milton looks for his model of society 
 
449 See Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, p. 4. 
450 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, pp. 130-2. 
451 Jason A. Kerr, ‘De Doctrina Christiana and Milton’s Theology of Liberation’, in Studies in Philology, 
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452 Davis, ‘Religion and the Struggle for Freedom in the English Revolution’, p. 516; cf. Martin 
Dzelzainis, ‘“In Power of Others, Never in My Own”: The Meaning of Slavery in Samson Agonistes’, in 
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to the unity achieved by a divine collective comprised of persons who are not only 
different and distinct from one another, but whose relations are characterized by 
liberty.’453 This resembles the studious society that Milton portrays in his idealised 
London in Areopagitica, where Milton’s citizens are ‘sitting by their studious lamps, 
musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present’ (CPW ii. 
554). Kerr suggests that Milton intends to realise this ideal society by encouraging the 
reader to enter into the lengthy process that produced his theological treatise. Milton 
asserts this view himself at the beginning of De Doctrina: 
 
Lastly, I intend to make everyone understand, from the arguments I shall be found to have 
advanced (whether old or new), by their weight and influence, but more by the authority of the 
scriptures on whose very frequent witness the arguments rely, just how crucial it is for the 
Christian religion that the freedom be granted not simply of probing every doctrine, and of 
winnowing it in public, but also of thinking and indeed writing about it, in accordance with each 
person’s firm belief (CWJM viii. 9). 
 
The agency that Milton affords his reader, however, especially given his entrenched 
disaffection with the English people by the late 1650s, is individual to that reader. As 
this study has shown, Milton’s belief in an ideal society of studious interpreters in 
Areopagitica is distinct from the increasing emphasis on the individual – exclusively the 
elect individual – from 1649 onwards. Indeed, in The Readie and Easie Way, Milton 
proposed national education as a means of making the commons more effective 
scriptural interpreters. While freedom of conscience remains a universal ideal for 
Milton, its purpose nevertheless becomes more centred around individuals rather than 
societies. The comprehensive biblical references that he makes in the running text of De 
Doctrina, rather than in the margins, therefore, illustrates the need for the reader to 
undertake individual research. Incorporating the words of De Doctrina, Kerr identifies 
this process as a form of slavery.454 If Milton did formulate his animist monism in 
response to determinist mechanism, then he does so through this freedom-as-servitude 
philosophy. Milton’s philosophy of liberty, therefore, is compatible with the universal, 
utopian hierarchy of Paradise Lost. Whereas Hobbes views freedom as a condition of 
motion, and systems as artificial – illustrated most famously by the ‘artificial man’ of 
the Leviathan – Milton perceives freedom as immanent and vital, but systems as 
universal and pervasive. The universe of Paradise Lost, which is defined by the Fall of 
 
453 Kerr, ‘Milton’s Theology of Liberation’, pp. 359, 351 
454 Ibid., pp. 356-60. 
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Adam and Eve and the promise of millenarian ascension, is structured by its hierarchical 
system. 
The universe of Paradise Lost is constituted by a hierarchy that incorporates 
many of the essential aspects of Milton’s political philosophy and theology. As a 
structure of animist materialism, the universal hierarchy permits access to the celestial 
sphere through obedience. Spiritual metamorphosis is brought about by service to God 
and elevation through the hierarchy. This anticipates the kind of apocalyptic 
transformation that will occur after the millennium, where ‘God shall be all in all’ (iii. 
341). Until then, in characteristic utopian fashion, obedience is required, as Raphael 
suggests. Raphael’s prelapsarian instruction exhibits the essence of Milton’s utopian 
millenarianism: the individual is free to choose to obey, but that choice is encouraged 
by a penal hierarchical system that punishes transgression. In De Doctrina, Milton’s 
laborious scriptural interpretation is characterised as a godly service, which Milton 
hopes his reader is capable of emulating. Adam’s failure to fulfil this service, as we 
shall see, necessitates Michael’s rehabilitative postlapsarian education in the final two 
books of the poem. The universal hierarchy has Heaven at its helm, which epitomises 





Milton’s Heaven is an idealised totality. As the paragon of the universal hierarchy that 
Raphael describes to Adam, and the zenith of that hierarchy – the ideal to which the 
obedient, godly individual aspires – the Heaven in Paradise Lost is utopian. Amy 
Boesky has described Milton’s Heaven as a militarised totality.455 To understand 
Milton’s depiction of a hierarchy in Heaven, it is valuable to consider the godly 
republicanism of Henry Vane (1613-62), who Milton had praised in Sonnet 17 (CWJM 
iii. 291) for his advocacy of a separation of church and state. Chapter 6 showed how 
Milton’s 1659-60 texts shared utopian and millenarian ideas with Hobbes and 
Harrington, and also that his belief in liberty of conscience – specifically in the form of 
religious liberty discussed earlier in this chapter – marks him apart from them. By 
contrast, Feisal G. Mohamed argues that ‘Milton is clearly keeping company with the 
Vane circle in the critical years of 1659-60, and the ideas he promotes at this moment 
 
455 See Amy Boesky, ‘Milton’s Heaven and the Model of the English Utopia’, 91-110. 
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remain pervasive in his major poems.’456 Vane’s A Healing Question propounded 
(1656) and The Retired Mans Meditations (1655) illustrate the relationship between 
godly republicanism and utopian millenarianism.457 Vane’s angelology helps to 
elucidate the juncture between Milton’s theology and political philosophy and its 
manifestation in the Heaven of Paradise Lost.  
Theologically and politically, Vane shares considerable common ground 
with Milton. As part of the Council of State, Vane was involved with the Barebone’s 
Parliament that Cromwell forcibly dissolved in December 1653, but he maintained his 
distance from the Fifth Monarchist faction of the Council of State by suggesting that 
‘he was willing to defer his share in the reign of the saints until he came to heaven.’458 
In A Healing Question propounded (1656), he writes in implicit terms of Cromwell’s 
impact on the ‘good Old Cause’.459 Vane explains how the right to ‘be governed by 
National Councils, and successive Representatives of their own election’, which was 
‘ratified, as it were, in the blood of the last King’, has been repressed by ‘a great 
interruption’, which he defines as ‘accommodated to the private and selfish interest of 
a particular part’ and has resulted in disintegration of the commonwealth: ‘Hence it is 
that this compacted body is now falling asunder into many dissenting parts’ (2-3). 
Vane’s opposition to Cromwell in A Healing Question led to his arrest and 
imprisonment in 1656. The similarities that this chapter will acknowledge between 
Milton and Vane, therefore, must be considered in light of their differing support for 
Cromwell. Chapter 5 showed how Milton is necessarily distinguished from Nedham 
for his elitist attitude towards the people, which anticipated the utopianism of The 
Readie and Easie Way and did not align with Nedham’s interest theory. Milton 
nevertheless wrote in The Readie and Easie Way that ‘what I have spoken, is the 
language of the good old cause’ (CWJM vi. 520). Martin Dzelzainis argues that Milton 
viewed this slogan, coined by Vane, as representing a government that protects 
 
456 Feisal G. Mohamed, Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century England and the Making of the Modern 
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(1965), p. 507. 
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religious freedom: ‘This liberty of conscience which above all other things ought to be 
to all men dearest and most precious, no government more inclinable not to favor only 
but to protect, then a free Commonwealth’ (CWJM vi. 515). While Milton, as this 
study has argued, continued to support Cromwell during the Protectorate due to the 
latter’s protection of religious freedom, which is also in part why Nedham does the 
same, he considered a commonwealth like the one he proposed in The Readie and 
Easie Way preferable. Dzelzainis also posits that, while Milton did not tolerate 
Catholicism, which Vane did, their views on toleration were closer than is 
conventionally maintained.460 A comparison with Vane illuminates Milton’s 
similarities with godly republicanism, but it also further emphasises how Milton’s 
theology is his own and that, in Paradise Lost, it can be interpreted with an awareness 
of his utopian millenarianism. 
Milton’s Heaven in Paradise Lost is defined by its hierarchy. Although the 
Father refers to the ‘Thrones, Princedoms, Powers, Dominations’ (iii. 320), and again 
later to the ‘Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers’ (v. 601), he does not 
go into detail about these angelic ranks.461 Milton’s clearest departure from the 
Dionysian model is in ‘promoting the ministerial Archangels to the top of his angelic 
hierarchy, and demoting the Seraphim and Cherubim to the bottom’.462 Joad Raymond 
emphasises the significance of hierarchy in Heaven, but acknowledges that the 
militarised formation of Heaven overrides the Dionysian system, which suggests that 
the angels ‘do not constitute a single, coherent hierarchy’.463 The military depiction of 
Heaven has led Amy Boesky to argue that Milton’s Heaven is the most evident utopia in 
Paradise Lost.464 Boesky compares the rise of the New Model Army to contemporary 
utopias exhibiting ‘a civilian corps of trained and zealous workers, dedicated to the 
common goal of productivity.’ Not only does Boesky accommodate both Plattes’s 
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(2006), 123-48. 
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Macaria and Winstanley’s Law of Freedom into her definition, but she also includes Of 
Education: 
 
Discipline was to consolidate the corps of ideal students in the Miltonic academy, and similarly 
discipline governs the celestial community in Paradise Lost. Milton’s Heaven draws on 
contemporary utopian interest in regulation and discipline while offering one of the most elaborate 
presentations of the military aesthetic in the period.465 
 
The discipline evident in Of Education, which shares more with More’s Utopia than 
Cromwell’s New Model Army, is a prominent feature of Milton’s utopianism. While 
Vane lacks the military emphasis of Milton’s representation of Heaven, he does believe 
in a universal hierarchy that he discusses in detail. 
Vane defines his millenarian vision of a heavenly hierarchy in The Retired 
Mans Meditations, OR THE Mysterie and Power of GODLINESS (1655). Mohamed, in 
his lengthy discussion of angelology that looks back to the origins of the ninefold 
hierarchy in Dionysius, compares Vane’s angelic hierarchy to that of Milton in 
Paradise Lost.466 It is possible, however, to identify more evident and illuminating 
similarities between the two polemicists. Indeed, it is interesting that Vane encourages 
the reader to withhold judgment and ‘not to be prejudiced at the first view […] without 
a full and serious weighing of the whole; but by a diligent search and perusal of the 
Scriptures, whereon the things here witnessed’ (sig. a3). This resonates with Milton’s 
hope that a reader will be inspired by De Doctrina to embark on their own 
investigation of scripture (CWJM viii/1. 9). Vane offers in Meditations a lengthy 
interpretation of the hierarchical relationship between the saints, Heaven, and the 
millennium. He describes different groups of earthly people in hierarchical order: the 
first ‘know no higher rule at present, then this shadowy image of Christs natural 
perfection’; the second are Jews, described as ‘higher enlightened’ and the ‘seed of 
Abraham’ (126-8); the third, the idealised elect, are of the ‘Spiritual Seed’, and, 
‘through the blood of the Lamb, being received into the unity of their faith of the Son of 
God, have the use of the spiritual senses […] enabling them to hear and obey what the 
spirit saith unto the Churches’ (137). The blurred boundary between body and spirit in 
Vane’s depiction of the elect extends to him envisioning the elect as ‘being made one 
dead or crucified body with Christ’, which, following the second coming, 
 
465 Boesky, ‘Milton’s Heaven’, pp. 95, 97. 
466 For Dionysius, see Mohamed, In the Anteroom of Divinity, pp. 3-5. 
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metamorphoses into ‘one glorified body with Christ’ (403), during which ‘the believer 
hereby receives a raisedness of discerning and enlargedness of his natural mind, 
answering that effusion of spirit upon him, surpassing all natural knowledge of the 
uncrucified mind, causing him to see as he is seen’ (75).467  
Vane’s depiction of the saints constituting both a pre-millenarian 
‘crucified’ body and a spiritualised post-millenarian body exhibits the remarkably 
close relationship between the saints and Christ that Vane envisions. Vane explains 
that, in the ‘heavenly Jerusalem’, ‘where the Elect and holy Angels are to have their 
residence, howbeit in station inferior to the Church or general assembly of the first-
born, whose names are written in heaven, and who are the Lambs Bride and wife, 
whilst the Angels are but friends of the Bridegroom, and admitted into the secrets of 
the Bride-chamber […]’ (73). As Mohamed acknowledges, Vane envisages the saints 
as above the angels and in a marital union with Christ; the angels are only permitted 
access to the bridal chamber, rather than being an intimate part of it like the saints.468 
Vane differs from Milton in that he places the elect above the angels, whereas Milton 
does not articulate the structure of a post-millenarian Heaven. Where Milton’s 
depiction of the Son is at the helm of a united angelic entity – ‘your head I him 
appoint’ (v. 606), the Father announces to the assembled angels in Heaven – Vane 
portrays the saints as wielding the power of judgement on behalf of Christ:  
 
Secondly, as the Father gives authority to Christ in the capacity of the Sonne of man, to execute 
judgement as the only TENTATE, KING OF KINGS and LORD OF LORDS, under him, so 
Christ also shall give and derive to his body (the general assembly of the first-borne, whose 
names are written in heaven) authority to be the only Potentates, Lord of Lords, and King of 
Kings under him, whose Decrees and Ordinances, shall be binding unto all in heaven or in earth, 
or under the earth, next and immediately under Christ their head […] (409). 
 
By placing the elect in such a high position within the heavenly hierarchy, Vane 
identifies their unique value in Christ’s threefold governance. However, unlike Milton, 
this did not encourage Vane to become more elitist in his political beliefs. Although 
Milton did not envision such an elevated position for the elect, the prospect of the 
millennium exacerbated his disillusionment with the commons and, in turn, 
encouraged his utopian formulations, which drew away from Nedham and Vane’s 
republicanism. Vane’s exegetical discussion of a universal hierarchy, and especially a 
 
467 Cf. Of Reformation, in CPW i. 572. 
468 Mohamed, In the Anteroom of Divinity, p. 102. 
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hierarchy in Heaven, is comparable to Paradise Lost and Milton’s own knowledge and 
experience of godly republicanism. 
In Paradise Lost, the hierarchy of Heaven is depicted alongside utopian 
discipline early in Book V when Raphael recounts God’s appointment of the Son as his 
right hand. In Raphael’s initial description, the angels stand ‘Innumerable before th’ 
Almighty’s throne’, ‘Under their hierarchs in orders bright’: 
 
Ten thousand thousand ensigns high advanced, 
Standards and gonfalons ‘twixt van and rear 
Stream in the air, and for distinction serve 
Of hierarchies, of orders, and degrees    (v. 585, 587-91) 
 
As Raymond suggests, these military ranks contradict the Dionysian system that Milton 
accommodates in Heaven elsewhere. The emphasis here is on the extreme discipline 
needed to create order within the extreme number of angels present. The image is 
followed by a declaration by ‘the Father infinite’ that the Son will stand at his right 
hand to rule over Heaven: 
 
your head I him appoint; 
And by myself have sworn to him shall bow 
All knees in Heav’n, and shall confess him Lord 
Under his great vicegerent reign abide 
United as one individual soul     (v. 606-10) 
 
Where Vane envisions the saints as having a ‘vicegerent’ role above that of the angels, 
in Milton’s pre-millenarian Heaven, there is no saintly elect. Instead, resonating with 
Milton’s assertion in Of Reformation that ‘a commonwealth ought to be but as one huge 
Christian personage’ (CPW i. 572) and with the unity of his studious London in 
Areopagitica (CPW ii. 553-5), the angels constitute a unified and disciplined collective. 
This collective is, moreover, monistic: rather than a ‘personage’, the angels form ‘one 
individual soul’, but the Father appoints the Son as its ‘head’, suggesting a corporeal 
aspect to the entity. As the angels experience bodily functions and yet are at the spiritual 
end of the universal hierarchy, they represent the linear continuum of spirit and matter 
that Milton had theorised since the early 1640s. Comparable to the image of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan state, depicted on the frontispiece of Leviathan, in which the sovereign is 
constituted by the bodies of its citizens, Milton’s representation of Heaven in Paradise 
Lost corresponds with the concept of a utopian totality. 
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The need to defend Heaven from Satan’s rebellion, or, given God’s 
omnipotence, perform the act of defence, militarises the utopian depiction of Heaven. 
Milton’s God, aware of Satan’s plan to incite insurgency against the Godhead, 
addresses the Son with distinctively militarised language:  
 
Nearly it now concerns us to be sure 
Of our omnipotence, and with what arms 
We mean to hold what anciently we claim 
Of deity or empire, such a foe 
Is rising, who intends to erect his throne 
Equal to ours, throughout the spacious North   (v. 721-6) 
 
Milton establishes a careful balance between ‘deity or empire’: the supernal and godly 
language of ‘omnipotence’ and ‘erect’ contrasts with the imperial tone of ‘arms’ and 
‘throne’. The utopian stability and security of the totality, which God asserts to be 
embodied in the Son earlier in Book V, requires defence; its omnipotent permanence 
must be upheld. This translates to Milton’s depiction in Book VI of the angelic forces in 
an even more concentrated totality than before, as they marshal against Satan’s 
insurrection. The ‘powers militant, / That stood for Heaven, in mighty quadrate joined / 
Of union irresistible’ and marched ‘In silence their bright legions, to the sound / Of 
instrumental harmony’ (vi. 61-3, 64-5). The cohesive movement is a fitting illustration 
of perfect, military discipline. ‘On they move’, Raphael continues, 
 
Indissolubly firm; nor obvious hill, 
Nor straitening vale, nor wood, nor stream divides 
Their perfect ranks; for high above the ground 
Their march was, and the passive air upbore  
Their nimble tread […]     (vi. 68-73) 
 
The heavenly totality is whole and perfect in its unassailable permanence. The 
uncompromising cohesion of the angelic collective mirrors the military status of 
Heaven. As we shall see, it is to this perfect, utopian totality that Adam will aspire to 
return following Michael’s postlapsarian education in Book XII. 
Milton’s Heaven is, therefore, like the wider universe of Paradise Lost, 
defined by hierarchy. Raymond’s concept of a ‘flexible hierarchy’ captures the 
complex relationship between status and proximity with God afforded by the universal 
hierarchy that Raphael describes: ‘Milton’s theory of matter, free will, and evil 
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depends on flexible hierarchies.’469 Abdiel, in his passionate and solitary rejection of 
Satan’s sinful rhetoric, articulates a view of progressive heavenly unity, whereby the 
hierarchy of Heaven accommodates an elevating association with the Godhead: 
 
all the spirits of heaven 
By him created in their bright degrees, 
Crowned them with glory, and to their glory named 
Thrones, dominations, princedoms, virtues, powers, 
Essential powers, nor by his reign obscured, 
But more illustrious made, since he the head 
One of our number thus reduced becomes   (v. 838-43) 
 
The final juxtaposition of ‘reduced becomes’ represents the potential for ‘One of our 
number’ to ascend the heavenly hierarchy, and therefore the relationship between 
hierarchical rank and collective ennoblement brought about by connection to God, 
especially with the Son as the head of the angelic collective. Given the exalting 
influence of the Son at its head, the embodied angelic entity is comparable to 
Raphael’s explanation of the universal hierarchy. It may not be an explicit Neoplatonic 
chain of being, but there is a vital consistency between Milton’s Heaven and the 
universal hierarchy that Raphael describes. The flexibility of this hierarchy depends on 
an essential quality that encourages elevation from material to immaterial, from Earth 
to Heaven: obedience.  
The one figure in Paradise Lost who chooses not to obey, and thereby 
incited a futile rebellion against God in Heaven, is Satan. Raphael describes to Adam 
in Book V how Satan, as one of the highest archangels, could not accept that the Son 
was higher up the universal hierarchy than he was: ‘he of the first, / If not the first 
Archangel, great in power, / In favour and pre-eminence, yet fraught / With envy 
against the Son of God’ (v. 659-62). ‘Affecting all equality with God’ (763), Satan 
erects a ‘royal seat’ (756) in the hope of artificially elevating himself to his desired 
status. It is here, in a further corruption of the speech that God made about the Son just 
a few lines earlier, that Satan addresses his own ‘Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, 
Virtues, Powers’, but expresses concern that   
 
If these magnific titles yet remain 
Not merely titular, since by decree 
 
469 Raymond, Milton’s Angels, pp. 262-3. 
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Another now hath to himself engrossed 
All power, and us eclipsed under the name 
Of King anointed […]     (v. 772-7) 
 
Satan’s argues that the Son’s appointment at the head of Heaven overshadows the 
hierarchical positions of the rest of the angels. Such a reduction of hierarchical value, 
Satan explains to his fellow apostates, in a perverted formulation of Milton’s concept 
of liberty, impacts their condition of freedom: ‘if not equal all, yet free, / Equally free; 
for orders and degrees / Jar not with liberty, but well consist’ (v. 791-3). For Milton, 
the universal hierarchy provides the opportunity for mobility if Adam chooses to obey; 
for Satan, the inability to raise to the status of the Son is a limitation that necessitates 
transgression in exercise of that essential freedom to choose. The consequence of 
Satan’s rebellion, as God announces pre-emptively after anointing the Son, is to fall to 
and remain steadfastly at the base of the universal hierarchy, ‘Into utter darkness, deep 
engulfed, his place / Ordained without redemption, without end’ (v. 614-15). Like 
Adam and Eve, Satan is ‘free to fall’ (iii. 99); unlike Adam and Eve, though, Satan 
does not have the opportunity to be forgiven and reascend. The manner in which 
Milton’s hierarchy is flexible corresponds to how freedom, both in Paradise Lost and 
in his wider corpus, is at once individual and systemised. Adam and Eve must navigate 
this hierarchical system: they have the choice to remain steadfastly obedient like 






In Eden, Adam and Eve must maintain their obedience in order to ascend to Heaven 
rather than descend – or fall – to a lesser Eden, or even Hell. Adam and Eve come to 
understand the condition of Milton’s universe through Raphael’s prelapsarian 
education, which mirrors the postlapsarian counterpart that Michael provides in Books 
XI and XII.470 As Milton republished Of Education in 1673, he appears to have 
maintained the elitist educational ideas presented in the tract in 1644, which was 
discussed in Chapter 2. Critics who have read the educational aspects of Paradise Lost 
 
470 For a recent discussion of education in Paradise Lost generally, see Karen Edwards, ‘Learning and 
Loving in Paradise Lost’, in Milton Studies, 62/2 (2020), 239-51. 
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with an awareness of Of Education have often focused on Milton’s asserted intention in 
the tract that the purpose of learning was to ‘regain to know God aright’. Michael Allen 
suggests that Raphael and Michael represent two different styles of education – the 
former too lenient and the latter too critical – neither of which succeed; Adam’s 
discussions with the Father, by contrast, represent a successful education, which enables 
Adam to ‘know’ God in the manner to which Milton aspires in Of Education.471 Erin 
Webster has recently observed a similar relationship between Of Education and 
Paradise Lost, acknowledging the ‘empirical flavour of Milton’s epistemology’.472 
While there is value in these arguments, neither acknowledge the Hartlibian context of 
Of Education, which informs a reading of education in Paradise Lost. As Chapter 2 has 
shown, the idealised intention of ‘regaining to know God aright’ – the idea of education 
and learning regaining something lost – is inherently Baconian. Milton more often 
identifies postlapsarian learning as studious scriptural research in order to discover – or 
rediscover – a lost Truth, as he suggests in Areopagitica – the ‘generall and brotherly 
search after Truth’ (CPW ii. 554) – and exemplifies in the composition of De Doctrina. 
Adam’s initial discovery of the world, in which he ‘learns’ God, is a representation of 
Baconian empiricism. As the following two sections will show, however, empiricism 
can not only help an individual to understand God, but it can also encourage characters 
like Adam and Eve to become enraptured by sensual experience. The ability to 
moderate such experience – in an exercise of self-control – is an essential quality of the 
elect individual that Adam must learn at the end of the poem. 
There has been much debate over Milton’s Baconianism and his sympathy 
for new science, as it developed from the Hartlib Circle through to the Royal Society. 
Alvin Snyder argues that Milton ‘found himself drawn towards the new philosophy and 
scientific ideology of the Great Instauration’, with a particular focus on origins, which 
he aligns to Bacon.473 William Poole, by contrast, argues for Milton’s distance from the 
organisations of new science. He argues that ‘Milton remained a very peripheral contact 
of the Hartlibians’ and equates this to his continued distance from the Royal Society, 
 
471 Michael Allen, ‘Divine Instruction: Of Education and the Pedagogy of Raphael, Michael, and the 
Father’, in Milton Quarterly, 26/4 (1992), pp. 114-17, 120; for an alternative discussion of Paradise Lost 
and Of Education, see Stephen J. Schuler, ‘Sanctification in Milton’s Academy: Reassessing the Purposes 
of Of Education and the Pedagogy of Paradise Lost’, in Milton Quarterly, 43/1 (2009), 39-56. 
472 Erin Webster, The Curious Eye: Optics and Imaginative Literature in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 126, see generally 125-7. 
473 Alvin Snyder, Origin and Authority in Seventeenth-Century England: Bacon, Milton, Butler (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 91; on Milton and Bacon, see also David Carroll Simon, Light 
Without Heat: The Observational Mode from Bacon to Milton (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018). 
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exemplified by correspondence with members of the Society, such as Henry Oldenburg 
(1619-77).474 As Chapters 2 and 3 of this study have shown, while Milton can be 
defined neither as a Hartlibian nor a Comenian, he espoused many central Hartlibian 
ideas, such as, most clearly, the Baconianism of Of Education. Members of the Royal 
Society remained wary of Milton: John Beale (1608-83), for instance, was concerned 
with Milton’s depiction of Satan in Paradise Lost, but also considered how Milton’s 
services could be employed by the Royal Society.475 Milton may not have engaged with 
contemporary scientific movements of the Royal Society, but the Baconianism of some 
of his 1640s writings survived into his later works. ‘While there is no denying that it is 
possible to situate Milton in some kind of “dialogue” with contemporary science,’ Poole 
argues, ‘the dynamics of this dialogue are affected by other variables, notably the 
appropriation of radicalism, particularly theological radicalism.’476 This study has 
identified in Milton’s utopian millenarianism precisely this bridge between Milton’s 
theology and his Baconianism. While Milton became aloof from the Hartlibians in the 
late-1640s and remained separate from the Royal Society, his utopian millenarianism 
maintained the view that knowledge, in a Baconian fashion, could regain proximity to 
God by reconstituting truth. M. L. Donnelly asserts that Milton’s characterisation of ‘the 
lonely and heroic champion of truth against the sottish multitude, would have found no 
congruence in Bacon’s Atlantic collaborative enterprise’.477 Milton’s utopianism was 
institutionalised in Of Education and The Readie and Easie Way, but, as the focus of 
Milton’s utopianism became more internalised in the 1660s, so the focus of Milton’s 
Baconianism became more individualised. While Adam is an individual in Paradise 
Lost, the exposition of his post-creation experience nonetheless reflects Baconian 
empiricism. As Bacon advocates in The Advancement of Learning, ‘pure knowledg of 
nature and universality’ is comparable to ‘a knowledge by the light whereof man did 
give names unto other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him’ (OFB iv. 
6).  
 
474 William Poole, ‘Milton and Science: A Caveat’, in Milton Quarterly, 38/1 (2004), 18-34; for 
contrasting interpretations of Milton and science, see Karen Edwards, Milton and the Natural World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Catherine Gimelli Martin, ‘“What if the Sun Be Centre 
to the World?”: Milton’s Epistemology, Cosmology, and Paradise of Fools Reconsidered’, in Modern 
Philology, 99/2 (2001), 231-65. 
475 On Beale and Milton, see Poole, ‘Two Early Readers of Milton: John Beale and Abraham Hill’, in 
Milton Quarterly, 38/2 (2004), pp. 76-88. 
476 Poole, ‘Milton and Science’, p. 28. 
477 M. L. Donnelly, ‘Francis Bacon’s early reputation in England and the question of John Milton’s 
alleged “Baconianism”’, in Prose Studies, 14/1 (1991), p. 17. 
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The empiricism of Eden reflects Bacon’s natural philosophy: Adam comes 
to know God by his decisive and dominating understanding of Eden’s natural world and 
its inhabitants. In Book VIII, Adam explains to Raphael how, having just been created, 
his power to name facets and creatures of the natural world gives him both 
understanding and control. Adam explains how he tried to speak, ‘and forthwith spake, / 
My tongue obeyed and readily I could name / What’er I saw.’ Adam’s natural ability to 
name is illustrated by his emphatic second person address of nature: ‘Thou sun’; ‘thou 
enlightened earth’; ‘Ye hills and dales, ye rivers’ (viii. 271-3; 273; 274; 275). Adam 
then questions ‘how came I thus, how here?’ (277), which is answered by the Father in 
a theophany. It is here that the Father explains to Adam his dominance over the natural 
world, and the role of naming, which Adam had begun to do impulsively, in bringing 
about this dominion: 
 
Not only these fair bounds, but all the earth 
To thee and to thy race I give; as lords 
Possess it, and all things that therein live, 
Or live in sea, or air, beast, fish, and fowl. 
In sign whereof each bird and beast behold 
After their kinds; I bring them to receive  
From thee their names, and pay thee fealty 
With low subjection […]     (viii. 338-45) 
 
The names come directly from Adam in a display of the natural power he has over the 
animals and the ‘fealty’ they show him. Adam’s empirical knowledge, of learning from 
a direct and sensual understanding of nature, is Baconian in its relationship to 
dominance. The Father encourages the empirical process by prompting Adam, who 
questions why he is alone, to explain why the ‘various living creatures’ of Eden are not 
sufficient company (369). Milton’s God, aware that he is going to create Eve, 
encourages Adam to look beyond himself and to the natural world. In response, Adam 
expresses himself in hierarchical language – ‘Hast thou not made me here thy 
substituted, / And these inferior far beneath me set?’ (381-2) – and provides evidence 
through examples from nature, referring to ‘Each with their kind, lion with lioness; / So 
fitly them in pairs thou hast combined’ (393-4). By naming the Edenic creatures that 
God has presented to him, Adam is able to understand the subtle distinctions between 
them. As a result, Adam comes to an understanding of the universal hierarchy. 
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The Father then elevates Adam’s focus from the natural world to God 
himself, which completes Adam’s empirical process from natural world to knowing 
God. The Father responds to Adam’s comparison of himself to natural creatures with a 
comment on how he is ‘alone / From all eternity, for none I know / Second to me or 
like, equal much less’ (viii. 405-7). Adam replies by drawing on his understanding of 
distinctions in the natural world; he uses language of elevation, in accordance with 
Milton’s ordered universe: 
 
To attain 
The height and depth of thy eternal ways 
All human thoughts come short, supreme of things; 
Thou in thyself art perfect, and in thee 
Is no deficience found; not so is man, 
But in degree, the cause of his desire 
By conversation with his like to help, 
Or solace his defects.     (viii. 412-19) 
 
It is from Adam’s understanding of God’s ineffable and inscrutable nature that he can 
identify his own lesser status, ‘in degree’, and understand his need for conversation and 
procreation.478 One of the distinctions that Adam observes between himself and God is 
the Father’s ability to elevate the status and condition of the Edenic creatures: ‘I by 
conversing cannot these erect / From prone, nor in their ways complacence find’ (432-
3).’ God commends Adam for ‘knowing not of beasts alone, / Which thou hast rightly 
named, but of thyself’, particularly because Adam was made in ‘My image’, which was 
‘not imparted to the brute’ (438-9; 441). Adam raises his empirical gaze from the 
Edenic creatures to the Father, which helps him to understand himself. Milton, 
therefore, exalts empirical knowledge as a prelapsarian skill that God nurtures by his 
questioning of Adam. 
However, Adam’s excessive use of the senses – as a corruption of Edenic 
empiricism – also exposes his fallible nature, and his inadequate response to Raphael’s 
education. When Adam invites Raphael to join him and Eve in their bower, he does so 
using hierarchical language: 
 
 
478 Cf. Milton’s concern in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce that marital partners should enjoy a 
‘correspondence […] of the mind’ (CPW ii. 326), rather than just carnal union; see also Diane Purkiss, 
who suggests that ‘conversation’ was a ‘euphemism for sex in the period’, in ‘The Rhetoric of Milton’s 
Divorce Tracts’, note 14, p. 192. 
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Heavenly stranger, please to taste 
These bounties which our nourisher, from whom 
All perfect good unmeasured out, descends, 
To us for food and for delight hath caused 
The earth to yield; unsavoury food perhaps 
To spiritual natures; only this I know, 
That one celestial Father gives to all.    (v. 397-403) 
 
Raphael’s education is intended to fill the gap in Adam’s knowledge. Where Adam 
intuits through his empirical process that there is a universal order, Raphael explicitly 
educates him with his monistic and Neoplatonic description of the universal hierarchy, 
and, as discussed above, the obedience required to remain or elevate within this 
hierarchy. It is, therefore, significant that Adam does not appear to fully understand 
Raphael’s teachings. Adam explains how Eve was created following his encounter with 
the Father. In his account, Adam responds to Eve in much the same way as he did with 
Eden earlier, but he does so by allowing his senses to overwhelm reason, and thereby 
ignore Raphael’s lengthy education. Adam explains how Eve ‘on her bestowed / Too 
much ornament, in outward show / Elaborate’ (viii. 537-9), and acknowledges that ‘Of 
nature her the inferior’, but he admits that  
 
when I approach 
Her loveliness, so absolute she seems 
And in her self complete, so well to know 
Her own, that what she wills to do or say, 
Seems wisest, virtuousest discreetest, best   (viii. 546-50) 
 
Adam is overwhelmed by Eve’s appearance: unlike his empirical interaction with Eden, 
Adam’s response to Eve is sensual, which draws away from his understanding of God. 
He affirms this when he says that ‘All higher knowledge in her presence falls / 
Degraded’, for ‘Authority and reason on her wait’ (551-2; 554). ‘Ignoring his rational 
superiority to Eve’, Mohamed explains, ‘Adam focuses instead on sensual desire’, 
which ‘puts him directly at odds with the internal fitness to which his celestial physician 
has devoted his efforts.’479 Adam is not the only character in Paradise Lost to become 
overwhelmed by sensual stimulus: Eve herself is enchanted by her own reflection when 
she was first created (iv. 453-91) and Satan becomes ‘Stupidly good’ as a consequence 
 
479 Mohamed, In the Anteroom, pp. 119-22, 127. 
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of beholding Eve (ix. 455-72). The difference with Adam is that he has received 
Raphael’s education. As a result, his failure to learn from Raphael here anticipates the 
Fall later in the poem and signifies the importance of self-control that Adam will need 
to exhibit in order to reattain God’s favour, and which the Son of Paradise Regain’d 
exemplifies. 
While Milton locates Baconian empiricism in Eden, he also identifies its 
limits: Adam must adhere to Raphael’s explanation of obedience, and be aware of the 
universal hierarchy, in which there is both reward by elevation and punishment through 
a ‘fall’. Empiricism is a means of knowing God. With only a few scaffolding comments 
from God, Adam swiftly – over just a few lines – moves from sense and sensual 
response to nature to an appreciation of God and the structured order of Milton’s 
universe. Adam, nevertheless, despite Raphael’s warnings, exhibits the sensuous 
fallibility that marks the consequence of the Fall, whereby he is ‘fondly overcome with 
female charm’ and, having eaten of the forbidden fruit, ‘he on Eve / Began to cast 
lascivious eye, she him / As wantonly repaid’ (ix. 999; 1014-15). Indeed, Adam’s 
failure to adhere to Raphael’s education has led some critics to suggest that Raphael’s 
education is performative rather than constructive: Philip Gallagher argues that 
Raphael’s ‘descent turns out in the event to have been a restorative work of merciful 
supererogation’.480 That Adam’s empiricism is associated with the Fall accords with 
Milton’s belief that obedience is required to attain the millennium in the postlapsarian 
world. Whereas Adam’s innate, empirical skills indicate his natural ability to withstand 
the Fall and suggest that he is ‘Sufficient to have stood’ (iii. 99), the Fall means that 
Michael has the difficult task of re-educating the transgressed Adam. Raphael’s 
education is affirmative, in that Adam is already innately sufficient; Michael’s 
postlapsarian teachings, by contrast, are rehabilitative, in that Adam has fallen and must 
uncover a truth now disparate and lost. 
 
 
POSTLAPSARIAN EDUCATION: REGAINING PARADISE 
 
Adam makes clear progress in Michael’s postlapsarian education, despite being a more 
challenging pupil than Raphael encountered. Critics such as Allen and Schuler 
 
480 Philip Gallagher, Milton, the Bible, and Misogyny (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990), p. 
167; see also Margaret Thickstun, Milton’s Paradise Lost: Moral Education (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), pp. 105-18. 
 217 
discussed above have focused on the teaching qualities and methods of Raphael, 
Michael and the Father. A problem with these arguments is that they assume a 
consistency of pupil, or at least deny the significance of the Fall as a transitional and 
complicating factor in the progress of Adam’s education: the ‘similarities between 
Michael’s instruction and Raphael’s teaching should suggest that the Fall does not 
drastically alter the educational process; rather, the Fall simply makes the process more 
difficult.’481 However, Adam’s initial response to Michael’s visions signifies his fallen 
condition; he is distinct from the Adam that Raphael educates earlier in the poem. 
Having ascended the ‘hill / Of Paradise the highest’, which recalls the height of God’s 
hill in Book V and Satan’s perverse reflection of it, Michael displays to Adam ‘visions 
of God’, or an account of biblical history from the reader’s perspective (xi. 377-8; 377). 
Adam is first exposed to Cain murdering Abel, as Abel, ‘deadly pale / Groaned out his 
soul with gushing blood effused’ (xi. 446-7), the graphic language of which illustrates 
the visionary quality of this education. Adam’s immediate reaction is one of incredulity, 
if not defiance: ‘O teacher, some great mischief hath befallen / To that meek man, who 
well had sacrificed; / Is piety thus and pure devotion paid?’ (xi. 450-2). Allowing the 
vision to overwhelm his reason – now a familiar mistake for Adam – Adam’s rhetorical 
question appears as a challenge, as he blindly questions why Abel is killed. Such a 
confrontational question is of stark contrast to the inquisitive questioning Adam 
displayed in his discussions with Raphael and God. While the Fall may have been 
inevitable, Adam was still ‘Sufficient to have stood’ (iii. 99) for Raphael; for Michael, 
Adam is fallen and must now begin the journey to recovery and ascension.  
In a sign of early progress, Adam’s defensive pity for his firstborn sons soon 
gives way to anguish over the reality of death that all mankind must experience, images 
of which Michael provides through the ‘lazar-house’ of sickness, ‘wherein were laid / 
Numbers of all diseased, all maladies’ (xi. 479-80). Adam laments, 
 
O miserable mankind, to what fall 
Degraded, to what wretched state reserved! 
Better end here unborn. Why is life giv’n 
To be thus wrested from us? rather why 
Obtruded on us thus? who if we knew  
What we receive, would either not accept  
Life offered, or soon beg to lay it down, 
Glad to be so dismissed in peace.    (xi. 500-7) 
 
481 Schuler, ‘Sanctification of Milton’s Academy’, p. 53. 
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These rhetorical questions draw parallels with Adam’s wider postlapsarian existential 
questioning, which he directs to God himself in Book X: 
 
Did I request thee, Maker, from my clay 
To mould me man, did I solicit thee 
From darkness to promote me, or here place 
In this delicious garden?     (x. 743-6) 
 
Mirroring the progression of the Father’s questions for Adam immediately after he had 
been created, Adam shifts from an egocentric focus in Book X to a broader sympathy 
for his sons in Book XI and then, finally, to an encompassing mourning of all 
‘miserable mankind’. Although Adam is making progress, he is a different student to 
the individual whom Raphael taught. Michael’s education is, therefore, necessarily 
restorative: where Raphael’s explanation of hierarchy and obedience was not enough to 
overcome Adam’s sensual overreliance, Michael’s prophetic visions use the senses to 
more tangibly show the fallen man why obedience is best. The visions themselves – as a 
sensory means of teaching – may be an effective and pragmatic pedagogical decision on 
Michael’s part. 
Adam continues to make progress by responding appropriately to and 
identifying with the elect individuals in Michael’s visions. By comparing what Adam 
learns about suffering to the experience of the Levellers in 1649, Williams argues that 
the latter two books of Paradise Lost ‘level’ boundaries and hierarchy through unity 
with God.482 As this chapter has shown, hierarchy is a defining theme of Paradise Lost, 
and this is no less clear in the latter two books of the poem. As Hammond explains, 
‘“Few” is a word that frequently appears in Paradise Lost, signifying the small group in 
which – rather than in the people – Milton has now invested his hopes.’ The trajectory 
of Milton’s elitism is one of increasing exclusivity: ‘In the postlapsarian world it is 
often not even the few but only the solitary individual who now embodies faithfulness 
[…].’483 This is illustrated by Michael’s vision of a debauched, sinful world, in which 
only an elect few remain steadfast and obey God. Having depicted a scene of a siege, 
where ‘carcasses and arms th’ensanguined field / Deserted’, Michael reassures Adam of 
 
482 Williams, Milton’s Leveller God, pp. 341-5. 
483 Hammond, Milton and the People, pp. 227; 228 
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what will happen to the ‘one rising, eminent / In wise deport’, who ‘spake much of right 
and wrong, / Of justice, of religion, truth and peace’: 
 
him the Most High 
Rapt in a balmy cloud with winged steeds 
Did, as thou saw’st, receive to walk with God 
High in salvation and the climes of bliss, 
Exempt from death, to show thee what reward 
Awaits the good, the rest what punishment   (xi. 654; 665-7; 705-10) 
 
This initiates a series of Old Testament stories, in which Michael focuses on the select 
individuals that promote God and truth to their people. Michael’s description of Noah, 
for instance, has a significant influence on Adam. In a time where ‘all shall turn 
degenerate, all depraved’, ‘One man except, the only son of light’ will ‘them admonish, 
and before them set / The paths of righteousness’ (xi. 806, 813-14). Adam responds 
directly to the vision of Noah, declaring that he no longer feels the need to ‘lament for 
one whole world’, but can instead ‘rejoice / For one man found so perfect and so just’ 
(xi. 874; 875-6). Where he earlier shifted away from a selfish focus on himself and 
towards all of ‘miserable mankind’, he now returns to a celebration of the success and 
obedience of elect individuals, distinct from his earlier concern for his fallen 
descendants. The elect individual compensates for the decimation of an entire world. 
Just as Of Education illuminated our understanding of the Baconian qualities of Eden 
when Adam was first created, so it shines a light on Adam’s development as an elite 
individual through Michael’s education. The celebration of the elect in Paradise Lost 
resonates with Milton’s belief in the education of the elite serving as a necessary means 
of bringing about greater unity with God and greater societal progress. As Adam 
recognises and aspires to the ideal of these elect individuals, so he is himself fulfilling 
that ideal.  
The millennium serves as the final inspiration for Adam to return to 
obedience.484 Having witnessed the Hebraic republic, Adam asks Michael ‘why to those 
/ Among whom God will deign to dwell on earth / So many and so various laws are 
giv’n’ (xii. 280-2). Adam’s valid question solicits a valuable response from Michael, 
who identifies the millenarian purpose of obedience: while the ‘law appears imperfect’, 
 
484 For discussions of millenarianism in Paradise Lost, see Stella P. Revard, ‘Milton and Millenarianism’ 
in Milton and the Ends of Time, pp. 56-62; Malabika Sarkar, ‘Astronomical Signs in Paradise Lost: 
Milton, Ophiucus, and the Millennial Debate’, in Milton and the Ends of Time, pp. 88-92. 
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Michael explains, it is intended ‘to resign them in full time / Up to a better cov’nant, 
disciplined / From shadowy types to truth, from flesh to spirit’ (xii. 300, 301-3). This 
recalls the promise that Raphael made to Adam that man could eventually ascend to the 
spiritual status of angels. Michael’s prophecy of the second coming encodes the idea of 
a spiritual metamorphosis of matter:  
 
And thence shall come, 
When this world’s dissolution shall be ripe, 
With glory and power to judge both quick and dead, 
To judge th’ unfaithful dead, but to reward  
His faithful, and receive them into bliss, 
Whether in Heav’n or earth, for then the earth 
Shall all be Paradise, far happier place 
Than this Eden, and far happier days    (xii. 458-65) 
 
‘The transformation of the universe at the end of time’, Juliet Cummins suggests, ‘is 
achieved in Paradise Lost through material transformation.’485 In accordance with the 
emphasis on the elite few throughout Michael’s education, Adam asks ‘what will betide 
the few / His faithful, left among th’ unfaithful herd, / The enemies of truth’ (xii. 480-
2). Michael responds to this not only with a story of the disciples, but also by indicating 
that the role that the disciples play in spreading truth in a world of sin will also be the 
role that the elect must take throughout Christian history.486 Michael’s final description 
of ‘New heavens, new earth, ages of endless date / Founded in righteousness and peace 
and love’ solicits Adam’s conclusive declaration of obedience:  
 
Greatly instructed I shall hence depart, 
Greatly in peace of thought, and have my fill 
Of knowledge, what his vessel can contain; 
Beyond which was my folly to aspire.  
Henceforth I learn, that to obey is best, 
And love with fear the only God […]    (xii. 557-62) 
 
Adam does not seek more knowledge; he recognises that ‘beyond is all abyss, / Eternity, 
whose end no eye can reach’ (xii. 555-6). Adam will not replicate the act of 
overreaching that led to the Fall. He will, instead, obey: with a knowledge of what will 
 
485 Juliet Cummins, ‘Milton and Apocalyptic Transformations’, p. 170. 
486 See Hammond, Milton and the People, p. 229. 
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result from his continued obedience, he now emulates the elect individuals of Michael’s 
visions. Aligning with the relationship between utopianism and millenarianism 
identified in this thesis, Adam’s conformity will, ultimately, result in his elevation 
beyond Eden and to millenarian unity with God.  
Adam’s postlapsarian, rehabilitative education, is the part of Paradise Lost 
that most directly relates to Milton’s own postlapsarian condition. Throughout his prose 
works, Milton had increasingly developed a belief in the elect individual. By the mid-
1660s, Milton, whose disillusionment with the English people had become irredeemably 
entrenched, would have naturally invested his faith and creative energies in an 
individual such as Adam, who, having fallen, commits to obedience in order to 
reintegrate into the universal hierarchy and, ultimately, ascend to angelic participation. 
Claude Stulting observes how, in the final two books of the epic, ‘rather than being 
grounded externally in the materiality of the created order, Adam’s and Eve’s relation to 
God becomes radically interiorized’.487 Where Adam comes to a prelapsarian 
understanding of God through his empirical observations of the Edenic natural world, 
his postlapsarian condition necessitates internal self-control, the virtue for which Milton 
praised Cromwell in Defensio Secunda, and which, as we shall see in the following 
chapter, would become a central motif in Paradise Regain’d. As Michael’s reference to 
‘shadowy types to truth’ suggests, to emulate Adam, Milton requires his reader to 
labour through scriptural study, just as Milton himself had done in De Doctrina, and 
which he idealised in Areopagitica. The distinction between Raphael’s affirmative and 
Michael’s restorative education is significant. Adam and Eve’s transgression removes 
them from the totality of the universal hierarchy; the promise of the millennium by 
Michael and the example of their elect, godly descendants, inspires in Adam the utopian 
obedience and self-control necessary to secure eschatological reunification with God. 
Adam’s reaction to Michael’s education exemplifies how elect individuals should act in 
Milton’s time: obedience to God through internal self-control, realised by a condition of 






487 Claude N. Stulting Jr., ‘“New Heav’ns, new Earth”: Apocalypse and the Loss of Sacramentality in the 
Postlapsarian Books of Paradise Lost’, in Milton and the Ends of Time, p. 191. 
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Paradise Lost exhibits multiple facets of Milton’s utopian millennium. The hierarchy 
that pervades the poem is defined by the totality of Heaven: as the hierarchical head, it 
is a utopian ideal from which Adam and Eve, through transgression, fall away, and to 
which, through obedience, they aspire to return. As in Milton’s wider corpus, utopian 
obedience in Paradise Lost is necessary to achieve the millenarian ideal promised to 
Adam by Michael at the end of the epic. The Baconian utopianism of Adam’s 
prelapsarian empiricism – individualised, rather than monumentalised as in Salomon’s 
House – results in an overreliance on sensual experience. In the postlapsarian world, it 
is obedience to God, the exercise of religious freedom that Milton had idealised 
throughout his prose works and which formed a central feature of his utopian 
millenarianism, that promises reunification with God and ascension of the universal 
hierarchy. Milton depicts an epic universe in which utopian means achieve millenarian 
ends. The individualised focus on Adam anticipates Milton’s most complete depiction 
of his utopian millennium in the figure of the Son of Paradise Regain’d. The decision 
to obey God is an exercise in religious liberty. Adam begins to appreciate this 
postlapsarian reality in the final books of Paradise Lost; the Son of Paradise Regain’d, 





















Paradise Regain’d: The Utopian Millennium 
 
Milton most clearly realises his utopian millennium in the figure of the Son in Paradise 
Regain’d (1671). Where the pedagogical final two books of Paradise Lost depict 
Adam’s rehabilitative learning curve, from the Fall to his vow of obedience in the final 
lines of the poem, the Son in Paradise Regain’d is the embodiment of the obedience 
that Michael teaches.488 Milton makes the distinction between ‘one man’s disobedience 
lost’ and the ‘Recovered Paradise to all mankind, / By one man’s firm obedience fully 
tried’ (i. 2; 3-4) explicit in the opening lines of the brief epic.489 This chapter will argue 
that Milton’s Jesus demonstrates his status as Christ through his utopian will: a perfect, 
unfaltering resilience to temptation that secures the millennium for mankind. The Son, 
therefore, becomes a representation of truth sparring against satanic falsehood, which in 
Areopagitica served as part of Milton’s argument against pre-publication licensing: ‘Let 
her and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open 
encounter’ (CPW ii. 561).490 The chapter will use Milton’s proximity to contemporary 
Quakerism to illuminate this depiction of the Son: Milton’s steadfast belief in liberty of 
conscience not only contributes to the internal focus of Paradise Regain’d, but it also 
establishes a common ground between the blind poet and contemporary Quakerism. The 
individualism of the idealised Son, moreover, aligns with Milton’s entrenched 
disaffection with the commons. Far removed from the backsliding English people, with 
whom he had long been disillusioned, the Son embodies Milton’s perfectionist 
elitism.491 The total self-control that the Son exhibits, resembling similar qualities that 
Milton praises in Cromwell in Defensio Secunda, is representative of an inner utopia. 
Having shown Milton’s Quaker context, this chapter will assert that Milton’s utopian 
millennium is realised in the figure of the Son and, as Milton aspires to emulate the 
qualities of the hero of the brief epic, in Milton himself. 
 
488 For Adam’s declaration of obedience, see Paradise Lost, book xii, lines 557-62 
489 See Barbara Lewalski, Milton’s Brief Epic: The Genre, Meaning, and Art of Paradise Regain’d 
(London: Methuen, 1966); Milton describes Job as a ‘brief model’ of the epic form in The Reason of 
Church Government (1642), in CPW i. 813. 
490 On Milton’s defence of heresy, which he initially articulates in Areopagitica on these terms, see Of 
Civil Power, CPW vii. 250-2; Of True Religion Hæresie, Schism, Toleration (1673), CPW viii. 422-7. 
491 See Milton, Eikonoklastes, in CWJM, vi. 424, and chapter 4 of this study; see also The Readie and 
Easie Way, in CWJM, vi. 501, and chapter 6 of this study. 
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Thomas Corns posits that Paradise Regain’d exhibits a continuity between 
Milton’s political and poetical works, in which Milton’s self-representation is central. 
While the debate surrounding Paradise Regain’d has centred on its pacifism or implicit 
militarism, Corns argues that this critical tradition ‘misses the point that Milton, since 
the 1640s, has sought assiduously to equate the two.’ The role that Milton identifies 
himself as fulfilling is an activist one. Specifically, for ‘Milton, evidently, the image of 
the battle of the books, revitalised in his prose, is an unironised representation of the 
continuities between his polemical endeavours and military conflict.’ As this study has 
shown, Milton depicts textual conflict in Areopagitica as millenarian Truth combating 
Falsehood, which can only be realised in a community that tolerated liberty of 
conscience and did not enforce pre-publication licensing. Milton’s vision for a studious 
and collaborative London community exemplifies this ideal (CPW ii. 553-9). The 
concept of military-style textual disagreement that Corns identifies in Paradise 
Regain’d, as we will see, is the mature realisation of the combative Truth depicted in 
Areopagitica. Milton, as with the Son he conveys, identifies himself as a defender of 
Truth, in active opposition to Falsehood: ‘whatever the Son’s conduct and values may 
be associated with, they are not, in the Miltonic value system, to be equated with 
passivity’. Rather than an ‘imtatio Christi’, the Son represents an ‘imtatio Miltoni’.492 
This chapter will contribute to Corns’s astute analysis by bringing greater attention to 
Milton’s engagement with the contemporary liberty of conscience debate, especially in 
relation to his proximity to Quakerism, and how that further aligns Milton’s experiences 
in Restoration England with the internalised qualities of the Son. 
Studies concerning Milton’s proximity to contemporary Quakerism have 
focused on the pacifist principles that he may have drawn from the religious sect.493 
Stephen Marx and John Coffey offer differing views of the pacifism depicted in 
Paradise Regain’d. Marx suggests that Milton and the Quakers underwent similar 
experiences during the Interregnum and Restoration periods. With many Quakers 
originating from Cromwell’s New Model Army, Marx posits that they, like Milton, 
transitioned from support for the violent actions that secured the republic to 
 
492 Thomas N. Corns, ‘“With Unaltered Brow”: Milton and the Son of God’, in Milton Studies, 42 (2002), 
pp. 108-10, 120; on the militarist-pacifist debate, see Stephen Marx and John Coffey, discussed below, 
pp. 223-4; see also Michael Wilding, Dragons Teeth: Literature in the English Revolution (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 257; on Milton’s broader militarism, see Michael Lieb, Milton and the Culture 
of Violence (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Peter E. Medine, et al., eds., Visionary 
Milton: Essays on Prophecy and Violence (Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 2010). 
493 For an older study on the connections between Milton and contemporary Quakerism, see Alden 
Sampson, Studies in Milton (New York: AMS Press, 1970), pp. 167-239. 
 225 
disillusionment with the republican regime to further disaffection with the subsequent 
restoration of the monarchy.494 John Coffey offers a different perspective, arguing that 
Paradise Regain’d, despite advocating pacifist principles, which are ‘a sharp reminder 
to the godly that they should be willing to live with the mysteries of divine providence 
and follow the Son on the road of “patience and heroic martyrdom”’, is not a pacifist 
text. Coffey explains that many critics do not acknowledge that Paradise Regain’d 
depicts a scene from the ‘grand narrative of salvation history, a narrative with a 
beginning, a middle, and an end.’ Paradise Regain’d, Coffey asserts, is emphatic in its 
insistence that one day the Son will come in glory and in power to crush the satanic 
forces.495 While Marx focuses too readily on pacifism as a connective factor between 
Milton and Quakerism, Coffey himself identifies Milton’s millenarian militarism at too 
great a remove from Quaker pacifism. Whereas the militarism of Areopagitica is 
metaphorical – the ‘warfaring Christian’ helps metaphorical Truth to combat Falsehood 
– in a text like Samson Agonistes, which will be discussed at length in the conclusion, 
violence is at the climactic heart of the dramatic poem. The toleration that Milton 
advocates in Areopagitica, including of Quakers, creates a landscape where textual 
ideas can conflict through disagreement; the violence in Samson Agonistes is partly a 
consequence of Samson’s oppression, an experience that Milton shared with the 
Quakers in the 1660s. The apocalyptic violence that Samson exhibits at the end of the 
dramatic poem also finds parallel in Quakers like Thomas Ellwood: ‘Lament and mourn 
you sons of Belial […] for a sudden destruction is coming upon you.’496 While Milton 
was not afraid of violence, the Son’s apparent passivity in Paradise Regain’d signifies 
his self-control, an inner utopia that brings about the defeat of Satan. Rather than 
focusing on violence, this chapter will show how Milton’s engagement with 
contemporary Quakerism informs an interpretation of the individualism and 
internalisation of Paradise Regain’d. 
David Loewenstein identifies a consistency between the messianic hero’s 
patience and perseverance in Paradise Regain’d and the experience of the early 
Quakers, in which ‘inward strength, obedience, and faith were indeed fully tested and 
 
494 Stephen Marx, ‘The Prophet Disarmed: Milton and the Quakers’, in Studies in English Literature, 
1500-1900, 32/1 (1992), pp. 122, 118, 115-17. 
495 John Coffey, ‘Pacifist, Quietist, or Patient Militant? John Milton and the Restoration’, in Albert C. 
Labriola, David Loewenstein, eds., Paradise Regain’d in Context: Genre, Politics, Religion, Milton 
Studies, 42 (2003), pp. 163-4. 
496 Thomas Ellwood, An Alarm to the Priests; Or, a Message from Heaven, To forewarn them of the 
dreadfull day of the Lord which will suddenly overtake them, unless by speedy and unfeigned repentance 
they return to the Lord (1660), p. 3. 
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proven by trials and tribulations in the hostile wilderness of this world.’ This 
observation is astute, but it does not mean, as Loewenstein suggests, that Milton is 
depicting the struggles of the commons. Although it is true that the Son ‘hardly qualifies 
as an aristocratic epic hero’, Milton is representing the social status of the biblical Jesus, 
rather than making a social commentary. The representation of the Son does not support 
the implicit comparison Loewenstein makes between the social status of Jesus and the 
experience of Gerrard Winstanley or the Quaker, Richard Hubberthorne.497 Paradise 
Regain’d was written during a time of significant change in contemporary Quakerism. 
George Fox had published A Declaration from the Harmles & Innocent People of God, 
called Quakers, Against all Plotters and Fighters in the World (1660), in which he 
asserted Quaker pacifism to the king.498 The Quakers themselves had also moved away 
from the radical Digger-like egalitarianism that defined the movement for a large part of 
the 1650s.499 As Barry Reay explains, ‘In the 1650s the movement had been poised on 
the brink of a genuine radical egalitarianism: in the 1660s and 1670s it drew back.500 To 
illustrate, Robert Barclay declares in his An Apology For the True Christian Divinity 
(1678), which became a defining Quaker text, ‘let not any judge, that, from our opinion 
of these things, any necessity of levelling will follow, or that all men must have things 
in common’.501 Although the Quakers remained resistant to tithes, refused to take an 
oath to the king and actively lobbied for freedom of conscience, by the 1660s, they no 
longer espoused radical egalitarianism.502 As such, Milton’s association with the 
Quakers, which is the closest he came to engaging with contemporary sectarianism, 
must be qualified by these changes to Quaker ideology. The Son is an idealised 
individual. Rather than representative of the potential of the common people, the Son 
serves as a model of self-control for elect individuals like Milton.  
This chapter intends to contribute to N. H. Keeble’s work on identifying the 
nonconformist context of the Restoration period. At various points in The Literary 
Culture of Nonconformity in Later Seventeenth-Century England, Keeble discusses 
 
497 David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution, pp. 247; 251-54. 
498 George Fox, et al., A Declaration from the Harmles & Innocent People of God, called Quakers, 
Against all Plotters and Fighters in the World (1660). 
499 Edward Burrough in 1654 wrote ‘Wilstandley [Winstanley] sayes he believes we are sent to perfect 
that worke which fell in their handes hee hath bene with us’, quoted in Reay, The Quakers and the 
English Revolution (Palgrave Macmillan, 1985), p. 33. 
500 Barry Reay, The Quakers and the English Revolution, pp. 44, 110. 
501 Robert Barclay, An Apology for the True Christian Divinity, As the same is held forth, and preached 
by the people, Called, in Scorn, Quakers (1678), pp. 369-70. 
502 See T. A. Davies, The Quakers in English Society, 1655-1725 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 
71-2. 
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Milton’s nonconformity alongside contemporary Quakerism. Within his extensive 
analysis of broader nonconformist ideologies, he observes the pervasive ideas of 
internalisation and individualism, which are manifest in Paradise Regain’d.503 Although 
this ‘trend was most marked amongst the Quakers’, with their theology of the inner 
light, it was also a feature of broader nonconformist millenarianism in the Restoration. 
‘The millenarianism of the Interregnum’, Keeble explains, ‘was transmuted into what a 
modern theologian would call “realized eschatology”, the doctrine that the kingdom of 
God belongs not to the future nor to the world but is founded within each believer who 
possesses, in Milton’s phrase, “a paradise within”’.504 In the specific context of the early 
1670s, Laura Lunger Knoppers explains that the repressive legislation of the Clarendon 
Code, ‘designed to exclude dissenters from the Church of England and prohibit their 
worship outside of it, galvanised and unified an otherwise loosely connected assortment 
of Presbyterians and Baptists, Independents and Congregationalists, political radical and 
republicans.’505 Milton’s experience of persecution not only encouraged his association 
with contemporary Quakers, but it also facilitated his focus on the elect individual, 
which this study has traced as a product of his increasingly entrenched disaffection with 
the English people from 1649.  
Milton’s anti-trinitarianism separates the Son from the essence of God and 
closer to the human form of Christ. As Milton writes in De Doctrina, ‘what else can 
more plainly be understood than that God by his own will created – that is, generated, or 
brought forth – the Son as the first of all things, endowed with divine nature, just as in 
the fullness of time he wondrously engendered a human nature from the virgin Mary?’ 
(CWJM viii/1. 135). Martin Dzelzainis also observes that Milton argues in Of True 
Religion that Arians and Socinians, while heretical, should be tolerated as they base 
their views on scripture (CPW viii. 424-5).506 Milton’s anti-trinitarianism, positioning 
Christ closer to humanity than trinitarian Christology allowed, suggests that the Son of 
Paradise Regain’d was an individual to whom Milton could aspire. It also lends 
credence to Fallon’s suggestion that Milton’s belief in the individual was so exclusive 
 
503 On individualism in mid-seventeenth-century radical sects, see also Nigel Smith, Perfection 
Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion, 1640-60 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), pp. 229-95, 344-7. 
504 N. H. Keeble, The Literary Culture of Nonconformity in Later Seventeenth-Century England 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1987), pp. 193-5, 204-5; see also Ibid., ‘Wilderness Exercises: 
Adversity, Temptation, and Trial in Paradise Regain’d’, in Milton Studies, 42 (2003), 86-105. 
505 Laura Lunger Knoppers, ed., CWJM ii. xxi, see generally xx-xxxii. 
506 Martin Dzelzainis, ‘Milton and Antitrinitarianism’, in Sharon Achinstein, Elizabeth Sauer, eds., Milton 
and Toleration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 174-5. 
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that it became increasingly limited to, if not modelled on, himself: ‘Milton’s 
extraordinary claims for his own virtue in his earliest self-representations, and at times 
in his later ones, imply his exemption from the frailty attendant on the fall.’ Fallon 
extends this interpretation to Paradise Regain’d by suggesting that Milton self-
identifies with the Son in the brief epic.507  
Early English Quakerism was accused of anti-trinitarianism in the late-
seventeenth-century.508 While Quakers such as William Penn defended Quaker theology 
as trinitarian, they did believe in the internal manifestation of Christ and the light 
within.509 In his The Light and Life of Christ within (1668), George Whitehead (1636-
1723) explains the importance of the light of Christ within Quakers for illuminating the 
truth of scripture: ‘And as to Christ within both to Save and Rule, (for which we are 
accused) we are not ashamed of him; but do testifie to him within, and his Government, 
Power, and Authority within’.510 The inner utopia that this chapter will identify as 
depicted within the Son of Paradise Regain’d – recalling the ‘paradise within’ of 
Paradise Lost (xii. 587) – shares the interior emphasis of the internalised Christ in 
Quaker theology. Contemporary Quakerism provided Milton with a model of religious 
individualism and internalisation through which he could more effectively realise in his 
poetry the ideal of the utopian millennium that the English republic and the English 
people had failed to fulfil. Milton’s anti-trinitarian theology, moreover, enabled the Son 
to be an aspirational model of self-control. The internalisation of the utopian 
millennium was such that one of the few individuals – if not the only – capable of 
meeting the standard of Milton’s utopian millennium was Milton himself.  
 
 
MILTON AND THE EARLY ENGLISH QUAKERS 
 
Milton’s reaction to the Protectorate differed from contemporary Quakers: where many 
Quakers requested greater representation of their philosophy of inner light in the 
political sphere, Milton continued to work for the Protectorate, probably due to the 
 
507 Stephen Fallon, Milton’s Peculiar Grace, pp. 238-9. 
508 See David Manning, ‘Accusations of Blasphemy in English Anti-Quaker Polemic, c. 1660-1701’, in 
Quaker Studies, 14/1 (2009), 27-56. 
509 William Penn asserts Quaker trinitarianism against such accusations in A Key opening a way to every 
Common Understanding (1693), p. 17. 
510 George Whitehead, The Light and Life of Christ within (1668), p. 54. 
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broad toleration of Protestant beliefs that Cromwell secured and maintained.511 
However, during the Restoration, Milton and the Quakers mutually suffered from a 
significant loss of religious freedom. Compared to Milton’s brief incarceration in the 
Tower of London for his work for the republican regime, Quaker freedom was 
systematically repressed in the 1660s. The Clarendon Code, which incorporated the 
Quaker Act (1662) and Conventicle Act (1664), resulted in the mass persecution of 
Quakers; in 1680, an account of Quaker persecutions numbered nearly 11,000 
imprisonments and 234 deaths.512 The Conventicle Act was renewed in a more severe 
form in March 1670, but was met with ‘lack of enthusiasm, ineffectual enforcement, 
and renewed and widespread resistance’ (CWJM ii. xxviii). It was only in 1687, after 
the Declaration of Indulgence, that nonconformist religious groups experienced a form 
of toleration. By consequence, both Milton and the Quakers in the 1660s and 1670s 
were naturally invested in debates surrounding liberty of conscience, which saw a 
revived interest during the period of composition of Paradise Regain’d.513 Milton’s 
belief in liberty of conscience – specifically freedom of scriptural interpretation – is key 
to understanding his relationship with and tolerance of contemporary Quakerism. 
Milton’s belief in freedom of scriptural interpretation is particularly pertinent given the 
1662 Licensing Act, which required the pre-publication licensing of texts by a censor of 
the Stationers’ Company. A key difference between the individualism of Milton and the 
Quakers was that, where Milton argued for toleration in order to facilitate scriptural 
interpretation, the Quakers placed greater emphasis on inner light as a means of 
understanding God than scripture. For both, the individual was key, but Milton 
identified scripture, guided by the spirit, as the conduit to truth, rather than the 
individual himself. The relationship between scripture and internal sanctity is prominent 
in Paradise Regain’d. As we will see, Milton’s proximity to contemporary Quakerism 
exhibits how his tolerationism does not detract from the elitism that characterised a 
large part of his prose works. 
The form of Restoration Quakerism that Milton encountered when he 
moved to Chalfont St Giles in 1665 – organised, pacifist, and conservative – was far 
removed from the radical movement of the 1650s. James Nayler’s (1618-60) re-
 
511 On the Quaker response to the Protectorate, see Giuseppina Iacono Lobo, ‘Early Quaker Writing, 
Oliver Cromwell, and the Nationalization of Conscience’, in Exemplaria, 24/1 (2012), pp. 112-26. 
512 Reay, The Quakers and the English Revolution, p. 106.  
513 For a discussion of the renewed interest in the liberty of conscience debate during this period, see Gary 
S. De Krey, ‘Rethinking the Restoration: Dissenting Cases for Conscience, 1667-1672’, in The History 
Journal, 38/1 (1995), p. 56. 
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enactment of Christ’s arrival in Jerusalem in October 1656, by riding a horse into 
Bristol attended by followers, was widely condemned and resulted in a trial in 
December that made publicly clear concerns about Quaker theology, especially that the 
belief in inner light implied equality with Christ. Between 1656-60, there was a shift in 
Quakerism from a movement that opposed the established church to an organised 
religious institution. The first Quaker document on church discipline, the Epistle from 
the Elders of Balby, appeared in November 1656, possibly in response to the Nayler 
incident. Monthly and General Meetings further served to coordinate the sect.514 Quaker 
leaders, such as George Fox and Edward Burrough, worked to improve the Quaker 
image, especially in London, to one of established respectability, rather than the radical 
disorder represented by the Nayler affair.515  
Quakers generally did not oppose the return of monarchism, believing that 
they served the higher authority of God and could do so under any regime. There was 
broad – and perhaps unrealistic – hope for religious toleration from the Restoration.516 
The Quakers were, however, as has been noted above, widely persecuted in the 
Restoration period, which may have contributed to the increased organisation of the 
sect.517 In 1660, the Declaration from the Harmles & Innocent People of God made 
clear the Quaker commitment to pacifism.518 Internal bodies of central organisation, 
known as the Second Day Morning Meeting and the Meeting for Sufferings, limited 
Quaker publications and served as a form of self-censorship. Quaker discipline also 
became more organised and widespread, whereby errant Quakers were counselled 
through visitations that resembled church intervention that had once been opposed by 
the movement.519 The Quaker movement of the 1650s prioritised the individual, which 
facilitated the occurrence of extreme, heterodox displays of religious zeal, as 
exemplified by the Nayler controversy of 1656; in the 1660s, the collective conscience 
and needs of the Quaker community were prioritised, in a process of self-preservation as 
much as a natural evolution of the religious movement. It is important that, rather than 
 
514 See William C. Braithwaite, The Beginnings of Quakerism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), pp. 306-42. 
515 Rosemary Moore, ‘Seventeenth-century Context and Quaker Beginnings’, in Stephen W. Angell and 
Ben Pink Dandelion, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Quaker Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp. 23-8. 
516 Richard L. Greaves, ‘Shattered Expectations? George Fox, the Quakers, and the Restoration State, 
1660-1685’, in Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 24/2, pp. 237-40. 
517 On Quaker persecutions, see Richard C. Allen, ‘Restoration Quakerism, 1660-1691’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Quaker Studies, 29-46. 
518 See A Declaration from the Harmles People of God called Quakers (1660), pp. 4, 8. 
519 Reay, The Quakers and the English Revolution, pp. 110-18. 
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the radical movement of the 1650s, Milton came into contact with this form of 
Quakerism that was conservative, organised, and, at the height of the severe 
persecutions of the 1660s, maintained a belief in liberty of conscience illuminated by 
the inner light of Christ. 
Milton came into contact with Quakerism through his friend and student, 
Thomas Ellwood, who famously claimed to have inspired Milton to write Paradise 
Regain’d, ‘which before [Milton] had not thought of’.520 According to Ellwood’s 
account, Milton not only ‘remained a natural teacher’, as he helped Ellwood with his 
Latin pronunciation in 1662, but also developed a fondness for his student: after 
Ellwood had to take leave of his studies in Buckinghamshire, he recalls that Milton 
‘seemed heartily glad of my recovery and return’ (91). Through Ellwood, moreover, 
Milton chose to move to Chalfont St Giles, an established Quaker community, in 1665, 
in order to escape a major outbreak of the bubonic plague in London.521 Whereas some 
critics suggest that it was Ellwood who instigated the move, Ellwood himself explains 
that, as Milton made the request before Ellwood was imprisoned in 1665 for attending a 
Quaker burial, Ellwood was unable to oversee the move, despite facilitating the process: 
 
I was desired by my quondam master, Milton, to take a house for him in the neighbourhood where 
I dwelt, that he might go out of the city, for the safety of himself and his family, the pestilence then 
growing hot in London. I took a pretty box for him in Giles Chalfont, a mile from me, of which I 
gave him notice, and intended to have waited on him, and seen him well settled in it, but was 
prevented by that imprisonment’ (144-5).522 
 
The move to Chalfont St Giles was Milton’s idea: he intentionally integrated himself 
into a large Quaker community at a time when a number of Quakers, including Ellwood 
and Isaac Penington (1616-79), had been imprisoned for attending the funeral of the 
Quaker Edward Perrot. This study has frequently shown how Milton shared faith in the 
millennium with many contemporary sects, but that he nonetheless maintained a 
distance from organised religious radicalism.523 Ellwood shows how Milton’s 
 
520 Thomas Ellwood, C. G. Crump, ed., The History of the Life of Thomas Ellwood (Methuen, 1900), p. 
145; subsequent references to this text will be made parenthetically in the running text. 
521 Gordon Campbell, Thomas Corns, John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), pp. 322, 326. 
522 See David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution, p. 243, for an example of a commentary that does 
not acknowledge Milton’s initial request to move to Chalfont St Giles. 
523 See, in particular, Chapter 4 for a discussion of Milton, Winstanley, and Cary.  
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engagement with the Quakers changed this rule. Campbell and Corns provide an 
optimistic and insightful image of Milton’s experience in the Quaker community: 
 
He was among religious radicals, who knew and respected his contribution to English puritanism 
and to tolerationism, and was visited by brave, buoyant young Quakers, at least one of whom hero-
worshipped him. Instead of the desperate and discredited men with whom he worked in the 1650s, 
now hanging on to life and liberty as best they could, these embodied a new generation of 
dissent.524 
 
In the immediate post-revolutionary period, Milton, the newly-employed statesman, was 
at a significant remove from Winstanley, the agrarian Digger radical; after the 
Restoration, Milton shared with contemporary Quakers the common experience of 
persecution and reduced religious freedom. Ellwood, an inquisitive, supportive and able 
student, facilitated Milton’s sympathetic attitude to the organised and conservative 
Quaker community of the 1660s.  
The apparent incongruity between Milton’s belief in freedom of scriptural 
interpretation, which will be discussed later in this chapter, and the authority Quakerism 
places on the inner spirit over scripture suggests the importance of toleration in his 
engagement with the religious sect. The concept of an inner, divine light that informs 
the conscience of individual believers was central to Quaker theology. ‘The divine light 
of Christ manifesteth all things’, George Fox explains in his Journal, ‘and the spiritual 
fire trieth all things, and severeth all things.’525 The Son’s words in the final book of 
Paradise Regain’d seem remarkably close to those of Fox: ‘he who receives / Light 
from above, from the fountain of light, / No other doctrine needs, though granted 
true.’526 As Fox explains in his Journal, this inner light provides Quakers with ‘the pure 
knowledge of God and of Christ alone, without the help of any man, book or writing.’527 
The Son’s assertion that ‘No other doctrine needs’ seems to support this. However, 
Milton, as he expresses most explicitly in De Doctrina Christiana, places his faith, 
above all, in the ‘authority of the scriptures’, and thereby asserts ‘just how crucial it is 
for the Christian religion that the freedom be granted not simply of probing every 
 
524 Campbell and Corns, Life of Milton, p. 329. 
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doctrine, and of winnowing it in public, but also of thinking and indeed writing about it, 
in accordance with each person’s firm belief’ (CWJM viii/1. 9). Milton’s belief in 
freedom of scriptural interpretation defines his idiosyncratic view of liberty of 
conscience. As discussed in the previous chapter, this dates back to Areopagitica, in 
which his idealised London is populated by studious individuals who interpret scripture 
in the fashion Milton outlines in De Doctrina. Milton also advocates a form of 
interpretative conscience in Of Civil Power, arguing that ‘To protestants therfore whose 
common rule and touchstone is the scripture, nothing more protestantly can be 
permitted than a free and lawful debate at all times by writing, conference, or 
disputation of what opinion soever, disputable by scripture’ (CPW vii. 251). In 
Considerations (CPW vii. 302-4), moreover, Milton endorses a more extensive, national 
education in order to create the kind of community he idealises in Areopagitica, which 
he reiterates in The Readie and Easie Way (CWJM vi 501-3). As he had envisioned as 
early as the anti-prelatical tracts, debate and difference of opinion – especially in terms 
of scriptural interpretation – were essential to uncover lost truth within myriad 
falsehood. While Milton, therefore, may have disagreed with the Quaker belief that 
scripture was subordinate to free-standing inner light, he evidently tolerated the sect and 
encoded some Quaker ideas into Paradise Regain’d.   
George Bishop’s (fl. 1615-1668) references to Of Civil Power in his A 
Looking-Glass For The Times (1668) suggest that Milton’s ideas of religious freedom 
were not only compatible with and endorsed by contemporary Quakerism, but that 
Bishop shared Milton’s faith in scripture.528 Bishop, who was the official spokesperson 
for the Quaker movement in 1656 while Fox and Nayler were imprisoned, explains at 
the beginning of A Looking-Glass that he intends to show ‘That the Principles and 
Practices of the People called Quakers […] are the same as were the Principles and 
Practices of Christ and his Apostles’, for which he uses ‘pregnant instances of Scripture, 
History, and other Writings’. Bishop explicitly references Milton in the final section of 
the tract, which concerns ‘changeable Priesthood’. By this, Bishop means that, as 
established churches are prone to change, they are ‘neither from Christ nor the 
Scriptures, and hath neither ground nor foundation to be believed in’, for ‘the whole 
progress of the History […] speaks the Priesthood after the Apostles decease to be 
 
528 George Bishop, A Looking-Glass For The Times (1668). All references to this text will be made 
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changeable’ (210-11). By opposing ‘Priesthood’ and established religion, Bishop 
promotes the Quaker values of the inner light and the liberty of conscience that 
necessarily attends it. However, he does so with a clear focus on scriptural research, 
alongside an analysis of classical and modern texts. Here Bishop identifies ‘John 
Milton’, who, ‘in his Treatises of the power of the Civil Magistrate in causes 
Ecclesiastical, hath excellently pitched the bottom of the matter’ (231). Bishop’s 
citation of Milton runs over two pages, after which he explains  
 
Much more I might have produced as to this author, even the whole Discourse, wherein he fully 
convinces what in his Title page he asserts, to wit, That it is not lawful for any power on earth to 
compel in matters of Religion. He is one who pretends to the Church of Christ, but not by 
compulsion to Church-ship, or matters of Religion; as this his Treatise shews him (233). 
 
Bishop finds in Milton not only a fellow advocate of liberty of conscience and believer 
in the separation of church and state, but also a fellow nonconformist. Bishop may well 
be drawing from Milton’s suggestion that ‘He then who to his best apprehension 
follows the scripture, though against any point of doctrine by the whole church 
received, is not the heretic; but he who follows the church against his conscience and 
persuasion grounded on the scripture’ (CPW vii. 251). Bishop’s enthusiasm for Of Civil 
Power shows how a contemporary Quaker appreciated and drew on Milton’s works, in 
much the same way as Milton shares Quaker ideas in Paradise Regain’d. 
Milton’s elitism, which remains prominent in the individualism of Paradise 
Regain’d, does not limit his toleration of – or distance him from – contemporary 
Quakers. The emphasis on the individual in both Milton’s theology and that of the 
Quakers means that Milton’s elitism facilitates his toleration of Quakerism, rather than 
inhibits it. The Son himself voices an explicit aversion to the common people in Book 
III of the brief epic. At the beginning of the book, Satan tempts the Son with the 
prospect of counselling kings and experiencing thereby ‘The fame and glory, glory the 
reward / That sole excites to high attempts the flame / Of most erected spirits’ (iii. 25-
7). The Son’s response, while initially focusing on the brevity and futility of glory and 
empire, soon develops into a passionate rejection of the vulgar people: 
 
And what the people but a herd confus’d, 
A miscellaneous rabble, who extol 
Things vulgar, & well weigh’d, scarce worth the praise, 
They praise and they admire they know not what; 
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And know not whom, but as one leads the other;  
And what delight to be by such extoll’d, 
To live upon thir tongues and be thir talk, 
Of whom to be disprais’d were no small praise?  (iii. 49-56) 
 
The Son’s description of the people in these lines resembles Milton’s own denunciation 
of the people as ‘an inconstant, irrational, and Image-doting rabble’ in Eikonoklastes 
(CWJM vi. 424). It also recalls Milton’s specific defence of the sanior pars in his first 
Defensio. Given the Restoration context, it is difficult not to see here an allusion to the 
backsliding people who popularly desired the return of monarchy.  
Paul Hammond identifies how the Son turns away from the many, as he 
observes that ‘Th’ intelligent among them and the wise / Are few’ (iii. 58-9), in favour 
of the elect individual, ‘who dares be singularly good’ (57). Milton’s belief in the 
individual, which appeared in the attention afforded to elect individuals in Michael’s 
education of Adam in Paradise Lost and in the potential for Adam to rehabilitate at the 
end of the poem, necessitates focus on similar individuals in Paradise Regain’d. 
Hammond also observes the powerfully derogatory tone that the Son employs in his 
response to Satan’s suggestion that he should depose a tyrannical emperor, ‘and in his 
place ascending, / A victor-people free from servile yoke!’ (iv. 101-2). The Son’s 
response is consistent with that of Book III: ‘What wise and valiant man would seek to 
free / These thus degenerate, by themselves enslav’d, / Or could of inward slaves make 
outward free?’ (iv. 143-5). Hammond explains that the word ‘vile’ ‘is chiefly used in 
early modern English to denote moral depravity’. The suggestion ‘that the common 
people, having once been roused to victorious action, have now relapsed into their 
habitual condition’ of self-imposed slavery to tyranny, echoes Milton’s condemnation in 
the Tenure of those who are ‘govern’d to the inward vitious rule, by which they govern 
themselves’ (CWJM vi. 151) and, a decade later, his growing disillusionment with the 
people over the two editions of The Readie and Easie Way.529 The Son’s clear aversion 
to the common people in Paradise Regain’d exhibits how Milton is not only far from 
the egalitarian radicalism that Loewenstein suggests, but that his disaffection with the 
commons continued to contribute to his entrenched elitism. Milton’s philosophy of 
liberty of conscience and his proximity to Quakerism magnifies his individualised and 
narrow view of the elect. 
 
529 Hammond, Milton and the People, pp. 233-5.  
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This study has posited that Milton’s utopianism and millenarianism 
developed alongside and in tandem with his belief in liberty of conscience and elitist 
disaffection with the common sort. While contemporary Quakers elevated the status of 
inner light above scripture, George Bishop illustrates how Milton’s own tolerationist 
values were espoused by contemporary Quakers. While Milton’s elitism remained 
prominent in Paradise Regain’d, moreover, this did not negate his Quaker sympathies, 
as it had his sectarian sympathies in the immediate post-revolutionary period. Keeble 
observes how William Penn (1644-1718), who joined the Quakers in 1667 and 
suggested that Ellwood seek out Milton, was ‘of gentle birth and well educated’; both 
‘Classical learning and the later European tradition [were] at his disposal.’530 While 
Milton may have been tolerant of a broad swathe of Protestant sects, it was into this 




SCRIPTURAL INTERPRETATION AND THE BRIEF EPIC 
 
Freedom to express heretical ideas, which Milton first proposed in Areopagitica and 
reasserted in Of True Religion (1673), defines the action of Paradise Regain’d. In 
Areopagitica, Milton argued that it was necessary for individuals to publish ideas so 
that they could be met with opposing views before post-publication licensing was 
imposed, where necessary. In Of True Religion, Milton calls for the free discourse of 
texts in one of his clearest defences of toleration, using language that at times appears 
like a direct defence of the struggles of contemporary Quakers. In the tract, Milton 
places an emphasis on the individual as interpreter rather than, as he does in 
Areopagitica, on the individual as author. Whereas he idealised London in 
Areopagitica, Milton’s explicit defence of Protestant sects in Of True Religion draws on 
his experience of persecution, which he shared with contemporary Quakers. In Paradise 
Regain’d, Milton’s Son epitomises and idealises an elect individual, who successfully 
interprets scripture to defeat falsehood, which is represented by Satan in the brief epic. 
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David Loewenstein, eds., The Emergence of Quaker Writing: Dissenting Literature in Seventeenth-
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The interpretative freedom that Milton had advocated throughout much of his career is 
internalised in the utopianism of Paradise Regain’d and particularly in how the Son can 
use his knowledge of scripture to defeat Satan.  
Of True Religion (1673), despite being often interpreted for its anti-
Catholicism, promotes the philosophy of toleration and liberty of conscience that Milton 
endorsed in 1659, and which originates in 1644.531 Of True Religion was written in 
response to the 1672 Act of Indulgence that was voted down by the Cavalier Parliament, 
through which Charles intended to increase toleration for Catholics. Elizabeth Sauer 
argues that ‘Milton establishes the case for toleration negatively in arguing against 
Popish tyranny’ and, elsewhere, that the desire for liberty of conscience in the tract is 
borne out of a belief in reconfiguring English national identity.532 Ray Tumbleson 
compares Of True Religion to tracts by Andrew Marvell (1621-78) and Elkanah Settle 
(1648-1724), but acknowledges that ‘Milton makes the logical leap from condemnation 
of explicit faith to the necessity of absolute toleration – of Protestants’.533 It is necessary 
to develop the view that the ‘appeal for tolerating and testing of all beliefs does not 
contradict Milton’s opposition to […] Roman Catholicism’ by drawing greater attention 
to the significance of toleration in the tract.534 The anti-Catholicism of Of True Religion 
is a framing device: it emphasises the toleration that Milton endorses, draws on Milton’s 
belief in freedom of scriptural interpretation, and permits him to defend nonconformist 
theologies that he privately supported, such as Arianism and Socinianism. Milton uses 
the threat of Catholic indulgence to promote greater religious freedom for Protestants. 
As he explains, ‘the Rule of true Religion is the Word of God only; and that their Faith 
ought not to be an implicit faith, that is, to believe, though as the church believes, 
against or without express authority of Scripture’ (CPW. viii. 420).  
As Milton had advocated throughout his pamphleteering career, it is because 
of the truth inherent in scripture that liberty of conscience, especially freedom to 
interpret scripture, is essential. ‘Without that liberty’, Milton explains in De Doctrina, 
 
531 For discussions of Milton’s views on toleration, see Nigel Smith, ‘Milton and European Contexts of 
Toleration’, in Milton and Toleration, pp. 23-44; and, for an illuminating comparison between Milton and 
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Nationhood, and the Negotiation of Liberty’, in Milton Quarterly, 4/1 (2006), pp. 10-12. 
533 Ray Tumbleson, ‘Of True Religion and false politics: Milton and the uses of anti-Catholicism’, in 
Prose Studies 15/3 (1992), pp. 256-62, 262. 
534 Reuben Márquez Sánchez Jr., ‘“The Worst of Superstitions”: Milton’s Of True Religion and the Issue 
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‘there is no religion […] violence alone prevails’; in Of True Religion, he identifies this 
violence as ‘debates and contentions, schisms, and persecutions’ (CWJM viii/1. 133). In 
Of Civil Power, Milton argued for a separation of civil and religious powers for fear that 
‘Till then nothing but troubles, persecutions, commotions can be expected’ (CPW vii. 
243). Although Milton more readily supports the church in Of True Religion (419-23) 
than he does in Of Civil Power (247-9), he does maintain that those who hold 
unorthodox beliefs that are inspired by their conscience – so long as it is based on 
scriptural interpretation – cannot be heretics. ‘Heresie’, Milton argues, ‘is in the Will 
and choice profestly against Scripture; error is against the Will, in misunderstanding the 
Scripture after all sincere endeavours to understand it rightly’ (423). So long as 
sectarians interpret scripture in obedience to God and with every intention of fulfilling 
divine will, then they will be forgiven:  
 
But so long as all these profess to set the Word of God only before them as the Rule of faith and 
obedience; and use all diligence and sincerity of heart, by reading, by learning, by study, by prayer 
for Illumination of the holy Spirit, to understand the Rule and obey it, they have done what man 
can do: God will assuredly pardon them […] (423-4). 
 
This passage is followed by a list of Protestant denominations that zealously – and with 
no desire to promote falsehood – misinterpret scripture, including Calvinism, Arianism, 
and Arminianism (424-6). The conscientious efforts of these sects resemble Milton’s 
idealised citizens of London in Areopagitica, who he envisions as ‘musing, searching, 
revolving new notions and ideas’ (CPW ii. 554). In comparison with Areopagitica, 
however, the emphasis in Of True Religion is explicitly on scripture. As we shall see, in 
the context of Paradise Regain’d, this is significant as the Son’s ability to refute Satan 
is enshrined in scripture. As with books in Areopagitica, freedom to interpret scripture 
should be protected so long as such interpretations can be refuted where necessary, as 
Milton illustrates in Of True Religion.  
Paradise Regain’d, published two years prior to Of True Religion, 
represents scriptural interpretation as central to the climactic temptation of the poem and 
also to the Son’s own self-identification. John Rogers observes that, as the ‘conveyor of 
revealed truth most important to Paradise Regain’d is unquestionably Hebrew 
Scripture’, the Son’s knowledge of this scripture is central to his resistance of Satan’s 
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temptations and self-identification as the Son.535 The Son, in his opening monologue, 
explains how he realised from a young age that he was ‘Born to that end, born to 
promote all truth’ (i. 205). The Son resembles the speaker of Areopagitica, for whom 
millenarian truth is an ideal attainable through debates over differing and opposing 
ideas. He makes multiple direct scriptural references, which range from Daniel (ii. 277-
8) to Judges (ii. 436-40) to Job (iii. 65-70), the latter with whom the Son can be most 
easily compared. However, Milton’s Jesus also makes meaningful use of scripture as 
the word of God when he defends himself against Satan, who requests him to prove 
himself as the Son of God. In Book I, in response to Satan’s demand that ‘if thou be the 
Son of God, Command / That out of these hard stones be made thee bread’ (342-3), the 
Son asserts ‘is it not written / […] / Man lives not by Bread only, but each Word / 
Proceeding from the mouth of God’ (347-9). In the climactic temptation of Book IV, 
Satan, having placed the Son on the ‘highest pinnacle’ (549) of a temple tower in 
Jerusalem, tells him to jump: 
 
For it is written, He will give command 
Concerning thee to his angels, in thir hands 
They shall up lift thee, lest at any time 
Thou chance to dash thy foot against a stone.    (iv. 556-59) 
 
Whereas the Son responds to Satan’s temptation with a question – however rhetorical – 
in Book I, in the final book he cites Hebrew scripture with unwavering confidence: ‘also 
it is written, / Tempt not the Lord thy God, he said and stood’ (560-61). In this climactic 
moment, after which Satan falls, the Son is the embodiment of truth: Satan has 
misinterpreted scripture in an intentional manner that the pardonable heresy Milton 
defends in Of True Religion does not encompass, to which the Son has responded with 
an accurate interpretation that defeats his diabolic adversary. Corns compares the Son’s 
dual with Satan in Paradise Regain’d to the ‘battle of the books’ that Milton advocates 
in texts like Areopagitica.536 Where Truth defeats Falsehood in Areopagitica, in 
Paradise Regain’d, Milton’s Jesus is able to defeat Satan through an accurate reading of 
Hebrew scripture, in an act that would itself be recorded as scripture in the New 
Testament. 
 
535 John Rogers, ‘Paradise Regain’d and the Memory of Paradise Lost’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
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536 Corns, ‘Milton and the Son of God’, pp. 108-10. 
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The Son’s implicit activism has often been interpreted as pacifism in 
Paradise Regain’d. In his autobiographical monologue of the first book, the Son, having 
identified himself as a defender of truth, explains how he had to decide whether 
 
To rescue Israel from the Roman yoke, 
Then to subdue and quell o’er all the earth 
Brute violence and proud Tyrannick pow’r, 
Till truth were freed, and equity restor’d: 
Yet held it more humane, more heavenly first 
By winning words to conquer willing hearts,  
And make perswasion do the work of fear […]  (i. 217-23) 
 
The Son’s decision to use words rather than forceful, political action retains the power 
to ‘conquer’ those who are ‘willing’. While lacking physical action, this is not a passive 
decision. The Son’s active role as a scriptural interpreter contradicts arguments from 
critics such as Regina Schwartz, who identifies the Son’s suffering as ‘the portrait of his 
passivity’: ‘Christ can do nothing. He must suffer everything.’537 In comparison with 
the militant Son of Paradise Lost, or even the defiant Samson in Samson Agonistes, 
which was published alongside Paradise Regain’d in 1671, the Son of Paradise 
Regain’d, resembling contemporary Quakers, is physically inactive.538 The words of the 
Son, however, by defeating Satan, represent the action of the poem. Where in 1644, 
Milton believed that the people could fulfil the interpretative roles in an idealised 
London – even one structured by a system of utopian obedience – in 1671, with the 
people long since having backslided, Milton internalises this role in the Son. Action in 
both Areopagitica and Paradise Regain’d is metaphorical: it is represented by the 
recurring image of Truth combating Falsehood. The difference is that Milton envisions 
such action as individual rather than collaborative in his brief epic.  
Scriptural interpretation, therefore, is central to the action of Paradise 
Regain’d. The Son’s words represent a speech-act: they are performative in their ability 
to defeat Satan and cause him to fall. Laura Lunger Knoppers has shown how, in 
Paradise Regain’d, ‘Milton employs with Satan language of pretence, fraud, and 
usurpation that is elsewhere part of his anti-Catholic arsenal.’539 In light of Of True 
 
537 Regina M. Schwartz, ‘Redemption and Paradise Regain’d’, in Milton Studies, 42 (2002), p. 38. 
538 On the relationship between Paradise Regain’d and Paradise Lost, see John Rogers, ‘Paradise 
Regain’d and the Memory of Paradise Lost’, pp. 589-612. 
539 Laura Lunger Knoppers, ‘Satan and the Papacy in Paradise Regain’d’, in Milton Studies, 42 (2002), p. 
71. 
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Religion, it seems that Milton would have identified Satan’s intentional scriptural 
misinterpretation with Catholicism: he saw no justification for idolatry, given scriptural 
opposition to it. His tolerance of contemporary Quakers is, by contrast, distinct in the 
tract, as he seems to specifically defend the Quakers: Milton declares ‘how unequal, 
how uncharitable must it needs be, to impose that which his conscience cannot urge him 
to impose, upon him whose conscience forbids him to obey!’ (428). This exclamation 
echoes numerous requests for amnesty for Quakers who cannot take the Oath of 
Allegiance because it is ‘contrary to their own conscience’.540 While the emphasis on 
freedom of scriptural interpretation, therefore, is Milton’s own, the individualisation of 
this ideal in Paradise Regain’d accords with Milton’s exposure to Quaker theology. The 
Son’s wholeness as an individual – lacking the metaphorical dismemberment that 
defined Truth in Areopagitica – can be attributed to the inner utopia that he manifests. 
 
 
THE INNER UTOPIA 
 
In accordance with Milton’s Quaker context, the utopian millennium is internalised in 
the figure of the Son in Paradise Regain’d. As the brief epic shows, the Son’s resistance 
to Satan secures both the redemptive crucifixion and the restorative second coming. His 
success in defeating Satan is characterised by utopian self-control. Knoppers suggests 
that the ‘Son’s action, to all appearances, is inaction’ (CWJM ii. liii). The Son’s 
immobility, accordingly, represents his resistance to Satanic falsehood. As such, 
Milton’s representation of an inactive hero contradicts deterministic arguments of 
motion that defined the utopias of Hobbes and Harrington, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
The Son’s ability to maintain self-control, as modelled by his immovable stasis, is a 
personification of the totality that this study has identified as a common characteristic of 
seventeenth-century utopias. ‘The totality of the utopian vision’, Davis posits, ‘is part of 
the perfection, the order of the utopia.’541 The difference between Paradise Regain’d 
and contemporary utopias is that Milton depicts an inner utopia in his poem. As the 
 
540 A Declaration, p. 6; see also, George Whitehead, et al., To the King and Both Houses of Parliament 
(1666), pp. 5-6; William Penn, William Mead, The Peoples Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted in the 
Tryal of William Penn, and William Mead (1670), pp. 3-4; and Edward Burrough, The Case of Free 
Liberty of Conscience in the exercise of Faith and Religion, Presented unto the KING and both Houses of 
PARLIAMENT (1661). 
541 Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society, p. 38. 
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individual who will bring about eschatological end times and who exudes perfect, 
utopian self-control, the Son embodies Milton’s utopian millennium.  
The immanence of the totality of the inner utopia in Paradise Regain’d 
invites a valuable comparison with the epic poem, A Sea of the Seed’s Sufferings 
(1661), by the Quaker John Perrot (d. 1665), which, like Paradise Regain’d, is 
modelled partly on the Book of Job.542 Perrot claims to have written a large part of the 
Seed’s Sufferings in a ‘Rome-Prison of Mad-men’, in which he was incarcerated for 
attempting to convert the Pope to Quakerism.543 As Nigel Smith notes, the Seed’s 
Sufferings, alongside Perrot’s prose works of the time, ‘sublimate the experience of 
being tortured or beaten into sanity […] into a spiritual allegory built out of natural 
imagery.’544 As Kristina J. Kesselring suggests, Perrot was part of the schismatic and 
more radical side of early English Quakerism.545 His involvement with the ‘hat 
testimony’ scandal, by which Quakers wanted to remove any unnecessary outward 
forms of worship that detracted from the light within, such as doffing a hat before 
prayer, is representative of his belief in ‘the universality of the Light within both male 
and female’.546 Smith suggests that, where Satan’s rebellion and the Fall must be 
restored at the end of the Paradise Lost with Adam’s obedience, in the Quaker theology 
that Perrot espouses, the trajectory is ‘not from innocence to (ultimately) felix culpa, but 
from reprobation to grace and perfection.’547 In Paradise Regain’d, which Smith does 
not address, the Son exhibits inner, utopian perfection. However, while both Seed’s 
Sufferings and Paradise Regain’d share an interior focus, the universality of Perrot’s 
Quakerism necessarily distinguishes his Seed’s Sufferings from the individualised vision 
of the Son in Paradise Regain’d. While Milton’s increasingly narrow perception of the 
individual may have negated any form of universality, the interiority of Quakerism, as 
represented in Perrot’s epic, may have contributed to the inner utopia depicted in 
Paradise Regain’d.  
 
542 On Job and Paradise Regain’d, see Lewalski, Milton’s Brief Epic; see also Victoria Kahn, ‘Job’s 
Complaint in Paradise Regained’, in ELH, 76 (2009), 625-60. 
543 John Perrot, A Sea of the Seed’s Sufferings, Through which Runs A River of Rich Rejoycing (1661), p. 
1, cf. 34. 
544 Smith, Literature & Revolution, p. 225, see generally 225-30. 
545 Kristina J. Kesselring, ‘Gender, the Hat, and Quaker Universalism in the Wake of the English 
Revolution’, in The Seventeenth Century, 26/2 (2011), pp. 299-300, 307-10; cf., Nigel Smith, ‘Perrot, 
John (d. 1665), in ODNB (2004). 
546 H. Larry Ingle, First Among Friends: George Fox and the Creation of Quakerism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p. 199, see generally 197-206. 
547 Nigel Smith, ‘Exporting Enthusiasm: John Perrot and the Quaker Epic’, in Thomas Healy and 
Jonathan Sawday, eds., Literature and the English Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 253. 
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Perrot’s Seed’s Sufferings depicts the struggle of a Quaker who finds 
renewed faith in the internal manifestation of the word of God in a formally diverse 
collection of songs. The poem begins from the perspective of a man who perceives 
himself as a worm – ‘I Am a Worm poor and low’ – and who immediately observes the 
suffering of the seed: ‘So saith the Seed, grievous Oppressions long have bin / My 
weighty burthens’ (3). Having lamented the suffering of the seed, the worm experiences 
a theophany (10-19), which bears strong resemblance to that of the Job 38-41. In both 
Job and Seed’s Sufferings, God delivers a series of rhetorical questions that affirms his 
omnipotence. The difference with Perrot’s poem is that, in the second theophany, in 
which God appears ‘through the Clouds of Morning Dewes, in a clear serene Day of the 
early Spring’ (20), God promises to elevate the status of the worm by manifesting 
himself within the worm. Whereas Job is reminded of his low status as a man and 
accepts the authority of God, announcing ‘I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes’ 
(KJV 42:6), Perrot’s theophany exerts an elevating influence over the suffering worm. 
‘Lift up thine head,’ God commands the worm, ‘the DAY draws very nigh / In which 
this WORM I will exalt on high’, after which he requests that ‘thee wait in content and 
belief; / 
 
In th’Ark of the New-Testament abide, 
And in its secret desk, see that thou hide 
The written Rolls of Fire and pure Gold, 
Until the Word shall be, Thou maist unfold: 
The Sum of all thus seal’d up in thy breast, 
Lye down in Peace in the Lamb’s Endless Rest.  (22) 
 
The word of God, explicitly defined as the New Testament, in which the worm has 
initially taken succour, is to lie dormant in this man until the time when, in an 
apocalyptic sense, it can be revealed. Perrot blurs the boundary between flesh and 
textual word. The relationship between the interior manifestation of God and New 
Testament scripture, as the Word is materialised in flesh, recalls the disembodied figure 
of Truth in Areopagitica. The author in Areopagitica constitutes a bodily part of Truth 
through the act of composition; Perrot’s depiction of the Word materialises in the body 
of the worm.548 In Paradise Regain’d, by contrast, the Son is the embodied whole of 
 
548 For a discussion of embodiment and Truth, see Chapter 3 of this study, pp. 87-95; see also, Genelle C. 
Gertz-Robinson, ‘Still Martyred after All These Years: Generational Suffering in Milton’s Areopagitica, 
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Truth; he himself is responsible for bringing about the millennium. As such, the utopian 
qualities with which Milton depicts the Son distinguishes him from the worm in the 
Seed’s Sufferings. 
The utopianism of Paradise Regain’d is represented by the Son’s self-
control, which informs readings of immobility in the poem. In Book II of Paradise 
Regain’d, the Son identifies the qualities of an idealised king, who could rule over the 
people that he denounces in the final book of the poem. Having explained that ‘I reject / 
Riches and Realms’, the Son declares that, while the external appearance of a king is 
defined by ‘His Honour, Vertue, Merit and chief Praise, / That for the Publick all this 
weight he bears’,  
 
Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules 
Passions, Desires, and Fears, is more a King; 
Which every wise and vertuous man attains: 
And who attains not, ill aspires to rule 
Cities of men, or head-strong Multitudes, 
Subject himself to Anarchy within, 
Or lawless passions in him which he serves.   (ii. 457-58; 464-65; 466-72) 
 
The Son establishes a dichotomy between the worthy king, who rules internally, and the 
unfit king, who, like his people and as Milton articulated in The Tenure, is ‘govern’d to 
the inward vitious rule’ (CWJM vi. 151). Milton’s praise of Cromwell in Defensio 
Secunda reiterates support for self-rule: ‘he was a soldier well-versed in self-knowledge, 
and whatever enemy lay within – vain hopes, fears, desires – he had either previously 
destroyed within himself or had long since reduced to subjection. Commander first over 
himself, victor over himself, he had learned to achieve over himself the most effective 
triumph’ (CPW iv/2. 667-8).549 As Hammond observes, ‘the English republic had failed 
because the people, individually and collectively, failed in Milton’s estimation to master 
their own passions, desires and fears’.550 Milton had, in 1654, invested his faith in 
Cromwell after the people had failed to live up to his high expectations. The inadequacy 
 
in ELH, 70/4 (2003), pp. 976-8; and John R. Knott Jr., ‘“Suffering for Truths sake”: Milton and 
Martyrdom’, in Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics, pp. 153-70. 
549 For a discussion of Milton and Cromwell, see Chapter 5 of this study, pp. 147-50; on Milton’s support 
of Cromwell and the Protectorate, see Tobias Gregory, ‘Milton and Cromwell: Another Look at the 
Evidence’, in Journal of British Studies, 54 (2015), 44-62. 
550 Hammond, Milton and the People, p. 235. 
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of the people and the self-control exhibited by contemporary individuals like Cromwell 
helps to explain the focus on the individual that defines Paradise Regain’d. 
The Son’s stasis and immobility, through which he defeats Satan, is 
emblematic of both his self-control and of Milton’s animist view of matter. Hobbes 
articulated a determinist view of motion: ‘When a Body is once in motion, it moveth 
(unless something els hinder it) eternally’ (CETH iv. 26).551 In opposition to this view, 
Milton argues in De Doctrina Christiana that ‘all necessity must be removed from our 
freedom, nor even must the shadowy and external necessity based on immutability or 
prescience be admitted to the discussion. If any necessity remains, then as I said earlier 
it either determines free agents to a single course of action or else compels them against 
their will […]’ (CWJM viii/1. 61). The Son in Paradise Regain’d is not influenced by 
external forces of motion. Rather, as a self-active and free being, he is a paragon of 
internal control. References to the Son’s immobility steadily increase throughout the 
brief epic. The early reference to the Son’s ‘unalter’d brow’ (i. 493), initially indicating 
that he is unaffected by Satan’s temptations, which is mirrored by Mary’s general 
description of her son as ‘Private, unactive, calm, contemplative’ (ii. 81), becomes more 
specifically motional in the adjective ‘unmov’d’, used in both of the latter books to 
describe a response of the Son to Satan (iii. 386; iv. 109). It seems that, as Milton’s 
Jesus undergoes a process of realising his self-identification as the Son, his growing 
ability to use scripture with authority to defeat Satan coincides with a utopian self-
control. 
The emphasis on the Son’s stasis in Book IV is most clearly expressed by 
the epic narrator, who addresses the Son as he endures the nightmares Satan afflicts 
upon him: 
 
ill wast thou shrouded then, 
O patient Son of God, yet only stoodst  
Unshaken; not yet staid the terror there; 
Infernal Ghosts, and Hellish Furies, round 
Environ’d thee; some howl’d, some yell’d, some shriek’d, 
Some bent at thee thir fiery darts, while thou 
Sat’st unappall’d in calm and sinless peace.   (iv. 419-25) 
 
 
551 On Hobbes’s mechanism, see Scott, ‘The Rapture of Motion: James Harrington’s Republicanism’, in 
Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 139-63; cf. 
Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687), in which he articulates his first law 
of inertia. 
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The effort Milton invests into conveying the horrors that the Son has to endure further 
emphasises the contrasting stasis of the latter’s endurance. ‘Unshaken’ joins the 
negative adjectives that implicitly allude to how an average individual would respond to 
this experience. In the image, the Son is sat unmoving and at peace. Whereas Perrot’s 
seed and worm suffer and require immanent divine intervention in the form of the word, 
the Son is able to resist Satan’s horrors without fear or self-doubt. As Satan, frustrated 
and almost defeated, says to the Son the following day, 
 
And opportunity I here have had 
To try thee, sift thee, and confess have found thee 
Proof against all temptation as a rock 
Of Adamant, and as a Center, firm 
To the utmost of mere man both wise and good  (iv. 531-5) 
 
The Son’s unwavering will to resist epitomises his inner, utopian self-control. Satan’s 
astonishment illustrates the unique status of the Son as a perfect individual. While a 
contemporary Quaker may have more easily related to the speaker of Perrot’s epic, 
whose inner struggle and external persecution are eased by the inner light, the interiority 
of the Son’s resistance to Satan in Paradise Regain’d reflects the experience of 
contemporary Quakers. An individual, however elect, could not become Jesus, but if the 
Son is separate from God and became human, then just as Adam is promised that one 
day ‘with angels may participate’, the Son serves as an idealised model to which an 
individual may aspire. As Satan exhibits in Paradise Lost, aspiring to be the Son will 
result in eternal damnation; taking inspiration from the Son, however, was essential 
during the period of persecution that Milton and the Quakers were experiencing at the 
time. 
The interior focus of the Seed’s Sufferings complements the Son’s self-
control, then, but it is distinct from the utopianism that defines that self-control. In the 
Seed’s Sufferings, the speaker – likely the individual who, having once identified as a 
worm, has now been elevated by God – directly addresses the seed as capable of 
manifesting the light within. ‘Stand still,’ the speaker commands,  
 
I’ll touch a Stone and thou shalt know, 
That Waters in thee out of it shall flow; 
In Conscience there’s a secret LIGHT within, 
Which doth distinguish Truth from every sin.   (32) 
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There is a complex material relationship between external natural imagery and internal 
conscience and inner light in this passage: ‘Th’ Internal Knowledge of the virtuous 
Stone, / Out of which Waters pure of Life do gush’, from where ‘will his River run, and 
Flames ascend / Of heav’nly Vertue’. The speaker-as-worm announced earlier in the 
poem that ‘Yea, for thy sake my Bowels are a River, / Pour’d on the grounds, my Reins, 
my Heart, and Liver’ (7). Perrot’s correspondence with Benjamin Worsley (1618-73), 
who, in turn, sent a letter from Perrot to Hartlib himself, may help to explain the 
relationship that Perrot establishes between nature and knowledge in the poem.552 
Perrot, however, uses imagery of the natural world to convey the significance of 
conscience. ‘The depiction of moving bowels,’ Smith suggests, ‘which were associated 
with pity or tender feelings, becomes the most striking way of communicating the 
pressure on the conscience in response to suffering.’ The materiality of Perrot’s 
depiction of conscience encodes his own experiences of persecution as a Quaker. In 
Areopagitica, Milton envisioned a dismembered Truth that resonates with the fluid 
boundary between inner light and materiality that Perrot establishes in the Seed’s 
Sufferings.553 In Paradise Regain’d, Milton depicts an elect individual who internalises 
the utopian values he had once believed English society could realise. While the Son of 
Paradise Regain’d is distinct from the transformational speaker of Seed’s Sufferings, 
the interiority that Perrot depicts in his Quaker epic finds a parallel in the Son of 
Milton’s poem.  
The language used by Satan and the Son in the dialogue form of the poem 
reflects the contrast between the immovable, unshakeable figure of the Son and the 
futile and desperate attempts of Satan to break Milton’s elect hero. In Book IV, where 
the Son swiftly ends Satan’s attempts at temptation, the Son’s language is performative: 
his words act as the terminus of both the action and rhetoric of Satan’s temptation. After 
Satan has inflicted a night of terror on the Son, to which he ‘only stood’st / Unshaken’ 
(iv. 420-1), Satan explains to the Son, in long, elaborate verse, that the events of the 
night before bode ill for the future, a future that could have been avoided if the Son had 
allowed Satan to help him to ‘win thy destin’d seat’ (469). The Son, not stopping to 
listen to Satan, eliminates any appearance that Satan’s temptations have succeeded by 
his use of penetrating reason: he identifies Satan as the cause of the terrors, and 
 
552 Smith, Literature & Revolution, p. 226; Ibid., ‘John Perrot and the Quaker Epic’, p. 261; Worsley to 
Hartlib, undated, HP 26/28/4; Perrot to Worsley, 10 September 1657, HP 26/28/1A-2B. 
553 On the dissoluble boundary between author and text in early English Quakerism, see Smith, ‘John 
Perrot and the Quaker Epic’, pp. 248-50. 
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acknowledges that the purpose of the night terrors were ‘to terrifie / Mee to thy will; 
desist, thou art discern’d / And toil’st in vain, nor me in vain molest’ (496-8). The 
caesural semi-colon in the second line demarcates the Son’s response from the 
imperative ‘desist’. The transition from rational refutation to authoritative command is 
abrupt and final. Rather than responding to Satan with a speech of equal length, the Son 
terminates the dialogue. The Son uses language and syntax to resist temptation by 
ending the conversation with Satan.  
What follows is a Satan ‘swoln with rage’ (499), who, attempting to restart 
the dialogue, describes over 41 lines (499-540) how the Son is ‘Proof against all 
temptation as a rock / Of Adamant’ (533-4). The Son, significantly, says nothing in 
response to this and neither comments on nor acts against Satan as he takes him to the 
‘highest Pinacle’ of Jerusalem. By not engaging in dialogue with Satan, the Son does 
not permit the temptation to succeed. As has already been discussed, this final and 
shortest of Satan’s attempted temptations features a battle of scriptural interpretation in 
which the Son, as the proponent of truth, is victorious. Satan’s language is framed as an 
opposition between the immobile act of standing and the motion of falling: Satan jibes, 
‘There stand, if thou wilt stand; to stand upright / Will ask thee skill’ (iv. 551-1). The 
first part of this statement indicates the choice that the Son will make between standing 
or not; the latter suggests that Satan is aware that it will require effort – or the will of the 
Son’s self-control – to remain standing on this high point. The Son is succinct in his 
response to Satan: ‘To whom thus Jesus: Also it is written, / Tempt not the Lord thy 
God, he said and stood’ (iv. 560-1). The Son once again shuts down the dialogue 
between him and Satan using succinct, powerful, and performative language. After this 
simple acknowledgement by the unmoving Son, Satan, ‘smitten with amazement fell’ 
(iv. 562). Satan, becoming increasingly frustrated by his lack of success in tempting the 
Son, lacks the inner control that the Son embodies. The dialogue form of Paradise 
Regain’d brings attention to the differences between the Son and Satan: the authority 
and finality of the Son’s language, both as an accurate interpretation of scripture and as 
representative of his unmovable endurance in the face of temptation, contrasts with 
Satan’s elongated, misleading rhetoric. The Son subverts the dialogue form by resisting 
conversation with Satan, and in doing so resists Satan’s temptations. The Son’s stasis, in 
contrast to Satan’s fall, represents how he is the terminus of Satan’s tempting rhetoric. 
While the Son’s maintained stance at this high point illustrates his inner 
utopia, the scriptural words that he uses to defeat Satan are representative of the truth 
that both Milton and Perrot idealise. Where Milton idealises an elect individual, 
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however, truth for Perrot is a universalising agent. Following a familiar passage about 
bowels – ‘feel my Bowels, which like Rain distils, / And runs like Rivers down the 
steepest Hills’ – Perrot’s speaker employs universalising language to assert ‘So read me, 
You, We, One, through Life’s infusion, / In the first Principle, and last Conclusion’ (34). 
The speaker identifies with the text here, much as the inner light constitutes a material 
part of the speaker in the poem. Inner light here is framed, however, in multiple 
perspectives that unite as ‘One’. Unity – specifically Quaker unity – is brought about by 
the internalisation of the word in Seed’s Suffering. The Son’s inner utopia, by contrast, 
is an absolute ideal to which only the elect few can aspire. The inner utopia of the Son 
may bring about universal change in the form of the millennium, but it does not 
accommodate universal participation in that process, as the Quaker inner light does. The 
interior focus of Quakerism, therefore, may have facilitated the internalisation of 
Milton’s utopianism in the Son, but it did not draw him away from the latent elitism that 
had distinguished his writings for so many years. Whereas the inner light and 
immanence of the word in Seed’s Sufferings represents an interior proximity to God, the 
inner utopia in Paradise Regain’d is the means through which Milton believes the 
millennium, and thereby proximity to God, can be realised. 
Although the millennium itself is promised by the Son throughout Paradise 
Regain’d, he equally represents the ideal of Milton’s utopian millennium himself. 
Coffey insists that the militancy of Paradise Regain’d is found in the promise of a 
violent eschatological end of history.554 Christ’s everlasting millenarian kingdom is 
foreshadowed throughout the poem (i. 20, 241, 265; iii. 199, 351; iv. 151).555 Despite 
this prophesy, as Stella Revard observes, the millennium was increasingly viewed as a 
spiritual phenomenon in the Restoration period, rather than happening literally.556 By 
conquering Satan in Paradise Regain’d, the Son’s inner utopia of perfect, unwavering 
self-control realises Milton’s utopian millennium. As the cherubim sing at the end of the 
brief epic, 
 
now thou hast aveng’d 
Supplanted Adam, and by vanquishing 
Temptation, hast regain’d lost Paradise, 
And frustrated the conquest fraudulent: 
 
554 Coffey, ‘Pacifist, Quietist, or Patient Militant?’, pp. 163-4. 
555 See Barbara Lewalski, ‘Milton and the Millennium’, in Milton and the Ends of Time (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 22. 
556 Stella P. Revard, ‘Milton and millenarianism: from the Nativity Ode to Paradise Regain’d’, in Milton 
and the Ends of Time, pp. 56-7. 
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He never more henceforth will dare set foot 
In Paradise to tempt; his snares are broke: 
For though that seat of earthly bliss be fail’d, 
A fairer Paradise is founded now 
For Adam and his chosen Sons, whom thou 
A Saviour art come down to re-install.   (iv. 606-14) 
 
The paradise that the Son has regained is not externally manifest, like Eden, but rather, 
as Michael promised in Paradise Lost, it is the ‘paradise within’ (PL xii. 587) that 
Adam can attain by his constant obedience. In echo of the hierarchy of Paradise Lost, 
the Son has attained for Adam and his descendants a ‘fairer Paradise’; obedience, as in 
Paradise Lost, is the key to elevation. Adam’s ‘chosen Sons’ remind us of the elitism 
that invariably attends Milton’s millenarianism. The Son, however, has regained 
paradise ‘now’. It is not the product of the crucifixion, a role that only Christ can fulfil, 
but rather the defeat of falsehood by asserting scriptural truth. This is something that a 
seventeenth-century Protestant could achieve.  
Utopianism is internalised in Paradise Regain’d through the figure of the 
Son. While Perrot’s epic depicts the power of inner light in bringing about change in a 
suffering Quaker, for whom the scriptural word of God can manifest immanently, the 
inner light is a universalising ideal, which differs from the individualised ideal of the 
Son in Paradise Regain’d. This is in part because Perrot’s speaker is representative of 
the experience of persecuted Quakers in Restoration England; the Son of Paradise 
Regain’d, by contrast, is a figure to whom only elect individuals, such as Milton 
himself, could aspire. In Milton’s brief epic, the Son’s faithful few – Andrew, Simon 
and Mary – move from doubt (ii. 11-12) to questioning (39-40) and demand for action 
(47-48) to acceptance that they must wait (49-54). While Milton, with the English 
republic having failed and the monarchy restored, seems to acknowledge the value of 
patiently waiting for Christ’s second coming, the Son also represents a model of how 
the elect few could individually contribute to the realisation of end times. The collective 
responsibility of the community in Areopagitica is now embodied in the Son; the 
utopianism that Milton advocated in The Readie and Easie Way, is similarly internalised 
in the Son as an inner utopia. Just as The Readie and Easie Way is a model for pre-
Restoration England, the Son is a model for the post-Restoration elect individual. 
Indeed, Fallon has asserted that ‘Milton represented himself, to us and to himself, 
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through the Son’.557 While it is unlikely that Milton identified with the Son of God, the 
Son of Paradise Regain’d is situated between man and God along the continuum of the 
universal hierarchy that he depicted in Paradise Lost. The Son embodies Milton’s 
utopian millennium: his utopian qualities of immobility and self-control secure the 
millennium by defeating Satan. The role of Milton and the elect few in bringing about 





The liberty of conscience debate that surrounds Paradise Regain’d illuminates the 
poem’s distance from its epic precursor. Scriptural interpretation is at the climactic heart 
of the brief epic, which also accommodates Milton’s toleration of and engagement with 
the Quaker ideal of internalisation. While for Milton, authority will always remain with 
scripture, the emphasis still remains on individual interpretation. Milton’s entrenched 
elitism only facilitates this process: he imbues the Son with the ideal qualities that the 
people have persistently failed to exhibit for over thirty years. This process of 
internalisation brings clarity to Milton’s utopian millenarianism. The Son, through his 
utopian self-control, defeats Satan and secures the millennium. This is not the collective 
achievement of the community in Areopagitica or even the more controlled, 
systematised society of The Readie and Easie Way, but rather the individual victory of 
the Son. Paradise Regain’d provides an insight into the mind of the epic poet, 
disillusioned with his monarchical society, who has found in the Quakers a theological 
value of internalisation with which he can sympathise. As he invests his hopes in fewer 
and fewer individuals over his life, by 1671, near the end of his life, Milton may well 
have believed that one of the few individuals capable of meeting the Miltonic standard, 








557 Fallon, Milton’s Peculiar Grace, p. 238. 
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Conclusion: The Ends of Utopia 
 
Samson Agonistes, appended to the 1671 publication of Paradise Regain’d, offers an 
alternative Miltonic hero who nonetheless embodies the mature utopian millenarianism 
in the brief epic. Milton’s dramatic poem conveys a fallen Samson, who is far removed 
from the perfection of the Son in Paradise Regain’d. Samson has remained a divisive 
text for critics: some have argued for an intentional contrast between Samson and the 
Son of Paradise Regain’d; others have argued that the dramatic poem valorises, in John 
Coffey’s words, ‘the destruction of the Stuart monarchy and Anglican persecution that 
the defenders of the Good Old Cause continued to seek after 1660.’558 In contrast to 
Blair Worden’s suggestion for a more quietist Milton in the Restoration period, more 
recent criticism has characterised a Milton who endorsed the godly violence of Samson, 
even comparing it to terrorism.559 Richard Serjeantson, moreover, has shown how 
Samson’s violence was widely endorsed by radical Protestants in the Restoration 
period.560 Chapter 8 showed how the Jesus of Paradise Regain’d embodies Milton’s 
ideal of the utopian millennium. While Samson Agonistes is a markedly different text to 
Paradise Regain’d, it nevertheless espouses the political and theological values that this 
study has identified in Milton’s prose works, which anticipated and defined the 
representation of the utopian millennium in Milton’s epic poetry. Laura Lunger 
Knoppers, the most recent editor of the 1671 poems, acknowledges that ‘the violent 
action of Samson Agonistes seems to contrast with the restrained piety and refusal to act 
in Paradise Regain’d,’ but argues that ‘both poems focus on inner faith (whether 
maintained or regained), and individual endurance under persecution’.561  
 
558 On Milton not endorsing Samson as a hero, see Derek N. C. Wood, Exiled from Light: Divine Law, 
Morality, and Violence in Milton’s Samson Agonistes (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); 
Joseph Anthony Wittreich, Interpreting Samson Agonistes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); 
and Coffey, ‘Pacifist, Quietist, or Patient Militant?’, in Milton Studies, 42 (2002), p. 168. 
559 Blair Worden, ‘Milton’s Republicanism and the Tyranny of Heaven’, in Gisela Bock, Quentin 
Skinner, Maurizio, eds., Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
pp. 224-45; on violence in Samson, see Tobias Gregory, ‘The Political Messages of Samson Agonistes’, 
in Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, 50/1 (2010), pp. 175-203; Jennifer Lodine-Chaffey, ‘John 
Milton’s Samson Agonistes: Deathly Selfhood’, in Parergon, 36/1 (2019), 155-77; and Dennis Kezar, 
‘Samson’s Death by Theatre and Milton’s Art of Dying’, in ELH, 66/2 (1999), 295-336; on Milton and 
terrorism, see John Carey, ‘A Work in Praise of Terrorism? September 11 and Samson Agonistes’, in 
Times Literary Supplement, 6 September 2002, pp. 15-16. 
560 R. W. Serjeantson, ‘Samson Agonistes and “Single Rebellion”’, in Oxford Handbook of Milton, 613-
31. 
561 Knoppers, CWJM ii. lvii. 
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It is precisely these qualities of the 1671 poems that bring into greater relief 
Margaret Cavendish’s (1623-73) royalist, intolerant utopia, A Description of a New 
World, Called The Blazing World (1666). Born into a royalist family in Essex, 
Cavendish accompanied Charles I’s wife, Henrietta Maria (1609-69) to Paris in 1644, 
where she met William Cavendish (1593-1676), who would become Duke of Newcastle 
in 1665, after the couple’s return to England in the early Restoration period. Newcastle 
served as patron to Hobbes, which identifies Margaret Cavendish’s proximity to the 
man and his philosophy, even if Hobbes does not seem to have directly engaged with 
her in person.562 Cavendish’s utopia, therefore, exhibits a relationship between 
Restoration royalism and utopianism – both Baconian and Morean – that marks a 
significant counterpoint to Milton, the ex-republican statesman, whose utopianism, as 
Chapter 8 showed, became interiorised in Paradise Regain’d. John Rogers has argued 
that the animist monism of both Milton and Cavendish, alongside their mutual interest 
in the scientific debates of the time, suggest a valuable common ground between the 
two writers.563 Where this study has observed Milton’s early utopianism in the context 
of his proximity to the Hartlib circle, Cavendish envisions a Baconian academy in 
Blazing World that reflects her own proximity to the Royal Society.564 Where Milton 
employed the utopian republicanism of The Readie and Easie Way at a time when the 
English commonwealth had failed and the Restoration was inevitable, the Duchess 
assures the Empress in Blazing World that a monolithic, monotheistic state was superior 
to the changes that the Empress had implemented when she first arrived. Cavendish, 
keen to rebuild the Newcastle estate along with her husband following the Interregnum, 
offers a stark contrast to the internalised utopianism of the ex-statesman and still-
expectant millenarian, Milton. 
This thesis has argued that Milton’s millenarianism fostered his engagement 
with and articulation of various forms of seventeenth-century utopianism. Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 identified Milton’s involvement with the Hartlib circle as a reflection of the 
 
562 On Hobbes and Newcastle, see Lisa T. Sarasohn, ‘Thomas Hobbes and the Duke of Newcastle: A 
Study in the Mutuality of Patronage before the Establishment of the Royal Society’, in Isis, 90 (1999), 
715-37; on Hobbes and Cavendish, see Niall Allsopp, Poetry and Sovereignty in the English Revolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 83-99; Lisa T. Sarasohn, Natural Philosophy of Margaret 
Cavendish: Reason and Fancy During the Scientific Revolution (Maryland: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2010), pp. 113-22; and Sarah Hutton, ‘In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes: Margaret Cavendish’s 
Natural Philosophy’, Women’s Writing, 4 (1997), 421-32.  
563 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, pp. 180-1. 
564 Bethany Williamson suggests that Cavendish satirises the Royal Society in Blazing World, in 
‘Margaret Cavendish, the Royal Society, and the Alchemy of the Arabian Sands’, in Journal for Early 
Modern Cultural Studies, 17/1 (2017), 120-46. 
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Baconian utopianism of Of Education and Areopagitica. Chapter 5 acknowledged how 
Milton’s ideological divergence from Nedham during the 1650s anticipated his more 
direct engagement with the stringent, Morean form of utopianism manifest in The 
Readie and Easie Way, which was discussed in Chapter 6. In Paradise Regain’d, the 
millennium is secured by the utopianism immanent in the Son, the embodiment of 
unwavering constancy that Milton had failed to find in the English people throughout 
his polemical and republican career. Karen Edwards suggests that Samson’s melancholy 
represents the condition of waiting: Samson is one of ‘those born afterward who wait, in 
darkness, for Judgment, for apocalypse, for the coming of the Lamb. His melancholy is 
crucial to this representational strategy.’565 In contrast to Edwards, as this study has 
argued, while some individuals may have been content with patiently awaiting the 
apocalypse, many seventeenth-century millenarians sought ways to realise or at least 
prepare society for the second coming. For Milton, as with other political philosophers, 
such as Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington, utopianism became a means to achieve 
this eschatological end. The Son of Paradise Regain’d represented a model of idealised 
self-control, astute scriptural interpretation and constancy to which individuals like 
Milton could aspire. In his ‘Afterword’ to Milton and the Ends of Time, David 
Loewenstein argues that Milton intended the 1671 poems to serve as ‘a double-edged 
response to the crisis of the Restoration. The vision of spectacular apocalyptic 
destruction in Samson Agonistes is juxtaposed with the millenarian vision offered in 
Paradise Regained.’566 Discussing end-times in De Doctrina Christiana, Milton asserts 
‘from the beginning, I say, of his judgement until its end, and for some time after its 
end, it appears that that so often promised glorious kingdom of Christ with his saints 
will come into being on earth’, after which he lists a number of scriptural references to 
support this claim: ‘But that that kingdom will be on earth, how very many passages 
show!’ (CPJM viii. 883-7). Samson is neither passive nor exclusively apocalyptic in 
Milton’s dramatic poem. Samson is, however, more immediately relatable to Milton 
than the Son of God. The characteristic components of Milton’s millenarianism are 
manifest in Samson: utopianism; toleration; and elitism. As we shall see, Samson acts as 
an elect individual in obedience to God, in exercise of his religious liberty, having 
realised inner, utopian self-control. 
 
565 Karen Edwards, ‘Inspiration and Melancholy in Samson Agonistes’, in Milton and the Ends of Time 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 236. 
566 David Loewenstein, ‘Afterword: “The time is come”’, in Milton and the Ends of Time, p. 247. 
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Slavery and its relation to liberty – particularly as a contrast between 
negative liberty and Milton’s conception of religious liberty – in Samson invites 
comparison with both Hobbes and Cavendish. In keeping with the tragic framework of 
the drama, the theory of which Milton articulates in the preface of the text, Milton 
presents a fallen Samson in ‘servile toyl’, where the condition of incarceration defines 
Samson’s experience: ‘Daily in the common Prison else enjoyn’d me, / Where I a 
Prisoner chain’d, scarce freely draw / The air imprison’d also, close and damp’ (5-7). 
The Chorus identifies Samson’s blindness as compounding the experience of 
imprisonment: 
 
Which shall I first bewail, 
Thy Bondage or lost Sight, 
Prison within Prison 
Inseparably dark? 
Thou art become (O worst imprisonment!) 
The Dungeon of thy Self […]    (151-6) 
 
Imprisonment is both a physical reality and an internal condition for Samson. As the 
Chorus goes on to express, ‘inward light alas / Puts forth no visual beam’ (162-3). Read 
in the Quaker terms of Paradise Regain’d, Samson possesses an inner light that remains 
trapped within himself. As Martin Dzelzainis argues, ‘Samson’s physical enslavement, 
however much insisted upon, actually functions as a metaphor for his true, inner 
slavery.’ In line with his identification of slavery as a condition of both royalism and 
Catholicism, Milton, drawing on the negative conception of liberty from classical 
Rome, depicts Samson as a slave to himself, to his hubristic heroism and vainglory, 
which leads to the peripeteia of confiding the secret of his strength to Dalila: ‘The base 
degree to which I am fall’n, / These rags, this grinding, is not yet so base / As was my 
former servitude, ignoble’ (414-16).567 The concept of inner slavery aligns with 
Milton’s criticism in the Tenure of those who are ‘slaves within doors’, governed by the 
‘inward vitious rule’ (CWJM vi. 151). Chapter 6, moreover, discussed Milton’s 
perception of religious liberty in contrast to the negative liberty of Hobbes and 
Harrington. While the thought of Hobbes and Harrington cohered with utopianism, 
 
567 Martin Dzelzainis, ‘“In the Power of Others, Never in My Own”: The Meaning of Slavery in Samson 
Agonistes’, in Milton and the Long Restoration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 294-300; on 
neo-Roman liberty as distinct from slavery, see Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, pp. 82-4; and 
Skinner, ‘Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power’, in Cécile Laborde and John Maynor, eds., 
Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 85-6. 
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Milton’s religious liberty – a freedom to serve God – provided an essential freedom to 
the Christian individual, particularly in terms of liberty of conscience. As we shall see, 
Samson’s condition of incarceration and the manner in which he is able to attain the 
freedom to serve God appears as a direct refutation of Hobbes’s theory of liberty.  
The animist materialism of Cavendish’s Blazing World distinguishes her 
from Hobbes and identifies a common ground with Milton. In Leviathan, Hobbes 
expressed that ‘LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of 
Opposition’. As Cavendish insists in her Philosophical Letters (1664), with an 
awareness of Hobbes’s mechanist philosophy, ‘Motion is not the cause of Matter, but 
Matter is the cause of Motion, for Matter might subsist without Motion, but not Motion 
without Matter, onely there could be no perception without Motion, nor no Variety, if 
Matter were not self-moving […]’.568 Sarasohn suggests that Cavendish’s ‘all-
encompassing internalized freedom of self-movement results in a continuum of 
spirituality or soul from the smallest piece of matter to the rational soul of man.’569 
Bacon’s natural philosophy included a belief in immaterial spirits inhabiting matter.570 
In Blazing World, therefore, the world Cavendish envisages draws and develops from 
Bacon’s theory of matter and spirit, which Chapter 3 compared to Areopagitica. The 
‘young Lady’ at the beginning of the text, having been captured by a sailor, ultimately 
arrives at the fantastical, immaterial realm of the Blazing World following a storm, 
where she is soon appointed Empress. It is here that she has discussions with the 
animalistic spirits of the Blazing World that mark the empirical focus of the text, from 
which she concludes that ‘this living, self-moving body gives a spirit motion, and not 
that the spirit gives the body, as its vehicle, motion.’571 As Sarah Hutton suggests, the 
materialistic quality of Cavendish’s vitalism suggests her familiarity with Hobbes’s 
ideas as much as her criticism of his philosophy suggests distance and disagreement.572 
Rogers explains that Cavendish’s resistance to Hobbesian mechanism took on a 
gendered form: ‘Mechanism provided masculine dominance with a powerful 
organizational sanction, and I suspect that it was precisely the untenable nature of such 
 
568 Cavendish, Philosophical Letters: Or, Modest Reflections Upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy 
(1664), p. 22. 
569 Sarasohn, Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish, p. 122. 
570 On Bacon’s animist materialism, see Graham Rees, OFB vi. liv-lxiv; and Rees, ‘Matter Theory: A 
Unifying Factor in Bacon’s Natural Philosophy?’, in AMBIX, 24/2 (1977), pp. 110-125. 
571 Margaret Cavendish, The Description of a New World, Called The Blazing World (1666), in Kate 
Lilley, ed., Margaret Cavendish: The Blazing World and Other Writings (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 
133-62, 169; further references will be made parenthetically in the running text. 
572 Hutton, ‘In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes’, p. 422. 
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conclusion that impelled Cavendish to distance herself from the mechanical explanation 
of natural change and the negative conception of liberty it seemed logically to imply.’573 
Cavendish’s natural philosophy rejects Hobbesian mechanism in favour of a quasi-
Baconian theory of spirit and matter. This, in turn, enables Cavendish to depict in 
Blazing World a means of state-modelling that sheds the limitations of a female 
intellectual of the seventeenth-century.  
In a representation of state-modelling, after the soul of the Duchess of 
Newcastle – a fictionalised Margaret Cavendish – has joined the Empress in the Blazing 
World, she and the Empress enquire about other, undiscovered immaterial worlds. 
State-modelling itself is precisely the kind of idealistic utopianism that Milton opposed 
in Areopagitica – ‘To sequester out of the world into Atlantick and Eutopian polities, 
which never can be drawn into use’ (CPW ii. 526) – and which Nedham satirised in his 
‘letters of Utopia’, as discussed in Chapter 5. The spirits of the Blazing World, 
explaining that these other worlds are populated and should not be conquered, suggest 
that ‘every human creature can create an immaterial world fully inhabited by immaterial 
creatures, and populous of immaterial subjects, such as we are, and all this within the 
compass of the head or scull’ (185). The Duchess at one stage attempts to make a world 
‘according to Hobbes’ opinion; but when all the parts of this imaginary world came to 
press and drive each other, they seemed like a company of wolves that worry sheep, or 
like so many dogs that hunt after hares […]’. The animalistic depiction of a Hobbesian 
world is likely in reference to the chaotic natural state of man that Hobbes theorises, 
from which the process of authorisation and covenanting brings about security and 
order.574 By contrast, the world that the Duchess mentally creates ‘was composed of 
sensitive and rational self-moving matter; indeed, it was composed only of the rational, 
which is the subtlest and purest degree of matter’ (188).575  
While Milton’s mature philosophy shares Cavendish’s animist materialism, 
the liberty that he depicts in Samson Agonistes is distinctively religious and 
characteristic of the conception of liberty that this study has identified in earlier works. 
Despite Samson’s physical imprisonment, his liberty is dependent on his internal 
condition. Rather than determined by external forces of motion, as it is for Hobbes, 
liberty is immanent for Milton. Indeed, Hobbes explicitly refers to incarceration in his 
expression of freedom in Leviathan: 
 
573 Rogers, Matter of Revolution, p. 188. 
574 See Hobbes, Leviathan, in CETH iv. 188-96, cf. 48. 
575 Cf. Hutton, ‘In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes’, pp. 425-6. 
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For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space 
is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. 
And so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; 
and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, […] they are not at Liberty, to move in 
such manner, as without those externall impediments they would (CETH iv. 324). 
 
Rather than depicting this form of liberty, Milton takes the emphasis away from 
external impediment and focuses it on the internal realisation of liberty. Milton’s 
internal liberty is represented in the dramatic poem as Samson’s gradual acceptance of 
responsibility, which forms the anagnorisis of the drama.576 Having blamed the leaders 
of Israel for not accepting and acting on his heroic actions (241-76), when Manoa 
arrives, Samson’s tone changes, as he requests his father to attribute responsibility for 
his condition to him, rather than Heaven: 
 
Appoint not heavenly disposition, Father, 
Nothing of these evils hath befall’n me 
But justly; I my self have brought them on, 
Sole Author I, sole cause […]    (373-6) 
 
Rogers illustrates Milton’s focus on the individual in Samson by identifying the 
Socinian parameters of the dramatic poem. Socinianism, which was a form of 
seventeenth-century anti-trinitarianism, ‘provided the earliest and most coherent 
theological foundation for that new sense of the person we call liberal individualism.’ 
‘Socinus’s dismantling of the Trinity’, Rogers argues, ‘provided Milton with his best 
model, in the De Doctrina, for the incorporation of the liberal principles of 
individualism and free will into the very foundation of his religion.’ In Chapter 8, 
Milton’s anti-trinitarianism helped to explain how the Son of God could be perceived as 
an aspirational ideal. The anti-Calvinist and Socinian depiction of Samson helps to 
place the locus of agency and responsibility on the individual.577 Milton’s conception of 
 
576 On Samson’s self-perception, see Jennifer Lodine-Chaffey, ‘John Milton’s Samson Agonistes: Deathly 
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liberty in Samson, like Cavendish’s, is distinct from the negative liberty that defined 
Hobbes’s philosophy. 
Samson’s assertion of his status as an individual coincides with the implicit 
tolerationism encoded in his experience as a prisoner. Chapter 3 showed how Milton’s 
defence of liberty of conscience and toleration was formed by the belief that a private 
individual should be able to contribute to public good. Sergeantson argues that the 
emphasis on Samson as a private individual, both in the rebellious violence that 
precedes the poem and in the righteous violence with which the poem climaxes, is 
shared by contemporary interpretations of Samson.578 Whereas the collection of private 
individuals in Milton’s studious London collectively contribute to a public, millenarian 
good in Areopagitica, Milton’s identification of those who could fulfil the role of these 
private individuals narrowed in scope over the next decade, particularly, as Chapter 4 
has shown, following his employment by the nascent English republic in 1649. Whereas 
the Son in Paradise Regain’d is an idealised, constant hero, his perfection is 
necessitated by his divine status; in Samson, the fallen hero is afflicted and persecuted 
in such a way that, during his physical incarceration, he is unable to contribute to the 
public good of Israel.  
Sharon Achinstein argues that Samson reflects the ‘persecuting conditions 
of Restoration Anglicanism’, and particularly Milton’s proximity to contemporary 
dissent. Paradise Regain’d also, as Chapter 8 showed, exhibits Milton’s proximity to 
contemporary sectarianism in the form of the Quakers. Achinstein identifies the request 
made by the Philistine officials for Samson to perform for them at the feast of Dagon as 
a significant moment where ‘Samson is pressed to perform for the state an action we 
know offends his conscience’: ‘Thou knowst I am an Ebrew, therefore tell them, / Our 
Law forbids at thir Religious Rites / My presence; for that cause I cannot come’ (1319-
21).579 Samson subsequently repeats ‘I will not come’ (1342), asserting his internal 
freedom over his external slavery: 
 
My self? my conscience and internal peace. 
Can they think me so broken, so debas’d 
With corporal servitude, that my mind ever 
Will condescend to such absurd commands?   (1334-7) 
 
 
578 Serjeantson, ‘Samson Agonistes and “Single Rebellion”’, pp. 621-6. 
579 Sharon Achinstein, ‘Samson Agonistes and the Drama of Dissent’, in Milton Studies, 33 (1996), pp. 
143-9. 
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This leads Samson to make his most significant declaration of internal liberty, in a final 
refutation of Hobbesian negative liberty: 
 
Where outward force constrains, the sentence holds 
But who constrains me to the Temple of Dagon, 
Not dragging? the Philistian Lords command. 
Commands are not constraints. If I obey them, 
I do it freely […]      (1369-73) 
 
Andrew McKendry, in his discussion of toleration in relation to Samson’s blindness, 
argues that Samson’s earlier declaration that he ‘cannot come’ (1321), when the officer 
arrives to remove him from his cell, is representative of Hobbes’s view of liberty, 
‘however ironically charged and perhaps erroneous’.580 Samson’s rejection of 
Philistinian commands contradicts McKendry’s argument. At this late stage in the 
dramatic poem, Samson is distant from the fallen figure who bewailed his physical and 
psychological imprisonment. Samson’s language expresses his willingness to serve God 
once again and fulfil his divine purpose, in exercise of his religious liberty. This liberty 
enables Samson as a private individual to contribute to the public good of Israel. 
Samson not only encodes the struggles of persecuted nonconformists, but he also 
represents an assertion of individual liberty – specifically the liberty to serve God – that 
accords with Milton’s tolerationist philosophy. For such nonconformists as Milton, who 
had suffered in the Restoration period, the example of Samson was a model of 
endurance in a more distinctly human form than that of the Son in Paradise Regain’d. 
Cavendish’s royalist utopia is comparatively intolerant in its monotheistic 
policy. Corrine Harol argues that ‘in The Blazing World the literary imagination, as a 
world-creating faculty that shares attributes with politics and science, necessitates an 
engagement with questions about toleration – and the state-sanctioned violence that 
toleration seeks to manage.’581 Having engaged with a lengthy discussion of natural 
philosophy, the Empress of the Blazing World turns to the task of converting her utopia 
to ‘divine truth’ (163). Rather than implementing a state religion, she establishes two 
chapels: one where she ‘preached sermons of terror to the wicked, and told them of the 
punishments for their sins’ and the other where ‘she preached sermons of comfort to 
 
580 Andrew McKendry, ‘Blind or Blindfolded? Disability, Religious Difference, and Milton’s Samson 
Agonistes’, in Alison Conway, David Alvarez, eds., Imagining Religious Toleration: A Literary History 
of an Idea, 1600-1830 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019), p. 76. 
581 Corrine Harol, ‘Imagining Worlds and Figuring Toleration: Freedom, Diversity, and Violence in A 
Description of a New World, Called The Blazing World’, in Imagining Religious Toleration, pp. 97-8. 
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those that repented of their sins, and were troubled at their own wickedness’ (164). 
While the chapels serve as a form of state apparatus, Cavendish is insistent that the 
animalistic inhabitants of the Blazing World choose to convert by their own 
consciences: 
 
And thus the Empress, by art, and her own ingenuity, did not only convert the Blazing World to 
her own religion, but kept them in a constant belief, without enforcement or blood-shed; for she 
knew well, that belief was a thing not to be forced or pressed upon the people, but to be instilled 
into their minds by gentle persuasions […] (164). 
 
The Empress’s tolerationist policy, however, is disbanded at the Duchess’s suggestion. 
At the end of the first part of Blazing World, the Empress explains to the Duchess that 
‘there are such contentions and divisions between the worm-, bear- and fly-men, the 
ape-men, the satyrs, the spider-men, and all others of such sorts’, and so asks ‘how I 
may order it to the best advantage, that this world may be rendered peaceable, quiet and 
happy, as it was before’ (201).  
The Duchess’s proposed changes transition the Blazing World to the 
stringent utopianism that this study has traced in the seventeenth-century. The Duchess 
explains that the Blazing World should ‘have but one sovereign, one religion, one law, 
and one language, so that all the world might be but as one united family’, and this 
extends to a restriction of the various animalistic factions of the utopia. Where the 
Empress had permitted the bear men to use telescopes within their own society, 
enjoying a freedom comparable to that of Salomon’s House in New Atlantis (140-2), the 
Duchess advises the Empress to dissolve the animal societies, ‘for ‘tis better to be 
without their intelligences, than to have an unquiet and disorderly government’ (202). In 
his ‘letters from Utopia’, as discussed in Chapter 5, Nedham satirically envisioned 
political changes in Utopia that reflected the contemporary political landscape of the 
Protectorate in 1657; in Blazing World, Cavendish’s Empress transforms the Blazing 
World into a politically and religiously tolerant society that fails, and reverts to a 
regulated, monolithic and politically conservative utopia. Rachel Trubowitz is 
perceptive in identifying an absence of Cavendish from such studies as J. C. Davis’s 
Utopia and the Ideal Society. Indeed, Davis does not include any women writers in his 
analysis of utopianism. However, Trubowitz argues that Cavendish offers a revision of 
the intolerant, utopian society that Davis characterises in his book: ‘Unlike other 
utopias, including or especially those contemporaneous with it, Cavendish’s ideal world 
does not domesticate human and physical nature into a rationalized cultural grid that can 
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be easily managed and patrolled.’582 The passages quoted above suggest the opposite. 
Cavendish’s utopia epitomises the form of utopianism that Davis defines. State control 
resolves any problems borne out of the diversity of opinions permitted in the Empress’s 
initial tolerationist policy.583 The matter of religious toleration, therefore, distances 
Cavendish from Milton. Milton, a decade into the Restoration, suffused his literary 
works with his experience of persecution and intolerance. Cavendish, by contrast, 
returning to England in 1660 after over fifteen years exiled abroad, necessarily 
supported the actions of the crown that prevented a return to republicanism and the 
toleration that was safeguarded by the Cromwellian Protectorate. The context of the 
Restoration further illustrates why Milton internalised his utopianism in his 1671 
poems: whereas republicanism in the 1650s was compatible with utopianism, Milton’s 
experiences in Restoration England were not.  
If Samson depicts Milton’s experience of persecution, then the final 
climactic lines of the dramatic poem represent a conclusive assertion of religious 
freedom in servitude to God. Rather than an act of terrorism, Milton depicts the 
destructive ending of Samson as an act of liberation. Where the Son is depicted in 
violent glory in Paradise Lost and inactive constancy in Paradise Regain’d, Samson at 
the end of the dramatic poem exhibits both utopian self-control and aggressive 
retribution. Stephen Fallon identifies Milton’s self-representation in the figure of 
Samson, just as he does in the figure of the Son of Paradise Regain’d, but specifically 
in terms of ‘the freedom of even those especially chosen by God to fall.’584 While 
Samson falls, in keeping with the tragic framework of the drama, he also undergoes a 
process of self-realisation, from which he finally exercises religious liberty. The 
distinction that Fallon identifies, therefore, indicates a similarity between the two 1671 
poems: in both texts, utopian self-control realises the will of God. Before Samson 
asserts his distance from the commands of Philistine officials, the Chorus, having 
praised Samson’s heroic glory, asserts  
 
But patience is more oft the exercise 
Of Saints, the trial of thir fortitude, 
Making them each his own Deliverer, 
And Victor over all 
 
582 Rachel Trubowitz, ‘The Reenchantment of Utopia and the Female Monarchical Self: Margaret 
Cavendish’s Blazing World’, in Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature, 11/2 (1992), p. 230; see Davis, 
Utopia and the Ideal Society, pp. 36-8. 
583 For a discussion of the revised intolerant philosophy, see Harol, ‘Imagining Worlds’, p. 111. 
584 Fallon, Milton’s Peculiar Grace, p. 250, see generally 250-63. 
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That tyrannie or fortune can inflict    (1287-91) 
 
This follows Samson’s heroic defiance against Haraptha – ‘bring up thy van, / My heels 
are fetter’d, but my fist is free’ (1234-5) – and anticipates his assertion of free 
conscience. Samson’s decision to follow the messenger is the consequence of his 
feeling ‘Some rousing motions’ (1382), which suggests that it accords with his 
conscience: ‘Nothing to do, be sure, that may dishonour / Our Law, or stain my vow of 
Nazarite’ (1385-6). When Samson is led to the two ‘massie Pillars’ (1623) that he 
ultimately pulls down, the messenger describes him as ‘with head a while enclin’d, / 
And eyes fast fixt he stood, as one who pray’d, / Or some great matter in his mind 
revolv’d’ (1626-8). Samson’s stasis and self-reflection, particularly in contrast to the 
burst of activity that brings down the temple on the Philistines, is a valuable mirror of 
the Son in Paradise Regain’d. Samson realises an inner utopia in order to bring about 
divine retribution on the Philistines. Rather than sanctioning violence against 
persecutors, as Gregory suggests, Milton celebrates action brought about by utopian 
self-control that attends the realisation of Christian liberty as he saw it.585 Violence is 
secondary in Samson: the dramatic action is the product of obeying the will of God. In 
comparison with Paradise Regain’d, Samson’s inner utopia encourages millenarian 
readings of the dramatic poem. The millennium may not be possible in the Hebrew 
context of Samson – as it is guaranteed by the figure of the Son in Paradise Regain’d – 
but Samson’s final act exemplifies how a persecuted individual like Milton can fulfil the 
will of God. Samson’s utopian self-control and liberty of conscience realises the will of 
God in just the same way that elect individuals in Restoration England, by maintaining 
their religious freedom in spite of persecution and maintaining self-control, could 
anticipate the millennium. 
Cavendish’s Blazing World offers a valuable contrast to Milton’s 
utopianism that further illustrates the political and theological ideas that this study has 
discussed. In her Epilogue, Cavendish suggests that ‘if any would like the world I have 
made, and be willing to be my subjects, they may imagine themselves such, and they 
are such, I mean, in their minds, fancies or imaginations; but if they cannot endure to be 
subjects, they may create worlds of their own, and govern themselves as they please 
[…]’ (224-5). Milton never endorsed this fictional state-building. His utopianism, while 
initially characterised as Baconian, takes on a republican and Morean quality in the 
1650s, and, in the context of 1671, retreats internally, in response to his experience of 
 
585 See Gregory, ‘Political Messages’, pp. 199-200. 
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Restoration intolerance. For Cavendish, a female intellectual who lacked recognition 
from contemporary intellectuals, such as possibly by Hobbes himself, the fictional 
artifice of utopianism enabled her to both assert her form of natural philosophy and 
realise her ‘ambition […] not only to be Empress, but Authoress of a whole world’ 
(224).586 For Milton, utopianism was a means to achieve the millennium. Where the 
intellectual progress of Baconian natural philosophy intended to bring about a return to 
prelapsarian dominion of nature, the utopian totality – of rigid, state control – became 
Milton’s recommendation for steering the failed English republic away from the 
wavering inconstancy of the English people in 1659. It is the perfect standard of the 
millennium that feeds Milton’s elitism throughout his life. Whereas the people in 
Areopagitica contribute to a public good, by late 1649 Milton’s criteria for the upright 
private individual had narrowed; by 1671, it would be characterised by elect heroes, 
capable of realising inner utopian self-control. Milton’s utopian millennium sought to 
emulate divine perfection on earth. He never lost sight of the eschatological end point, 
but his utopianism adapted to the substantial political transformations of the mid-
seventeenth-century. Milton’s millennium ultimately merges with his utopia in the form 


















586 Sarasohn suggests that Hobbes may never have engaged with Cavendish in person, in Natural 
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